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Abstract
In the run-up to European Monetary Union (EMU), Italy put in place an extraordinary 
fiscal adjustment, whereas Germany encountered serious difficulties that go beyond the 
re-unification shock. "WaF-of-attrition" models are employed to explain this puzzle. It is 
argued that Italy's high debt burden and soft currency regime from 1992 to 1996 turned 
out as an opportunity. The prospect of EMU membership opened up room for market- 
induced credibility gains. By allowing a sensible reduction of interest payments, the 
high-debt GDP ratio de facto reduced the scope for welfare retrenchment, thus 
minimising conflicts between socio-economic groups over the distribution of the fiscal 
adjustment burden. At the same time, social concertation offered a locus of conflict 
resolution. Social partners’ fiscal preferences stemmed from an evaluation of the 
distributional impact of deficit reduction and of trade-offs in other policy areas, e.g. 
exchange rate policy. Thanks to Italy's soft-currency regime, domestic business agreed 
to unions' demands for a tax-imposed fiscal consolidation as the devalued Lira allowed 
them to maintain a competitive edge. The opposite is true for Germany, where the low 
debt burden and hard currency regime functioned, paradoxically, as straightjackets. With 
a low debt level, deficit reduction had to come from real government activities, either on 
the revenue or on the expenditure-side. Also, the appreciated Deutschmark did not offer 
an alternative "pressure valve" to Germany's export-oriented business. The failure of the 
1996 social pact is understood against this background. This thesis sheds light on the 
political economy of EMU-induced fiscal adjustment as well as on the determinants of 
social concertation in the EU. In this respect, it contributes simultaneously to two strands 
of literature: the now flourishing research agenda on fiscal policy in EMU -of which it 
rejects the strong institutionalist flavour, and the equally recent revival of corporatist 
studies since the 1990s.
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CHAPTER I
Empirical Puzzle, 
Definitions, and Case 
Studies
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1. Challenges to EU Fiscal Coordination
This dissertation is a study of how European candidates for the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) dealt with the challenge of fiscal consolidation in the 
period 1991-98. It focuses on two case studies, Germany and Italy, whose 
experiences with budgetary adjustment contradicted any rational expectation. 
This analysis offers a contribution both to the literature on the political economy 
of fiscal consolidation and to recent studies on the re-emergence of neo­
corporatism under austerity. I believe that the exercise of fiscal adjustment, just 
like the preservation of discipline thereafter, is strongly dependent upon the 
socio-economic environment in which it takes place. Any evaluation of austerity 
needs to take account of domestic factors, and of national socio-economic 
preferences and interests before everything else1.
I argue that Italy’s macroeconomic adjustment in the run-up to EMU benefited 
from a large social consensus in favour of fiscal discipline and, above all, of the 
way to achieve it, as also exemplified in the successful signing of a series of 
social pacts (1992; 1993; 1996). Converging societal preferences created an 
environment in which successive governments could pursue budgetary 
consolidation in spite of the presence of various real as well as potential 
institutional constraints (e.g. short-time horizons, political polarization, 
inefficient budget institutions, etc.). On the other hand, Germany’s fiscal 
consolidation was constrained by weak social consensus -the responsibility for 
this clearly lies also in the distributional implications of re-unification. The 
failure of the 1996 Social Pact supports this view. In this context, relative 
political stability and well-functioning budget institutions were per se not 
sufficient to allow for fiscal rigour.
Not only is an ex post explanation of these counterintuitive trajectories a 
worthwhile research subject, but the approach adopted here should additionally 
provide some leverage to understand more recent trends in EU fiscal policies,
1 For a discussion of the meaning of “preferences” and “interests”, see footnote 6.
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from when the Euro was officially launched in 1999 through to 2004. One of the 
strongest ideas within EMU, the coordination of national fiscal policies is 
currently in a crisis, if not actually on the verge of failure. From 2001/2 to 2004, 
Germany and France have been in breach of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
a binding agreement designed to guarantee that Euro-zone countries preserve 
fiscal discipline even once in EMU by sticking, in the short-term, to the same 3 
percent deficit target imposed by the Maastricht Treaty. Still, misbehaviour has 
not been punished. While the European Commission did initiate the excessive 
deficit procedure against Germany in November 2002 and, in April 2003, against 
France, but the ECOFIN did not endorse it fhttn://europa.eu.int/comm/economv 
finance/about/activities/ sgp/main en.htrn). Thus flaws emerged in the 
institutional set-up of the sanctioning system, so demonstrating that the latter is 
unrealistically designed. If considerations made at the time of shaping EMU were 
grounded in reality -  but the consensus is in fact now weakening2 - the possible 
collapse (real or perceived) of the SGP should pose then a significant threat to 
the European Central Bank (ECB), currently striving to take efficient one-fit-all 
monetary policy decisions.
The European Union (EU) has become aware of these shortcomings and agreed, 
on 21 March 2005, to reform the Pact with the submission of a proposal under 
the title “Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact” 
(ECOFIN 2005). It is uncertain how Euro-zone governments will interpret and 
react to this recent reform. In addition, it is in doubt if they will be able to 
explain the changes both to financial markets and public opinions, with one of 
the explicit objectives of the reform being that of making the Pact’s rules more 
transparent before the public (p.3). Leaving predictions aside, the important 
message behind the recent history of the SGP is that fiscal policies continue to be 
subject to significant national politico-institutional constraints that impede proper 
coordination at the EU level and that any reform of the Stability Pact should 
recognise the existence of these constraints. Even if only between the lines, the
2 It is fair to say that, even if  in the formative years o f EMU there was a large consensus on the 
need to guarantee a reasonable degree o f fiscal coordination, then not long after dissenting voices 
started to surface with some supporting the view that coordination o f national fiscal policies is 
not necessary for the good functioning o f the monetary union and others going as far as to argue 
that this is even counter-productive (Beetsma and Bovenberg 1995). For a brief overview o f the 
debate, see (Pisani-Ferry 2002).
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ECOFIN report does acknowledge the need to “enhance the national ownership 
of the fiscal framework” and by stating: “the Council confirms that enhanced 
coordination of fiscal policies must adhere to the Treaty principle of subsidiarity, 
respecting the prerogative of national Governments in determining their 
structural and budgetary policies, while complying with the provisions of the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact” (p.4).
The general argument underlying this thesis corroborates the recent official EU 
reading of the status of fiscal policies in EMU, adding to it by showing that 
domestic politics have always been an important factor even during the so-called 
convergence process in the run-up to the single currency (1991-98) when failure 
to reach a public deficit target of 3 percent and a debt target of 60 percent of 
GDP, as envisaged in Art.l09j and Art. 104c of the Maastricht Treaty, would 
have jeopardised candidates’ applications for EMU membership. At the time, 
only the commitment to the realization of the monetary union for some member 
states (e.g. Germany, France) and the threat of exclusion for others (e.g. Italy, 
Belgium) muted cross-country differences. This is not to say that they did not 
exist. This research proceeds from the strong assumption that nominal 
convergence achieved in 1997 by no means coincided with real convergence. As 
indicated earlier, this thesis’ explicit focus is on fiscal consolidation episodes, 
where convergence towards common inflation and interest rate levels is also 
accounted for, albeit only at the margins, in that it was mostly intertwined, either 
ex post or a priori, with fiscal policy decisions.
As a matter of fact, if by 1997 most EU countries had succeeded in bringing 
down their deficits to below 3 percent of GDP, they did so to different degrees 
and following different strategies. More specifically, this research distinguishes 
between four dimensions of budgetary adjustment. First, there is some, though 
small, variation in the timing of reform, with few countries following the 
Maastricht timetable very strictly. Secondly, deficit reduction has been more 
extensive in some countries than in others. The size of adjustment is not 
evaluated in absolute terms, as it would obviously depend upon countries’ 
starting positions, but in relation to the experience of similar countries and 
previous adjustment attempts in the same country. Thirdly, some governments
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reduced expenditures; others increased revenues or implemented both strategies 
simultaneously. In other words, the composition of adjustment differed from one 
country to the other. Finally, there are disparities with respect to the short-term 
persistence of stabilization. In parallel, it is worthwhile noting that budget 
consolidation took place against quite different domestic contexts (e.g. business 
cycles, political and budget institutions, degrees of corporatism, public opinion, 
etc.). My primary objective is to identify the (societal) reasons behind EMU 
candidate countries’ different approach to macroeconomic adjustment during the 
1990s. In so doing, I hope to shed light on current concerns around the socio­
political feasibility of fiscal discipline in individual Euro-zone countries.
l.l.Existing interpretations of fiscal adjustment
Considering the ambitious politico-economic experiment of European monetary 
unification, it is no surprise if, in recent years, the relevant theoretical literature 
has been expanding rapidly. However, existing research usually celebrates the 
achievement of nominal convergence. The Maastricht Treaty gave renewed elan 
to policies of deficit reduction after attempts to correct undisciplined behaviour 
in the preceding decade had failed in most Western European countries (e.g. Italy, 
France). Not only was the new effort successful if compared with previous 
experiences, but it was also achieved against a relatively short-time horizon 
(Rotte and Zimmermann 1998; OECD various issues). The same literature tends 
to ignore the complex domestic interactions that precede and accompany any 
fiscal stabilization policy. As convincing as it might be, the literature on the 
“vincolo esterno” fails to account for the fact that budget consolidation has far- 
reaching distributional implications and that EMU-induced macroeconomic 
adjustment had to confront a number of domestic veto players4 (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1996; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Featherstone 2001). Even 
state-centred explanations do not appear sufficiently persuasive. They support the 
argument that monetary unification was made possible thanks to the commitment
3 Vincolo esterno stands for external constraint.
4 One could say that exclusion from monetary unification would have such across-the-board 
distributional effects on late adjusters (e.g. Italy, Greece) that consensus was rapidly and 
uncontroversially achieved. Still, in the area o f budget policy, it is reasonable to expect different 
preferences on the ways to achieve balanced budgets.
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of high-profile bureaucrats and experts convinced of the merits of macro- 
economic stability (Verdun 1999; Marcussen 1999; Radaelli 1999; Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999). But there is ample evidence showing that many fiscal 
decisions were far from optimal in purely economic terms. On a similar note, 
Alesina argued: “the solution to the debt problem has very little to do with the 
criteria of optimality; instead it is the result of a political struggle” (Alesina in 
Giavazzi and Spaventa 1989, 39).
There is another strand of literature, which has been specifically concerned with 
the domestic politics of EMU-induced adjustment. The so-called New Politics o f  
the Welfare State literature has insisted on the resilience of welfare states even in 
the face of fiscal discipline pointing to the impediments government come across 
when trying to implement unpopular policies. The central argument is threefold. 
First, generous welfare states in continental Europe represent the status quo; in 
this sense any policy change would require extensive resources to be committed 
(Pierson 1996a; Esping-Andersen 1996, 266-7; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Second, 
governments refrain from implementing unpopular fiscal measures because they 
are afraid of electoral costs (Weaver 1986; Bonoli 1999; Bonoli 2000; Pierson 
2001). In this respect, these works provide also an answer to the issue of 
partisanship in that they de facto acknowledge that the ideological orientation of 
the government in power is less significant than governments’ strategic pursuit of 
the median voter preference. Third, well-organised interest groups oppose 
welfare retrenchment (Pierson 1994; Castles 1998; Ferrera 1998; Brugiavini et al. 
2000). However, this literature does not account for the fact that in many cases 
macroeconomic adjustment as well as welfare retrenchment did take place. 
Moreover, and most importantly, it proceeds from an a priori conceptualisation 
of domestic interests. These analyses underestimate the role of socio-economic 
preferences with respect to the trade-off between spending restraints and revenue 
increases under conditions of austerity.
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1.2.Consensus signals a solution to the “war of attrition”
While all domestic interest groups could agree on the desirability of fiscal 
discipline, they would place themselves on different points along the indifference 
curve between revenue-based and expenditure-based deficit reduction. Along 
these lines, there are reasons to believe that of the different dimensions of fiscal 
adjustment composition is the most relevant from a political economy 
perspective. Only where powerful interest groups have agreed on the content of 
fiscal reform will stabilization become feasible. In recent times, economists have 
moved composition of budget consolidation to the centre of their analysis and 
explained that this dimension bears a fundamental impact both on the size and on 
the persistence of deficit reduction (Alesina and Perotti 1994; Alesina and Perotti 
1995; Alesina and Perotti 1996; Perotti 1996; Perotti 1998; Perotti, Strauch and 
von Hagen 1998; Alesina and Ardagna 1998; Alesina et al. 1999; von Hagen, 
Hallett and Strauch 2001). Yet, these studies do not acknowledge that decisions 
about the most appropriate fiscal strategy are embedded in domestic socio­
political institutions (Granovetter 1985) and that the size of deficit reduction 
could be, for instance, endogenous to its composition or that persistence may be 
merely a sign of a social consensus that has been reached over fiscal discipline -  
rather than deterministically deriving from a “good” decision on composition.
Bearing these observations in mind, the model I am employing in this research 
work is inspired by Alesina’s and Drazen’s “war of attrition”. The departing 
point is that fiscal adjustment is a relatively unpopular exercise but, once 
accepted as a desirable objective, then the true battle will develop with reference 
to the content of fiscal reform. As deficit reduction will have to be achieved 
either on the revenue or on the expenditure-side of the budget5, its successful 
implementation depends primarily on competing domestic (partisan) interests 
agreeing to the distribution of its costs and benefits. From a top-down
5 O f course, the distinction is not so dramatic in reality, as deficit reduction could well come from 
a mixture o f both strategies. However, in the present discussion, such a simplistic categorization 
is preserved and should be taken as a mere prototype. Instead, in the empirical section where the 
two case studies are discussed, I will then look at mixed strategies as well as differentiating 
between types o f taxes and types o f expenditures.
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perspective, it is also about governments’ ability to forge such a consensus. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present study, the government is understood 
as just one of the players in the game, alongside the social partners, with only the 
distinction of being more committed than the others to providing the public good 
of fiscal discipline. Along similar lines, Alesina and Drazen suggested in their 
model that competing interests are there to supply a public good (Alesina and 
Drazen 1991). By extension once this consensus exists, fiscal, monetary and 
wage policies will more efficiently coordinate with one another with inevitably 
positive implications for deficit and debt levels, as will be further explained 
below.
Most of the existing political economy literature is deficient to the extent that it 
departs from an a priori definition of socio-economic preferences, and this is 
even more evident when fiscal policy preferences are at stake. The policy 
preferences of domestic interest groups can hardly be determined ex ante6. The 
empirical work behind this thesis consists of the identification of these 
preferences on the field through the analysis of official documents and public 
statements (Appendix la  and lb). In addition, semi-structured interviews have 
been used to confirm the results obtained from the abovementioned exercise 
(Appendix 2a and 2b). Already in the early stages of my fieldwork, there 
emerged prima facie evidence of the fact that social partners’ views about 
macroeconomic adjustment tend to internalise trade-offs between different but 
related policy areas (i.e. tax and welfare, monetary, exchange rate and wage 
policies). In this sense, one of the major difficulties consisted in the selection of 
relevant information considering that most economic preferences entail, in one 
way or another, a fiscal component. In turn, I have devoted special attention to 
written pieces and interview fragments where actors have looked simultaneously 
at the following key issues: preferences over the degree of fiscal discipline and, 
secondary to this, the trade-off choice between expenditure restraints and tax
6 In this thesis, I use the term “preferences” to indicate social partners’ views o f  fiscal adjustment 
as they are established empirically. By contrast, “interests” are theoretical views o f fiscal 
adjustment derived from the existing literature, and would include, for example, the traditional 
distinction between labour and capital. In a sense, they are hypothetical preferences. At times I do 
refer to one or the other, but in most cases the two terms are interchangeable, considering that the 
core o f my argument is constructed around a combination of empirically derived data and 
theoretical assumptions.
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increases. Moreover, to better visualise the potential trade-off between the 
desirable size of budgetary adjustment and its composition, I have ordered 
preferences according to their relative intensity, distinguishing between high-, 
moderate- and low-intensity preferences. The identification of different 
intensities has not been unproblematic. It was immediately manifest that fiscal 
preferences are to some extent endogenous, i.e. shaped by actors’ understanding 
of the government’s fiscal objectives and plans. By way of example, Italian 
unions’ opposition to welfare retrenchment was stronger under the 1996 Prodi 
Government than in previous and subsequent years just because, in the early 
stages of the budgetary process, the cabinet announced significant expenditure 
restraints (Appendix la). Appearing like a limit at first, this turned out quite 
convenient. Where the present approach is to look at the real-time interaction 
between fiscal authorities and social partners, then endogenous preferences 
should incorporate actors’ evaluation of factors that range from the ideological 
orientation of the government in power to its budget policy announcements. This 
makes them “strategic preferences”7.
In most existing research even specifically preference-based explanations of 
macroeconomic adjustment fall short of recognising that preferences are neither 
linear nor static. My ranking allows for the visualising of first-, second- and 
third-best choices as well as their natural evolution from 1991 to 1997 as I have 
provided for yearly rankings together with the median over the period 1991-97. 
More specifically to the methodology, in order to identify stated preferences I
Q t
have used a form of soft content analysis . I have organised preferences into the 
following categories: support for fiscal discipline, support for or opposition to 
expenditure cuts -mostly with reference to welfare cuts, support for or opposition 
to tax increases. I have employed a simple coding system attributing 3 points to 
the most intensive preference, 2 to the moderately intensive one, and 1 to the
7 For a discussion on “strategic preferences”, see (Scharpf 2000). Considering the soft game- 
theoretic approach here adopted, “strategic preferences” shall be more significant than “raw 
preferences”.
8 The methodological literature distinguishes between stated and revealed preferences, where the 
latter should be “revealed” by actors’ actual behaviour (Flick 1998). The distinction is not 
necessarily relevant to this research. Rather I have used a common-sense approach for attributing 
preferences that hinges on my own understanding o f the conditions under which agents act. In a 
similar vein, Scharpf argued that the best recollection o f actors’ preferences is the one counting 
on researchers’ own understanding o f options, constraints and trade-offs (Scharpf 1997; 2000).
22
least intensive. As mentioned above, I provide these rankings for every year from 
1991 to 1997. Where I generally refer to the distribution of fiscal preferences 
over the 1990s, then the data used represent the median calculated from every 
single year. Overall, the findings for Italy rest on 84 observations, whereas the 
German case is constructed on 78 observations9. While taking the calendar year 
as the reference timeline is probably not necessarily accurate as preferences 
would not respect the diary, this is nonetheless the most immediate and simple 
way to set preferences against a precise time frame so as to capture their 
evolution. In the case of Italy, this temporal classification has worked 
particularly well as the calendar year coincided for most of the 1990s with a new 
government so that this segmentation of preferences incorporated into social 
partners’ Weltanschauung the characteristics and partisan complexion of the 
government in power. I have employed the results therewith obtained, on the one 
hand, in Chapter VII where I compare the two cases of Italy and Germany. 
Identifying the constellation of socio-economic preferences is a fundamental 
precondition for understanding the “game” around fiscal stabilization. And 
indeed, the main assumption underlying this thesis is that, if preferences are 
dissimilarly structured in the two countries, one should expect their domestic 
games to be dissimilar, ceteribus paribus. On the other hand, I have used the 
same information contained in the selected public documents, official statements 
and semi-structured interviews to reconstruct large part of the narratives in 
Chapters III, IV, V, and VI, where I adopt a qualitative approach.
The focus on socio-economic preferences is per se not necessarily new. 
Economists have already suggested that social consensus is normally supportive 
of fiscal stabilization (Alesina in Giavazzi and Spaventa 1989; Boltho 1992; 
Bruno 1993). However, they have failed to conceptualise it and to explain how it 
is formed. The value-added of the present work consists in the attempt to identify 
the conditions under which consensus is more likely to emerge10. Of course, the 
greater the political polarization in one country, the more difficult it is to build
9 Out o f a sample o f more than 500 observations, I have selected and used only those where the 
agents discuss simultaneously the size and extent o f budgetary consolidation, often revealing 
their perception o f the links between the two dimensions.
10 As was implicitly hinted at above, by social consensus I mean the existence o f a potential for 
compromise between competing socio-economic interests.
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such a consensus, and here the two cases under investigation present a puzzle in 
that partisan polarization was far greater in Italy than it was in Germany (Budge 
et al. 2001). Yet, it is also true that starting fiscal positions are likely to matter. 
Paradoxically, the greater the necessary adjustment, the easier the distribution of 
the adjustment burden as sacrifices will have to be by and large widespread. 
When the adjustment is smaller and has in turn to focus either on the revenue or 
on the expenditure side of the budget, or even on one item or on another, then 
competition between opposing groups is harsher. This is evident even just in the 
rhetoric: Italian social partners did not refrain from referring unsophisticatedly to 
the choice between a revenue- and an expenditure-based adjustment, whereas 
German actors distinguished between types of expenditures and of taxes -so that, 
when organising and ordering preferences for Germany, I have made an explicit 
distinction between general taxation and social security contributions (SSC) (see 
Appendix lb).
I further argue that specific macroeconomic conditions allow for consensus 
formation. The first condition concerns the level of outstanding debt. I show that 
high-debt countries are better able to consolidate public finances, especially 
under a short time frame. This is a point economists have not failed to raise (von 
Hagen, Hallett and Strauch 2001). They have stated that the amount of pressure 
for adjustment high-debt countries are subject to explains comparatively better 
performances. As it is, the argument is hardly disputable. However, it misses the 
complex dynamics that precede (and follow) any stabilization episode. There are 
examples of countries that failed to consolidate in spite of barely sustainable debt 
paths, Italy in the 1980s being an interesting case in point. By the same token, 
some low-debt countries proved successful adjusters even if public finances were 
relatively under control (e.g. Germany 1982-88). Arguably, the perception that a 
financial crisis is incumbent is not sufficient to catalyse domestic interests 
towards budget consolidation11.
11 Also, the concept o f a “fiscal crisis o f the state” is far from objective. Some governments may 
believe that the level o f their public debt is unsustainable and others that a similar level is 
perfectly manageable. To be sure, neither economic theory nor empirical provide us with an 
indication o f a precise debt ratio to GDP that should be regarded as unsustainable (Giavazzi and 
Spaventa 1989).
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Fiscal policy decisions cannot be taken in a vacuum. Governments face the 
reaction of social partners, in corporatist realities, or more generally of voters. In 
turn, I offer an explanation of high-debt countries’ paradoxical comparative 
advantage that is grounded in society. First, in high-debt countries, part of the 
adjustment can stem from credibility gains once financial markets are persuaded 
by deficit reduction efforts or even by their mere announcement. This strategy 
does not have a tangible distributional impact and is thus, from a political 
economy perspective, perfectly feasible. Secondly, as stated above, where the 
size of adjustment is significant, as is the case for highly indebted countries, then 
there are good reasons to believe that sacrifices will be imposed on most groups. 
In other words, there is less scope for free riding. Thirdly, business actors in 
high-debt countries will manifest their opposition to high interest rate and 
inflation differentials once market conditions change. And, with the completion 
of the Single European Market (SEM), their “living space” was transformed 
relatively fast. In this new context, organised capital was prone to lobby public 
authorities for extensive deficit reduction in the expectation that this would 
finally induce a relaxation of monetary policy. In turn, cheaper money was 
perceived as an easy stimulus to investment, especially under conditions of low 
labour productivity (e.g. Italy).
The exchange rate regime is the second macroeconomic feature expected to 
shape fiscal preference formation. As stated above, it seems reasonable to believe 
that socio-economic interests formed their preferences after having taken trade­
offs between different policy areas into account (i.e. fiscal, exchange rate and 
wage policies). Where the exchange rate offers a pressure valve to preserve 
competitiveness, business actors in high-debt countries will try to impose their 
preference over the size of deficit reduction but allow labour unions to shape the 
content of budgetary interventions. Italian unions were largely in favour of a 
revenue-based adjustment. Producers accepted it because the depreciated Lira 
continued to fuel exports, in spite of higher fiscal pressure. Moreover, with the 
elimination of wage indexation, there was no risk of imported inflation. Finally, 
under a weak (floating) currency regime, monetary authorities were able to 
increase the money supply in reaction to fiscal restriction without being 
constrained by the need to support the external value of the currency. By the
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same token, it is quite paradoxical how the stability of the DM, if not its 
appreciation from 1991 to 1995, reduced monetary authorities’ room for 
manoeuvre. Faced with a weakening competitive performance, export-oriented 
producers did not accept unions’ proposal for a fiscal adjustment based on higher 
(progressive) direct taxation. Under these conditions, the striking of a deal 
between unions and producers appeared extremely difficult, revealing weak 
underlying social consensus.
The different fate of social pacts in Germany and Italy is to be interpreted against 
this background. Social concertation is the epiphenomenon of the presence of 
social consensus, even if it concerns only socio-economic elites (i.e. trade unions 
and employers’ organizations). Seeing the presence of corporatist arrangements 
as a manifestation of social consensus is a position that might be subject to some 
criticism. In trying to correct for this potential weakness, I have correlated the 
emergence (and frequency) of social pacts with the number of strikes and street 
demonstrations. The negative sign of the correlation supports the view that these 
pacts can be seen as good functional equivalents to the rather vague notion of 
social consensus . The puzzle with respect to the two case studies analysed here 
is that tripartite agreements were successfully concluded in a country like Italy 
where the institutional preconditions to corporatism were in fact lacking, i.e. 
united labour movement and centralization of collective bargaining (CB). Thus, 
even when it comes to accounting for corporatist patterns, the contribution of the 
present thesis consists in the appreciation of interest-based as opposed to 
institutionalist approaches, the argument being that social concertation emerges 
there where the preferences of social partners are distributed in such a way that a 
compromise is possible.
12 To be sure, Cameron and Keman already anticipated that labour quiescence associates 
systematically with corporatism (Cameron 1984; Cameron in Goldthorpe 1984; Keman 1984).
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2. Fiscal Consolidation: Old and New Definitions
Any study of fiscal adjustment runs against an important limitation; namely the 
technical complexity of the subject matter and the fact that fiscal policy 
outcomes are typically over-determined. Multiple factors, many of them out of 
government control, have an impact on fiscal stabilization. This explains why 
this policy area creates economic complexities for bureaucrats themselves, as 
they will have to simultaneously control for all these different factors and often 
face trade-off choices. With the aim of clarifying the most important 
determinants and intervening variables, this section looks at the economics of 
fiscal adjustment and at its different dimensions, focusing mainly on the aspects 
upon which politics is more likely to exert an impact. In addition, it should be 
stressed at the outset that wider fiscal policy decisions (e.g. welfare and tax 
reform) come into the picture only to the extent that they allow for public saving, 
hence for deficit, and in the long-term, debt reduction. In this research context, 
only those fiscal policy choices that have beneficial implications for the state 
budget matter, and more so when, also in the rhetoric, policy-makers have 
justified them as induced by the need to preserve fiscal discipline. In this respect, 
wider evaluations of fiscal reform -e.g. if welfare retrenchment is dramatic or 
incremental, or whether it impinges upon social rights (Pierson 1994; Clayton 
and Pontusson 1998; Pierson 2001; Green-Pedersen)- are not part of this research 
project.
2.1.The economics of fiscal consolidation
Fiscal consolidation can be broadly described as the adjustment of fiscal trends 
towards the budgetary targets to which a government has politically committed 
itself, either domestically or internationally (as in the case of EMU). More 
precisely, borrowing from other works, adjustment arises when the primary 
structural budget balance (i.e. the cyclically adjusted deficit excluding interest 
payments) has changed by more than 0.5 percent of potential GDP in one or 
more consecutive years (Perotti, Strauch and von Hagen 1998; von Hagen,
Hallett and Strauch 2001). As apparent from the definition above, the focus is on
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deficit reduction, and this for a number of reasons. First, it soon became clear 
that EU institutions would be more indulgent in the interpretation of the debt 
criterion, but would not allow deficits higher than 3 percent of GDP. Second, 
debt management is an exercise in which governments are highly constrained by 
market conditions (e.g. interest rate evolution, business confidence) as well as by 
the characteristics of the debt exposure itself (e.g. maturity structure of state 
bonds, category of creditors). Finally, debt stabilization occurs against long-time 
horizons. By contrast, this study is an evaluation of the domestic micro­
foundations of fiscal adjustment within a relatively short time frame (1991-98).
The external macroeconomic environment has a significant bearing, firstly on the 
choice of the most appropriate fiscal strategy and secondly on the actual results. 
As mentioned above, fiscal adjustment is conditioned by multiple factors. 
Amongst those out of government control are growth rates and long-term interest 
rates. As to the former, growth projections condition decisions about the most 
appropriate deficit reduction strategy. Were the government to expect slow 
growth, it would not be likely to build a stabilization programme that relies 
heavily on direct tax increases, for instance. In terms of outcomes, output growth 
determines the actual extent of public revenues. Thus in a booming economy, 
private incomes increase and so do revenues from direct taxation at constant tax 
rates. On the expenditure side of the budget, recession leading to unemployment 
would exercise a strong pressure on social security budgets pushing the net 
borrowing requirement upwards. On the other hand, long-term interest rates have 
a more focused target, as they would affect just one peculiar spending item, i.e. 
interest payments on the outstanding public debt. In addition, interest rate 
developments would have differentiated impact on countries according to their 
initial positions. In particular, high-debt countries are much more dependent 
upon the structure of interest rates than low-debt countries (Commission 1994, 
171).
The budget constraint equation offers a good representation of the evolutionary 
characteristics of fiscal consolidation (see Equation 1). In order to stabilise the 
public debt, the primary surplus will first have to grow substantially and 
continuously, the larger the debt ratio to GDP -  no surprise then that Italy’s
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primary surplus followed this trend in the 1990s, whereas Germany’s was subject 
on a more uncertain evolution. Second, to achieve this target, growth rates should 
be greater than interest rates. By implication, fiscal consolidation is easier where 
monetary authorities allow for an increase in the money supply. Were this not 
happen, then growth needs to be remarkably rapid, a condition that did not occur 
either in Italy or in Germany during the 1990s. Equation (1) suggests also that 
high public indebtedness represents an important constraint on fiscal authorities, 
as it does not allow the use of revenues for more urgent needs than debt 
repayment. Interestingly enough, this thesis will show that, from a political 
economy perspective, a high level of public debt is instead an advantage when a 
government is asked to put budgets in order against a short-time horizon. This is 
because it induces socio-economic interests to form fiscal preferences that are 
largely reconcilable with one another.
B G -  T B 13
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2.2.The dimensions of fiscal consolidation
Fiscal consolidation is not a monolithic episode. To be sure, most of the 
economic adjustment literature is keen on distinguishing between different 
dimensions of reform (Haggard and Kaufman 1992). When it comes to debt 
stabilization in particular, the most studied aspects of the process have been its 
timing (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Fatas and Mihov 2003), extent (Alesina and 
Ardagna 1998), composition (Alesina and Perotti 1995; Perotti 1996; Fatas and 
Mihov 2003) and persistence (Maroto Illera and Mulas-Granados 2001; von 
Hagen, Hallett and Strauch 2001). Most of the time, they have been evaluated 
separately. However, because they are somehow reciprocally related and are
13 Where AB/Y = change to the debt ratio to GDP; G = government spending; T = government 
revenue; and (r-g) B/Y = difference between real interest and growth rate applied to the amount 
of debt ratio to GDP (Burda and Wyplosz, 2001, 377).
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often endogenous to one another, where possible, I intend to consider these four 
dimensions together.
The timing gives an idea of a country’s intention to reform. In the case of EMU 
candidates, it is rather uncontroversial that the timing of extensive deficit 
reduction was shaped by the so-called Maastricht effect. However, the latter was 
more evident in some cases than in others. In Germany, for example, the re­
unification shock postponed the fiscal restriction to the second half of the 1990s. 
The Maastricht effect was certainly more visible in the case of Italy. After a 
series of attempts to put budgets in order in the 1980s, the country took the right 
steps on the way to fiscal discipline only once under the EMU constraint. Still, it 
is to be said that the dramatic adjustment put in place in 1992 was also a response 
to the financial crisis. Hence, the top-down explanation of the timing of reform 
ignores the fact that debt stabilization becomes viable only at the moment in 
which the “war of attrition” between competing interests has been solved. 
Therefore, it would be appropriate to analyse the timing of fiscal adjustment 
together with both its extent and composition.
The extent of consolidation is measured as the change in the primary structural 
balance so as to better isolate discretionary fiscal interventions14. Often, I use 
also the cyclically deficit to pinpoint differences between the two variables. 
Needless to say, this depends directly on a country’s initial position. For this 
reason, the size of budgetary retrenchment is analysed here by looking at groups 
of countries that started from similar deficit and debt levels and in comparison to 
previous consolidation episodes in the same country. From a political economy 
perspective, it is interesting that, in some countries, large restrictions were 
politically more viable than in others. Quite paradoxically, one of the arguments 
that cuts across the present work is that larger interventions were somehow easier
14 Cyclically adjusted data are available from the European Commission’s database AMECO. 
Here, the influence o f cyclical fluctuations on budget balances is calculated by multiplying the 
output gap by the marginal sensitivity o f revenues and expenditures to GDP. The output gap 
consists o f the difference between actual and trend GDP (Buti, Franco and Ongera 1997, 8; EU 
Commission 2000, 137-8). In this thesis, I use the adjusted primary surplus, where possible. This 
is the best approximation to discretionary fiscal policy and a better measure than the adjusted 
deficit considering that the latter incorporates a few factors that are out o f government control, 
i.e. inflation, real interest rates, exchange rate fluctuations, and receipts from natural resources 
(Blanchard 1990).
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to sell; first, because they could rely on credibility gains on financial markets -  
especially there where credibility was low to start with - and secondly because 
sacrifices were imposed across-the-board, thereby minimising competition 
between opposing groups. For a thorough understanding of the socio-political 
feasibility of fiscal reform, a closer look at its specific content is necessary.
In the present research setting, composition appears probably like the most 
significant dimension of adjustment. It is measured as the contribution of each 
budgetary item to the consolidation episode. Borrowing from von Hagen et al, 
consolidation is expenditure-based when spending cuts contribute to at least half 
of the total yearly deficit reduction (von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch 2001, 20). 
The EU Commission provides figures on changes to cyclically adjusted primary 
expenditures -which exclude interest payments, and to adjusted total revenues 
(AMECO Database). A strategy for economic stabilization can be based on tax 
increases or expenditure cuts, or a mixture of the two. Put another way, it should 
be characterised by an overwhelming dimension of retrenchment, but it could 
also entail elements of short-term expansion when a government strategically 
decides to reduce fiscal pressure to stimulate economic growth in Tl and 
therewith minimise public spending in T2. Here, again, starting positions are due 
to play an important role. High-debt countries are unlikely to go for tax 
alleviation. While theoretically lower fiscal pressure could boost the economy 
and create growth, in practice the unstable macroeconomic environment 
characteristic of highly indebted systems will probably not allow this to happen15. 
Initial conditions matter also if it is true that, in the 1990s, only countries with 
small tax burdens opted for revenue-based adjustments (Fatas and Mihov 2003)16. 
In recent times, economists have extensively studied composition indicating that 
expenditure-based deficit reductions are more successful. As spending cuts are 
perceived as definitive with economic agents expecting lower fiscal pressure in 
the short to medium term, both consumption and investment are stimulated. By 
the same token, revenue-based adjustments are detrimental, as they tend to come
15 Panel data analyses confirmed that high-debt countries tend to opt for expenditure-based 
adjustments (Von Hagen at al. 2001). The Italian case does not fully support this hypothesis.
16 Again, the research conducted by Fatas and Mihov looks at panel data so that the results hold 
only at the aggregate level. In fact, while certainly not being part o f the group o f low-tax-burden 
countries, Italy relied extensively on (direct) tax increases to balance public budgets.
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with stronger wage pressures with bargainers incorporating higher fiscal pressure 
in their wage demands (Giavazzi and Pagano 1996; Alesina et al. 1999; Ardagna 
2004). In these analyses, successful adjustments are those that last longer. This 
leads back us to the four dimensions considered here, namely the persistence or 
duration of fiscal discipline.
Table 1. Composition of budgetary consolidation in EU countries in the 
1990s
Revenue-based retrenchment
Consolidation
Period
Change in 
Structural 
Balance
Change in 
Structural 
Revenue
Change in 
Structural 
P r. Exp.
O f which 
Capital 
Spending
O f which 
C urren t 
Pr. Exp.
Change in 
Interest 
Payments
F 1995-97 3.3 2.6 -0.9 -0.1 -0.8 0.2
IRL 1990-94 2.3 3.0 2.5 0.6 1.9 -1.8
I 1991-97 9.4 6.4 -3.1 -1.0 -2.1 0.0
P 1992-96 3.6 7.4 6.1 0.9 5.2 -2.3
Expenditure-based retrenchment
FIN 1993-99 4.0 -4.6 -9.5 -0.7 -8.8 1.0
"Switching" Strategy
A Is1 phase 1995-96 1.3 2.3 0.8 -0.4 1.2 0.2
2nd phase 1997 2.2 -0.4 -2.3 -0.9 -1.4 -0.4
B 1st phase 1992-93 1.7 2.9 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.7
2nd phase 1994-96 3.6 1.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -1.9
D 1st phase 1992-93 1.4 3.3 1.3 0.1 1.1 0.6
2nd phase 1994-97 1.7 1.5 -0.7 -0.8 0.0 0.4
NLl “phase 1991-93 4.3 4.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.2
2nd phase 1994-97 1.7 -4.5 -5.4 0.9 -6.4 -0.8
E  1st phase 1992-93 -0.3 3.9 2.8 -0.6 3.5 1.3
2nd phase 1994-97 3.5 -1.4 -4.6 -1.0 -3.6 -0.2
Key: Pr. Exp. = primary expenditures
Source: European Commission, Public Finances in EMU, European Economy, 2000,
p.20.
Persistence is defined as the absence of significant deficit deterioration in the 
period under investigation17. It is a sign of serious commitment to fiscal 
discipline, especially when it overcomes potential politico-institutional
17 It should be stressed that persistence is by no means referring to sustainability.
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impediments, such as electoral cycles, new veto points, new international 
commitments etc. Empirical evidence indicates that the momentum in favour of 
fiscal discipline is not necessarily maintained by external pressures nor 
conditioned by fiscal starting positions. It refers instead to national authorities’ 
capacity to preserve a social environment favourable to austerity. In turn, the 
emergence (or not) of social consensus around fiscal adjustment is likely to 
depend on the ways in which stabilization policies are pursued. This takes us 
back to the content of fiscal reform. In a sense, the persistence of deficit 
reduction is conditional upon the acceptance of its very composition.
3. Stumbling Giant and Prodigal Son?
In the accounts on the run-up to EMU, Germany and Italy figure as two 
extremely interesting case studies. At the level of anecdotes, the European 
convergence process seemed to revolve around the striking of a compromise 
between Germany, with its authorities’ resistance to any relaxation of the 
Maastricht fiscal criteria, andltaly, travelling dangerously on the tightrope 
between satisfying the criteria and being excluded from EMU. This atmosphere 
prevailed until 1996 when Prime Minister Prodi successfully put in place an 
extraordinary budget correction, thereby securing EMU membership (Chiorazzo 
and Spaventa 2000). Just as Italy was about to conquer this goal, growing 
unemployment and decreasing productivity in Germany were putting the 
country’s easy landing on the EMU platform at risk. If diplomatic economic 
relations played a role at all, the “waltz” between Germany and Italy is a 
significant component of this process. At the same time, it is interesting to note 
that whereas in Italy a series of successful social pacts contributed significantly 
to austerity, in Germany, notwithstanding a long tradition of social concertation, 
government, employers and unions proved unable to come to a comprehensive 
agreement on public finance issues.
The underlying question this thesis is tackling is why Italy performed so 
unexpectedly well, while at the same time Germany showed more visible signs
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of an incumbent demise. The following two sections set out the methodological 
advantages as well as the constraints of such a comparison and suggest that a 
look at the raw economics of fiscal adjustment in Germany and Italy, while 
offering good guiding principles, is in fact not fully satisfactory.
3.1.Most-dissimilar-systems research design
From a methodological perspective, this research work follows a most- 
dissimilar- systems design. Most evidently, the two countries started from very 
different fiscal positions. In 1991, Germany’s public deficit was at 2.9 percent of 
GDP, or 4.8 percent in cyclically adjusted terms, to large part as a result of 
unification-induced spending, with but the overall consolidated gross debt at just 
40.3 percent of GDP. On the other hand, in Italy, the deficit amounted to 11.7 
percent of GDP in 1991, or 12.1 in cyclically adjusted terms, and the debt burden 
was at a record high of 100.6 percent of GDP (European 2004). Given these 
significant spreads, it is reasonable to ask if the comparison is really justifiable. I 
believe it is considering that, interestingly enough, their primary surpluses were 
quite similar, with Italy at 0.2 percent of GDP and Germany at just -0.1 percent 
of GDP in 1991. If the focus of the present work is deficit reduction rather than 
debt stabilization, then the fact that primary surpluses were more or less aligned 
is by itself a significant piece of information. It justifies the comparison on the 
grounds that the portion of the deficit that is manageable by discretionary fiscal 
policy was at the time similar in size. It is instead the ratio of interest payments 
that varied from one country to the other; something that depended upon the two 
countries’ different debt levels. Even if this is just tentative, then these elements 
could lead one to believe that there is something about the size of interest 
payments or, to put differently, about the overall public deficit that can account 
for the two countries’ unexpected fiscal performances. Rather than being a limit 
to a sound comparison, divergent starting positions will translate into the 
explanation for their divergent trajectories, where the intriguing empirical puzzle 
revolves around the fact that their respective fiscal consolidation episodes ran 
against what one would have expected in the light of their initial (debt) positions.
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On other fronts, the juxtaposition of these two cases is justified by the fact that 
(1) they are countries of similar size; (2) they have similar degrees of openness as 
in both exports account for about 20 percent of GDP18; (3) in both countries, 
primary expenditure levels amounted to around 40.2 percent of GDP in 1991 
(European 2004); (4) in addition, fiscal pressure was also similar at the beginning 
of the Maastricht convergence process. These aspects are not free of significance 
if, as the relevant literature has extensively insisted upon (Amenta and Skocpol 
1986; Immergut 1992; Ferrera 1993; Pierson 1996b; Thelen 1999), social and tax 
policy inheritance exercises feed back effects on reform efforts; (5) finally, from 
a macro qualitative perspective, both fall under Esping-Andersen’s 
categorization of “continental welfare states” (Esping-Andersen 1990)19; this 
means that any proposal for structural reform would have to face similar, even if 
not identical, institutional constraints (and opportunities).
True, Germany was subject to a historically unprecedented challenge with the 
unification of the Western and Eastern parts. However, in a sense, so too was 
Italy. To qualify for EMU in the first wave, the country had to put in place a 
proper macroeconomic regime change. Besides achieving balanced budgets, the 
country also had to reduce interest rate and inflation levels; at the same time, it 
was required to maintain exchange rate stability, abandoning the competitive 
devaluations extensively pursued in the past. A look at longer fiscal trends 
suggests that, in the German case, unification-induced deficit deterioration was 
not greater than the one resulting from lavish spending in the late 1970s and that, 
overall, fiscal policy outcomes were set under a sign of relative continuity with 
the past. Confirming this point is the fact that the 1990s are recalled as a period 
of blockage -the reference is to Reformstau (reform blockage), where 
institutional constraints impeded any structural reform. In this sense, unification 
is just an external contingent event impinging on resilient structures.
18 The relative openness o f a national economy is a significant determinant o f economic policy 
decisions to the extent that governments need to make sure that fiscal, wage and exchange rate 
policies are compatible with the preservation o f international competitiveness.
9 It is fair to say however that the definition is contested. For example, Ferrera suggested that 
Italy together with Spain, Portugal and Greece should be classified as “southern welfare state” 
(Ferrera 1993).
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There is another societal development that indicates how Germany and Italy did 
in fact follow different paths, but in a manner that was totally unexpected. The 
emergence of social pacts in Italy somehow challenges the existing corporatist 
literature, according to which social concertation emerges only where there are 
the appropriate institutional preconditions. But the country lacked those as the 
labour movement was ideologically fragmented and collective bargaining was 
not typically centralised. Still, social pacts seemed to be the norm in the 1990s, 
first in 1992 and 1993, and then in 1996. On the contrary, Germany’s traditional 
social partnership failed to materialise in the same period, in spite of the Kohl 
Government’s repeated attempts at bringing social partners together, most 
notably in 1996. This was associated with the crumbling of social consensus at 
large, as the 1990s witnessed a period of unprecedented social unrest with 
historically high number of strikes and street demonstrations in West Germany 
(ILO Database). It is worth noting that the 1996 German social pact failed as a 
result of disagreements around the most appropriate fiscal strategy, as will 
described below.
I have also introduced shadow cases so as to strengthen the case of a society- 
based fiscal adjustment and to corroborate one the main finding behind this 
research, namely that debt levels and currency regimes bear an important impact 
on fiscal preference formation and in turn, if the above is true, on fiscal outcomes. 
Belgium appeared like the best possible counterweight to the two central cases, 
as it is the only EU country with a debt burden comparable to Italy’s. Here, 
deficit reduction in the 1990s was certainly successful and was achieved without 
a social pact in the background. Differently to the Italian case, however, the 
country’s hard currency regime twisted unions’ arms into wage moderation 
without the need for an explicit political exchange. In a sense, the peculiar 
macroeconomic environment the country was in during the 1990s explains the 
failure of the attempted social pacts in 1994 and 1996, and this is where this 
work contributes indirectly to (neo)-corporatist literature. Portugal, the second 
shadow case, had a debt level similar to the German one and a hybrid exchange 
rate regime, where governments attempted to preserve the external value of the 
national currency but were not always capable of doing so. The Portuguese 
experience with budget consolidation in the run-up to EMU has been
36
disappointing somehow and the social pacts concluded were certainly limited in 
their actual impact on the economy with the largest union confederation refusing 
to sign them.
3.2.Italian and German budget consolidation: raw economics
When focusing on fiscal policy outcomes, the impact of business cycles can be 
hardly overstated - the European Commission has calculated that this amounts an 
average budget balance adjustment of 0.5 percent of GDP when the output gap 
changes by 1 percentage point (European Commission 2000, 137). In order to 
control for the interference of cyclical fluctuations, I am mostly using cyclically 
adjusted data as a good measure of discretionary fiscal policy20. Still, as with 
most constructed figures, they have some drawbacks, amongst them in particular 
the fact that potential output is kept constant whereas there are good reasons to 
believe that it changes along with the implementation, for example, of welfare 
and tax reform. While the impact of GDP growth, employment and short-term 
interest rates is more or less controlled for by the use of cyclically adjusted data, 
long-term interest rates attributed by financial markets should be considered 
independently.
I have earlier hinted at the fact that markets tend to react quite promptly to real 
fiscal policy changes, and that their sensitivity is strongly dependent upon 
countries’ starting positions, most obviously upon their debt burdens. Rising 
long-term interest rates can function as a significant constraint on 
macroeconomic management, and this is even more so in the case of high-debt 
countries, becoming notably more sensitive to interest rate developments. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that the risk premium on Italy had been 
progressively decreasing in the 1990s and so had long-term interest rates -with 
the exceptions of 1994-95 and 1996-97. Nevertheless, they were much above 
those imposed on Germany, in spite of the fact that the public debt there 
continued to rise. In a sense, financial markets did not severely punish Germany 
in spite of the uncertainty created by unification and the transition process in
20 See footnote 9.
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former DDR. In this respect, it is to be excluded a priori that Germany 
performed comparatively worse because o f  unfavourable market developments.
Related to this is another important feature o f  the two respective fiscal 
adjustments. Graph 1 illustrates that Germany’s actual public deficit was 
determined in full by the evolution o f the primary surplus. Because the latter 
represents the best approximation to government discretionary fiscal action, it 
can be concluded that, overall, the markets played a limited role in affecting the 
country’s fiscal performance. This was instead the result o f  alteration to real 
government activities, either on the revenue or on the expenditure side o f  the 
budget (Graph 1).
Graph 1. Evolution of Cyclically Adjusted Public Deficit and 
Primary Surplus, Germany and Italy (1991-2000)
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Source: European Commission, AMECO Database (last reviewed May 2005)
On the other hand, Italy’s budget consolidation was to some extent determined 
by discretionary policy interventions if  the primary surplus was set on an upward 
trend throughout the 1990s. However, the fact that the public deficit and the 
primary surplus, while moving in the same direction, are not identical shows that 
there was greater room for financial markets to play a role, namely to allow for 
the lowering costs o f  public debt servicing. This confirms the general assumption 
according to which high-debt countries would be more sensitive to interest rate
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developments than low-debt countries, both because the debt ratio to GDP is 
greater and so the gain, and because of the catch-up potential typical of modestly 
credible economies. Part of the adjustment would then stem from a socio- 
politically irrelevant item such as interest payments (see Rhodes in Pierson 2001). 
To put it in a provocative way, when judging on the German and Italian fiscal 
performance in the run-up to EMU, one can say: while it was not all Italy’s merit, 
it was certainly all Germany’s faultl
Where raw economics are not persuasive enough, the attention should shift to 
politico-economic considerations. The next chapter is a review of existing 
theoretical interpretations of fiscal adjustment.
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CHAPTER II
Theories of Fiscal 
Adjustment
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1. A Synopsis of Theoretical Interpretations
"(Policy reform) is like an investment that should ultimately benefit 
the majority by enough to make them happy they made it, but that in 
the short run will -like all investments- involve sacrifices. The 
distribution of these sacrifices over time and across groups is at the 
heart o f the politics of economic reform. ” Williamson and Haggard
(1994, 531)
Macroeconomic adjustment is by definition an unpopular exercise, in the short­
term at least. In turn, any theoretical conceptualisation of it has to account for 
strategies and conditions under which real or potential constraints are overcome. 
Theories of fiscal adjustment differ only in that they do not necessarily agree on 
the nature of the constraints and, therefore, on the means to overcome them. With 
some degree of simplification, one can distinguish between international and 
domestic intervening variables, where the former are predominantly institutional 
and the latter either societal or institutional. This equates to saying that 
explanations of successful fiscal adjustment vary from top-down to bottom-up 
according to the locus where constraints are believed to operate most intensively.
Amongst top-down explanations are those that recognise the overwhelming 
importance of the Maastricht commitment to account for successful fiscal 
consolidation after two decades of failed attempts. The presence of a legal 
constraint is believed sufficient to mobilise governments’ support in favour of 
reform. This approach is somehow similar to the one revolving around the notion 
of “vincolo esterno”, but the latter is more sophisticated in that it accounts for the 
role of ideas and for the fact that national policy-makers do instrumentalise an 
external constraint to acquire legitimacy at home. In this respect, such accounts 
are more similar to Putnam’s two-level game than to pure top-down analyses 
(Putnam 1988). Acknowledging a more active role from part of governmental 
actors, the tying one’s hands theory states that public authorities may impose 
upon themselves disciplinary devices usually capable of allowing a better 
economic performance, the notable example being policy-makers’ enthusiastic 
embracing of the EMS project.
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Domestically, there is likely to be an extremely high number of potential 
impediments to successful budget consolidation. To be sure, it is not necessarily 
true that everything that happens at the domestic level should develop from 
bottom-up. Where decisions are taken by politically insulated technocrats, then 
international factors are not relevant but the process can be still defined as top- 
down. An important strand of literature has succeeded in the task of Bringing the 
State Back In to show that dramatic policy change is initiated only by powerful 
state administrations. It does appreciate the significance of expertise, of policy 
legacies, and of state autonomy from the wider societal context. Somewhere 
between top-down and bottom-up explanations is the literature on political and 
fiscal institutionalism according to which the shape and functioning of political 
and budget institutions bear an indisputable impact on fiscal policy outcomes.
Conversely, pure bottom-up explanations of fiscal adjustment recognise the role 
of state-society relations. While probably all in favour of fiscal discipline (in the 
1990s at least), governments of different ideological orientation may differ in 
their preference over the size and composition of fiscal reform considering that, 
for example, large adjustments that base interventions on the spending side of the 
budget tend to have quite different distributional consequences from small ones 
implemented on the revenue side {partisanship). Deficit reduction is destined to 
encounter strong opposition from specific socio-economic categories, depending 
on what fiscal strategy is being employed, as well as from the electorate at large. 
According to the so-called New Politics o f  the Welfare State literature, this 
should be the qualifying difference between welfare expansion and retrenchment. 
The intensity of social and political opposition to retrenchment would also 
depend on the partisan complexion of the electorate and on the degree of 
organised interests’ involvement in fiscal policy-making, namely on models o f  
corporatism. The latter aspect seems to be particularly important in accounting 
for the Italian and German experience with fiscal consolidation. If Italian social 
partners signed an unprecedented series of social pacts that aimed, among others, 
to secure fiscal discipline, German social partners by contrast failed to come to 
an agreement. The corporatist literature is unable to account for the actual fiscal 
preferences of social partners and their evolution. Only interest group politics
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approaches and their focus on preferences have the potential to reveal the micro­
foundations o f  fiscal adjustment, and probably even the emergence (or not) o f  
corporatist arrangements (Table 2).
Table 2.A synopsis of different theoretical interpretations
IN T E R N A T IO N A L  D O M E ST IC
T O P-D O W N Legal constraint State administrations
Vincolo esterno Political/fiscal institutions
B O T T O M -U P
Tying o l e ’s hands
Partisanship
N ew  politics o f  welfare
Neo-Corporatism
Preferences
2. The Lim its o f  T op-D ow n E xplanations
I have argued above that one simplistic, but probably at the same time quite 
effective, way o f  putting some order on the vast literature on macroeconomic 
adjustment is by distinguishing between top-down and bottom-up explanations o f  
fiscal reform. The following paragraphs go through existing top-down theories -  
i.e. external pressures, state administrations, political and fiscal institutions- with 
the objective o f  describing their specific contents and analytical leverage. I 
contend that, for one reason or another, they are not fully satisfactory, either in 
accounting for fiscal consolidation at large or, more specifically, in providing 
clarification for Italy’s and Germany’s awkward experiences with budgetary 
adjustment in the 1990s. A theme that cuts across most o f  the criticisms moved 
against top-down interpretations is that these fall short o f  demonstrating the 
micro-foundations o f  the political economy o f  budget consolidation as they do 
not account for the distributional implications o f  fiscal discipline.
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2.1. The role of external constraints
Amongst top-down interpretations of the EMU convergence process are those 
that look at the role of external pressures. There exist variations of the argument 
that differ from one another in accordance with their relative conceptualisation of 
the term “external pressure”. First, in a straightforward and rather 
uncontroversial manner, some argue that the presence of an international binding 
commitment should explain why so many European countries managed to reduce 
their deficit and debt levels after successive failed attempts in the preceding two 
decades, and also why this happened in a relatively similar time frame (Rotte and 
Zimmermann 1998). With the sole exception of Greece, all Euro-zone candidates 
had in fact managed to meet the 3 percent public deficit target by 1997, the 
reference year against which the EU was to decide EMU qualification. By setting 
a deadline common to all candidates, the Maastricht Treaty was also responsible 
for the timing of fiscal consolidation across the EU, with 1992 and 1996 
representing in fact two European-wide structural breaks in the conduct of fiscal 
policies (European Commission 2000).
The argument is uncontroversial, at least at the aggregate level, and thus to some 
extent unproblematic. However, when considered through stricter analytical 
lenses, it shall provoke two criticisms, one empirical and the other theoretical. As 
to the former, nominal convergence around the 3 percent deficit did not coincide 
with real convergence, as is often acknowledged in this thesis. Real fiscal 
convergence was not there neither in the run-up to EMU nor thereafter. For 
example, cyclically adjusted fiscal positions continued to differ from one country 
to the other. Second, EU governments implemented different qualitative 
strategies to reduce their deficits with inevitable consequences for both the 
persistence of fiscal discipline and fiscal aggregates’ short- and medium-term 
sensitivity to the economic cycle1. From a theoretical perspective, rule-based 
explanations of fiscal performance tend to be positivist and often fail to
1 This would potentially lead to even greater divergence in national sensitivities to the cycle. The 
reference here is to the impact o f welfare and tax reform on the extent and quality o f a national 
economy’s sensitivity to the business cycle.
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acknowledge that the same rule can be interpreted differently2. There might be 
also a gap between the actual and the declared perception of the rule, with the 
latter being an important input to the whole process of preference formation if it 
is true, as constructivists argue, that ideas play a definite independent role in 
policy formulation.
Ambiguities between the reality and the rhetoric of the Maastricht commitment 
were particularly evident in the cases of Italy and Germany. Italian actors 
initially advocated a flexible interpretation of the Treaty provisions. Once this 
option faded away, the following step was to present fiscal discipline to the 
public as a EU imposition. The truth is that the Maastricht commitment exercised 
a greater pressure on Italy than it did on Germany, considering the former’s less 
favourable starting position and the greater costs the country would incur into, 
were it be excluded from EMU. On the other hand, German authorities insisted 
on the rigorous respect of the “dreikommanull” deficit target and sold financial 
stability as a public good rather than an imposition from the outside. In factual 
terms, it is to be acknowledged that Germany felt certainly less pressure to 
qualify for EMU than Italy.
The above considerations take us to the second interpretation of “external 
constraint” available in the literature, one that is slightly more sophisticated than 
the former. Theories on the so-called “vincolo esterno” are predicated on a 
narrow and a broad definition of the external constraint (Featherstone 2001). In 
more general terms and borrowing from constructivism, the argument is that the 
idea of EMU reached national policy-makers and became for them a positive 
constraint (McNamara 1999). My contention is that this explanation is 
unsatisfactory in that it sees EMU and, by extension, fiscal consolidation as elite- 
driven phenomena. Fiscal policy has such far-reaching distributional implications 
that they can be hardly overstated. An argument related to the former is at the 
heart of the tying one’s hands theory, which focuses on the economic rationale 
behind international agreements. It is argued that international commitments are
2 There is in addition a strand o f literature discussing the effectiveness o f fiscal rules in general. 
Most agree that fiscal rules are needed only there where reputation is lacking (e.g. Italy); by the 
same token, they would be unnecessary in the case o f countries with a strong reputation o f fiscal 
prudence (e.g. Germany), see (Kopits 2001).
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often self-imposed and used as means to acquire credibility. Needless to say, they 
are valuable policy tools for low-credibility countries. Along these lines, one 
could say that Italy’s interest in EMU membership links back to its desire to 
import Germany’s low-inflation reputation. Still, first, such a strategy is not 
necessarily successful. Giavazzi and Pagano show that Italy’s membership of the 
EMS since 1979 was not sufficient to preserve exchange rate stability, and thus 
low inflation (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988). Secondly, the argument falls short of 
explaining Germany’s support of EMU, and this is so also because EMU results 
in a much more complicated international arrangement than the EMS, one in 
which both positive and negative externalities play a greater role. Most 
importantly, the theory underestimates distributive conflicts, as well explained in 
Walsh:
“The tying hand analysis focuses on the preferences o f some policy makers 
for adjustment, but does not specify the domestic political conditions under 
which these preferences can be implemented. Measuring the aggregate 
consequences o f divergent macroeconomic policies fails to consider how such 
policies affect groups whose specific interests may differ from the national 
interest” (Walsh 1999, 76).
Putting greater emphasis upon the interaction between elites and societal forces, 
the narrow definition of the “vincolo esterno” suggests that policy-makers may 
have used EMU to strengthen their positions at home (Dyson and Featherstone 
1996; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Grande 1995; Heritier and Knill 2000). Set 
against the tradition of rational-choice institutionalism, these interpretations 
indicate that EMU provides policy makers with strategic advantages, especially 
where there the State is traditionally weak. In other words, it is often used as an 
excuse to proceed with unpopular reforms. The availability of such an option 
would thus depend critically on the level of public support for EMU. The EU is 
an effective justification for reform only where the public opinion is supportive 
of the principles inspiring European integration. In this respect, the narrow 
definition of the vincolo esterno is probably illuminating in explaining the Italian 
experience with fiscal adjustment. According to Eurobarometer, Italy enjoyed 
levels of EU public support that were substantially higher than in other member 
states {Eurobarometer, various issues). No surprise then that successive 
governments in the 1990s presented deficit reduction as the condition that would
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save the country from exclusion from the European project Nevertheless, this 
interpretative perspective says little about the choice over the composition of 
fiscal reform. In addition, while it is true that the Germans continued to be 
strongly attached to their national currency and were generally sceptical of the 
Euro, this does not explain why the Kohl Government failed to provide the 
degree of fiscal discipline everyone one was striving for, considering that 
financial stability was, as much as the DM, a national value embedded in formal 
and informal institutions.
2.2. The position of state administrations
In the previous section, I have suggested that external pressures may account for 
nominal fiscal convergence and for the timing of reform across the EU. Still, the 
Maastricht commitment meant different things for different people, which is by 
itself indication of the fact that fiscal consolidation cannot be explained by 
exclusive reference to outside events. And indeed the Maastricht Treaty is unable 
to provide an explanation for persistently different real fiscal positions, be they 
the degree of fiscal discipline or the content of budgetary adjustment, aspects 
which neither tying one’s hand theories nor the literature on the “vincolo 
esterno” nor arguments about the threat of exclusion from European monetary 
unification can satisfactorily account for. Against this context, there is no doubt 
that domestic factors are paramount. Even domestically, one should distinguish 
between top-down and bottom-up dynamics, though the borders here are much 
more in flux.
Political elites and state administrations can be regarded as domestic forces 
capable of imposing pressures for change from above. Inaugurated with the 
publication of the pioneering research “Bringing the State Back In”, an important 
strand of literature has contended that dramatic policy reform can only come on 
the initiative of a powerful state administration (Skocpol and Evans 1985). This 
and other state-centred explanations of reform are predicated on three main 
assumptions. First, communities of experts are important inputs to the decision­
making process. They induce preference formation and allow for policy learning
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(Heclo 1974; Hall 1989; Radaelli 1999). In this sense, it is to be expected that 
policy reform is undertaken following optimal recipes, or at least those perceived 
as such. In the case of fiscal policy, one would expect the application of the tax- 
smoothing principle, just to name an example. Second, any reform is conditioned 
by policy legacies, either success or failure stories, and state administrations 
figure as the guardians of these legacies (Hall 1989; Skocpol 1992). Third, it is 
assumed that the State acts autonomously from society. This implies by 
extension that only strong States are capable of initiating and then realising 
policy change.
Undoubtedly, state administrations are central to the budgetary process. Officials 
play a pivotal role in the drafting of budget laws before these are passed through 
to parliament and, even more so, in the implementation phase. Still, even at first 
sight, state-centred explanations appear to entail some limits when it comes to 
explain fiscal policy outcomes. It is unclear how state administrations could 
affect medium- and long-term aspects of deficit reduction such as the persistence 
of discretionary fiscal discipline or what role they could play in the definition of 
the content of fiscal reform, where it is clear at the outset that this does not 
follow the principle of optimality. Often researchers have supported the view that 
state administrations and experts play a greater role in the case of complex policy 
areas whose distributional implications are either unclear or unpredictable 
(McNamara 1998). My belief is that fiscal policy does not fall under this 
category. Because the distributional impact of fiscal policy decisions tends to be 
both far-reaching and visible, it is extremely difficult to allow policy formulation 
to take place behind closed doors. In the following paragraphs, I shall test the 
validity of state-centred approaches to macroeconomic adjustment by discussing 
the relative explanatory power of the three assumptions mentioned above.
As to the first, bureaucrats can either be experts themselves or they can establish 
strong ties with communities of experts whose comparative advantage over 
policy-makers relates to their access and understanding of the relevant 
information. Game-theorists would talk of the existence of informational 
asymmetries between experts and politicians (Krehbiel 1991). However, it is not 
always true that state administrators are neutral to the content of the decisions
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they take and that optimality shall prevail. For one, bureaucrats can be affiliated 
more or less explicitly to political parties, through which they embrace views 
about desirable fiscal policy targets. Moreover, they can have a vested interest in 
the policies they design. There is an important strand of literature, which 
developed mostly in the 1970s, arguing that officials support public sector 
expansion, hence fiscal profligacy rather than discipline, as any public 
expenditure cut has the potential of threatening their own position (Tullock 1975; 
Niskanen 1975; Buchanan 1978; Przeworski 1990; Finlay 1990; Olson 1982).
But even imagining that bureaucrats are the neutral and efficient decision makers 
the literature is attempting to portray, the process of fiscal convergence in the 
run-up to EMU entails a few characteristics that are hardly reconcilable with this 
view. First, and most importantly, EU governments had to take budget decisions 
within a relative short-time horizon. Probably, this did not allow them to opt for 
efficiency. There is extensive evidence of fiscal policy makers having 
implemented one-off fiscal measures simply with the immediate objective of 
cutting the net borrowing requirement the following year in mind. Secondly, the 
existence of a specific numerical target for the public deficit implied that all 
governments were deprived of the choice over the most appropriate deficit level; 
which by itself constrained the full exploitation of their economic expertise3.
According to the second assumption, state administrations are in the privileged 
position to guard policy legacies from which they can draw lessons. Already in 
1935, Schattschneider noted that “policies create politics” meaning that past 
policies produce resources, incentives and learning effects on governmental elites. 
More recently, it has been similarly explained that past policies exert feed back 
effects, possibly even expanding state capacities, and eventually having a clear 
bearing on future decisions (Hall 1989; Skocpol 1992, 58; Pierson 2000). This 
interpretation has been applied quite extensively to explain Italy’s experience 
with budget consolidation in the 1990s. It has been suggested, for example, that a 
long history of policy failures in the area of fiscal policy led to institutional
3 It is well documented that many economists across the EU expressed doubts over the soundness 
of the 3 percent target, often even those in the role o f government advisers. Some commentators 
give a political explanation for the choice o f that specific deficit level, arguing that it coincided 
with the German net borrowing requirement at the time in which the Maastricht Treaty provisions 
were being designed (see Walsh 2000, 97-104).
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reform of the budgetary process in the late 1980s. This represented an essential 
precondition to the conquest of fiscal discipline during the 1990s (Radaelli 2000). 
Nevertheless, policy learning is incapable of accounting for other aspects of 
fiscal reform. In the case of Italy, for example, deficit reduction continued being 
undertaken on the revenue side of the budget, a strategy applied in the past, but 
one that economists had never failed to criticise. Thus, there is no clear-cut 
evidence of policy learning effects when it comes to giving reasons for the 
content of macroeconomic adjustment. If one interprets the feed-back metaphor 
more mechanically, then it is also not necessarily true that EMU candidates’ 
choice for a revenue-based consolidation stemmed from the fact that revenue 
budget items are notably more flexible than spending items (De Haan, de Kam 
and Sterks 1992, 7), which would confirm past public policies and in particular 
the financing structure of government programme-directed policy change in the 
1990s. As a matter of fact, still sticking to the Italian case, successive 
governments did implement a few expenditure cuts. Also, other EMU candidates 
opted for largely expenditure-based adjustments, which also indicates that the 
relative flexibility of budget items was not always present and was not 
necessarily a constraint on future policy decisions. I contend that past policies are 
not relevant because of the impact they exercise on governmental actors and 
structures, but rather because of feed-back effects on domestic interest groups 
and the public at large (see Pierson 1994; Myles and Quadagno 1997; Immergut 
1992). The crucial point is that the financing structure of public programmes 
establishes beneficiaries. Fiscal reform proposals have the potential of altering 
their position - the most notable example being pension reform - and are thus 
more than likely to attract the opposition of vested interests (see Anderson 2001). 
To sum up, past policies matter in fiscal adjustment only to the extent that they 
have induced the formation of specific vested interests.
Third and linked to the considerations above, it seems highly unrealistic to 
assume state autonomy in fiscal policy-making. Decisions about the scope and 
distribution of public money touch on a multiplicity of socio-economic interests. 
In addition, when it comes to retrenchment, these interests are normally 
concentrated, thus functioning as powerful veto points (Pierson 2001). Having 
succeeded in mobilising large part of society in favour of welfare expansion in
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the post-war period (Korpi 1983), European labour unions now prove to be 
crucial actors in any decision concerning welfare retrenchment, mostly opposing 
it, even if to different extents and for different reasons across the EU (Brugiavini 
et al. 2000). By the same token, where welfare reform did in fact take place, this 
was feasible only thanks to the explicit support of social partners (Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997). Moreover, most case studies indicate that the involvement of 
labour unions and employers’ associations in the framing of fiscal policy 
decisions had little to do with the strength of the state, a trait the literature 
mentioned often insists upon. The evidence is in fact mixed. States have proved 
able to lead negotiations with the social partners thanks to their indisputable 
strength, as was the case for Germany in the 1980s (Gualmini 1997). But, social 
partners can be directly and effectively involved where weak states are looking 
for a social legitimisation of their actions -  the Italian experience in the 1990s is 
a case in point. This suggests that the relative power of the state is not 
independent from society; it is actually defined by the society it speaks to. To 
conclude, technocratic politics, policy legacies and the assumption of state 
autonomy find weak support in the real world and vacillate in front of the need to 
account for the emergence of social consensus (or lack of it) in favour of fiscal 
discipline and of the ways to achieve it. Wildavsky is probably right in saying:
“if politics is regarded as conflict over whose preferences shall prevail in the 
determination of national policy, then the budget records the outcome of this 
struggle” (Wildavsky 1979, 4). In this sense, other elements should be 
incorporated in the analysis that takes account of bottom-up inputs to fiscal 
policy-making.
2.3. Political and fiscal institutionalism
I have shown above that state-centred explanations have little explanatory power 
when it comes to accounting for the run-up to EMU. In so doing, I have worked 
from an actor-based analysis showing that state officials, while being constituent 
parts of fiscal policy-making and of the budgetary process in particular, cannot 
“go it alone”. This is not to say that state structures do not matter at all. 
Somewhere between top-down and bottom-up approaches, institutionalism
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suggests that national fiscal performances are strongly dependent upon the 
institutional setting in which budget decisions are taken, and more precisely upon 
party structures and budget institutions. From there and with some degree of 
simplification, one can identify two strands in the literature: political and fiscal 
institutionalism (Poterba and von Hagen 1999). According to these 
interpretations, fiscal discipline emerges where the government in power faces a 
limited number of veto points, as in the case of single-party governments, and 
where the budgetary process is efficiently designed, namely it is transparent and 
largely insulated from parliamentary amendments.
Originated in the US, institutionalist accounts of fiscal consolidation have 
become popular also in Europe in more recent years once the Maastricht Treaty 
had institutionalised the principle of sound public finances. Political 
institutionalists argued that any form of political instability, whatever the source, 
discourages fiscal prudence. As they give rise to coalitional governments, 
proportional representation systems (PR) are generally associated with poor 
fiscal performances. The underlying argument is that, against a high number of 
parties, fiscal discipline is more difficult to achieve because no one party would 
accept to bear the burden of adjustment; each one will then exercise its veto 
power (Alesina and Tabellini 1987; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Grilli, Masciandaro 
and Tabellini 1991). Economists have also gone as far as to evaluate the effect of 
political institutions on the composition of budgetary adjustment. In a panel data 
analysis looking at 20 OECD countries in the period 1960-1992, Alesina and 
Perotti have demonstrated that coalitional governments, when successful in 
budget consolidation, rely almost exclusively on interventions on the revenue 
side of the budget (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 21). Again the argument is 
modelled around the collective action problem by which, in the presence of 
multiple actors, it is easier to impose the diffuse costs from higher fiscal pressure 
than the concentrated costs that welfare retrenchment tends to produce. By the 
same token, single-party governments are seen as more efficient fiscal reformers 
and better capable at imposing discipline on the expenditure side of the budget.
In addition, besides party structures, the length of government tenure - actual or 
expected (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991) - should also bear an impact
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on fiscal policy outcomes as, for example, governments not expecting to be re­
elected would not embark on unpopular fiscal retrenchment.
As opposed to political institutionalism, which is in fact quite generic, fiscal 
institutionalism focuses more specifically on the formal institutional setting in 
which decisions take place. The budgetary process has been often defined as a 
“locus of conflict resolution” (European Commission 1994). The circumstances 
under which the conflict is solved depend upon the rules and norms 
characterising the budget process itself. There is an extensive literature 
demonstrating that budget procedural rules at all stages, during the governmental, 
parliamentary and the implementation phase, affect fiscal policy outcomes (von 
Hagen and Harden 1994; European Commission 2000). Amongst the most 
comprehensive cross-country investigations of budget rules is the European 
Commission Report “Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the 
European Communities” (von Hagen 1992). By looking at the particular shape of 
budget institutions, von Hagen constructed a “structural budget index”, which he 
showed to be correlated with countries’ relative fiscal prudence. The composite 
index addresses five dimensions of the budgetary process: 1) the structure of 
budget negotiations within government; 2) the structure of the parliamentary 
stage; 3) the transparency of the initial budget draft; 4) the flexibility of budget 
execution; 5) the presence (or not) of some form of long-term financial planning 
procedure. He came to the conclusion that: “budget procedures lead to greater 
fiscal discipline if they give strong prerogative to the Prime or Finance Minister, 
limit universalism, reciprocity and parliamentary amendments, and facilitate 
strict execution of the budget” (von Hagen 1992). Hallerberg provides a more 
recent estimate of the degree of efficiency in the budgetary process by looking at 
most of von Hagen’s variables and capturing them in a composite index. 
Interestingly enough, he compares the situation in the early 1990s with that at the 
end of the decade (Hallerberg 2004).
It remains to be seen if institutionalist explanations can satisfactorily account for 
the unexpected fiscal performances of Germany and Italy in the 1990s (Chapter 
III and V address the issue). Still, at a theoretical level, it should be noted that 
this literature is more interested in the transmission mechanism from fiscal inputs
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to outputs rather than in the nature of the input, which is instead the focus of the 
present thesis. Most importantly and linked to the previous point, both political 
and fiscal institutions do not operate in a vacuum. Fiscal contractions tend to 
have so far-reaching implications for domestic socio-economic interests that it is 
unrealistic to expect that the interests that are often represented within 
institutions do not become suddenly visible, and possibly active in a way that 
may well be contrary to the traditional operation of that particular institution. 
This is not to say that state structures play no role, yet they only matter to the 
extent that they channel societal claims by defining, for example, interest groups’ 
access to policy-making. In this thesis, I intend to focus on this latter aspect, i.e. 
the relationship between state structures and society rather than on the technical 
transmission mechanism through which inputs turn into outputs.
3. The Leverage of Bottom-Up Explanations
In the previous paragraphs, I have suggested that top-down explanations are not 
always persuasive when it comes to accounting for deficit reduction, and 
especially not if applied to the Italian and German experiences with budgetary 
consolidation in the run-up to EMU; though the latter will emerge more clearly 
in the empirical chapters (Chapters III, IV, V, VI). The following section focuses 
on bottom-up interpretations -i.e. partisanship, new politics of the welfare state, 
corporatism, and interest group politics. As has been insisted upon earlier, fiscal 
policy has such significant distributional implications that it is hard to believe 
that structures matter more than preferences or, and similarly, that decisions are 
not entrenched in socio-economic interests. I will explore here the relevance of 
partisanship to assess if and to what extent, according to existing literature, the 
ideological orientation of the party in power would affect fiscal policy outcomes. 
Secondly, with a more institutionalist flavour, the new politics of the welfare 
state literature supports the view that fiscal austerity runs against multiple veto 
points consisting both of voters and minority vested interests, in most cases 
labour unions. This theoretical approach can be seen as a sort of institutionalism 
from below, as it focuses on the existence of formal opposition at the micro-
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foundations of fiscal policy formulation. This links nicely to neo-corporatist 
studies exploring the contribution of social partners to policy-making. The latter 
is certainly an attractive perspective that ties appropriately with the two cases 
analysed here, with Italian governments, on the one hand, successfully 
concluding agreements with the social partners and the Kohl government, on the 
other hand, failing to put in place a comprehensive political exchange with 
national peak associations. Nevertheless, I argue that, while crucial to the 
understanding of fiscal consolidation episodes, the (institutionalist) literature on 
corporatism falls short of taking actual interest groups’ preferences into account.
I shall then conclude by recalling contributions from the literature that look 
specifically at the role of socio-economic interests and at the ways in which these 
can inform policy outcomes; this refers to interest group politics and preference- 
based approaches.
3.1. The fate of ideology under permanent austerity
There is hardly a more contentious and debated issue in comparative political 
economy than the role of partisanship. Starting with Hibbs, left-wing 
governments have been always associated with fiscal profligacy, whereas right- 
wing parties adopted restrictive fiscal policies, largely in the expectation that 
these keep inflationary pressures at bay (Hibbs 1977; Hibbs and Masden 1981; 
Cameron 1984). There is however an extensive successive literature arguing that, 
in the era of globalisation and with the prevailing of a neo-liberal consensus in 
favour of fiscal rectitude, budget preferences between Left and Right have in fact 
faded away. On the one hand, national governments are said to be unable to 
manage their own economies at all. In Europe, fiscal policy would be constrained 
by full capital mobility after 1990 and by the need to stick to fixed exchange 
rates; even if only until the ERM crisis in September 1992 for some EU member 
states. On the other hand, imagining that they still retain some room for 
manoeuvre, the same external economic conditions highlighted above do not 
allow leftist governments to pursue their traditional constituents’ interests. Large 
public budgets stop being an option; the little fiscal stimulus that they can inject 
into the economy is nothing different from that which conservatives can do.
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Indeed, most of the research focusing on the role of partisanship under austerity 
is unconvincing. It is so because results are mixed, hence largely inconclusive. 
Besides the two extreme views of partisanship - one where it is believed to affect 
fiscal policy choices and the other ascribing no role to it at all - there are subtler 
conceptualisations of the new role of ideology in an internationalised economy. 
Global markets do not necessarily lead to left-wing parties behaving like right- 
wing ones. True, they may have abandoned demand management but not 
necessarily reduced their level of intervention in the economy. The Left will 
continue supporting the goal of full employment by spending, for example, on 
human capital formation, hence mainly relying on supply-side reforms (Boix 
1997; Boix 1998). More paradoxically, other researchers even argue that leftist 
governments are better able to implement unpopular reform such as welfare cuts 
because the party’s reputation sends a reassuring message to voters and 
organised socio-economic interests alike (Ross 1998; Armigeon et al. 2001). 
Going against the current conventional wisdom, Garrett argues that under capital 
mobility social democratic governments prove to be more generous fiscal 
spenders as they need to compensate losers from globalisation (Garrett and 
Lange 1991). Throwing a bridge across to neo-corporatist literature, Korpi 
argued that ideology continues to be an important determinant of fiscal policy 
outcomes and that it is more important where there are strong encompassing 
unions support the government in power (Korpi and Palme 2001).
The ambiguity of the research results is probably to be ascribed to the fact that 
there is no common definition of austerity and that most researchers tend to 
associate it with a change in the level of social expenditures as a proportion of 
GDP. This is not necessarily the best measure of welfare retrenchment as it 
misses the qualitative dimension of the problem. Responding to this 
methodological concern, Korpi focused on social rights curtailment (Korpi and 
Palme 2001). Pierson looked simultaneously at social spending levels and 
changes to benefit entitlements (Pierson 1996). Here, where the focus is fiscal 
discipline in general rather than how it is achieved, I intend to look at 
interventions both on the revenue and on the expenditure side of the budget 
introduced with the primary goal of cutting the public deficit. Once the priority is
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balancing the budget, then any fiscal decision consists of a trade-off choice. Even 
in the 1970s, welfare expansion was to come with greater fiscal pressure. 
Similarly, in the 1990s, where leftist governments refuse to cut welfare 
programmes, they are forced by default to accept greater fiscal pressure4. Against 
this background, this thesis attempts to test if ideological preferences affected 
fiscal authorities’ positioning on the indifference curve that pictures the trade-off 
between lower expenditures and greater public incomes, once balanced budgets 
are accepted as primary aim.
There is only a limited number of studies that focused on the impact of 
partisanship on the composition of fiscal consolidation. In particular, Alesina and 
Perotti have demonstrated that leftist parties are more likely to adjust fiscal 
imbalances by intervening on the revenue side of the budget. Instead, 
conservative parties tend to opt for spending restraints (Alesina and Perotti 1995; 
Alesina and Perotti 1996). The underlying assumption is that revenue 
maximization consists de facto in an enlargement of the role of the state, and is 
therefore preferred by the Left (Fatas and Mihov 2003). By the same token, 
right-wing parties would choose cuts to social security programmes and to public 
wages as a means to minimise public interference with the markets as well as to 
please state-unfriendly financial markets (Krugman 2001).5
In reality, there is not only a problem with the definition of austerity. The very 
distinction between Left and Right is somehow simplistic and falls short of 
providing a realistic picture of parties’ positioning in front of different issues. 
Similarly to the concept of the median voter, the Manichean distinction between 
two extreme ideological poles does not capture the fact that political beliefs are 
multidimensional. In turn, the present research looks not only at political parties’ 
ideological heritage but also digs into their expressed preferences vis-a-vis single 
issues. From a methodological perspective, the latter is certainly a much more 
challenging task but is well supported by recent content analyses of electoral 
manifestoes (see Budge et al. 2001). And indeed, the distinction between actual
4 See for a similar conceptualization o f fiscal policy decisions, see (Korpi and Palme 2001)
5 Still, not all agree with the proposition that market participants approve o f spending cuts, while 
punishing tax increases. Through a series o f interviews, Mosley argues that it is the size o f deficit 
reduction that matters at the end of the day (Mosley 2004, 749).
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and declared fiscal preferences is significant, as the two should not necessarily 
coincide6.
3.2. The new politics of the welfare state and beyond
EMU candidate countries were to face difficult choices, having to strike a 
compromise between three not easily reconcilable pressures: the Maastricht 
commitment and its severe fiscal prescriptions, their own ideological preferences 
and, thirdly, the views of their electorate and/or affiliated interest groups. For 
once, partisanship is significant only to the extent that it does shed light on the 
relationship between governments and society. In this respect, any investigation 
on the political economy of fiscal adjustment should also look at the second 
reference object, namely society. The latter can impose severe constraints on 
public authorities’ ability to pursue preferred or optimal fiscal policy recipes. 
First, electorates can feel that they have different priorities from their own 
governments. Second, labour unions, especially where well organised, can 
certainly obstruct undesired government decisions. They will do so by depriving 
the elected of their specific support, financial in addition to political, or more 
generally of the underlying social consensus. The latter tends to happen in those 
cases where unions are also political actors, in the wider sense.
The achievement of fiscal discipline is an unpopular exercise. Even if it is true 
that diverse strategies are available to cut the public deficit, there is wider 
consensus on the fact that, in the back of de-industrialization and of the ageing of 
the European population, welfare reform should be the way to go or at least 
where to start from, would sustainable fiscal stability be in governments’ 
intention. Pierson explains that any attempt at reducing citizens’ welfare will 
incur high electoral as well as socio-political costs. Following from arguments on 
path dependency and socio-political inertia (Visser and Hemerijck 1997), the 
new politics of the welfare state literature suggests that welfare states are in 
general highly resistant to change. Secondly, if governments do reform welfare 
states, they will opt for blame-avoidance strategies, so as to minimise the
6 In a similar vein, Cusack has made a distinction between government partisanship and demand- 
side partisanship (Cusack 1997).
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unavoidable political costs (Weaver 1986). This type of literature implies by 
extension that the position of the median voter is more relevant than the partisan 
complexion of government7, where the latter are seen primarily as rent-seeking 
actors. Third and finally, welfare beneficiaries not necessarily coinciding with 
labour unions’ membership tout court will oppose retrenchment (Pierson 2001).
The empirical evidence on fiscal adjustment in the run-up to EMU is not 
completely supportive of all the tenets behind the new politics of the welfare 
state literature. In most EU member states, welfare reforms were implemented 
(e.g. Italy: 1995 pension reform), even if in completely different contexts. 
Blame-avoidance probably did take place but is nonetheless a soft component; 
one that research on fiscal policy outcomes should not necessarily look at. There 
is more convincing evidence about the role of welfare beneficiaries, and in 
particular of labour unions. Having said this, large cross-country differences 
concerning the degree and type of social partners’ involvement in fiscal policy 
decisions suggest that the argument about beneficiaries’ unconditional veto is 
probably too naive. Indeed, because most decisions require an evaluation of costs 
and benefits, preferences are far from unconditional. Instead, they would appear 
to be very much dependent on contingencies, such as incentives and/or 
compensation mechanisms. The trade-off arises because, when fiscal discipline is 
an accepted target, failure to tackle expensive welfare programmes will translate 
into either lower public investment or greater fiscal pressure. In this respect, the 
new politics of the welfare state suffers also from a theoretical flaw to the extent 
that it does not recognise that the resilience of some public programmes may lead, 
for example, to even higher, real or perceived, costs than their actual reform. To 
account for these aspects, this thesis attempts in turn to visualise the structure of 
such trade-off choices by looking at Italian and German interest groups.
Again from a rather theoretical perspective, this literature is possibly too 
dramatic in the relaxation of the Right/Left paradigm. Partisanship may not 
function in the way it has traditionally done, as highlighted above, but this does 
not mean necessarily that it is irrelevant. Parties can use partisanship strategically
7 According to Downs’ democratic theory (Downs 1957).
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(Scharpf 1991). Finally and most importantly for the present research agenda, as 
Hemerijck and Visser note, “there is not much room in these accounts for 
negotiated reform, for compromises between political reformers and the 
representatives of organised interest groups” (Visser and Hemerijck 1997, 52) an 
argument that is certainly related to criticisms concerning the naive 
conceptualisation of socio-economic interests. The possibility of a political 
exchange between politicians, as rent seeking as they could be, and well 
organised entrenched intermediate organizations is just not taken into account.
3.3. The contribution of neo-corporatism
Intermediate organizations dispose of diverse means through which they can 
inform fiscal policy-making processes and try to affect or alter outcomes. The 
neo-corporatist literature does not always distinguish clearly between their 
contribution to the actual process (Schmitter 1974; Schmidt 1982; Katzenstein 
1985; Alvarez et al. 1991) and to the outcome, where the latter would require in 
most cases a sophisticated evaluation of unions’ and employers’ economic 
behaviour and of their internalisation, for example, of the trade-off between low 
inflation and employment along the lines of the Phillips-Curve model. The three 
most common channels through which organised interest groups participate to 
policy are lobbying, informal and formal consultation. Lobbying activities are an 
integral part of today’s affluent democracies, widespread phenomena that are 
probably not necessarily relevant in this research context. As a matter of fact, 
lobbying does not automatically imply that these groups affect actual outcomes, 
which are instead the focus of this research. Informal consultation arises when 
governments consciously seek advice and support from the social partners, an 
example being Chancellor Kohl’s so-called Kanzlerrunde. Only a case-by-case 
evaluation can tell if these arrangements bear an impact on outcomes. Finally, 
formal consultation would require instead a recognisable institutional setting 
against which decisions are taken according to commonly agreed rules and 
norms, as in corporatist realities. And here because the agreements are usually 
structured on a political exchange (Pizzomo 1978), it is extremely troublesome to 
differentiate between the participation of social partners in the process and their
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contribution to the outcome. The ambiguity is ingrained in Cawson’s definition 
of corporatism:
Corporatism is a specific socio-political process in which a limited number of  
monopolistic organizations representing fundamental interests engage in 
bargaining with state agencies over public policy outputs. In exchange for 
favourable policies, leaders o f interest organizations agree to undertake the 
implementation of policy through determining the co-operation of their 
members” (Cawson 1987, 105).
This thesis looks at formal consultation with particular attention to tripartite 
agreements between government, employers and unions (so-called social pacts) 
and in so doing it shall simultaneously consider social partners’ contribution both 
to the process and the outcome. As to the first, under austerity, governments 
resorted to organised interests mostly with the aim of legitimising their fiscal 
policy decisions. Often retrenchment took place with unions’ consent (Fajertag 
and Pochet 2000; Baccaro 2000; Anderson 2001) and certainly, as Bordogna and 
Celia note: “they would have fiercely opposed similar measures if they had been 
introduced by the State” (Bordogna and Celia 1999). As to outcomes, many 
authors have established a clear-cut link between the conclusion of social pacts 
and successful fiscal consolidation (Sestito 2002; Hancke and Rhodes 2004). To 
the extent that these always revolve around voluntary wage restraint (Hassel 
2003), corporatist arrangements clearly overlap with wage bargaining, thereby 
making visible the link between models of corporatism and macroeconomic
Q
performance . Looking at fiscal performance, pay restraint bears an impact via 
multiple channels. When it improves the employment rate, public spending on 
the unemployed diminishes and revenues from social security contributions 
increase. Second, wage moderation in the public sector has a direct beneficial 
impact on public employee compensations. Third, voluntary wage restraint 
should keep inflation at bay, thereby reducing or preserving the real value of 
interest payments.
8 Somehow merging their contribution to both the process and the outcomes, Rhodes talks of  
“competitive corporatism” (Rhodes 1997). While aiming to provide a name for this new 
constellation o f preferences and strategies, he de facto  acknowledges that they exercise an impact 
on countries’ competitive performance by means of reducing unit labour costs.
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And there is an extensive literature on the impact of corporatist arrangements on 
economic indicators and performance. In general, it has been argued that they are 
valuable because they prove capable of simultaneously performing allocative and 
distributive policy tasks (Katzenstein 1985; Hicks and Kenworthy 1998). 
According to Cameron, corporatism in the 1970s allowed governments to 
achieve two, often irreconcilable, policy goals: high levels of employment and 
low inflation (Cameron 1978). Borrowing from Scharpf (1991), Hassel points to 
the fact, with the new social pacts of the 1980s and 1990s, governments can 
partially offset the negative effects from monetary adjustment (Hassel 2003). 
Looking at wage bargaining systems and thus only directly at varieties of 
corporatism, Calmfors and Driffil explained that employment does not always 
improve where social partners have the power to shape wage policy. It depends 
more specifically on the structure of wage bargaining. In a nutshell, centralised 
and decentralised systems tend to do better than moderately centralised ones 
(Calmfors and Driffil 1988; Streeck 1994). Others enriched the argument by 
incorporating monetary policy into the model and arguing that central bank 
independence adds to centralised collective bargaining to the extent that, being a 
credible threat in the eyes of wage bargainers, it minimises de facto the trade-off 
between growth and low inflation, with bargainers conscious of the fact that 
aggregate price effects will not be accommodated (Hall and Franzese 1998; 
Soskice and Iversen 1998; Iversen 1999).
More specifically to the budgetary process, Rubin adopts an institutionalist 
approach to show that openness of the budget process to socio-economic groups 
has just the effect of amplifying the number of claims and requests, inevitably 
exercising upward pressures on public expenditures (Rubin 1997). By contrast, 
Perotti suggested that openness to few monopoly organizations might indeed be 
beneficial as it channels clearly defined socio-economic interests (Perotti,
Strauch and von Hagen 1998). The underlying argument is indebted to Olson’s 
collective action model. Animated by the same inspiring principles and more 
distinctively to the link between fiscal and wage policies, Summers at al. 
demonstrated that, in corporatist regimes, labour taxation tends to be both higher 
and less distortionary. Because peak associations internalise the effects from 
augmented SSC in exchange for greater social expenditures, higher labour
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taxation does not have the effect of dampening labour supply (Summer et al. 
1993). Still, compensations in the form of more generous spending programmes 
are not always available. Acocella et al. suggested however that this does not 
necessarily alter the nature of the exchange between government and unions. 
Even under austerity, monopoly unions internalise negative macroeconomic 
externalities arising from the exchange between wage moderation and lower 
public expenditures (Acocella, Di Bartolomeo and Tirelli 2004). Indeed, there 
are degrees by which welfare programmes can be cut back.
While the degree of centralization and other institutional characteristics of the 
bargaining process are fundamental when it comes to account for the feasibility, 
for example, of collective decisions, i.e. the possibility of actually implementing 
collectively agreed wage moderation, they shed little light on the actual 
preferences of social partners. The same criticism was directed to the new 
politics of the welfare state literature said to underestimate the concrete and 
contingent interests of organised groups and the fact that they constantly face 
trade-off rather than linear choices. If it is true that institutions might coincide 
with the interests they represent -as seems to be the case for corporatist 
institutions, then it may well be that a specific distribution of socio-economic 
preferences is what explains the emergence (or not) of social pacts. In this 
respect, this research also contributes to neo-corporatist literature in determining 
whether “the institutional bias in neo-corporatist theory meant that all of these 
explanations underplayed actors’ rational calculation of their interests and 
objectives in creating corporatist institutions” (Rhodes and Molina 2002, 314).
4. Bringing Socio-Economic Preferences Back In
This thesis revolves around the assumption that interests matter more than 
institutions or, at least, that it is not necessarily easy to distinguish between the 
two, considering that normally institutions are modelled around the socio­
economic interests they represent and that any separation of the two is somehow 
artificial. In Chapter I, I have insisted upon the fact that budget consolidation is a
63
multidimensional exercise. As its dimensions vary, so should the preferences 
confronting them. Where should one go to identify preferences when faced with 
fiscal consolidation? What is the most appropriate level of analysis and of 
aggregation? Around what cleavages are these preferences organised? The 
following sections look, first, at existing literature that has analysed the role of 
vested interests, or raw preferences, in economic policy-making. Secondly, I will 
go through the patchy current wisdom on interests and fiscal consolidation, 
trying to order preferences in front of the different dimensions of fiscal reform, 
and in particular of composition. This shall be just a tentative scheme, one that 
only the empirical research can definitely validate or invalidate, as is done in 
Chapter VII.
4.1. Vested interests and economic policy
As highlighted above, the bulk of the literature on neo-corporatism is 
institutional in essence. The underlying argument is that socio-economic interests 
affect policy outcomes because they are granted access to the policy-making 
process. The corporatist literature falls short of constructing hypotheses about the 
actual preferences of social partners. In general, there is no doubt that they 
promote the cause of their members and try to improve their political status. 
However, it is not always clear what the fiscal interests of employers and 
workers are. Not only are their preferences likely to be affected by factors other 
than class (e.g. economic sector, size of the group, outsiders vs. insiders), but 
also general macroeconomic conditions might have a bearing on the shaping of 
these preferences and, more so, on their evolution.
In recent years, preferences have somehow returned to the centre of political 
economists’ attention. Moravcsik referred to preferences when describing 
national governments’ behaviour at the EU negotiating table (Moravcsik 1998). 
Verdun resorted to this conceptual category to explain different approaches to, 
and implementations of, EMU in some EU member states (Verdun 2000). More 
often, researchers have looked to preferences to account for different policy 
outcomes across countries exposed to the same external constraint or over time in
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the same country (Gourevitch 1986; Milner 19881; Frieden 1991; Milner 1997; 
Hall 1989, 1997; Frieden 1999). When focusing on preferences, two fundamental 
issues should be addressed. Firstly, one has to establish a strategy to identify and 
aggregate such a complex and heterogeneous variable. Secondly, one needs to 
explain how preferences influence policy. While the neo-corporatist studies and 
institutionalism more generally provide a good answer to the second question9, 
the former is probably under-researched, especially in relation to the exercise of 
fiscal adjustment10.
There is a substantial number of studies considering functional coalitions of 
interests and their impact on government economic policies; in most cases, the 
reference is to trade policies. Most of these studies aggregate preferences around 
actors’ market position. Rogowski suggested that trade policy outcomes are 
affected by countries’ relative factor endowment in capital, labour and land 
(Rogowsky 1989). Gourevitch, Milner and Henning have all identified 
differences between export-oriented and domestic-market-oriented business 
sectors (Gourevitch 1986; Milner 1988; Henning 1994). Working from a similar 
aggregation of interests, Frieden demonstrated that export-oriented business is 
keener to partake of monetary integration than more insulated actors (Frieden
1991). Looking beyond producers, Swenson argued that employers in key export 
sectors ally with workers against employers and workers in sheltered sectors to 
preserve wage rates or promote skill differentials vis-a-vis the other group 
(Swenson 1991). With an eye on types of product, Rodrik showed that the 
preferences of producers of tradable goods vary from non-tradable producers 
(Rodrik 1994). All these works share common traits, i.e. they are quite static 
assigning preferences a priori in addition to deriving them merely from market
9 It is fair to say that the distinction is not necessarily so clear-cut, as in Milner’s words: “the 
preferences o f different interest groups are weighted by their access to policy-making 
institutions” (Milner 1992, 494). Another example o f studies that fail to distinguish between the 
identification o f raw preferences and o f the instruments to transform them into policy outcomes is 
the so-called power-resource literature. Exponents of this approach studied the preferences of  
those in power looking at Left and Right and their respective alliances with labour and capital 
(Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983; Castles 1982, 1998; Esping-Andersen 1985; Baldwin 1990). The 
crucial argument is that the governing party would implement policies that please her natural 
constituents grouped around classes.
10 Instead, Garrett and Lange provide a valuable account o f the role o f preferences and 
institutions that simultaneously addresses both questions (Garrett and Lange in Keohane et al. 
1996, 48-75).
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position. These assumptions are unconvincing. Preferences are likely to evolve in 
response to changing external conditions and, as Kindstone notes, “the market 
leaves preferences underdetermined” (Kingstone 2001, 988). Therefore, there is 
probably more to preferences than market position.
4.2. Vested interests in fiscal adjustment
It was suggested above that most of the political economy of reform can be 
explained in terms of prevailing preferences and that, in turn, accounting for 
preferences is probably one the central challenges facing political economy (Hall 
in Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997, 174-207). While the previous part generally 
dealt with vested interests in economy policy-making and outcomes, this section 
discusses specifically fiscal preferences by focusing on the socio-economic 
categories, other than governmental actors, that seemed to have played a central 
role in EMU-induced macroeconomic adjustment, namely national social 
partners. Here I will lay out the conventional wisdom on the fiscal/budget 
preferences of social partners by relying on available literature. This a priori 
classificatory scheme is only intended to provide some guidelines to the 
empirical research that follows, and is thus likely to be altered when tested in 
specific real-world conditions (see Chapter VII).
Independently of how it is pursued, fiscal consolidation involves some social 
costs. Governments find it difficult to distribute them evenly; hence most 
stabilization policies are about the choice over what socio-economic category 
shall prevail. In turn, debt management should be interpreted as a redistributive 
struggle between competing economic interests, both intra-generational and 
between current and future generations. It goes without saying that societal 
conditions matter in explaining budgetary adjustment. This has not gone 
unnoticed, even by economists. There is an extensive literature on the implicit 
social contract that needs to underlie deficit reduction. More to the point, Boltho 
argued that stabilization policies are successful only in the back of vast social
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consensus (Boltho in Einaudi 1992)11. Fiscal discipline is feasible only there 
where society agrees with the goal, independently of the structure and 
functioning of formal institutions. However, albeit with a few exceptions, 
economists have failed to provide a definition of social consensus or to identify 
the conditions under which this is more likely to emerge.
A notable exception is that of Alesina and Drazen, who suggested that 
stabilization is achieved without delay once the “war of attrition” between 
competing interests over the distribution of the burden from higher taxes or 
expenditure cuts is resolved (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Drazen 2000). Indirectly, 
they provide for a conceptualisation of social consensus to the extent that they 
talk about the solution of a conflict. Their model is predicated on a number of 
assumptions. First, it is given that fiscal discipline is desirable as delay in 
adjustment entails costs in terms of distortionary taxation or inflation, a 
possibility not taken into account by the new politics of the welfare state 
literature or by path-dependency approaches with their focus on a status-quo bias. 
The same can be said for EMU-induced national experiences with budgetary 
consolidations, where general support of monetary unification, as well as the 
evidence of large public deficits having led in the 1970s to unfavourable price 
developments did not leave doubts as to desirability of fiscal discipline. Second, 
in their model, society consists of rational heterogeneous agents. This research 
looks at a much smaller number of actors -  and the link with the corporatist 
literature becomes necessary here - but departs from a similar assumption 
assigning to business and labour’s divergent interests, at least to some extent. 
Finally, the authors do not have the instruments to assess qualitatively the 
preferences of the confronting groups and, for the very same reason, do not take 
environmental changes into account when describing the dynamic evolution of 
the war of attrition. I attempt here to fill in the gaps by measuring preferences on 
the field and by relaxing the second unrealistic assumption to show how the 
changing macroeconomic environment could in fact induce different preference 
formation.
11 This strand o f literature is indebted to previous studies o f capitalism looking at the role o f the 
class compromise for the normal functioning o f capitalist economies (see Przeworski 1985).
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One good starting point might be Alesina’s attempt in 1988 to construct a 
political theory of the debt. He hypothesised a specific distribution of fiscal 
preferences identifying three categories of stakeholders: renters, business and 
wage earners. At the same time, he contemplated three possible solutions to the 
debt problem: default, inflation and tax increases. Bondholders would oppose 
both default and inflation, privileging instead a revenue-based adjustment, but 
not progressive taxation. Holders of physical capital would support default and 
inflation, the latter in particular allowing for a reduction of real wages and the 
stimulation of exports where conducive to exchange rate depreciation. Their 
position vis-a-vis tax increases is less straightforward; they would however 
almost certainly oppose taxes on wealth and physical capital. Wage earners 
would be in favour of debt default, progressive income taxation as well as taxes 
on wealth and on capital. On the other side, they would oppose inflation if real 
wages were to fall (Alesina in Giavazzi and Spaventa 1988, 34-89). While this is 
possibly the clearest scheme on preference distribution that is available in the 
economics literature, it cannot be taken in full to account for EMU-induced 
stabilization. First, debt default was definitely not an option. Secondly, the policy 
of inflating away the debt was also not on hand as the Maastricht criteria also 
targeted inflation levels. In this respect, the available strategies for deficit 
reduction were at the same time narrower and wider. Governments would have to 
intervene either on the revenue or on the expenditure side of the budget; this 
meant however that, provided for the relative flexibility of each budget item, 
each of them could have been subject to reform. Bearing this in mind, the 
following paragraph derives a priori preferences for fiscal adjustment strategies 
from the existing economics and welfare literature.
Public employees and welfare beneficiaries are due to suffer from public 
spending cuts. On the contrary, most industrialists will appreciate smaller 
government in the belief that this allows for a more efficient allocation of 
resources. However, when national industrialists are also employers, then their 
preferences are less linear. There is abundant empirical evidence indicating that 
in fact business organizations support public welfare programmes (Thelen in 
Iversen et al. 2000; Swank and Martin 2001; Mares in Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Mares 2003). Not even interventions on the revenue side of the budget are
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without redistributive effects. Higher direct taxation is socially neutral only if 
completely progressive. In general, where it has the effect of slowing growth 
down, it will first of all be to the detriment of wage earners and only affect 
producers in the medium-term. On the other hand, indirect tax hikes are against 
the interests of wage earners, whose purchasing power will decrease overnight. 
Less straightforward is an evaluation of the distributional implications of 
increased SSC. The latter tend to reduce both demand for and supply of labour. 
Most importantly, they induce an internal redistribution of the adjustment burden 
between employees and employers.
At the same time, however, one should account for the fact that fiscal profligacy 
and/or exclusion from EMU following the failure to meet the Maastricht fiscal 
criteria could be even more costly than any budget consolidation episode, being 
it on the revenue or on the expenditure side of the budget. It is uncontroversial 
that most European business actors supported monetary unification, even if to 
different degrees (Moravcsik 1998), and mostly in accordance with their degree 
of external exposure (Frieden 1991). There is also convincing empirical evidence 
suggesting that most European labour unions themselves were supportive of 
EMU (Verdun 1999; Talani 2000) and, in turn, of the conditions for entry 
including fiscal discipline. In particular, besides the fear of loosing out from the 
growth effects expected from monetary unification, workers supported direct 
fiscal discipline as a means of keeping inflation at bay, especially in small 
countries for which a strong currency signified cheap imports (Jones 2005). Still, 
it is probably worth distinguishing between preferences faced with different 
dimensions of fiscal adjustment, as the latter is far from a monolithic exercise.
As far as the timing is concerned, there is no doubt that both industrialists and 
labour unions were keen on their respective governments’ capacity to cut the 
deficit in time for EMU. This is to say that they shared a common goal and the 
interaction between them results into a cooperative game more than a war-of- 
attrition in Alesina’s and Drazen’s terms. The threat of exclusion also shaped 
their preference for the extent of deficit reduction considering that there was a 
specific numerical target they had to aim for. Nevertheless, labour unions are 
probably less sophisticated in the evaluation of the pros and cons from a large vs
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small retrenchment. Business actors strongly believe in the fact that extensive
fiscal consolidation sends a credibility message to financial markets thereby
allowing for lower long-term interest rates. Supported by a series of interviews
with market participants, Mosley comes in fact to the conclusion that it is mostly
the size of deficit reduction than induces positive reactions from financial
markets (Mosley 2003). While not underestimating the role of financial markets,
labour is probably more interested in the implications of credibility on inflation
levels. A statistical evaluation of household surveys shows that consensus on
exchange rate stability in the framework of the European Monetary System
(EMS) was favoured by a general decrease in tolerance for inflation relative to
1 ^
unemployment (Collins and Giavazzi 1991) . But wage earners are also 
concerned about the fact that large deficit reduction cannot be socially neutral, as 
it would require inevitably some form of retrenchment. Still, by and large, there 
is no reason to doubt that even when it comes to the size of consolidation, 
consensus and cooperation will prevail.
Much more controversial is instead the issue of composition. Following on 
from the conventional wisdom on the preferences of labour and capital, it 
may be hypothesised that business actors privilege expenditure-based 
adjustment, whereas pro-welfare coalitions such as unions opt for revenue- 
based deficit reduction, albeit by default. Here, conflict is likely to arise, so 
that the recalled war of attrition would revolve around the composition of 
adjustment and the strategy eventually chosen by the result of a non- 
cooperative game between players (i.e. government, unions and employers) 
with conflicting interests (Table 3). Along similar lines, Alesina and Drazen 
note: “in the political debate over stabilization, this distributional question is 
crucial” (Alesina and Drazen 1991, 1172). This confirms composition as the 
most challenging aspect of deficit reduction, at least for political economists.
12 It is interesting to note that, according to this research, this shift in preferences concerned 
almost all EU countries with the notable exception o f Germany where the contrary was true, 
namely households showed lower tolerance for unemployment relative to inflation 
(Collins/Giavazzi 1992).
70
Table 3.Social partners and dimensions of fiscal adjustment
Timing Extent i  Spending t Taxation
Labour Support Neutral Opposition Support
Capital Support Support Support Opposition
GAME Cooperative Cooperative Conflict Conflict
The following chapters treat the two empirical cases. With the examples of Italy 
and Germany, I intend to test the relative importance of state administrations, 
political and budget institutions, partisanship, corporatist agreements and socio­
economic preferences in affecting decisions over EMU-induced macroeconomic 
adjustment. Because anecdotal and empirical evidence already points to the 
central role of social partners, special attention is devoted to their preferences 
and contribution to budget policy formulation from 1991 to 1998 in both 
countries. The next chapter focuses specifically on the Italian case, exploring the 
characteristics of the country’s successful budgetary consolidation in the 1990s 
and the overall institutional and social context against which this was achieved.
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CHAPTER III
Timing, Size, Composition 
and Persistence of Italy’s 
Fiscal Consolidation (1991- 
98): Preferences versus 
Institutions
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1. Italy’s Fiscal Consolidation: Stylised Facts
This chapter describes the main features of Italy’s fiscal consolidation in the 
1990s. The focus is on the timing, size, composition and persistence of fiscal 
adjustment in 1991-98. In this research project, I proceed from the assumption 
that all four dimensions should be taken into account in order to come to an 
objective evaluation of adjustment episodes. To be sure, in some cases, they are 
reciprocally related, with the result that it may well be that one dimension is 
endogenous to the other. To take just one example, large consolidation episodes 
tend to be revenue-based. When governments aim at extensive and rapid deficit 
reduction, then they may think of interventions on the revenue side of the budget 
as more appropriate because (1) public incomes are by definition flexible budget 
items; being far more regulated, spending commitments need more time to be 
reversed; (2) taxpayers are not as organized as welfare beneficiaries, which 
implies that tax increases are politically more feasible than welfare cutbacks. 
Also, both size and composition could relate to the persistence of fiscal 
adjustment. After governments have obtained extensive deficit reduction in Ti, it 
is more likely that they will succeed in keeping public budgets under control also 
in T2 and T3, ceteribus paribus. More technically, having a direct impact on 
economic growth, composition can either favour or hinder persistence. For all 
these reasons, the following section takes all four dimensions equally into 
consideration.
The timing refers simply to the relative adherence to the Maastricht timetable, 
and should be thus treated in conjunction with the size of adjustment. The latter 
is normally measured as the cyclically adjusted change in the value of primary 
surplus as a percentage of GDP. Needless to say, this has been extensive in the 
case of Italy considering that the country began with high deficit and debt levels 
in 1991. In this respect, absolute figures are not as illuminating as relative data 
may be. Bearing this in mind, I will juxtapose the Italian fiscal experience with 
that of other EMU candidates that started from a similar fiscal position (e.g. 
Belgium). In addition, the evolution of the country’s public deficit is analysed in
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historical perspective to test if the fiscal performance in the 1990s would in fact 
represent a case of policy or regime change. At the micro-level, yearly changes 
in the extent of deficit reduction convey important information about the 
government’s eagerness to stick to fiscal discipline and/or about the presence of a 
social context in which this is feasible.
Secondly, I analyse the composition of fiscal adjustment. The parsimonious 
argument that cut across this thesis is that budget consolidation is only viable 
where there is a large socio-political consensus around the distribution of the 
adjustment burden, especially around its content. True, the choice over fiscal 
strategies is often influenced by principles of optimality. However, in Italy, the 
composition of budget adjustment changed, in some cases remarkably, after 
consultation with the social partners (see 3.1), thereby losing any resemblance to 
the initial government proposal. Thus, while most socio-economic actors agreed 
to the principle of balanced budgets, they differed widely over their composition. 
The content of budgetary interventions is likely to reflect the preferences of the 
most powerful domestic interest groups rather than being a technical decision 
weighted within experts’ circles.
Persistence itself conveys significant information about the nature of fiscal 
adjustment in one country. In the presence of a trend of uninterrupted deficit 
reduction, one could say that the government is committed to fiscal discipline 
and/or the existence of a socio-political context in which fiscal austerity can be 
perpetuated without leading to excessive social and/or electoral costs (e.g. 
strikes, street demonstrations, electoral punishment, etc).
1.1.The timing and size of fiscal consolidation
Italy has experienced severe fiscal imbalances since the 1970s. With current 
expenditures growing exponentially (e.g. transfers to households and 
compensations to public employees), and revenues unable to keep the pace, 
deficit and debt levels grew rapidly (Stagni in D'Adda 2001). In the 1980s, Italy 
suffered from the highest public deficit in Europe with values above 10 percent 
of GDP (European Commission 2003a). The politically dependent Banca d’ltalia
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responded to deficit spending by augmenting short-term interest rates. This 
caused strong inflationary pressures on top of everything else (Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini 1991). The country’s financial instability was further 
aggravated by the specific structure of wage bargaining and by the operation of 
an automatic wage indexation system known as scala mobile, which produced 
inflation-wage spirals. Yet only with Italy’s membership of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 did inflation differentials vis-a-vis the trading 
partners become a more urgent problem. At this stage, fiscal consolidation was 
advocated only as a means to curb Italy’s above-average inflation down.
Fiscal discipline became a policy objective in its own right in 1983-84 once 
inflation rates started to fall, albeit still modestly (Graziani 1988; Camera dei 
Deputati, October 1992, 17-24; Verzichelli 1999). With the divorce of the Italian 
Treasury and the Banca d ’ltalia in 1981, the monetization of public debt had 
stopped being an option (Epstein and Schor in Lange, Regini and al. 1989,147- 
164). In turn, the public debate revolved around the identification of the most 
appropriate debt stabilization strategy. It was soon clear that the best approach to 
Italy’s fiscal problems would be a large and as rapid as possible improvement of 
the primary surplus (Morcaldo in Graziani 1988; Giavazzi and Spaventa 1989; 
Camera dei Deputati, Servizio Studi 1992). According to observers, the 
commitment to austerity remained superficial in those years. The country’s high 
political instability and the numerous inefficiencies in the budgetary process 
neutralised any attempt at correcting fiscal imbalances (Salvati 1984; Giavazzi 
and Spaventa 1989; Verzichelli 1999, 98-142; Monorchio and Tivelli 1999, 22- 
27). Failure to consolidate was even more disappointing if one considers that, in 
the late 1980s, high growth rates should have soften the recessive bias of fiscal 
austerity (Sartor 1998; Degni and al. 2001).
After a few failed attempts at fiscal adjustment in the mid-1980s, Italy succeeded 
in cutting her deficit down in the 1990s under the pressure to participate in 
European monetary integration in the first wave. Needless to say, the timing of 
Italy’s macroeconomic reform is significantly conditioned by the “Maastricht 
effect”. Between 1989 and 1997, the cyclically adjusted net borrowing 
requirement improved by 9.2 percent of GDP (Caselli and Rinaldi 1998, 60). In
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the same period, Belgium managed to cut its deficit by 5.9 percent o f  GDP. Even 
in the shorter time span 1993-97, Italy continued to enjoy the best fiscal 
performance across the EU spectrum with a 6.4 percent improvement o f  CA net 
borrowing. The second best outcome was that o f Belgium with a deficit decline 
o f  4.6 percent o f  GDP (Caselli and Rinaldi 1998, 61). More specifically, the 
country’s actual deficit continued decreasing until 1997 without major 
interruptions. Lower interest payments contributed importantly to deficit 
reduction. Italy stands out even when the development o f  the structural primary 
surplus is considered. In 1992-97, this improved by 6.3 percent o f  GDP (OECD 
various issues). The large surplus the government managed to create was also 
important to the extent that, functioning as a buffer against the continuous 
growth o f  the public debt until 1993, it further supported deficit reduction (Graph 
2).
Graph 2. Italy: Evolution of Actual Public Deficit, CA Public 
Deficit and General Government Gross Debt (1980-2003)
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Source: European Commission, European Econom y S tatistical Annex, 2004.
As pointed out above, Italy’s fiscal performance stands out if  set against parallel 
experiences in other EMU candidates. It is extraordinary also by “Italian 
standards”. It is certainly true that, in the 1990s, the country experienced a proper 
regime change. Never had the country benefited from so low  a deficit level. In 
truth, the CA net borrowing started to fall already in 1990, before the country
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officially committed to sound public finances through the signing o f  the 
Maastricht Treaty. In 1991, for the first time, the primary balance turned into a 
surplus; it continued to improve until 1997, the reference year the EU had chosen 
to evaluate EMU candidates’ readiness to join monetary union. At the time when 
Prime Minister Giuliano Amato made fiscal consolidation a top priority in 1992 
(Tesoro 1992), Italy’s fiscal convergence process seemed already set on the right 
footing (Graph 3).
Graph 3. Italy: Evolution of the CA Deficit (1980-2000)
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Source: European Commission, General Government Data 2003.
It could be that the economic situation made deficit reduction easier, as would be 
the case for example in the presence o f  high growth rates. However, this was 
certainly not the case for Italy. Graph 2 shows that EMU-induced fiscal 
consolidation took place in bad times: with the actual deficit lower than CA 
deficit from 1992 to 1996 it was clear that the business cycle was running against 
fiscal adjustment. Nevertheless, this did not jeopardise the continuous 
improvement o f  the deficit. This is a striking aspect o f  Italy’s fiscal performance 
in the 1990s. Not only was consolidation initiated in bad times, but also the 
depression that followed the first adjustment episodes was not such that fiscal 
authorities decided to give up their goal. On the contrary, they were asked a 
greater discretionary effort to counterbalance a deteriorating economic
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environment, by strengthening for example consumer and business confidence. 
This is indication of the fact that successful adjustment was a political process, 
one in which not even recession was sufficient to dissuade policy-makers of their 
aim.
It is interesting to note that the pace of adjustment was not even from one year to 
the other. Table 4 provides a good picture of the different magnitudes of fiscal 
correction in the 1990s -expressed in trillions Lira and as a proportion of GDP. 
Interestingly enough, the two smallest (nominal and real) corrections were 
implemented in 1993 and 1995 respectively, under two technocratic cabinets -the 
Ciampi and Dini Governments. By the same token, the three largest deficit 
reductions took place under elected, and hence more legitimate, governments. 
External pressures should by no means be underestimated. Prime Minister Amato 
had to respond, in 1992, to a dramatic financial crisis. In 1996, Prodi aimed to 
secure Italy’s accession to EMU. Still, the regular juxtaposition of small 
interventions and non-elected governments is indication of the fact that the lack 
of an electoral base and support functioned as a constraint on the severity of 
fiscal policy. Extensive anecdotal evidence shows that to be able to impose 
discipline domestically, non-elected governments in the 1990s made a great 
effort to compensate the lack of vast parliamentary support with an intense 
dialogue with the social partners (e.g. Ciampi and Dini Governments).
Table 4. Italy: Size of Budget Manoeuvres 1991-98 (+ contraction; - expansion)
1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Projected 40.6 84.1 30.3 48 32.5 56.2 25
Actuals 60 75 25 53 38 60 25
Actuals 1.5 1.3 0.6 1 0.6 4.2 -0.2
Actualc 2.4 1.7 -1 1 0.5 2 -1.5
K ey: P rojected  (extent) =  size o f  correction as laid dow n in official budgetary docum ents (trillion Lira). 
A ctuala (extent) =  real size o f  retrenchm ent at the end o f  the consolidation episodes; here, data tend to be 
overall larger than projected figures because they do no t refer only to  F inance B ills but include also the 
im pact o f  em ergency budgets (trillion Lira). A ctual6= change in cyclically adjusted ne t borrow ing (%  GD P). 
A ctualc=  change in prim ary surplus adjusted on potential GD P (%  GD P).
Source: Degni et al., II Riequilibrio della Finanza Pubblica 2001; European Commission 2003a.
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1.2.The composition of fiscal consolidation
The issue of the composition of deficit reduction entails great significance both 
in economic and political terms. As to the first, economists largely agree on the 
fact that expenditure-based fiscal consolidations are more likely to generate non- 
Keynesian growth effects (Alesina and Perotti 1995). This implies that that they 
would lead to more successful fiscal outcomes to the extent that relatively high 
growth rates reduce the debt ratio to GDP. As to the second point, if  interest 
groups and citizens agree to unpopular expenditure restraints, then social 
consensus in favour of fiscal discipline is likely to be high. In addition, cuts to 
spending programmes are certain, as opposed to measures on the revenue side of 
the budget, whose impact are highly dependant on business cycles. From a 
political perspective, the content of fiscal adjustment is indicative of the specific 
constellation of domestic preferences regarding fiscal discipline.
In 1989-97, greater current revenues contributed to the improvement of the 
structural primary surplus by 60 percent, with the second largest contribution 
coming from lower capital spending, which decreased by 23 percent. When 
considering the shorter time span from 1993 to 1997, structural consolidation 
stemmed mainly from lower interest payments. Second came primary 
expenditure restraints with revenues contributing only to 7 percent of the total 
correction (Caselli and Rinaldi 1998, 60-1). Overall, and in comparison with 
other EMU candidates, the European Commission regarded Italy’s fiscal 
adjustment as largely revenue-based (European Commission 2000).
Graph 4 shows the changes to CA primary expenditures and total revenues in 
1991-98. In 1990-93, deficit reduction came from rising public incomes. The 
latter were so significant that they helped cover the costs from increased public 
spending. In the following year, from 1993 to 1994, CA public revenues started 
decreasing. This resulted not much from an actual lowering of Italy’s fiscal 
pressure but from the fact that the Ciampi Government declined to renew one-off 
revenue measures introduced in the preceding two years (Tesoro 1993, 10-14). 
With the public debt ratio set on a downward trend since 1993, primary
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expenditures started slowly to decrease thanks to lower interest payments. In 
1994-95, CA expenditure restraints were sufficient to offset revenue shortfalls, 
thereby not affecting the positive trend o f  deficit reduction. In the period 1995- 
97, under the Dini and Prodi Governments, interventions on the revenue side o f  
the budget surged again to become the most important contribution to fiscal 
discipline. Amounting to a value o f  3 percent o f  GDP, Italy’s largest fiscal 
correction in 1996 was the result o f greater public revenues, which increased 
over one year by 2.7 percent o f  GDP (Banca d’ltalia, February 1998).
Graph 4. Italy: Change in CA Primary Spending and Total 
Revenues 1991-98
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1.3 .The p ersis ten ce  o f  fiscal conso lidation
The persistence o f  deficit reduction in Italy is quite striking, as will be further 
discussed below. In 1991-97, the country went through politico-institutional 
turbulences, not to mention yearly government changeovers. Still, in spite o f  
such an unstable institutional background, budget consolidation seemed largely 
undisturbed. This is taken as indication o f  the fact that the domestic consensus in 
favour o f  fiscal discipline and EMU membership was sufficiently large to 
overcome any institutional constraint, including electoral cycles.
% GDP o T 1
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2. The Role of Fiscal and Political Institutions
The most recent literature on fiscal adjustment focuses on the economic role of 
budget and political institutions (see North 1990) where the argument is that 
financial policy outcomes depend strongly on the institutional framework in 
which decisions are taken. And in line with this interpretative approach, many 
have argued that Italy’s disappointing fiscal performance since the 1970s was 
determined by an unstable politico-institutional setting, one in which government 
changeovers were too frequent and political coalitions were too weak to allow 
courageous fiscal interventions. Collective action and coordination problems 
would be at the base of ill-thought-out and inefficient macroeconomic 
management. With the improvement of the budgetary process and the 
transformation of the national party system in the 1990s, observers have been 
naturally induced to look for institutional explanations to Italy’s successful fiscal 
consolidation. Against this interpretation, this section indicates that some budget 
and political institutions did indeed become more efficient, but at the hand of 
actors whose preferences were already set in favour of fiscal discipline. In a 
nutshell, preferences came before institutional change1.
It is true that the analysis of fiscal policy outcomes is affected by significant 
methodological limitations, of which the most significant is that a country’s 
fiscal performance is typically over-determined. Bureaucrats cooperate with 
policy-makers in the drafting of budget proposals; members of parliament can 
often exercise significant amendment powers. In addition, domestic interest 
groups have access to fiscal policy-making either directly through roundtable 
talks or indirectly when represented by parliamentarians. With the aim of putting 
some order into this complex web of actors and institutional contexts, this section 
focuses mainly on the budgetary process. Electoral systems and the ensuing 
political fragmentation come into the picture to the extent that they shape budget 
actors’ preferences and relative power.
1 For details on the debate about the relationship between preferences and institutions, (see North 
1990; Immergut 1998).
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Since the late 1980s, i.e. well before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, Italy 
started to embark on a macroeconomic regime change consisting of a relatively 
rapid though long awaited institutional adaptation to the culture of stability. With 
the 1988 Budget Reform, long-term financial planning became one of the 
cornerstones of fiscal policy-making in imitation of successful experiences 
elsewhere (e.g. Germany). In addition, the budgetary process was subject to 
minor adjustments. Of particular note among them was the Parliament’s 
obligation to preserve the size of the budgetary correction as planned by the 
Finance Ministry. On the monetary front, the divorce between the Treasury and 
the Bank of Italy in 1981 represented the first step in the direction of central bank 
independence, which was only officially established in 1993. The strong 
domestic preference in favour of greater stability was reflected also in the 
conduct of exchange rate policy. After 1988, thanks to Bankitalia's restrictive 
monetary stance, the Lira remained within the ERM bands, thus making any 
realignment unnecessary (Giovannini 1990).
For some, while it is true that progress had been made already in the pre- 
Maastricht period, fiscal adjustment became possible only under the EMU 
constraint. Not only was the threat of exclusion from monetary integration an 
effective incentive for all to put public finances in order, but it also triggered 
institutional adaptation both directly and indirectly. As to the first, Italian 
authorities were under the obligation of institutionalising the independence of 
Banca d ’ltalia by January 1, 1993. Indirectly, the threat of non-participation to 
the Euro-area catalysed domestic forces towards the common goal of balanced 
budgets, so that everyone accepted the centralization of the budgetary process 
around the figure of the Prime Minister and the ensuing downsizing of the role of 
Parliament (Verzichelli 1999; Radaelli 2000). Against this perspective, this thesis 
offers an interpretation of the facts that privileges preferences over institutions. 
The argument is that the striking of a compromise between competing socio­
economic interests was conditio sine qua non for successful deficit reduction.
The country’s improved institutional configuration in the 1990s allowed for these 
preferences to translate into policy outcomes without the disturbing mediation of 
poorly functioning institutions. In other words, while necessary, better budget 
institutions would have not been sufficient to guarantee such a remarkable result.
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The following section describes in detail the evolution and character of fiscal 
institutions in Italy.
2.1.The Italian budgetary process
Currently, the Italian budgetary process relies on a long series of documents and 
pieces of legislation. In February, the Treasury sends out technical notes for 
budget drafting to all ministries. Around May or June, the Council of Ministers 
approves the Documento di Programmazione Economica e Finanziaria (DPEF), 
a long-term financial planning document sketching out fiscal objectives for the 
following 3 to 5 years. This is then passed on to Parliament for approval. In 
September, the government presents its own budget proposal known as Relazione 
Previsionale e Programmatica (RPP). The latter sets out in detail the content of 
the commitments made in the DPEF. This document becomes the object of 
parliamentary debates, which develop over a few months in the so-called budget 
session. Before the end of December, Parliament has to translate the RPP into the 
final Finance Bill (Verzichelli 1999).
Until the late 1970s, Italy’s budget process consisted of the mere elaboration of a 
“formal law”, the so-called Legge di Bilancio (budget bill). It was termed formal 
because neither the government nor parliament had the power to prescribe new 
expenditures and/or taxes. Their task was limited to acknowledging the financial 
impact of previous legislative decisions. In 1978, the government engaged in a 
significant restructuring of the country’s public finance legislation (Law n. 468
1978). The two successive oil shocks played an important role because they lead 
public authorities to desire greater control capacity over public resources 
(Verzichelli 1999, 104; Petricone 2000, 23-4). The 1978 Financial Law 
established the mandatory estimate of the net borrowing requirement within the 
newly created Legge Finanziaria (finance bill). In contrast to the budget bill, the 
financial bill created room for concrete fiscal interventions. Observers 
suggestively describe the first as the “budget of bureaucracy” and the Legge 
Finanziaria as the “budget of politics” (Camera dei Deputati, 19 September 
1996). The present work focuses on this latter document.
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The 1978 legislation was not sufficient to guarantee fiscal discipline. Poorly 
designed institutional arrangements continued to compromise Italy’s fiscal 
performance. First, the Finance Minister did not play a strong supervising role. 
Second, the Parliament enjoyed extensive amendment powers over government 
proposals. In addition, at this stage of the process, the high number of political 
parties created huge coordination problems. Third, budget documents lacked 
transparency; this implied that efficient financial planning was compromised in 
spite of the earlier introduction of the finance bill. Fiscal decisions ended up 
being taken on an incremental basis (Morcaldo 1993; Camera dei Deputati, 6 
December 1993, 21055-68; Alesina and Perotti 1995; Monorchio 1996;
Giavazzi, Penati and Tabellini 1998; Poterba and von Hagen 1999; Monorchio 
and Tivelli 1999). Fourth, and most importantly for the purpose the present 
research, the process was wide open to pluralist interest groups (Cotta in Cotta 
and Isemia 1996, 43). Under the pressure of numerous and diverse government 
clienteles, public spending continued to grow after the late 1970s (Morcaldo 
1993) with public authorities forced into a perverse practice of distributing public 
resources in areas far from budgets’ traditional redistributive tasks (Ferrera
1992). In light of all these factors, Italy’s fiscal institutions were traditionally 
regarded as the most inefficient in the EU.
As a result, at the end of the 1980s, a widespread consensus had formed around 
the need to improve further the institutional foundations of fiscal policy-making 
(Pisauro in Bemardi 1990, 61). In 1988, a new reform improved long-term 
financial planning with the introduction of a new budget document known as 
DPEF (Law n. 362, 1988). There, the government was expected to work out the 
main contents of its financial policy for the following 3 to 5 years. The same 
reform established the so-called provvedimenti collegati (accompanying 
provisions). Being part of the finance bill, these addressed specific policy areas. 
They allowed for micro-reforms to bypass Parliament, thereby speeding up the 
parliamentary passage of the budget and delegating additional powers to the 
executive. In addition to this, on 8 August 1988, the government issued a 
directive imposing limits on spending by the individual ministries. For the first 
time, spending centres were subject directly to a legal constraint. In the past,
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limits were imposed on expenditure items rather than on decision-makers 
(Pisauro in Bemardi 1990). At first, institutional reform failed to deliver, if we 
are to follow Vincenzo Visco’s, Finance Minister in 1996-98, view of the 1980s:
“Italy appeared to be, and indeed was, a country without economic discipline, 
characterised by a low level of social cohesion, mal-govemed by a ruling class 
that was incapable of making brave choices, that yielded in to the requests and 
pressures exercised by interest groups, and which increasingly and openly 
corrupt and therefore less authoritative. In such a situation, it not at all 
surprising that the adjustments introduced gradually starting from the end 
of the 1980s, involving all the revenue side, were not deemed to be 
sufficient and were ignored by the markets that continued to penalise Italian 
public debt” (Visco 2002).
2.2.The economic role of fiscal institutions
One has to wait until the early 1990s to see institutional reforms having a 
concrete impact on Italy’s fiscal policy-making. On the one hand, the 1988 
budget reform started to deliver. On the other, fiscal authorities continued a 
piecemeal process of institutional adaptation. It was only after 1992 that the 
Italian government required the strict application of one of the provisions in the 
1988 Budget Law under which parliamentarians submitting an amendment to the 
government budget proposal had to indicate the corresponding financial coverage 
for the entire period of application and not just for the following year (Degni and 
al. 2001). A leftover of the 1988 Reform, governments in the 1990s exploited the 
option of making use of the accompanying provisions (or delegation laws) with 
the purpose of ringfencing entire sections of the budget from parliamentary 
amendments. The Head of the Accounting Department at the Treasury, Andrea 
Monorchio, stated on this note: “it would have not been possible to govern the 
country without the accompanying provisions” (Monorchio and Tivelli 1999, 
148). All these measures shared the objective of strengthening the budgetary role 
of government over parliament.
It is indisputable that there exists a correlation between reformed budget 
institutions and stricter fiscal discipline. For example, large early corrections
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were associated with greater government strength over parliament2. In July 1992, 
the Amato Government approved by decree a correction for a total value of 30 
trillion Lira (15.5 billion euro), being at the time in the position to circumvent 
potential parliamentary opposition (Corriere della Sera 3/8/1992). Under the 
Ciampi Government, the fiscal intervention for the following year amounted to 
only 12.7 trillion Lira (7 billion euro). Yet, there is something extraordinary 
about this intervention that reminds the reader of the importance of the content of 
reform. Most of the adjustment was to come from the expenditure side of the 
budget. To reach this result, Prime Minister Ciampi took fiscal decisions in close 
consultation with his economic cluster but left out spending ministers and social 
partners (Tesoro 1993; Corriere della Sera 21/5/1993). In addition, both the 
Amato and Ciampi Governments relegated indications about cuts to areas as 
sensitive as health care, pensions and public employment to the accompanying 
provisions, thereby avoiding an inevitably troublesome parliamentary passage 
(Camera dei Deputati, 16 September 1992, 3250-3282; Corriere della Sera 
24/7/1992, 29/7/1992; Pesole 2001).
Better functioning fiscal institutions not only affected the extent and, at times, the 
quality of deficit reduction, they also improved government planning capacity, a 
crucial point, if it is true that good planning capacity improves fiscal results 
(Wildavsky 1979). Graph 5 sketches the gap between programmatic and actual 
budget deficits in billion Lira over the period 1981-1998. It is manifest that the 
early 1990s represent a breakthrough with planning capacity improving 
remarkably, with the exception of 1996.
While budget institutions have been clearly improving with notable 
consequences for fiscal policy outcomes, this does not mean that under a better 
functioning institutional setting Italian governments were finally able to take 
decisions independently of society, be it parliament or the social partners. 
Extensive anecdotal evidence indicates that budget proposals were being 
constantly reshaped under pressure from labour unions as well as during
2 The results come from a linear correlation, where I have juxtaposed the early size o f fiscal 
corrections to a multidimensional index of government strength relative to parliament computed 
by Verzichelli (Verzichelli 1999). The correlation produced a positively inclined slope.
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parliamentary passage. Moreover, even quantitative data suggest the process was 
not fully isolated from societal pressures. If this were the case, then one should 
expect a dramatic change also in the quality o f  fiscal interventions, with the 
executive proving capable o f  tackling uncontrolled spending growth, something 
that did not really happen with the notable exception o f  the Ciampi Government. 
Graph 6 contains data on the ratio o f revenue increases to the total nominal value 
o f  the fiscal correction, as planned by government authorities. It is interesting to 
note that the revenue content o f  budgets started heading below average from 
1987 onwards, i.e. before the implementation o f  the ambitious 1988 Budget 
Reform. That was a time in which the preferences o f  most political actors were 
converging in favour o f  fiscal discipline, not least because o f  the parallel conduct 
o f  a disciplined exchange rate policy, for which Italy had given up the option o f  
realignments within the EMS. This seems to suggest that part o f  the explanation 
to Italy’s changing fiscal strategies lies in external macroeconomic constraints 
and the ways in which these might have altered the constellation o f  domestic 
preferences. In other words, budget reform arose first and foremost from shifting 
preferences.
Graph 5. Italy: Programmatic and Actual Public Deficits 
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While the reliance on revenue maximising measures seemed to diminish after 
1987, a comparison between the Maastricht years and the preceding decade does 
not reveal macro-differences. By way of example, the average revenue 
component of budget correction in 1992-98 does not differ dramatically from 
that in 1981-92. In the first period, programmatic revenue increases represented 
46 percent of the cumulative fiscal correction whereas, in the second, they 
averaged 56.5 percent (Graph 6). There is instead a visible difference when it 
comes to assessing actual rather than projected budget outcomes. Planned budget 
measures in 1981-1992 consisted by more than half of greater public incomes, 
but the latter actually ended up contributing to 73 percent of the total correction 
at the end of the financial year {read after passing through Parliament). In 1992- 
98, the gap between projected and actual totals amounted instead to just 2 
percent . In conclusion, by improving government planning capacity, budget 
reform guaranteed only the matching between initial preferences and outcomes 
rather than forcing political elites into unpopular decisions on welfare reform.
At a micro-level, some of the assumptions in the institutionalist literature appear 
to be confirmed. For example, there seems to be a positive correlation between 
parliament strength (or government weakness)4 and revenue-based consolidation, 
thereby confirming the hypothesis according to which common pool resource 
problems within multi-actor institutions (i.e. parliament) lead to the introduction 
of revenue-maximising measures by default. However, these results should be 
interpreted with caution. First, the Amato and Ciampi Cabinets consisted of the 
same number of parties but the macro-content of their respective interventions 
differed quite substantially. Second, members of parliament also represent 
specific socio-economic interests and, in this respect, evidence is not sufficient to 
show that the composition of fiscal packages was affected by the coalitional 
character of government rather than by the actual policy preferences of 
parliamentarians.
3 Own elaboration from data in: Cappuggi (2000).
4 Indexes on parliamentary strength derive from Verzichelli’s computation (1999).
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Graph 6. Italy: The Revenue Component of Budgets, 
percentage contribution (1979-2000)
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Other points can be raised that confirm the argument according to which 
improved budget institutions are not a sufficient explanation o f  successful fiscal 
adjustment. First, better budget rules did not translate into greater control over 
expenditures, as the institutionalist literature might have anticipated. Even in the 
following years, observers continued to protest at the lack o f appropriate tools to 
control spending growth (Pisauro in Bemardi 1990; von Hagen 1992; Alesina 
and Perotti 1996; Poterba and von Hagen 1999). As indicated above, fiscal 
institutional change only had the effect o f  improving financial planning. Second, 
as anticipated, the 1988 reform was not perceived as capable o f  addressing 
completely the inefficiency o f  Italian budget institutions. The theme o f  a 
necessary revision o f  the budgetary process continued to be central throughout 
the decade (Camera dei Deputati 29/6/1996, 1703). In 1991, government 
authorities denounced the still difficult exercise o f  expenditure growth control 
(Tesoro 1991, 23). In addition, once the EMU convergence process was 
concluded, two additional reform initiatives were taken, in 1996 and 1999.
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2.3.The economic role of political institutions
Intertwined with the budget process are also political institutions. The latter 
exercise an indirect impact on fiscal institutions, as in the case of a variable such 
as parliament polarization. In the theoretical debate, government instability and 
political fragmentation of the party system have been associated with larger 
public deficits and debts. This is particularly true in the case of Italy. In the post­
war period, the country experienced the most numerous government changeovers 
of all OECD countries (Lijphart 1984, 71). Weak short-sighted executives proved 
unable and/or unwilling to adjust public finances (Morcaldo 1993; Verzichelli 
1999). More precisely, fiscal imbalances were strategically employed in a war of 
attrition between alternating governing party coalitions, where the incumbent 
would purposely leave large debts to its successors (Alesina and Drazen 1991).
The 1990s are no exception to Italy’s instability record. In the wake of a vast 
institutional crisis after most politicians had been accused of corruption in the 
1992 “Mani Pulite” scandals, Italy’s political parties found it difficult to forge 
long-lasting parliamentary coalitions. Between 1992 and 1998, five different 
governments undertook the troublesome task of leading the country towards the 
ambitious goal of fiscal consolidation. To some extent, the presence of the 
Ciampi and Dini technocratic governments reduced the scope for inter-party 
electoral competition. However, two elections still took place in 1994 and 1996, 
which could have potentially kick-started the vicious game between alternating 
coalitions described above.
By creating significant coordination problems, the high number of political 
parties was likely to lead to greater fiscal imbalances. In 1994, Finance Minister 
Giulio Tremonti noted: “public debt and the proportional electoral system are 
nothing but two sides of the same coin” (Regonini in Cotta and Isemia 1996, 87). 
Minister Tremonti’s was the first establishment to be elected under the new semi- 
majoritarian electoral law passed in 1993. While the reform’s objective was to 
reduce Italy’s political fragmentation, numerous political formations continued to 
hide under new umbrella names. In this respect, the 1990s represent no particular
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break with the past. It is therefore difficult to defend the argument according to 
which more stable political institutions would explain public authorities’ firmer 
macroeconomic management.
With the political system proving not sufficiently sound to support difficult 
budget balancing, budget reforms seemed to serve the primary function of 
minimising and counterbalancing the weakness of political institutions. They did 
so by centralising the budgetary process around pivotal institutions. In a sense, 
renewed fiscal institutions compensated for structural deficiencies elsewhere 
without necessarily nullifying the political nature of the process nor centripetal 
forces from below.
Amongst a country’s institutional characteristics is corporatism. The literature on 
the relationship between models of corporatism and fiscal performance is divided 
into two strands. An older research agenda is concerned with the effects of 
institutional openness on fiscal results. Italy’s budgetary process has been 
commonly characterised as an open one, where interest groups have enjoyed full 
access to macroeconomic policy-making, although largely through the 
intercession of parliament (Rubin 1997). In the 1990s, their involvement in 
budget policy-making underwent a significant institutional transformation. In 
two successive income policy agreements, signed in 1992 and 1993 respectively, 
social partners were granted the status of budget actors with the government 
obliged to consult them prior to the presentation of yearly DPEFs, as well as 
before the submission of the RPP. As a result, the political arena fell in 
importance to the advantage of the social arena with labour unions even 
substituting political parties in the task of creating social consensus around 
budget proposals (Celia and Treu 1998). To illustrate this state of affair, some 
have used the expression of “consensual stabilization” (Salvati in Rossi 2002). A 
second more recent strand of literature studies the trade-offs between government 
fiscal policy and wage moderation suggesting that highly centralised union 
confederations have in fact improving equilibrium outcomes (see Chapter II). I 
will tackle these issues in practice in Chapters IV and VII.
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3. Partisan and Median Voter Preferences
In the previous sections, I have attempted to demonstrate that institutions per se 
are not responsible for Italy’s successful fiscal consolidation in the 1990s. Or 
rather that, it is inappropriate to treat institutions independently of the 
preferences of the actors operating within them. Bearing this observation in 
mind, I intend to assess here the role of partisan, strategic and self-interested 
preferences in the Italian process of fiscal convergence from 1991 to 1998. My 
argument is that successful adjustment was not the result of isolated technocrats 
taking harsh but necessary fiscal decisions on the basis of principles of 
optimality. Instead, governments were constrained partly by their ideological 
preferences, which under specific circumstances exercised some impact on the 
content of budget consolidation, and partly by electoral considerations, though 
only in 1994 and 1996. Yet, the greatest input came from self-interested socio­
economic groups, whose support for fiscal discipline was considered a public 
good by all governments, independently of partisan orientation.
There is hardly any evidence of a “politics of expertise” in Italy’s financial 
history (Radaelli 1999). On the contrary, the country’s fiscal problems have been 
explained by the fact that politics traditionally obfuscated bureaucrats and 
experts (Franco in Einaudi 1992). On a similar note, the Head of the Accounting 
Department at the Italian Treasury, Andrea Monorchio, claimed with reference to 
the pre-Maastricht period: “technical considerations on the appropriate 
management of public finances were systematically ignored” (Monorchio and 
Tivelli 1999, 25). To prove this point is for example the fact that there is no 
empirical support for the tax-smoothing theory according to which governments 
acting as social planners would increase spending during recessions and decrease 
it when growth is sustained (Giarda 1989, 7). In spite of the extraordinary size of 
fiscal adjustment, the 1990s represent no break with the past to the extent that 
budget policy decisions were not necessarily inspired by efficiency concerns 
(interview with Andrea Monorchio). Is there any evidence of this? In a nutshell, 
fiscal strategies in the 1990s were not optimal to the extent that (1) they did not 
follow a consistent and gradual course; (2) they differed from one budget
92
document to the other; (3) they did not address directly the very source of the 
problem (e.g. the expensive welfare state); and (4) they were not necessarily 
consistent with the nature of international pressures (e.g. financial integration).
Absence o f gradual consistent fiscal course
Different fiscal adjustment magnitudes from 1991 to 1998 suggest that deficit 
reduction was not gradual. Some governments were more virtuous than others. 
Table 4 sets out the projected and actual extent of budgetary corrections in 
trillion Lira. Figures show that, in 1993 and 1995 respectively, the technocratic 
Ciampi and Dini Governments were less fiscally ambitious than the other 
governments, and the 1996 elected Prodi Government in particular. Not even the 
macroeconomic scenario against which budget decisions were set justifies these 
differences in magnitude. It is not true, for example, that large consolidations 
correlated with optimistic growth projections. The tax smoothing theory I 
referred to above does not hold true either for the 1990s. This seems to suggest 
that the degree of fiscal discipline depended more on the government’s electoral 
and societal support -  naturally greater in the case of elected governments - than 
on the technical opportunity to implement an extensive fiscal adjustment.
Variation from one budget document to the other 
Most interestingly, both the extent and composition of budgetary interventions 
changed from one budget document to the next -  and not necessarily in response 
to an altered macroeconomic environment - thus supporting the view according 
to which fiscal discipline was still the result of a socio-political compromise 
between competing socio-economic interests. The size of the manoeuvre in the 
final Finance Bill often differed from provisions in the DPEF by more than 20 
percent. At the end of the process, its content was also different from initial 
projections. This is to say that pressures exerted on political actors at different 
stages of the budgetary process undermined initial and potentially optimal 
government decisions over the most appropriate size and quality of fiscal 
consolidation.
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No adjustment at the source o f the problem
Experts in the Italian Treasury believed in the desirability of expenditure-based 
consolidation if only because, when based on the revenue side of the budget, 
stabilization would push prices up thereby inducing in turn greater nominal 
outlays (Morcaldo in Einaudi 1992, 176; interview with Andrea Monorchio). 
Because Italy’s fiscal imbalances stemmed mainly from excessive pension and 
health care spending Franco in (Einaudi 1992), the natural adjustment strategy 
was one that would tackle these programmes and possibly involve a radical re­
thinking of the role of the State in the national economy (Morcaldo in Graziani 
1988, 130). However, in 1991-97, two-thirds of fiscal discipline was guaranteed 
by interventions on the revenue side of the budget. There is no indication of 
austerity having entailed welfare retrenchment. True, in 1995, a radical pension 
reform was approved. However, its short-term financial impact was modest, at 
best (Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris 1996).
Inconsistency with international developments 
Italy’s choice of fiscal strategies seems also to run against parallel economic 
developments at the international level. In 1990, capital movements were 
liberalised. By 1992, the SEM was completed. In addition, the prospect of EMU 
increased expectations of a fully integrated European market. Against this 
background, most EU countries were concerned with competitiveness and started 
looking into strategies to boost their competitive position without resorting to 
exchange rate policies. The challenge was particularly pressing for a country 
such as Italy, which for two decades had taken advantage of competitive 
devaluation. Still, to achieve fiscal adjustment, the country paid the price of 
greater fiscal pressure. By 1997, total revenues had increased by 4.2 percent of 
GDP and were above the EU average by more than 1 percent of GDP (European 
2003). Nor do initial tax levels justify this choice considering that, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, Italy did not belong to the group of low-fiscal-pressure 
countries (e.g. Portugal, Ireland).
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3.1.Demand-side partisan politics
In the previous section, I have attempted to demonstrate that pure optimal policy 
considerations failed to drive Italy's fiscal adjustment. I investigate here if 
ideology played any role in the process. Even a superficial look is sufficient to 
indicate that the desirability of fiscal discipline was not a prerogative of liberal 
parties. The culture of financial stability together with the desire to qualify for 
EMU pervaded most political agendas from the right to the left of the political 
spectrum. Partisanship might instead play a role on two fronts. First, the 
ideological orientation of government is likely to impact on financial markets. 
Conservative governments tend to be more credible than social democratic ones. 
Secondly, leftist coalitions would possibly be less prone to cut the welfare state. 
With the aim to identify the contribution of ideology to the Italian process of 
fiscal convergence, I employ both anecdotal and empirical evidence.
There is sufficient anecdotal evidence showing that politics did in fact continue 
to matter. Fiscal policy decisions were driven by the political beliefs of fiscal 
actors. This is evident even under formally technocratic governments. The 1992 
Amato Government is normally considered a technocratic establishment. I argue 
instead that this did not translate into political neutrality. First, while the Italian 
party system had already collapsed by 1992, Amato came to power under the 
rules of the old so-called “party government” (Cotta and Isemia 1996). Second, 
Amato himself explained that technical considerations about the most 
appropriate fiscal adjustment strategy were mediated by ideological concerns and 
accompanied by an evaluation of the social feasibility of any budget policy 
decision:
“I remember when I was Prime Minister and had to increase taxation. Some 
of my advisers insisted for an across-the-board surcharge on incomes so as to 
collect as much as possible from medium-low income groups. And I thought 
that this was something they could have asked Margaret Thatcher to do, not 
me. My instinct, as a socialist, was to render an inevitably large fiscal 
adjustment socially acceptable” (Amato/Giddens 25/2/2002, 
www.policvnetwork.orgV
95
Partisan politics were even more visible under the Berlusconi Government. 
Elected at the end of March 1994, the new government coalition consisted of 
a rightist segment including Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) with the largest 
share of votes, Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the Lega Nord (LN) and two 
minor centrist parties. All three major parties were more ardent supporters of 
welfare retrenchment than Italy’s other political formations, even if AN was 
much less liberal than the other two coalition partners (Budge et al. 2001). In 
spite of a few differences in the conception of social policies, FI-AN-LN 
delivered a relatively consistent public image of outspoken liberalism. 
Unsurprisingly, much of the fiscal effort in 1994 came from primary 
spending restraints.
After the transitional left-supported Dini Government, on 21 April 1996 a 
new coalition under Prime Minister Prodi came to power. It was the first 
centre-left government guiding the country since the post-war period. It was 
composed of members from the PDS and relied on the votes of the extra- 
governmental RC without whose support it would not have enjoyed absolute 
majority in the Lower House. In his first appearance in front of Parliament,
Prodi acknowledged that fiscal austerity had to go hand in hand with social 
justice and equity (Camera 22/5/96; www.parlamento.it, July 2002). Hence, 
all governing parties were keen on preserving Italy’s welfare state and 
amongst the hardest opponents of welfare retrenchment (Budge et al. 2001). 
Overall, the Prodi Government attempted to deliver the image of a virtuous 
(social democratic) establishment making the best out of a financial situation 
of emergency (Levy 1999).
To sum up, Governments in the 1990s differed substantially in their respective 
declared (and actual) ideological orientations and, when discussing the most 
appropriate fiscal strategies, partisan arguments were often put forward. Yet, to 
what extent did partisan preferences affect the actual content of fiscal reform? A 
closer look at the composition of budget corrections under the Amato, Ciampi, 
Berlusconi, Dini and Prodi Governments reveals that partisanship is generally 
well reflected in fiscal policy outcomes. Ciampi, Dini and Prodi did not tackle
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social expenditures and the latter two put in place revenue-based consolidations. 
Instead, the Berlusconi Government announced a typically rightist fiscal policy 
agenda with more than half of the budget correction stemming from spending 
restraints, in which social outlays played an important role. Table 5 elucidates the 
main characteristics of budget interventions in the 1990s. Transfers were 
significantly curtailed only in 1994 under the Berlusconi Government, where 
they diminished by 0.7 percent of GDP in CA terms.
However, rather than Government partisanship, it seems that it was the partisan 
complexion of Parliament, which is the closest approximation to the preferences 
of society, that exerted the greatest impact on reform contents. As the budget 
proposal moved from the governmental to the parliamentary stage, the 
contribution of revenues to deficit reduction tends to increase but it did so more 
when the leftist component of Parliament is strongest (under the Amato, Dini and 
Prodi Governments). The Amato Government, for example, was a relatively 
moderate formation; this is at least what emerges from an analysis of electoral 
manifestos and programmes of its different partisan components5. Yet, here, the 
centralization of the budget process around the executive induced the latter to 
introduce significant social expenditure restraints which, it was acknowledged, 
were highly unpopular but necessary to set Italy’s fiscal adjustment on the right 
footing. Yet, not surprisingly, the contribution of spending cuts to deficit 
reduction diminished as the budget process moved from the governmental to the 
parliamentary stage. In the DPEF, which tends to be a technical note in which 
considerations of optimal policy are dominant, 74 percent of the total 
intervention was to address public spending; the share diminished, moving to 61 
percent in the government budget proposal (RPP) delivered in September and 
more so in the final Finance Bill, where expenditure restraints represented only 
half of the total adjustment.
5 Budge at al. constructed indexes measuring parties’ policy preferences using electoral 
manifestos and programmes (2001). One particular index measures the party’s positioning on the 
Left-Right spectrum where negative values indicate an extremely leftist policy agenda. As 
contents o f official documents reflect more moderate and rightist agendas, the value of the index 
increases progressively. The Amato Government scored a value o f 8.24 against the most leftist 
configuration, the RC, which had a negative score o f -26.7  and the most rightist position, that o f  
the Italian Republican Party (PRI), with a positive value of 36.73.
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As has already been argued in the literature, demand side partisan politics may at 
times be more relevant that supply-side (Government) partisanship and, in this 
particular research context, this is indicative of the overwhelming importance of 
society as opposed to state structures. Certainly factors other than pure 
ideological preferences should be taken into account -e.g. relationship with 
organised interests.
Table 5. Italy: Revenue Contribution to Total Adjustment (1992-97)
Dpef 1 (2)-(l) Rpp 2 (3)-(2) FB 3 ATransfers
Amato 26 50% 39 35% 63 0.3
Ciampi 9.7 23% 12 25% 15 -0.1
Berlusconi 41 2.5% 42 17% 49 -0.7
Dini 51 8% 55 27% 70 0.1
Prodi 35 43% 50 34% 67 0.4
Key: Bold = leftist governments or with leftist component; Dpef = contribution o f revenues to 
the total fiscal correction as indicated in the Dpef; (2)-(l) = percentage increase o f revenue 
contribution from the Dpef to the Rpp; Rpp = contribution o f revenues to the total fiscal
correction as indicated in the Dpef; (3)-(2) = percentage increase o f revenue contribution from 
the Rpp to the FB; FB = contribution of revenues to the total fiscal correction as indicated in the 
Finance Bill; ATransfers = actual cyclically adjusted change in social transfers (yearly).
3.2.The Italian median voter
Electoral politics have important implications for retrenchment. The original 
literature on austerity indicates that expenditure restraints are put in place 
only where governments have designed an effective strategy of blame- 
shifting onto other domestic or, more commonly, international actors/factors 
(Ross 1997; Pierson 2001). The natural assumption behind this literature is 
that welfare retrenchment is against the preferences of the median voter. In 
this section, I attempt to indicate the extent to which electoral politics played 
a role in Italy’s fiscal adjustment. It is about identifying the relative 
importance of strategic preferences.
I have already demonstrated above how it is not true that technocratic 
governments were more courageous than elected ones, as some of the 
literature has suggested. This is interpreted as a sign of the societal 
embeddedness of economic reform in the 1990s. In turn, societal support is a 
variable that fiscal authorities would take into account when forming
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decisions on debt stabilization. Graph 7 illustrates the median voter support 
for welfare expansion for each electoral year6. A  falling mean percentage 
signals that the electorate is more prone to accept welfare retrenchment. In 
the 1990s, the average support for the welfare state was historically low. It 
started decreasing from 1983, at a time in which the need to put social 
security budgets in order was strongly felt, without anything tangible being 
achieved. The median voter theory finds no support at the micro-level either. 
Support increases from 1992 to 1994 as the Berlusconi Government takes 
power. This is in contradiction with the empirical quantitative evidence 
showing cyclically adjusted transfers down by 0.7 percent o f  GDP in 1994- 
95. Moreover, under the successive two governments, social transfers 
actually increased, even i f  the median voter was less keen on the welfare 
state.
Graph 7. Italy: Median Voter Position on Welfare (Degree of 
Support for Expansion), 1946-1998
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In conclusion, electoral politics did not prove relevant to the story o f  Italy’s 
macroeconomic adjustment. To be sure, the view  taken here is that the notion o f  
a median voter is one-sided and does not allow for a representation o f  relative 
preferences and trade-offs. These are instead, as mentioned earlier, crucial to 
understanding the political economy o f  fiscal consolidation. As a confirmation o f
6 The percentage is taken from Budge et al. 2001.
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the limits of median positions come detailed survey-based data, which provide a 
rather different view of citizens’ preferences. Conducted in the 1990s, the 
surveys testify of the existence in Italy of an overwhelming preference for the 
preservation of the status quo in welfare state reform. This preference is stronger 
in the case of poor, older and labour market insiders. However, it is interesting to 
note that there is a strong status quo bias in the case of union members that goes 
beyond individual attributes (Boeri, Boersch-Supan and Tabellini 2001). This 
trait is of extreme relevance in this research context. First, it supports the 
decision to focus on powerful interest groups as a special category of actors. In 
the case of Italy, these also had significant access to budget policy-making. 
Second, it confirms the assumption behind the new politics o f  the welfare state 
literature, in which minority vested interests are rather more conservative than 
the general population. Because the finding remains general, it makes more sense 
at this point to focus on the actual fiscal micro-preferences of social partners.
There is no doubt then that social partners played an important role in budget 
policy-making. The argument that cuts across this thesis is that a full 
understanding of their role and contribution to deficit reduction is possible only 
once their micro preferences have been unveiled. In the next chapter, I describe 
in detail budget policy-making in the 1990s focusing on the input and 
preferences of social partners.
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CHAPTER IV
Social Pacts and the Fiscal 
Role of Italian Social 
Partners
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1. Macroeconomics and the Italian Variety of Corporatism
Besides rigorous institutionalist analyses of macroeconomic policy change there 
are studies that focus on the role of social partners. It is not to be ignored that, by 
illustrating a policy-making mode, models of corporatism represent themselves 
institutional variables (see Chapter II). However, it is reasonable to expect that 
corporatist institutions differ from budget and electoral institutions to the extent 
that, socio-economic preferences are more likely to play a role and possibly even 
to forge consensus in favour of a corporatist compromise at the very outset. I 
depart from the strong assumption that corporatism does not exist independently 
of the macro- and microeconomic preferences of the actors involved (see Rhodes 
and Molina 2002)7.
What formal corporatist channels did Italian social partners have available to 
them in the 1990s that allowed them to exert an impact on budget outcomes? 
First, and most importantly, representatives of organized labour and capital 
enjoyed institutional access to public finance decisions starting from 1992. The 
1992 Income Policy Agreements bound the government to consult them in May 
before the presentation of the DPEF to Parliament and again in September when 
the executive was due to submit its official budget proposal (Protocollo sulla 
Politica dei Redditi, July 1992; Celia and Treu 1998, 397). While the agreement 
was formally extending consultation rights to a wide range of socio-economic 
associations, it is indisputable that the government’s actual reference partners 
were just Confindustria and the three labour confederations CGIL-CISL-UIL 
(Amato 1994). Mandatory consultation on public finance ran parallel to the 
signing of four successive social pacts, in 1992, 1993, 1996 and 1998. These 
represent typical examples of explicit corporatist agreements. To the extent that
7 On the contrary, budget processes are either efficient or inefficient and tend to shape 
preferences rather than being shaped by preferences, in the short-term at least. The reference is to 
the debate revolving around endogenous institutions.
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they revolved around income but also tax and welfare policies, they were deemed 
to have a great impact on the country’s fiscal performance8.
More informally, namely outside more or less explicit corporatist arrangements, 
domestic interest groups continued to access the policy-making process by 
lobbying members of government and parliament (CGIL, Nuova Rassegna 
Sindacale 35, 5/10/1992). Finally, social partners play a significant 
macroeconomic role in the context of collective wage bargaining. In the 1990s, 
collective bargaining was subject to extensive restructuring. While committing 
unions to wage restraint, the 1993 Income Policy Agreements also included a re­
organization of bargaining on two levels, the national and the plant level. This 
reform resulted in a strengthening of centralization, which probably created the 
institutional conditions against which labour unions could accept and, most 
significantly, implement wage moderation (Olson 1982; Calmfors and Driffil 
1988). The section that follows sketches the profile of Italian interest groups 
looking at membership; relative importance in the national economy; 
centralization of wage bargaining and macroeconomic role. This description may 
offer some leverage to better interpret their fiscal preferences in the 1990s. I also 
review Italy’s previous experiences with social concertation.
l .l .A  profile of Italian interest groups
For two decades after WWII, the Confederation of Italian Industry -  
Confindustria- enjoyed representation status (see Offe 1981, 137), namely a 
monopoly over interest intermediation. It was so not only because, at the time, 
the labour movement remained extremely divided and weak but, more positively, 
because the organization’s public image benefited from the fact that it was 
associated with the post-war reconstruction of the national economy and with 
Italy’s economic miracle in 1959-1963 (Salvati 1984). The balance of power 
between labour and capital started to change from the late 1960s. As elsewhere 
across Europe, Italy witnessed the outbreak of worker discontent and a strong
8 An additional form o f corporatism would be the joint or self-administration o f welfare 
programmes on the part o f labour unions. However, this is a rather sectoral type o f policy-making 
and does not necessarily follow the same trend as the wider macroeconomic picture.
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political mobilization never experienced before. During this period, the country’s 
largest union confederations -  CGIL, CISL, UIL - gained enormously in 
organizational and political power. Not only did union density increase across the 
board, but also Italian governments soon became aware of the fact that the labour 
movement had turned to a powerful political actor (Regini 1981). The 
empowerment of unions culminated in 1970 with the introduction of the Statuto 
dei Lavoratori (Worker Statute). Thereafter, the first attempts at social 
concertation took place.
Differently from other European countries (e.g. Germany), the relationship 
between Italian social partners and political parties has always been extremely 
close, with large flows of union officials joining the political arena. Hence, 
ideological cleavages divide Italy’s three largest labour confederations. The 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) has been affiliated with the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI) and, after 1989, with the Party of the Democratic 
Left (PDS)9. The Confederazione Italiana Sociale del Lavoro (CISL) has instead 
been traditionally associated with the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and after 
1992, when corruption scandals caused the disintegration of DC, with minor 
political formations that remained but inspired by the social catholic ideology. 
While created with the mandate of serving workers at large, independently of 
their ideological orientation, the Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL) did not refrain 
from striking deals with the Socialist Party (PSI) and other liberal formations 
(Kemeny in Urbani 1992, 68-9; www.uil.com. October 2002).
On the other side of the spectrum, Confindustria has attempted to present a 
politically neutral self-image (www.confindustria.com. November 2004). The 
organization has shown interest in government as such, namely in the 
concessions that public actors could grant to its members (Mattina 1992), with 
the result that it tended to support moderate political coalitions, independently 
from whether they were gravitating to the right or the left of the political 
spectrum. To be sure, at least until the 1960s, Confindustria had established a
9 With the fall o f the Soviet bloc, the more leftist CGIL segments abandoned the union to form a 
new political configuration under the name o f Rifondazione Comunista (RC) led by former union 
leader Fausto Bertinotti.
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cooperative relationship with the Christian Democrats in power, even if their 
respective ideological backgrounds were quite different. Where the cultural 
heritage of the DC was deeply rooted in the catholic social tradition, organised 
capital converged on a more liberal platform. This indicates how Confindustria 
was committed to strategic alliances.
What is today’s organizational profile of Italian social partners? Confindustria 
represents about 208 affiliates from all sectors: industry, agriculture and, since 
1991, services. Multiple cleavages cut across this heterogeneous organization, 
such as that between protected and export-oriented sectors, between producers of 
tradable and of non-tradable goods and between large and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) (Celia and Treu 1998, 150; Traxler, Blaschke and Kittle 
2001, 48). Confindustria is the confederation of industry and the association of 
employers as well, thereby combining two roles that in other socio-economic 
systems tend to stay separate (e.g. Germany). This institutional trait is significant 
for at least two reasons. First, it explains why the confederation always adopted 
an “interdisciplinary approach” during roundtable talks, showing willing to 
discuss issues as diverse as wage moderation and welfare reform at the same 
negotiating table. Second, it accounts for the relative flexibility of the 
organization’s bargaining behaviour to the extent that the representation of 
multiple interests increases the number of equilibrium outcomes. Internalising 
negative externalities is in fact easier when the actor in question is the same one. 
So, for example, it becomes easier to trade wage restraint with higher fiscal 
pressure.
In addition to intense ideological competition, CGIL-CISL-UIL have also been 
characterised by slightly different organizational profiles, even if they have 
shown a tendency towards convergence in the last decade. The largest of the 
three, CGIL continues to preserve to this day its original associational monopoly. 
In 1990, 46.4 percent of all union members were affiliated to CGIL, 34.5 to CISL 
and 19.1 to UIL (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000, 384). The high number of non­
active members is also an important trait of CGIL. In 1990, 45.8 percent of all 
members consisted of pensioners against the 38.2 and 18.7 percent of CISL and 
UIL respectively. Still, it is interesting to note that the other two confederations
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witnessed a rapid increase in the number of affiliated pensioners from 1990 to 
1995 (Table 6). This is to say that the CGIL-CISL-UIL coalition sitting at the 
negotiating table in the era of the successful social pacts was principally 
representing the interests of pensioners. Sectoral concentration changes too from 
one confederation to the other. CGIL members are concentrated in the export- 
oriented manufacturing sector (Frieden 2002). CISL has privileged access to 
public sector employees. UIL aims to represent the self-employed (CNEL 2000b, 
322).
Table 6. Percentage of Non-Active Members (CGIL-CISL-UIL)
1990
Non-active (%)
1985-90
Increase of non-active
1990-95
Increase of non-active
1995-97
Increase of non-active
CGIL 45.8 + 30% + 17% + 3%
CISL 38.2 + 44% + 24% + 8%
UIL 18.7 + 60% + 37% + 6%
Source: Ebbinghaus and Hassel, Trade Unions in Western Europe, 2000 (Ebbinghaus
and Visser 2000, 424).
1.2.The historical relevance of macro-concertation
Italy’s variety of corporatism is an awkward one. Experts like to talk of a hybrid 
case of neo-corporatism (Regini 1981; Bull 1988). Until the 1990s, Italy lacked 
the institutional preconditions which neo-corporatist theory had identified as 
being conditio sine qua non for the emergence of corporatist arrangements; these 
being the high centralization of collective bargaining and the institutionalisation 
of dialogue between government and social partners (Lehmbruch and Schmitter
1979). In spite of these deficiencies, the country has experienced forms of social 
concertation before the 1990s. More specifically, one can identify different 
historical phases. The first experiment of tripartite social partnership goes back to 
the late 1970s when unions gave their consent to a severe austerity programme.
In the early 1980s, social concertation took the form of a traditional political 
exchange between wage restraint and government fiscal concessions. In the 
successive years, bilateralism prevailed with the State playing a marginal, if even 
that, role in negotiations between labour and capital. The social pacts of the
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1990s marked the return of tripartism with social partners enjoying a very 
powerful position (Regini 1981; Salvati 1992).
This section describes in detail the first three phases with particular attention to 
the incentives behind them and to the content of the agreements. My ultimate aim 
is to appreciate differences between older corporatist experiments and recent 
social pacts. Corporatism emerged in Italy for the first time in the wake of a 
dramatic economic crisis (1976-79). As a result of the two successive oil shocks, 
the country was burdened with extraordinary inflationary pressures and severe 
fiscal imbalances. In 1976, once the PCI had joined the coalition under the new 
Solidarity Government, organised interests agreed to the implementation of an 
austerity programme. Union support came also from the fact that it was the 
General Secretary of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, who advocated greater 
discipline (Golden 1988). In this context, it is interesting to note that the call for 
fiscal austerity is not necessarily a prerogative of conservative parties, but more 
probably a function of the distributional impact of an economic crisis and/or 
emergency.
At the time, Italian labour unions appreciated the need for a concerted response 
to economic emergency. A different behaviour would produce in fact 
“unintended macroeconomic consequences” (Regini 1987). Their readiness to 
strike a deal with the Solidarity Government is explained only partially by the 
partisan argument. Strategic considerations mattered too. In particular, with the 
State playing an important role in the alliance, labour unions expected fiscal 
compensations in exchange for wage restraint. These took the form of additional 
social transfers, which in the long-term produced the rapid uncontrolled growth 
of social security spending (Salvati 1992; Treu in Dore, Boyer and Mars 1994). 
After three years, tripartite consultation started to stumble when confronted with 
a divided labour movement. On the one hand, the three confederations were 
competing ideologically against each other. On the other, and because of this 
partisan confrontation, CGIL, CISL, and UIL had different conceptions of the 
social viability of the austerity package (Golden 1988).
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In the early 1980s, Italy was still suffering from high inflation. There was 
widespread awareness that at the basis of the country’s excessive price levels was 
the wage indexation system that unions and employers had introduced in a 
consensual fashion in 1975. In 1983, government and the social partners came to 
an agreement on incomes policies. Workers committed to controlling wage 
growth so as to keep it in line with programmatic inflation as much as possible. 
The government was expected to guarantee that direct taxes and SSC were not 
augmented. Also, the government decided on a decrease of health contributions, 
the elimination of the fiscal drag, the exemption from SSC for employment 
contracts in the South and on additional benefits to families (CNEL, Accordi 
Governo e Parti Sociali, www.cnel.org). It was again a political exchange but 
one where the government was compensating wage earners with tax alleviation. 
In 1984, a similar compromise failed after the opposition of CGIL. Observers 
started to talk of the end of consensual politics.
The mid- and late 1980s marked a manifest decline in corporatism. Firstly, the 
State stayed out of talks between labour and capital. In this sense, there was a 
move from tri- to bipartism. Secondly, social partners themselves were losing 
political and organizational power as elsewhere in Europe (Golden et al. 1999). 
With collective bargaining moving towards decentralization in most European 
countries, observers forecasted the “end of corporatism” (see Schmitter 1974). 
Thirdly, cooperative relations between CGIL-CISL-UIL were rapidly 
deteriorating. One has to wait the early 1990s to see the re-emergence of social 
concertation in Italy in response to the 1992 financial crisis and under pressure to 
qualify for EMU. In section IV of this chapter, I will describe in detail the 
contents of the social pacts emerged in the 1990s and, in Chapter VII, I will 
attempt to identify their determinants.
2. Fiscal Policy Responses to the Financial Crisis
This chapter focuses on fiscal policy-making in 1992-94. This was an 
exceptionally turbulent time marked by the collapse of Italy’s traditional party
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system after a series of corruption scandals, by the 1992 financial crisis 
culminated in the Lira’s abandonment of the ERM and by the dramatic economic 
recession spread across Europe in 1993. It was but also the period in which 
serious fiscal consolidation was put in place under the Amato and Ciampi 
Governments, importantly with the crucial support of labour unions. The 
elimination of wage indexation in the 1992 social pact controlled the potential 
inflationary impact of the Lira’s significant depreciation. In the successive 1993 
agreement, the government reiterated its commitment to fiscal discipline should 
labour unions continue to support it indirectly by means of voluntary wage 
restraint. The terms were set for a sort of political exchange to some extent 
similar to those flourishing in Europe during the 1970s. The following sections 
describe this period.
2.1.The U-turn under the Amato Government (1992-93)
When, in May 1992, Giuliano Amato became Prime Minister, Italy was in 
political and financial turmoil. The recent corruption scandals known as 
Tangentopoli (Bribe city) had undermined the country’s politico-institutional 
foundations. In addition, the economic situation was far from comforting.
Growth projections were modest both in comparison with the previous five years 
and with parallel developments in other European countries (Tesoro 1992, 4). 
Inflation continued to be high and interest rate differentials with Germany grew 
as a result of financial markets lending little credibility to the troubled country. 
Against this background, the Amato Government soon realised that an extensive 
fiscal intervention was urgently needed. Deficit reduction was necessary to fight 
inflation and to improve the current account deficit10 (Tesoro 1992, 6; Camera 
dei Deputati 16/9/1992, 3250-3282). It is interesting to note that fiscal 
adjustment was means both to keep inflation under control and, more obviously, 
to preserve the sustainability of public finances.
10 While macroeconomics literature has not confirmed the existence o f a systematic general 
relationship between high deficit and debt ratios to GDP and inflation, this seems but to be the 
case for Italy. Certainly, public authorities were firmly persuaded that the two were associated. In 
addition, by weakening internal demand conditions, fiscal adjustment would put a halt on 
imports, thereby correcting current account imbalances and, eventually, preserving the Lira’s 
stability.
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In the face of a rapid deterioration of Italy’s financial situation, the new 
government was obliged to realise an extraordinary budget intervention in July. 
Passing it by decree so as to circumvent potential parliamentary opposition, 
Prime Minister Amato approved a corrective measure of about 30 trillion Lira 
(15.5 billion Euro) consisting mainly (75 percent) of revenue increases stemming 
from tax hikes on real estate and on bank deposits, and from greater pension 
contributions (Corriere della Sera 3/8/1992). It was also planned that, having 
obtained delegation from Parliament, fiscal authorities would design a structural 
reform in the areas of pension, health services, local finance and public 
employment (Camera dei Deputati 16/9/1992, 3250-3282; Corriere della Sera 
24/7/1992) to allow expenditure restraints for 6.8 trillion Lira (Banca d’ltalia
1993). The significant fiscal restriction was not sufficient to avert fears about 
skyrocketing inflation. In the same month, Governor of the Bank of Italy Ciampi 
raised the discount rate by 1.75 points (Tesoro 1992, 18). Italy’s high public 
indebtedness made a restrictive monetary stance often necessary. Anti- 
inflationary measures would in fact allow also to contain the cost of servicing the 
debt (Pesole 2001; interview with Andrea Monorchio). It is interesting to note 
that Italy was the only EU country to pursue fiscal adjustment against rather 
restrictive monetary conditions (European Commission 2000, 12).
CGIL-CISL-UIL did not welcome Amato’s emergency fiscal correction. A CISL 
official explained that, while unions were giving their green light to the size of 
the planned budget correction, they were doubtful about the specific distribution 
of the sacrifices (CISL, CdL 25/9/92). They expressed concerns about pension 
restraints and about the planned freeze on public employment contracts 
envisaged in the delegation law, on which they had not been even consulted 
(CGIL, NRS 34, 28/9/1992, 8-9). Unions were also critical about the suggested 
0.8 percent increase in pension contributions and campaigned against housing 
tax, finally obtaining an exemption on first houses (Corriere della Sera 
29/7/1992)11. CGIL indicated that, while having tackled the appropriate side of
11 There was not unanimity in the labour movement on the question o f the housing tax. CGIL was 
extremely critical o f the measure and welcomed the granted exemption as a victory. Instead,
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the budget, government authorities were targeting the wrong items. They should 
instead tax capital gains as well as reform the national tax system to eliminate 
widespread fiscal elusion and evasion (CGIL, NRS 29, 27/7/1992, 8-9).
On the other side of the spectrum, Confindustria was supportive of such 
extensive fiscal correction. Yet, as budget negotiations between government 
authorities and social partners were evolving, President Luigi Abete remarked 
upon the potential failure of a measure whose composition was being rapidly 
reshaped under labour unions’ pressure. This was believed to be detrimental to 
the external credibility of the Italian economy, showing the government’s 
incapacity to resist bottom-up pressures (Corriere della Sera 23/7/1992; 
5/10/1992). Content analysis of official documents and media reports released in 
September shows that business actors were at the time primarily concerned with 
fiscal discipline as such. For most of the 1990s, they showed great concern for 
the reaction of financial markets, a trait that would be quite important to the 
political economy of fiscal adjustment. Second came their preference over its 
very composition; they favoured expenditure restraints but were equally firm in 
opposing greater fiscal pressure. The fact that the Lira had not yet abandoned the 
ERM explains their sensitivity to the tax burden to the extent that this, if 
significant, would endanger competitiveness (see Chapter VII).
With the supplementary budget came the first agreement between government 
and social partners. The Lira continued being subject to intensive speculative 
pressures and large amounts of currency reserves were employed to preserve its 
external value. On top of that, Italy’s large inflation differential vis-a-vis other 
EU countries was further weakening the national currency. While the 
commitment to fiscal discipline aimed to calm financial markets down, 
domestically only across-the-board wage moderation would help the country out 
of mounting inflationary pressures. The pact signed in July 1992 revolved around 
the elimination of the scala mobile (wage indexation), substituted it with a 
system where only productivity growth was rewarded. The ensuing reduction of 
unit labour costs would support the too weak domestic investment ratio. In
CISL supported it because it enlarged the tax base, once excessively concentrated on employment 
and pension (CISL, CdL 25/9/1992).
I l l
addition, the agreement prescribed that government consult social partners before 
the presentation of the financial planning document (DPEF) and budget proposal 
to Parliament (Protocollo sulla Politica dei Redditi, July 1992).
In September 1992, the government resumed consultation rounds with the social 
partners. The Lira had further weakened making the preservation of fixed 
exchange rates extremely difficult. The Italian Confederation for Industry was 
sceptical of the possibility of devaluating officially. Since the late 1980s, 
organised capital was showing hostility to the use of competitive devaluations. In 
the autumn of 1992, the organization’s primary interest resided in the size of the 
fiscal correction. The latter would convince financial markets of Italy’s serious 
commitment to fiscal discipline, thereby allowing a reduction of interest rates. 
The Bank of Italy supported a similar view (Banca d’ltalia 1993)12. At the root of 
Confindustria's strong preference for rapid and significant budget consolidation 
was also a concern for the excessive cost of money that was strangling the Italian 
industry (Corriere della Sera 5/10/1992). Secondly, business actors indicated that 
deficit reduction had to be achieved by means of expenditure restraints and 
privatisation proceeds and not through tax increases (Corriere della Sera 
9/9/1992).
The final devaluation of the Lira at the end of the month created alarm amongst 
workers after all three confederations had signed up to the elimination of the 
wage indexation system in July (CGIL, NRS 34, 28/9/1992). Fears for the 
inflationary impact of a flexible exchange rate in the absence of wage indexation 
strengthened unions’ support for speedy and extensive deficit reduction, thereby 
clearly aligning their preferences with those of Confindustria (CGIL, NRS 36, 
12/10/1992). This did not stop them from pressing government for further 
adjustment to the content of the budget. In the DPEF, the Amato Government 
had in fact envisaged a rather expenditure-based manoeuvre with cuts to primary 
spending of 36 trillion Lira (18.5 billion euro) and revenue increases of 16
12 Nor was the government less concerned with the reaction o f financial markets. In consultation 
with the unions, Amato declared: “I acknowledge you are risking screws, but I have to confront 
the markets every day” (author’s own translation). There is extensive empirical evidence showing 
improvement in the value o f the Lira in perfect correspondence with the approval of various 
budget documents, especially there where this approval came by decree (Corriere della Sera 
15/10/1992).
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trillion Lira (8.3 billion euro) (DPEF 1993-95, 11). As revealed by some content 
analysis of documents dating back to September 1992, labour unions were 
equally committed to fighting against cuts and to promoting revenue-maximising 
measures, having deficit reduction as their priority (see Chapter VII). CISL 
leader Sergio D’Antoni acknowledged his support for the austerity package, but 
asked for a fairer distribution of the fiscal adjustment burden (CISL, CdL 19- 
20/9/1992). CGIL-CISL-UIL put forward a common proposal, which envisaged 
a revenue-based consolidation constructed around the elimination of the too 
numerous tax benefits, the imposition of a minimum tax on firms and on the self- 
employed (CISL, CdL 15/9/1992).
At the end of roundtable talks with social partners, the Amato Government 
presented its official budget proposal for 1993. The fiscal package, worth 93 
trillion Lira (48 billion Euro), embodied the greatest budget correction in Italy’s 
economic history, amounting to 6 percent of GDP (OECD, Country Survey:
1 3Italy, 1994) . More than half of the effort was concentrated on the revenue side 
of the budget. Measures included a revision of tax breaks, a new municipal tax 
on buildings, a new tax on companies’ net assets, a tax amnesty, VAT 
harmonization and tighter rules in the computation of income from self- 
employment. The remainder was to come from spending cuts spelt out in the 
accompanying provisions of the budget law, of which pension cuts constituted 
the greatest part (Pesole 2001; CGIL, NRS 35, 5/10/1992, 10-12).
While Confindustria was satisfied with the government’s fiscal strategy, 
expecting that the extraordinary size of adjustment would bring about a fall of 
interest rates (Corriere della Sera 11/9/1992), CGIL-CISL-UIL were much more 
critical. True, they would also welcome a more relaxed monetary stance expected 
in response to successful deficit reduction, but insisted that its composition be 
revised on more equitable terms (CISL, CdL 25/9/1992). The three union 
confederations unanimously rejected measures taken in the areas of pension and 
health care (CISL, CdL 18/9/1992), the freeze on seniority pensions and the one- 
year freeze on public employment contracts. They suggested that government
13 Over the period 1971-91, the average size o f budget corrections amounted to 18 trillion Lira 
(9.3 billion Euro) (see Verzichelli 1999).
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substitute planned spending restraints with additional revenue-maximising 
measures (CGIL, NRS 35, 5/10/1992, 10), such as a surcharge on capital gains, 
the suspension of tax returns and the introduction of special measures to fight 
fiscal evasion (CISL, CdL 22/9/1992; CGIL, NRS 35, 5/10/1992, 10-12). Their 
position was as follows:
“We have to intervene on the public debt, we must and we can; we should do 
it now because tomorrow could be too late or, anyway, much more expensive; 
but we have to do it keeping always equity in mind; this is a fundamental 
prerequisite for any fiscal manoeuvre to be successful. We are aware that this 
will have to be translated into additional taxes, but the burden of adjustment 
should not be based on the most numerous but less wealthy social categories” 
-author’s own translation (CISL, CdL 25/9/1992).
Their discontent took the form of a massive mobilization on 13 October. Against 
the threat of a second general strike (CGIL, NRS 38, 26/10/1992, 7), the Amato 
Government declared itself willing to strike a deal with the unions over the 
content of the budgetary correction as long as its extent was preserved (CGIL, 
NRS 35, 5/10/1992, 10-15; CISL, CdL 23/9/1992). Cutbacks to pension and 
health care were reduced and the ensuing loss compensated by restraints on 
development policies; the fiscal burden was shifted onto the self-employed away 
from wage earners; tax increases on utilities and on the personal income tax 
(IRPEF) postponed; and the surcharge on firms incorporated in a decree law to 
guarantee immediate application (Corriere 29/9/1992: CGIL, NRS 36,
12/10/1992; NRS 38, 26/10/1992; CISL, CdL 16-25/10/1992). In the end, CGIL- 
CISL-UIL acknowledged that all their requests had been accepted. Approved by 
Parliament at the end of December, the 1993 Finance Bill consisted of 
expenditure restraints of 41.9 trillion Lira and of revenue increases of 44.4 
trillion (Degni and al. 2001). In terms of final outcomes, the intervention led to a 
cyclically adjusted deficit reduction of 1.3 percent of GDP with the primary 
surplus improved by 1.7 percent of GDP. Total revenues increased 4.3 percent of 
GDP. In spite of the budget’s planned nominal spending cuts, CA total 
expenditures actually increased by 3.1 percent of GDP (European Commission 
2003).
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Existing literature explained the Amato Government’s success in imposing such 
an extensive budget consolidation on two grounds. First, the commitment to the 
Maastricht Treaty and the impending financial crisis left authorities with no 
choice (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). Secondly, deficit reduction was allowed 
by stronger political and budget institutions. More specifically, Della Sala argued 
that, with the collapse of the Italian party system, the executive was de facto 
granted greater room for manoeuvre and independence from Parliament with the 
result that ambitious fiscal plans had little chance to get lost during the 
parliamentary passage (Della Sala 1997). On a similar note, Verzichelli suggests 
that, from an institutionalist perspective, the most visible change in the early 
1990s was the government’s enhancement of direct responsibility in economic 
matters (Verzichelli in Cotta and Isemia 1996, 223-4). To take one example, 
Amato was the first prime minister to threaten resigning, should the size of the 
budget correction not be preserved after the parliamentary stage. In a nutshell, 
stronger institutions accounted for the conquered fiscal rigour.
My contention is that, while significant, the centralization of the budgetary 
process around the figure of the prime minister is not a sufficient explanation of 
fiscal stabilisation. Anecdotal evidence is clear about the fact that Amato was be 
no means a “free rider” but required constant support from labour unions. With 
the traditional party system having lost legitimacy, trade unions inherited 
significant political power. At that time, they also enjoyed great mobilization 
potential. Their direct involvement in budget policy-making allowed for the 
creation of a broad social consensus around fiscal discipline (interview Giuliano 
Amato). CGIL-CISL-UIL ended up substituting Parliament in the function of 
transmission channels between the State and society (Amato 1994). However, 
before their consent could be obtained, fiscal authorities would need to design an 
acceptable reform package. This explains why the dimension of composition is 
of such relevance and why it also accounts for the size of budgetary 
consolidation, when the latter is a good proxy for successful deficit reduction. In 
brief, the progressive convergence of budget actors’ fiscal preferences from one 
consultation round to the other is on the basis of policy change. By the same 
token, the 1992 financial crisis was not an abstract external threat, as suggested 
by some literature, but had the specific effect of altering the preferences of socio­
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economic interests, allowing for labour and capital to converge on a similar 
position in favour of fiscal discipline, even if for different reasons. Again, the 
explanation lies in the newly emerged constellation of domestic preferences 
rather than in institutions.
2.2.Technocrats, social partners and markets (1993-94)
In May 1993, the technocrat Carlo Azeglio Ciampi was appointed Prime 
Minister. He was immediately confronted with two challenges, namely the state 
of public finances and the relationship with the unions. Fiscal consolidation 
continued to be an absolute priority. The latter was even more urgent now in 
light of the fact that the Lira had abandoned the ERM and was more vulnerable 
to financial markets’ perception of Italy’s progress towards financial stability. 
Ciampi had been a firm advocate of stability for the past two decades. When 
governor of the national central bank, he insisted that balanced budgets were 
essential, both for keeping inflation under control and for freeing up the 
resources necessary to sustain growth and employment creation (Banca d’ltalia 
1979-1986). Also, with wage moderation having offered a great contribution to 
adjustment in the previous year, it was felt that the new government should put 
its effort into maintaining the support of labour unions.
At the beginning of the year, the macroeconomic scenario seemed to offer better 
opportunities than it had been the case in 1992. First, while the devaluation of the 
Lira had the potential to undermine Italy’s credibility on international markets, it 
had also offered a pressure valve for domestic exports and could so contribute to 
growth, had other variables being controlled for. Second, the income policy 
agreements signed in July 1992 guaranteed greater control over inflationary 
spirals (Tesoro 1993,10-14). With the inflation rate appearing to be under control 
in the first months of 1993, domestic groups pushed for a more relaxed monetary 
stance. The reduction of interest rates was expected to minimise the cost of the 
country’s high public debt, guaranteeing greater sustainability of public finances 
in a situation in which overall growth was alarmingly slowing down. Impending
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recession was perceived as a severe problem to the extent that it undermined the 
possibility to contain fiscal imbalances through the growth channel, without 
major sacrifices (CGIL, NRS 6, 22/2/1993).
It was fundamental that the new Prime Minister succeeded in preserving an 
environment in which unions’ commitment to wage restraint could be sustained. 
Not only was the cooperation of the social partners necessary to the success of 
the government plan for economic adjustment, but also politically desirable 
considering that the new technocratic establishment lacked electoral legitimacy. 
The difficulty arose from the fact that the Prime Minister had to create as wide a 
socio-political consensus as possible in a situation in which there was no real 
alternative to retrenchment (Corriere della Sera 7/5/1993; Pesole 2001, 122-130). 
Faced with this tricky situation, Ciampi declared his commitment to maintaining 
an open dialogue with the unions, acknowledging that their support was essential 
to successful economic reform. Wage restraint and the ensuing control over 
inflation would help keep interest rates low, thereby benefiting both investment 
and debt sustainability (Tesoro 1993, 19). It was fortunate that unions had full 
trust of the Prime Minister (Tesoro 1993, 12-14; Corriere della Sera 5/5/1993; 
interview Andrea Monorchio).
Still, the government’s first fiscal act came under strong criticism to the extent 
that decisions were taken at closed doors without consultation with the social 
partners (Corriere della Sera 22/5/1993). Faced with a rapid deterioration of 
public finance aggregates at the end of May, the executive had been induced to 
deliver a supplementary budget worth 12.7 trillion Lira. More than half of the 
burden of adjustment was placed on the revenue side of the budget, where a new 
ecological tax was introduced and indirect taxation increased. The rest came 
from cuts to central government consumption and from reduced transfers to local 
administrations (Tesoro 1993; Corriere della Sera 21/5/1993). Domestic groups 
were not satisfied mainly because they had not been consulted. UIL leader 
Larizza indicated that the government should have taken concrete measures to 
fight fiscal evasion and implemented more generous investment policies 
(Corriere della Sera 3/5/1993). The Confederation of Italian Industry criticised 
the excessive reliance on tax hikes. In response, Prime Minister Ciampi was keen
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to acknowledge that his was an emergency measure and that decisions over the 
official budget proposal would be taken in close consultation with the social 
partners (Corriere della Sera 27/5/1993).
Delivered on 13 July 1993, the government’s long-term financial document 
reflected the technocratic character of the new establishment. Ciampi’s fiscal 
objective was threefold. First, he was committed to a gradual but firm debt 
stabilization, in contrast with previous governments’ fiscal policy prescriptions 
where deficit reduction had represented the one and only target, with debt 
reduction believed to follow en suite. Second, it was acknowledged that Italy’s 
non-tradable sector was excessively protected (e.g. services) and that resources 
had to be redistributed towards tradable sectors (e.g. manufacturing). Thirdly, it 
was recognised that the welfare state was deemed to face significant strains as a 
result of the ageing population. According to government plans, about 80 percent 
of the total (nominal) value of the fiscal correction would stem from expenditure 
restraints in public administration; these would come without compromising the 
quality of public services (DPEF 1994-96, 14-36). The remaining would come 
from additional revenues created by the rationalization of the tax system. The 
Government had no reason or inclination to further increase Italy’s fiscal 
pressure, not least because of mounting socio-political pressure upon the 
executive (Bemardi 1994, 22).
Under the Ciampi Government, social partners agreed to the signing of a second 
social pact. This was meant to complete the 1992 agreement. From the way in 
which they had been conceived, the 1993 Income Policy Agreements 
immediately became a manifesto in favour of fiscal discipline. It was 
acknowledged that wage moderation was an essential part of inflation control 
and of successful budget consolidation. Among other effects, lower price levels 
would induce financial markets to believe that Italy was setting itself on sounder 
feet with positive implications for the country’s alarming risk premium. Not only 
did this pact reiterate labour unions’ voluntary wage restraint, but it also 
envisaged a complete restructuring of wage bargaining on two levels of 
negotiation, the national and the plant level (Protocollo sulla Politica dei Redditi, 
July 1993). Considering collective bargaining had been previously quite
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fragmented, this innovation was significant in that it made the national level 
more visible, thereby enhancing centralization and coordination across regions 
and sectors.
On 9 September, the Council of Ministers presented the official budget proposal 
for 1994. It envisaged a 31 trillion Lira intervention (15.5 billion Euro), of which 
only 3.8 trillion came from greater incomes and 27.2 trillion from spending 
restraints, thereby largely confirming data laid down in the DPEF. Already in the 
design, Prime Minister Ciampi’s budget policy did not share common traits with 
either previous or subsequent fiscal interventions. It was both the smallest and 
the most expenditure-based manoeuvre. Content analysis of official documents 
and declarations to the press reveals how Confindustria, while appreciating the 
significant expenditure component of the budget correction, nevertheless 
expressed concerns about the fact that the limited size of the intervention would 
not induce a sufficiently rapid deceleration of interest rate levels (Corriere della 
Sera 3/9/1993; CISL, CdL 10/9/1993). At the same time, Italian trade unions - 
Confcommercio, Confartiginato and Confesercenti- appreciated the fact that the 
Government had abolished the minimum tax, a transitory measure introduced by 
Amato in the previous year which, consisting of a minimum flat-rate 
contribution, was conceived with the aim of correcting for self-employed 
workers’ tendency to evade (Corriere della Sera 4/9/1993).
In spite of Ciampi’s effort to gain the support of CGIL-CISL-UIL, labour unions 
were extremely disappointed and called for a general strike to take place on 28 
October. Content analysis of official documents identifies three peculiarities 
about 1993. First, the fiscal preferences of labour unions were much more 
volatile than they had been the year before. Second, the opinions of the three 
confederations tended to diverge more often than not. Third, fiscal discipline was 
not always perceived as their most intensive preference; only greater 
interventions on the revenue side of budget were (see Appendix la). With 
recession looming in the background, organised labour was more cautious in 
calling for a restrictive fiscal stance and, instead, went so far as to ask the 
government to launch new programmes in favour of employment.
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Under particular criticism was Ciampi’s decision to abolish the minimum tax, 
which labour representatives felt had the advantage of correcting for the unequal 
distribution of the adjustment burden between dependent and self-employed 
labour (Corriere della Sera 21/9/1993). Most importantly, the tax was one of the 
items the government had exchanged for wage moderation. In that respect, its 
abolition was perceived as a violation of the 1992 and 1993 Income Policy 
Agreements (CISL, CdL 5/10/1993; Corriere della Sera 13/10/1993). Also, CISL 
criticised interventions on pensions and health care, showing particularly concern 
over the ungenerous public employment provisions (CISL, CdL IIVIXWI, 
13/10/1993; Corriere della Sera 14/9/1993), not least because of the unions’ 
significant penetration in the public sector. CGIL talked more vehemently of an 
equal distribution of the adjustment burden, mainly as a result of the introduction 
of indiscriminate spending cuts (CGIL, NRS 32, 27/9/1993, 4-7). In agreement 
with CISL, CGIL expected signs of commitment to greater public investment in 
research and vocational training (CGIL, NRS 32, 27/9/1993; CISL, CdL 
24/11/1993). Their position is well reflected here:
“Unions were asking for a larger intervention on the revenue side o f the 
budget. Certainly, they are not asking for greater fiscal pressure, which has 
reached unbearable levels. Yet, they are asking for less fiscal benefits and for 
the devolution of the ensuing additional revenues to employment-boosting 
initiatives.. .Since the government has to proceed in the adjustment of public 
finances, it would have to do so by guaranteeing fiscal equity and by 
intervening more significantly on fiscal benefits so as to free resources to be 
devoted to investment and to active labour market policies” -author’s own 
translation {CdL 12/9/1993, 6/10/1993).
Approved at the end of December, the 1994 Finance Bill confirmed the size of 
the adjustment as indicated in the September RPP, but its composition was 
slightly revised on the revenue side of the budget, with revenues increasing from 
3.8 to 5 trillion Lira. Public incomes would be inflated thanks to indirect tax 
hikes, which were intended to cover for the approval, during the parliamentary 
session, of an amendment to Ciampi’s severe provisions on minimum pensions 
(Corriere della Sera 16/10/1993). Large savings derived from the vast reform of 
public administration designed by Civil Service Minister Sabino Cassese (4.6 
trillion Lira), but also from cuts to pensions, health care and public investment 
(OECD various issues). In terms of actual fiscal outcomes, the CA deficit fell 0.6
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percent of GDP; results came from both sides of the budget with total CA 
expenditures and revenues both diminishing by 2.5 percent of GDP (European 
Commission 2003). Yet, the adjusted primary surplus deteriorated by 1 percent 
of GDP showing in fact that interest payments had contributed significantly to 
deficit reduction, as in authorities’ expectations.
3. The Creation of Consensus in the Final Run-Up to EMU
With 1994, a new elected government came into power, a development that had 
important implications for fiscal policy. Budget policy-making certainly becomes 
more politicised. The neo-liberal Berlusconi Government was relatively 
successful in putting in place some expenditure restraints. However, its attempt 
to achieve a pension reform without unions’ support in fact into a failure, forcing 
the establishment to resign. Financial markets showed particular sensitivity to the 
instability caused by this, as well as being not much impressed by the Prime 
Minister’s repeated calls for an expenditure-based consolidation. After the 
transitional Dini Government, under which a significant pension reform was 
successfully negotiated with the unions, the ball rolled to another elected 
government. The Prodi Government in power from 1996 to 1998 was able to 
successfully manage Italy’s final rush into EMU, with a deficit reduction in 1996 
of 4 percent of GDP. In the following sections, I describe in detail fiscal policy­
making during this period.
3.1.The neo-liberal agenda of Berlusconi (1994)
Elected in 1994 under the new semi-majoritarian law, the centre-right Berlusconi 
Government did not linger to express its full support for an expenditure-based 
fiscal adjustment. The electoral campaign itself had centred on economic issues, 
much against Italy’s politico-institutional heritage (Bemardi 1995; Bellucci 
1999). In official budget documents, the government attacked Italy’s expensive 
pension and health care system and excessive public wages (Tesoro 1994, 1-5). 
Only structural cuts, as opposed to mere deficit reduction, would keep inflation
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under control, thereby accelerating debt stabilization (Pesole 2001, 130-1). 
Ideological reasons explain the government’s fiscal stance. Welfare expenditure 
cuts together with the parallel project for significant tax alleviation aimed de 
facto at reducing the role of the state in the national economy (Verzichelli 1999), 
as was explicitly suggested in the DPEF:
“The excessive role o f the State in the production o f goods and services 
generates, on one side, inefficiencies in the allocation and redistribution of  
resources and, on the other, creates and protects monopolies hindering the 
emergence o f the degree o f competition that is necessary to produce wealth. 
Budget consolidation cannot be successful if  not associated with the retreat o f  
the State from economic activities that are, by nature, better performed by the 
market” -author’s own translation (Tesoro 1994,2 & 9).
In their first budget act, fiscal authorities envisaged a moderately large fiscal 
intervention worth 35 trillion Lira, 27.8 trillion of which came from expenditure 
restraints, mostly in the area of pensions and health care. The September budget 
proposal largely confirmed these figures. It contained savings for total 50 trillion 
Lira (25.9 billion Euro), with more than half coming from adjustments to the 
pension system and to the health service, from a halt to public employment 
contracts and from reduced transfers to local administrations -this done with the 
intention to prepare for fiscal federalism. On the revenue side of the budget, the 
government had planned to gain from an improvement of fiscal administration 
and from one-off measures, e.g. an amnesty on building infractions (OECD 
various issues).
In spite of the apparent match between the government’s fiscal proposals and the 
requests that Confindustria had put forward over the previous couple of years, 
the Confederation was sceptic of the new establishment. The country’s 
credibility on financial markets continued to be their major concern. Government 
authorities actually expressed the same view and explained that courageous cuts 
to the welfare state were aimed, among other things, at proving to markets that 
the government was able to oppose labour unions’ pressures (Tesoro 1994, 24; 
CISL, CdL 13/10/1994). However, this did not materialise. On the contrary, 
when Foreign Minister Martino criticised the EMU project and expressed doubts 
about Italy’s chances of meeting the Maastricht criteria, interest rate differentials
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with Germany started to grow again after having narrowed in the two previous 
years. Confindustria's initial disappointment was inevitable. In its view, budget 
consolidation had to be, above all, credible.
However, the real challenge came from labour unions. These opposed 
Berlusconi’s fiscal plan, not least for ideological reasons. CGIL-CISL-UIL 
criticised the budget for being “unbalanced and socially dangerous” (CISL, CdL 
30/9/1994) in light of the overwhelming predominance of spending cuts and the 
insufficient reliance on revenue-maximising measures. It was suggested that 
privatisation programmes be accelerated and measures taken to scrap fiscal 
benefits that worked only to the advantage of a few socio-economic categories 
(CISL, CdL 28/9/1994):
“Not a penny has to be taken from the pensions fund so as to rescue a fiscal 
manoeuvre, which is saving powerful people and tax evaders...we ask for 
fiscal consolidation and equity. The government budget is too biased in 
favour o f spending cuts, in spite of the recent efforts to increase 
revenues.. .the government has to take out requests into account, namely 
consider a reform o f taxation able to generate additional incomes from tax 
evasion and elusion” -author’s own translation {CdL 28/9/1994).
With this backdrop, budget negotiations between government and unions proved 
extremely troublesome. Unions complained about the fact that fiscal policy was 
not really constrained by the international economic environment, as suggested 
by government authorities, but that it was rather, and more disappointingly, the 
result of specific political considerations, at the root of which were the electoral 
promise to reduce fiscal pressure and the belief that public spending always 
determines a distorted allocation of resources (CISL, CdL 13/10/1994). Having 
let divisions through under the previous government, the front of CGIL-CISL- 
UIL was again highly united as reflected in the perfect convergence of their 
preferences. Again, content analysis suggests that fiscal discipline figured as 
their priority; second came opposition to welfare cuts; third the support for 
revenue-maximising measures (see Chapter VII).
In the first round of talks, the Prime Minster seemed to grant a few concessions. 
The revenue side of the budget was subject to some fine-tuning so that, in the
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new proposal, the contribution of revenues to adjustment was raised from 33 to 
43 percent of the total value of the fiscal intervention (CISL, CdL 13/10/1994). 
Still, CGIL-CISL-UIL did not consider the changes satisfactory. In parallel, 
unions explained that spending restraints were not acceptable because they were 
an exercise in cost containment that lacked the logic of reform (CISL, CdL 
30/9/1994). With negotiations coming to a halt, CISL leader D’ Antoni noted:
“The government did not take into account our requests to balance spending 
cuts with revenue increases by about the same amount. Still, unions do not 
object to fiscal austerity. The government has privileged short-term cuts over 
a general and equal reform to be negotiated with the social partners” -author’s 
own translation {CdL 13-20/10/1994).
The conflictual relationship with the unions entered also into Parliament. In a 
parliamentary hearing, CGIL-CISL-UIL reiterated their unconditional support to 
the size of the fiscal intervention but declared firm opposition to its composition 
(CISL, CdL 19/10/1994). The Prime Minister was in a difficult position 
considering that he did not enjoy an absolute majority in the Upper House and 
risked facing obstruction from the pro-labour opposition. It was soon clear that 
Berlusconi had no alternative but to strike a deal with the unions. In early 
December, government and social partners came together to sign an agreement. 
Labour unions obtained an amnesty over pension contributions, additional 
spending in favour of the South and more modest cuts to health services (CGIL, 
NRS 44, 12/12/1994, 4).
The most visible change was the decision to treat pension reform separately from 
the finance bill so as not to jeopardise the punctual conclusion of the budget 
session (Corriere della Sera 25/11/1994). In this separate document, the increase 
of the retirement age was postponed to July 1995. Second, it was planned that 
pensions be adjusted to inflation much earlier than anticipated. These provisions 
were to be financed through higher indirect taxes and pension contributions 
(Corriere della Sera 9-22/12/1994). At the end of the negotiations, all three union 
leaders appreciated the considerable adjustment made from the original budget 
proposal; which had been possible without altering the size of the correction 
(CISL, CdL 2-7/12/1994; CGIL, NRS44, 12/12/1994, 5). The agreement allowed
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the last-minute approval of the budget manoeuvre, but did not save the 
government, which was forced to resign soon after. The following government 
would inherit the sensitive issue of pension reform. As to actual fiscal outcomes, 
at the end of the financial year, Berlusconi’s manoeuvre had brought to a 1 
percent of GDP deficit reduction, with expenditures and revenues falling 1.7 and 
0.7 percent of GDP, respectively (European Commission 2003).
3.2.The Dini and Prodi Governments (1995-98)
On 13 January 1995, in the midst of the political crisis provoked by the 
resignation of Prime Minister Berlusconi, former Treasury Minister Lamberto 
Dini was designated to lead the country through the transition period before new 
political elections. The domestic atmosphere was tense, with deteriorating 
economic variables. In the previous year, the country had suffered from a 
considerable loss of credibility on financial markets with the result that the 
floating Lira had lost too much value. Since its exit from the ERM, the national 
currency had depreciated by more than 40 percent vis-a-vis the DM. Having 
reached such low level, the exchange rate was starting to also affect the 
sustainability of public finances, even if only a limited portion of public debt was 
denominated in foreign currencies. Simultaneously, inflationary pressures were 
building up (Modigliani and Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris 1998). Yet, for most 
observers, currency depreciation was not the cause of higher inflation. Rather, 
the latter was determined by domestic producers deliberately pushing prices 
upwards to recoup profits eroded by recession (FT 21/2/1995; Pesole 2001, 137- 
146). Against this climate, in February, the Banca d ’ltalia raise the discount rate 
from 7.5 to 8.24 percent, thereby provoking Confindustria’s fierce protests (FT 
22/2/1995).
Soon after, the Dini Government had to introduce an emergency budget 
intervention to correct for newly emerged fiscal imbalances and at the same time 
to restore the credibility of the Lira on financial markets (Sole240re 12/2/1995). 
Confronted with strong criticism within Parliament, the extraordinary fiscal 
package was finally approved thanks to the last-minute support from a section of
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the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) and from the extra-governmental 
Rifondazione Comunista (CGIL, NRS 11, 27/3/1995, 7-8). While the new 
government expressed on various occasions its technocratic origin and agenda 
(www.parlamento.it. July 2002; CGIL, NRS 4, 6/2/1995, 4), it is a fact that its 
appointment was possible only thanks to the parliamentary support of the left- 
wing Party of the Democratic Left (PDS). Against this background, Forza Italia’s 
vote against the budget rested on ideological grounds too. After being subject to 
multiple parliamentary amendments (CGIL, NRS 11, 27/3/1995, 8), the approved 
fiscal correction consisted of 3.6 trillion Lira in spending cuts and 16 trillion in 
revenue increases from VAT, greater direct taxation and contributions to the 
health system (Bemardi and Parlato 2000, 8; Pesole 2001, 139).
CGIL-CISL-UIL privileged fiscal rigour above all, as was apparent in official 
documents, but did not abandon their push for greater spending in favour of 
employment as a means to allow rapid recovery from the recent recession (see 
Chapter VIII). Unions were generally quite supportive of the plan, with the 
exception of the government’s decision to increase VAT. Workers’ sensitivity to 
inflation developments had increased since 1992, when labour unions had signed 
up to the elimination of the wage indexation system. Greater indirect taxation 
was thus undesirable because it was likely to exert pressure on price levels (FT 
17/3/1995; CGIL, NRS various issues). To be sure, Confindustria expressed a 
similar concern. Their argument was that the shrinking of disposable income as a 
result of inflation would dampen already modest domestic consumption 
(Sole240re 12/2/1995; FT 22/3/1995). On the whole, CGIL-CISL-UIL did 
appreciate Dini’s first fiscal act to the extent that it appeared relatively balanced 
in its composition, as in the words of CGIL representatives:
“Finally, the government has acknowledged what we were trying to argue last 
autumn during budget negotiations; in our conditions, promising and 
implementing a policy o f fiscal pressure reduction (as Berlusconi suggested) 
is irresponsible and represents a swindle against citizens. The idea o f asking 
for a contribution from firms and self-employed through higher direct taxation 
and social security contributions is inspired by a principle o f equity” -author’s 
own translation (NRS 8, 6/3/1995,4).
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On 2 June, the government presented its DPEF, in which it reaffirmed the 
commitment to fiscal consolidation but also gave renewed emphasis to the fight 
against inflation and the strengthening of public investment policies in most 
disadvantaged regions (Tesoro 1995, 15-36). Amounting to 32.5 trillion Lira 
(16.8 billion Euro), the proposed fiscal correction was modest even compared 
with previous budgets but fairly balanced between spending restraints and 
revenue increases. For the first, government authorities suggested a freeze on 
public contracts and wages and a rationalization of the system of central 
government consumption and of transfers to local authorities. On the revenue 
side of the budget, the government increased VAT and enhanced control over 
fiscal evasion with a commitment to at least maintain fiscal pressure to 1995 
levels (Tesoro 1995, 24).
At the same time, Dini initiated his pension reform process in close consultation 
with the unions. The plan envisaged a shift from Italy’s wage-based to a 
contribution-based pension system. While the reform’s short-term financial 
impact remained uncertain and offered no immediate guarantee for deficit and 
debt reduction (Padoa-Schioppa Kostoris 1996; Sole240re 5/8/1995), its 
contents were certainly revolutionary. The direct involvement of CGIL-CISL- 
UIL in the reform process was vital to its very success. Labour unions accepted 
welfare reform only because they were allowed to contribute to the relevant 
decisions exercising an impact on the shape of the new system (Ebbinghaus and 
Hassel 2000; Baccaro 2000; Ferrera and Gualmini 1999, 107-10; interview 
Beniamino Lapadula; Andrea Monorchio). For the same reason, organised 
capital regarded the reform as overly modest and refused to sign it. It lamented 
the fact that it failed to address the problem of expensive seniority pensions 
(Sole240re 15/6/1995).
At the end of September, the Dini Government unveiled its budget proposal. If 
the size of the intervention confirmed figures laid down in the DPEF, its 
composition had been significantly shaped by union pressure with the result that 
spending cuts were withdrawn and greater weight placed on revenue increases in 
the name of equity (CGIL, NRS 31, 11/9/1995, 6-7; CISL, CdL 28/9/1995). In 
particular, the government accepted that public employees recovered part of the
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inflation-induced loss in real earnings, a measure pushed through also by the 
parliamentary centre-left coalition supporting Dini (FT 28/9/1995; CGIL, NRS 
35, 9/10/1995, 4-5). In addition, it withdrew cuts to health services, in line with 
union requests (CISL, CdL 21/9/1995), and laid down provisions for a greater 
rationalization of public administration. It was believed that these measures were 
unavoidable in order to preserve social expenditure levels (CGIL, NRS 31,
11/9/1995; CISL, CdL 28/9/1995). In the end, CGIL-CISL-UIL were very 
satisfied with the outcome and went as far as to argue that Dini’s represented the 
most equitable of all recent fiscal corrections (CISL, CdL 28/9/1995).
Needless to say, unions’ enthusiasm was matched by the disappointment of the 
Confederation of Italian Industry. The latter lamented the fact that the budget’s 
underlying rationale consisted of “fulfilling social aims rather than being 
instrumental to stability and growth” (FT 28/9/1995). Confindustria opposed the 
government’s decision to adjust public wages to inflation (CISL, CdL 
20/10/1995; CGIL, NRS 37, 23/10/1995, 30). The disagreement with VAT 
increases also reflected a concern with inflation. Again, business actors feared a 
restrictive monetary stance in reaction to mounting price levels. Most 
importantly, the confederation criticised the cabinet’s declared intention to 
withdraw some of the tax breaks firms had obtained from the previous 
Berlusconi Government and warned against the absence of initiatives on the 
spending side of the budget. Interestingly enough, Governor of the Bank of Italy 
Antonio Fazio voiced similar concerns (FT 3/11/1995).
There is no doubt that Dini’s use of concertation guaranteed large socio-political 
consensus around fiscal adjustment (CISL, CdL 30-31/12/1995). Extensive 
anecdotal evidence shows that unions and leftist political parties managed to alter 
the composition of the budgetary intervention for 1996, making it more revenue- 
based. Unions showed appreciation for the fact that planned expenditure 
restraints were withdrawn, that the level of social spending was left untouched 
and that public revenues were to be enhanced through greater control over fiscal 
evasion. On the other hand, the relationship between this establishment and 
Confindustria was more tense. The Dini Government had repeatedly accused the 
business community of causing inflation by expanding margin profits. Still, in
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spite of the Confederation’s general disapproval of the chosen fiscal strategy, the 
emphasis on fiscal consolidation was appreciated, as was Prime Minister Dini’s 
decision to allow currency depreciation in spite of its pushing of inflationary 
pressures (Walsh 1999, 79).
At the end of the parliamentary phase, the resulting finance bill appeared clearly 
biased in favour of greater public incomes (Pesole 2001, 44). The impact of the 
provisions on central government accounts was calculated at 22.6 trillion Lira 
from revenue increases and around 10 trillion from spending cuts (Degni and al. 
2001). Just before the end of the financial year, the rightist opposition succeeded 
in passing an additional intervention worth 5.25 trillion Lira which, thanks to the 
government coalition’s veto power, did not incorporate social spending cuts (FT 
30/12/1995). In terms of actual outcomes, the resultant end-of-year correction 
proved quite modest amounting to 0.6 percent of GDP. CA incomes and 
expenditures grew 0.3 and 0.5 percent of GDP, respectively (European 
Commission 2003).
The year 1996 represents an annus mirabilis for Italy’s EMU convergence 
process. With the implementation of one of the country’s largest deficit 
reductions, the new Prodi Government succeeded in bringing Italy into EMU. 
Between 1996 and 1997, the actual public deficit moved from 4.2 down to 2.7 
percent, below the target value imposed by the Maastricht Treaty. Multiple 
factors account for the successful fulfilment of the Maastricht fiscal criteria.
First, and most obviously, the EMU project was at its final stage. Failure to fulfil 
the criteria would have meant Italy’s exclusion from European monetary 
integration. Second, it became easier to take courageous fiscal decisions against a 
more stable politico-institutional environment at home. In April 1996, political 
elections had given birth to a legitimate centre-left government after a long 
succession of technocratic executives. Third, in that period, the Bank of Italy was 
highly supportive of fiscal austerity and responded by relaxing monetary policy 
twice. In July, the new Governor Antonio Fazio lowered the discount rate from 9 
to 8.25 percent and then, in October, down to 7.5 percent (FT 21/6/1996; 
24/10/1996). It is not to be excluded that the support of monetary authorities was 
the natural consequence of the fact that the Budget Ministry was taken over by
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former governor Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (Monorchio and Tivelli 1999, 97 & 170; 
Pesole 2001; Visco 2002).
With the Euro-clock ticking, government authorities were keen to insist on their 
serious commitment to budget consolidation. Economic rhetoric consisted of an 
important component of the government’s strategy. The number of official 
statements rose massively, as a means for communicating with financial markets. 
Embracing a rather critical attitude, business actors argued that the presence of a 
leftist coalition was itself a message to international markets and were afraid of 
the possibility that fiscal discipline could come under threat. As in 1992, 
Confindustria strongly believed in the need to put in place extensive deficit 
reduction. Fiat CEO Cesare Romiti explained that this was the only possible 
recipe to allow interest rates to decrease (Corriere della Sera 8/5/1996). In truth, 
the government had no reason to think differently. The presence of Ciampi in the 
government meant that this strategy, which he had already pursued as a prime 
minister in 1993, was given absolute priority. In his own words:
“If inflation is reduced and government as well as the whole country gain 
greater credibility, then we can expect a lowering o f nominal and real interest 
rates. The long awaited reduction of interest rates is key to the relative success 
o f Italy’s economic policy. Without a considerable fall in interest rate levels, 
it will not be possible to trim the debt burden, to open up the way for private 
investment and, more generally for production process” -author’s own 
translation (Senato 10/7/1996).
However, while the new establishment would not dare question austerity, it 
adopted a different approach to its composition. During the presentation of his 
government programme, on 22 May, Prime Minister Prodi indicated that revenue 
increases were no longer feasible and that sufficient room existed to restructure 
the welfare state without necessarily jeopardising social justice and equity 
(Camera dei Deputati 22/5/1996). He attempted to deliver the image of a 
progressive establishment concerned with social rights but at the same time 
aware of the need to respond to globalisation pressures. As progressive as it 
might have been, when in office, the new coalition expressed the intention to 
intervene on pensions, health and education.
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Prodi’s eagerness to reform the welfare state was not well perceived by labour 
unions. In particular, if it is true that CISL and UIL were aware of the fact that 
pensions and the health sector needed some restructuring -  mostly against the 
position of CGIL, which was rather supportive of the status quo - they were more 
inclined to qualitative adjustments, so that would not necessarily result in deficit 
reduction, at least in the short-term (Corriere della Sera 10/5/1996). In other 
words, it was not accepted that welfare retrenchment becomes a means to 
balance the public budget. UIL leader Larizza noted: “the welfare state can be 
reformed towards greater efficiency and cost-minimization, but this should not 
compromise the State’s duty to provide social insurance” (Corriere della Sera 
8/5/1996). In spite of the govemment-union confrontation in front of the content 
of budget consolidation, CGIL-CISL-UIL expressed their full support to 
extensive deficit cuts (Reuters 4/6/1996).
On 20 June, a few months after its election, the Prodi Government announced an 
extraordinary intervention. As lower-than-expected growth had depressed public 
incomes, the establishment’s first task was to guarantee that fiscal outcomes for 
the previous year would be met (Bemardi and Parlato 2000, 14). Worth 17 
trillion Lira (8.8 billion euro), the intervention consisted in two thirds of 
expenditure cuts affecting transfers to railways and road authorities and, for the 
remaining third, of revenue increases expected to come from a review of taxation 
on bank deposits. In spite of the overwhelming predominance of measures on the 
spending side of the budget, these were such that the preferences of 
Confindustria were not met. In particular, employers were critical of the 0.6 
percent reduction of tax allowance for employee welfare payments (FT 
21/6/1996; OECD 1998-99). The Confederation of Industry accused the 
government of deliberately shifting the burden onto the business sector.
The subsequent DPEF envisaged, for 1997, an intervention of 32.4 trillion Lira 
(16.7 billion euro). The Treasury was proudly announcing that this last proposal 
was a significant break with the past, to the extent that expenditure restraints 
were at the heart of the new fiscal strategy. According to public authorities, it 
was possible to achieve a threefold objective, namely to defend discipline, 
alleviate fiscal pressure as well as guarantee at the same time the preservation of
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the Italian welfare state (Tesoro 1996; Senato 10/7/1996; The Economist 
13/7/1996; CNEL 2000a). However, after consultation with the social partners in 
September, the budget proposal looked very different from provisions contained 
in the long-term financial planning document. In terms of its layout, it consisted 
now of two distinct financial acts. On the one hand, the government profiled an 
ordinary intervention worth 37.5 trillion Lira which, being largely based on 
spending cuts, respected the original plan in the DPEF (Senato 7/10/1996). On 
the other hand, fiscal authorities foresaw an extraordinary measure known as 
“Intervention for Europe” consisting of Treasury operations and of the 
contentious introduction of a Euro-tax, a surcharge on all types of incomes (nota 
di Aggiomamento Tesoro 1996).
The new government’s first fiscal act had been then altered both in terms of 
extent and composition. The size of the correction was doubled. This decision 
was taken against the growing certainty that Italy would be able to fulfil the 
deficit criteria by 1997 (Chiorazzo and Spaventa 2000). Instead, functional needs 
and political pressures explain the choice over the content of this extensive 
adjustment. The new document gave absolute priority to revenue increases, in 
spite of Prodi’s initial commitment not to increase fiscal pressure. Functionally, 
measures on public incomes could be realised in a shorter time frame. From a 
political perspective, with labour unions and the Party of the Reconstructed 
Communists vetoing interventions on pensions and health care, revenue- 
maximising measures remained the only option left (II Mondo 12/10/1996). 
Treasury Minister Vincenzo Visco explained the reasons behind this last minute 
change to the budget:
“The decision to make an all-out attempt was taken in September...Having 
cast aside any chance o f radical cut in spending for political and time-related 
reasons, and with the promise of intervening with Treasury measures, the sole 
means that remained was tax increases” (Visco 2002).
The decision to extend the size of deficit reduction taken in September was 
very well perceived by Confindustria. Giorgio Fossa, chairman of the 
organization, had earlier warned that strong action was necessary to allow 
Italy into EMU in the first wave (FT 12/9/1996). The Bank of Italy was
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criticised for not having relaxed monetary policy to a sufficient degree. It 
turn, it was believed that only markets could reward Italy’s serious fiscal 
consolidation policy by allowing interest rates to decrease (II Mondo 
23/11/1996). A wide consensus had formed more generally among political 
elites on the fact that efforts had to be directed to designing a credible 
adjustment, one that would bring Italy’s risk premium down. There was in 
fact a conscious political exercise towards this goal (II Mondo 1/6/1996;
CNEL 1996; interview Andrea Monorchio). The Prodi Government seemed 
to have succeeded when, after the September announcement of the ambitious 
deficit reduction, long-term interest rates started to fall (Camera dei Deputati 
3/10/1996).
Despite this, Confindustria was less persuaded of the content of budget 
adjustment. The rise of direct taxes would have a recessive bias, further 
aggravating the country’s capacity to generate growth (CISL, CdL 
26/9/1996; II Mondo 21/12/1996)14. Possibly, it would be necessary to tackle 
social spending to allow such an extensive cut to the net borrowing 
requirement (CISL, CdL 12/6/1996). Not only that, but while they would be 
desirable because of their expected growth-generating effects, structural 
spending cuts would also maximise the credibility of fiscal reform in front of 
financial markets (II Mondo 1/6/1996; FT 30/9/1996; Sole240re 1/10/1996).
As revealed by content analysis, expenditure restraint had moved to the 
forefront of business interests (see Chapter VII).
The centre-left establishment was keen to preserve relations with unions even 
if they seemed more interested in reducing the political power of unions in 
the framework of social concertation (Mania and Sateriale 2002). Despite the 
fact that CGIL-CISL-UIL shared with members of the coalition a common 
ideological background, agreement on fiscal policy issues was neither 
immediate nor easy. Unions rejected Prodi’s initial reform proposals on
14 In addition, while some interventions on the revenue side o f the budget were purely o f an 
accounting nature, they would still be disliked by the Confederation o f Industry. One of them, in 
particular, consisted o f advance payment o f taxes on leave-of-service contributions from 
medium-large firms with more than 15 employees. It was obvious why Confindustria would be 
against it.
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pensions and health care and threaten to respond strongly (CISL, CdL 24- 
26/9/1996). The government was open to compromise. Soon after, the two 
partners came to an agreement with labour unions expressing satisfaction for 
the budget proposal’s appropriate balance between spending cuts and 
revenue increases (CGIL, NRS 8/10/1996; and 15/10/1996). First, the 
government accepted lowering the inflation target down to 2.5 from 3 
percent (Reuters 3/7/1996). Second, the Euro-tax was made progressive, as 
the unions had requested (FT 18/11/1996; CGIL, NRS various issues; CISL,
CdL various issues). In addition, in spite of fierce opposition from the 
Treasury, it was agreed that the tax would be returned in the form of 
repayments (Corriere della Sera 19/11/1996; FT 28/11/1996).
Not only was the composition of the budget proposal continuously altered under 
unions’ pressures but also passage through parliament led to important changes 
with the result that the revenue component of the fiscal manoeuvre moved from 
50 percent up to a consensus figure of 67 percent of the total volume (see table 
3)15. End-of-year fiscal results confirm the exceptionality of Prodi’s intervention. 
The CA deficit went down 4.2 percent of GDP. Public incomes grew 2.4 percent 
and total expenditure fell 2.1 percent of GDP (European Commission 2003).
As public finance figures deteriorated in the first months of 1997, the debate over 
alternative adjustment strategies re-emerged. CGIL-CISL-UIL proceeded in their 
refusal to accept any welfare retrenchment (Sole240re 5/1/1997). In more 
critical terms, Confindustria acknowledged that fiscal pressure had reached 
unsustainable levels and criticised the government’s inability to tackle primary 
expenditures, and welfare spending in particular (Sole240re 10/1/1997; OECD 
1998-99; www. eiro. euro found, ie), while subject to socio-political constraints and 
still naively relying solely on the financial gains from lower interest rates 
(Sole240re 23/5/1997). Fiat CEO Cesare Romiti commented with 
disappointment:
15 The use o f different accounting principles explains why there is no consensus on the relative 
contribution o f spending and taxing items to deficit reduction. With reference to fiscal 
manoeuvres in 1996, the Bank o f Italy calculates that 60 percent o f the total volume o f the 
intervention came from revenue increases (Banca d’ltalia 1997, 159). By contrast, according to 
Confindustria, the revenue component reached 70 percent (Camera and Senato 9/7/1999; 
www.univa.it/Studi.nfs. October 2002).
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“The government action is rather puzzling; public deficit reduction is obtained 
through an increase in fiscal pressure damaging the production system, hence 
growth and employment. Without welfare state reform and the reduction of 
interest rates, a larger adjustment will be necessary” -author’s own translation 
(Sole240re 25/4/1997)
With the fiscal manoeuvre for 1997, Italy secured access into EMU. Not 
surprisingly, in the following year, the Prodi government embarked on a much 
more modest budget adjustment. Worth 25 trillion Lira, the fiscal package 
described in the DPEF was fairly balanced between revenue increases and 
spending cuts. Resources were to come from the rationalization of tax 
administration, the harmonization of VAT to European standards and the fight 
against fiscal evasion. Amongst the restraints were lower transfers to local 
authorities and pension funds and a curtailment of public employment. At the 
same time, fiscal authorities expressed their interest in promoting employment 
with a package of measures worth 1.5 trillion Lira (Tesoro 1997).
Later on in the summer, the public debate happened to be dominated by 
discussions on welfare state reform after the appointment made by Prodi of a 
technical commission to study and submit a report on the issue. Confindustria 
insisted that any piece of reform should be included in the budget proposal for 
1998 so as to send a strong message to markets (Sole240re 30/7/1997). On the 
other side, CGIL-CISL-UIL opposed welfare retrenchment (Sole240re 
29/5/1997) as well as the idea that welfare reform became a sub-section of 
finance. Also, they read the appointment of the Onofri Commission as Prodi’s 
attempt to take economic policy-making out of their direct control and requested 
that any reforms be negotiated with them (Sole240re 21/8/1997). To be sure, 
once EMU membership had been secured, unity of intent among Italy’s three 
largest union confederations started to crumble. Divisions arose with regards to 
welfare reform. Whereas UIL was against any type of intervention on social 
spending, CGIL and CISL were more reform-oriented, for example remaining 
open to a possible revision of the Dini pension reform.
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The September budget proposal confirmed figures contained in the DPEF. 
Business actors continued to criticise the lack of ambition in deficit reduction, 
whereas labour unions showed appreciation for the fact that interventions on 
health care were kept to a minimum and the Onofri’s proposal left out of the 
budget (CISL, CdL 11/9/1997; 23/10/1997). The battle over the budget during 
the parliamentary session was even tenser than that on the streets. After unions 
had broken up the common front with the loss of the EMU constraint, political 
parties followed suit. Suddenly, Italy’s politico-institutional fragility became 
visible again. This fact confirms the general argument set forth in this 
dissertation. Socio-political consensus over fiscal adjustment from 1992 to 1998 
rested on a fragile equilibrium and did not depend upon a radical transformation 
of Italy’s political and fiscal institutions, as other have argued. Contingent socio­
economic interests and their specific constellation retain greater explanatory 
power, as Chapter VII will indicate in greater detail. In this context, social pacts 
epitomise the solution to the distributional conflict between all these diverse 
socio-economic interests. In the next section, I will look at the content and 
financial impact of social pacts signed in Italy during the 1990s.
4. Social Pacts: Their Content and Financial Impact
This thesis has suggested that social concertation can contribute to successful 
fiscal adjustment. However, it is not social dialogue per se that is supportive of 
fiscal discipline. To be sure, public choice theories on collective action problems 
would suggest that the greater the number of the actors involved in a decision­
making process, the less likely it is to reach a final compromise. This theoretical 
line seems in contradiction with authoritative political economy literature 
demonstrating that the involvement of social partners in policy-making leads, for 
example, to better economic performances. These latter studies are only in 
apparent contradiction with public choice explanations since they specify that 
such an outcome is likely only where labour unions are centralised, which 
functionally is equivalent to saying that unions become a single actor. Hence, in 
the end, there is no large multiplicity of actors taking part in the process of policy
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formulation. In this respect, it is certainly noteworthy that, after the 1993 reform 
of bargaining levels, Italy moved to a more centralised industrial relations 
system. It is to be expected that Italian labour unions were in the 1990s more 
inclined to internalise negative externalities inherent to wage moderation, while 
also being better able to implement it.
However, the analysis would not be complete if another aspect was not taken into 
consideration, i.e. the content of social pacts. It is one of the central contentions 
of this research work that institutional features are not sufficient to explain policy 
change or its failure. A look at the preferences of the actors involved is deemed 
necessary. More precisely, an ordering of preferences would allow identifying 
the situations in which centralised labour unions could in fact accept a particular 
trade-off. Centralization explains only the fact that they can come up with fairly 
clear-cut preferences without that differences between sectors, for example, 
worked against the formulation of a common position. A focus on contents 
would also allow the researcher to determine if social pacts are corrective (or 
not) of existing fiscal imbalances. The part that follows analyses the content of 
Italy’s social pacts.
4.1.The content of Italian social pacts
Just as in the late 1970s, it was an economic emergency that triggered social 
concertation in the 1990s. Inflation continued to be high by comparative 
standards and the Lira was subject to increasing speculative attacks that put into 
question the government’s ability to preserve parity within the ERM. At the core 
of the first agreement between the Amato Government and the social partners 
was inflation control. As it was generally recognised that Italy’s longstanding 
problem with inflation levels had been driven by excessive wage increases in the 
form of a continuous automatic adjustment to actual inflation, the consensual 
elimination of the scala mobile was believed to serve the primary purpose of 
softening inflationary pressures. Not without internal conflict, especially within 
CGIL (Corriere della Sera 7/5/1992; 5/6/1992), the three labour confederations 
accepted the deal in the anticipation that this move would prevent devaluation.
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There was widespread recognition that competitive devaluation did not represent 
a recipe for growth. By importing inflation, it would immediately affect workers’ 
purchasing power (CISL, CdL 15 and 24/9/1992). In addition, lower inflation 
would allow also a reduction of interest rates (CGIL, NRS 34, 28/9/1992). With 
unions seriously committed to wage moderation, government authorities would 
on their part exercise a more stringent control over prices and tariffs (Protocollo 
sulla Politica dei Redditi, July 1992).
At the same time, inflation control would positively contribute to the 
government’s desperate attempt to reduce the public deficit. Firstly, when 
concerning the public sector, slower wage growth translated into savings with an 
immediate positive impact on the state budget. Secondly, lower inflation would 
reduce the burden of government consumption, and particularly the real burden 
of interest payments on the country’s high public debt. The Amato Government 
played an active role in convincing the unions of the need for wage moderation 
(interview Giuliano Amato; interview Beniamino Lapadula; DPEF various 
issues). However, as at this time public resources were lacking, Italian authorities 
could not act as generous providers of side-payments but had to simply assume 
the role of defenders of the public interest. This state of affairs does not go 
against the traditional interpretation of social pacts being based on a political 
exchange. A closer look at the negative preferences of unions suggests that there 
was still some room for compensation to the extent that their strong opposition to 
welfare retrenchment was taken into account and deficit reduction concentrated, 
by default, on the revenue side of the budget. On a similar note, Treu 
acknowledges:
“A second area covered by the (1992) agreement had more popular appeal and 
has long been a preoccupation of the unions; measures to reduce tax evasion 
among artisans, small shopkeepers and those in the liberal professions. The 
subsequent directives produced strong reactions from these groups and the 
political lobbies which support them, but if  the public administration is strong 
enough to implement them they promise the most redistributive effect o f all 
efforts at concerted action -a  clear case o f the unions acting as representatives 
of the public interest to achieve a more equitable income distribution and raise 
fiscal revenues, partially counter-balancing pressures to cut social 
expenditures” (Treu in Dore, Boyer and Mars 1994).
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The commitment to deficit reduction and debt stabilization became explicit only 
in the 1993 Income Policy Agreements signed under the subsequent Ciampi 
Government. If, earlier, inflation control was believed to serve the purpose of 
correcting fiscal imbalances, in this latter agreement unions were asked to accept 
fiscal austerity as the price for lower inflation (Protocollo Politica dei Redditi 
July 1993). The direction of causality was somehow reversed. Now, the 
government was compensating unions’ wage discipline with the promise to put 
in place credible and effective budgetary corrections. The definition, in the same 
pact, of a new structure for wage bargaining that moved in the direction of 
further centralising the process had the effect of making social partners’ 
involvement in fiscal policy-making more visible through the collective 
bargaining channel.
Meant to re-establish peaceful relations between the two, even the bilateral 
agreement between the Berlusconi Government and the unions in 1994 contained 
quite detailed provisions on strategies to guarantee successful fiscal 
consolidation. In the 1996 Employment Pact signed under the Prodi Government, 
besides a description of expensive measures to support employment creation 
were detailed suggestions with regards to financing methods (.Patto per 
I ’Occupazione 1996). To sum up, in Italy, the pact’s bits and pieces never 
overlooked the need to preserve fiscal discipline. Italy’s financial instability well 
as the commitment to the Maastricht Treaty provisions functioned as an 
important catalyst of socio-economic forces towards the goal of deficit reduction 
and, eventually, of debt stabilization. It was not about the abstract notion of an 
external threat. By shaping socio-economic preferences, the crisis mobilised 
domestic interest groups, allowing for a constellation of interests that was 
eventually conducive to successful fiscal adjustment.
4.2.The financial impact of social pacts
Experts and policy-makers have repeatedly recognised that the income policy 
agreements signed in 1992 and 1993 have represented a major determinant of 
Italy’s fiscal adjustment (Tesoro 1993; Sestito 2002, 32-41). But why were social
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pacts of this kind so beneficial to the country’s fiscal performance? The 1992 
agreement abolished the wage indexation system, which was universally believed 
to be the main cause of inflationary spirals in the last two decades. As a result, 
inflation levels started to decrease remarkably. According to the Bank of Italy, in 
the absence of income policies, Italy’ inflation rates would have been 3-5 points 
higher than they actually were in 1997 (Fabiani et al. 1998). Graph 8 shows how 
the gap between nominal and real compensations narrowed progressively in the 
decade from 1990 to 1998. While securing the fulfilment of the Maastricht 
inflation and interest criteria, lower inflation had also the effect of minimising 
the country’s debt service, therewith addressing fiscal imbalances (Corriere della 
Sera 5/5/1993). In addition, the public budget benefited also directly from wage 
moderation as public employee compensations, which amounted in 1991 to 
almost 15 percent of GDP (European Commission 2003b), started then to follow 
a downward trend.
This pattern is not peculiar to Italy. Most of the countries that resorted to social 
pacts in the 1990s benefited from an improved fiscal performance as well. In the 
Netherlands, within the new social pacts agreed in 1982 and 1993 respectively, 
not only was wage moderation guaranteed but these also formed a forum in 
which more far-reaching and spending-minimising labour market reforms were 
successfully agreed (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The country’s CA primary 
surplus increased by 3.6 percent from 1989 to 1997, the fourth best performance 
in the EU (Caselli and Rinaldi 1998). Similarly, Spain and Portugal improved 
considerably their fiscal position in the framework of social pacts. By the same 
token, in Greece, where social concertation was attempted but failed to take off 
because of the lack of a sufficient degree of coordination between unions and 
employers, fiscal adjustment was relatively unsuccessful, at least until 1997.
Nor it is the first time that social concertation has proved particularly beneficial 
to Italian public finances. Italy’s first corporatist experiment, in 1976-79, was 
motivated by a similar desire to curb inflation down. It was after the formation of 
a large governing coalition including, for the first time, the Communist Party 
(PCI) that an austerity programme was being promoted. There, wage restraints 
were sold as a means to control inflation, which prior to fiscal consolidation had
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reached 16.4 percent points, and preserve workers’ purchasing power (OECD 
various issues). In 1976-77, Italy’s structural balance improved by 3.3 percent o f  
GDP. Similarly, when in the very early 1980s, after a setback in 1979-81, social 
concertation experienced a brief revival; the C A public deficit improved by 1.6 
and 0.5 percent o f  GDP at the end o f  1982 and 1983, respectively (European 
Commission 2003a).
Graph 8. Italy: Gap between Nominal and Real 
Compensations per Employee Total Economy, 1990-98
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This is but not to say fiscal consolidations accompanied by voluntary wage 
restraint are always successful. Rather, my contention is that Italy’s 
macroeconomic environment in the 1990s and the fiscal preferences that 
domestic groups formed in response to it were such that simultaneous trade-offs 
between different policy areas existed, with the result that compromised 
solutions were at hand allowing for an efficient coordination o f  fiscal, monetary 
and wage policies. As it will be indicated in the next chapters, this was not the 
case for Germany.
141
CHAPTER V
Timing, Size, Composition 
and Persistence of 
Germany’s Fiscal 
Adjustment (1991-98): 
Preferences versus 
Institutions
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1. Germany’s Fiscal Adjustment: Stylised Facts
The following section describes the characteristics of Germany’s fiscal 
consolidation during the 1990s. As for the case of Italy, special attention is 
devoted to four dimensions of fiscal adjustment, i.e. the timing, its actual size 
measured in cyclically adjusted terms, its composition, and its persistence over 
the period under investigation (1991-98). All four convey a significant message 
about the nature of the process and allow the reader to form a relatively complete 
picture of the case study and of its peculiarity, if any, in the 1990s.
Relatively unproblematic, the timing of fiscal reform is but indicative of the 
domestic perception of the Maastricht constraint. Indeed, this was never pressing 
in the case of Germany with fiscal authorities treating sound public finances as a 
collective good rather than an externally imposed constraint. EMU was called 
into question at a much later stage, around 1996. This issue will be treated in 
conjunction with the size of the adjustment. Taken at face value, the actual extent 
of deficit reduction would not be such a revealing variable in the German case. 
Indeed in 1991, when the EMU convergence process was inaugurated, the 
country’s public deficit was already amongst the lowest in the EU. In comparison 
to other EMU candidates, and in spite of the pressure from the recent unification, 
the size of the necessary adjustment to the Euro was modest to start with. 
Accordingly, I will analyse Germany’s fiscal effort in comparative perspective 
by looking at similar countries’ experience over the same period (1991-98) and at 
the German historical record since the late 1970s. This seems to be a more 
meaningful way of looking at the extent of budget consolidation. At the micro­
level, a weakening of the federal government’s discretionary fiscal rigour from 
one year to the other may reflect either a more moderate commitment to sound 
public finances on the part of public authorities -for whatever reasons (e.g. views 
about the most appropriate policy mix, partisan considerations, electoral 
concerns) or a deteriorating institutional framework or, rather, a more difficult 
and less compromise-prone social context, one in which the government was 
unwilling and/or unable to impose sacrifices on its citizens. The size of the 
German fiscal adjustment in the 1990s is read according to these basic 
indications.
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I will then discuss the specific composition of budget consolidation. From a 
political economy perspective, the decision to either cut public spending or 
increase taxation is of uttermost importance. At the basis of this choice might be 
issues of policy optimality. Just as an example, fiscal policy-makers could think 
of abrupt tax increases as undesirable because most taxes tend to have 
distortionary effects (Balaam 1961). However, it could well be that, once the 
federal government had guaranteed the necessary transfers to East Germany, the 
“rest of the pie” was allocated on the basis of socio-economic actors’ 
preferences. In this respect, the content of macroeconomic adjustment would 
reflect the fiscal preferences of the most powerful domestic groups whether they 
act independently {interest group politics) or are represented by the political 
party in power {partisan politics).
Finally, in the sense of uninterrupted deficit reduction, persistence measures the 
country’s degree of commitment to fiscal discipline and the existence - or not - of 
a domestic context in which retrenchment can be perpetuated in spite of other 
possibly disturbing factors, such as the presence of multiple veto players at 
different stages of the budgetary process {political and fiscal institutionalism) or 
an upcoming national election {political business cycles).
l.l.T h e timing and size of fiscal adjustment
Germany enjoys a tradition of fiscal discipline that goes back to the late 1960s 
when, with the 1967 Stability and Growth Law, the federal government 
committed itself to the threefold objective of low inflation, full employment and 
balance of payment equilibrium. Since then and thanks to the introduction of 
important reforms to the budget process, sound public finances have been at the 
top of successive governments’ economic policy agendas, irrespective of their 
ideological orientation. Moreover, the Bundesbank’s switch to monetarism after 
1975 imposed a concrete constraint on fiscal policy-makers to the extent that any 
attempt at deficit spending would be punished by a restrictive monetary stance 
with unwanted consequences for national growth. In sum, the late 1970s marked 
Germany’s embracing of economic orthodoxy. It was not only an issue for
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economic elites. Even German public opinion strongly believed in the 
desirability of balanced public budgets, a preference that would become more 
and more intense with the actual progressive deterioration of public finances 
from 1979 to 1982 (Noelle-Neumann 1983, 1997). Voters tended to punish 
undisciplined governments. Some have argued that the SPD-FDP government’s 
loss of power in the early 1980s was due to the Social Democrats’ inability to 
keep public expenditures under control (Giersch and al. 1995, 193).
Notwithstanding this deeply rooted austerity tradition, during the 1990s the 
German government demonstrated a relatively uncertain hand over the 
management of public finances, and not only as a result of the re-unification 
shock. Some literature states that the prospect of joining the monetary union did 
not exert the same degree of pressure on Germany as it did on other more 
vulnerable EMU candidates (e.g. Italy, Belgium, Ireland). This shall be evident 
even from the timing of reform, with EMU surfacing in the public debate as late 
as 1996 (Hassel 2001). While this is certainly true, it must be acknowledged that 
the financial impact of unification represented for many - elites as well as public 
opinion - a source of great preoccupation. In this respect, the pressure to adjust, 
while domestically generated, was not necessarily less strong than in the case of 
Italy (interview with officials at the Finance Ministry). Still the country’s fiscal 
performance was rather poor. In the short time span between 1991 and 1997, the 
actual value of the public deficit deteriorated in 1992-93 and again in 1994-95 -  
as a consequence of a deterioration of the primary surplus (Graph 9), remaining 
as a result above the Maastricht reference value for two consecutive years, in 
1995 and 1996 (European Commission, 2002). In cyclically adjusted terms, the 
net borrowing requirement deteriorated by 2.5 percent of GDP in 1989-97, of 
which 1.5 percent came from a fall of the primary surplus and 1 from higher 
interest payments. In the same period, countries like Austria and France, which 
like Germany started from quite low deficit levels in the early 1990s, performed 
significantly better, registering improvements in their primary surpluses of 1.1 
and 1 percent of GDP respectively (Caselli and Rinaldi 1998, 60).
More specifically with reference to the every-year management of fiscal policy, 
it may be worthwhile considering business cycles. True, the use of CA figures
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should control for them but, as stressed in Chapter I, the measure is far from 
unproblematic so that one could draw some insights from the juxtaposition of 
actual and adjusted data. It has been an exploited argument to say that cyclical 
conditions affected Germany’s fiscal policy outcomes in the 1990s. Slow growth 
has the effect of reducing incomes from direct and indirect taxation and, when 
creating greater unemployment, of putting upwards pressures on social budgets. 
In the first years after re-unification and until 1995, the conjuncture seemed to 
play quite an important role -  as exemplified by the large gap between actual and 
cyclically adjusted figures. Yet, it did so by improving rather than worsening the 
country’s fiscal performance with actual figures below CA data1 (Graph 9). Only 
in 1995-99 were cyclical conditions responsible for a lower-than-expected deficit 
reduction. Still, these were also the years when the government had put in place a 
much more visible fiscal consolidation effort. In a nutshell, the cycle accounts 
only for a deviation from the fiscal plan rather than for its overall direction, i.e. 
increasing or decreasing deficit trends. It follows that slow growth cannot be the 
only reason behind weak fiscal discipline. Nor are financial markets responsible 
for it. As indicated in Chapter I, the deficit trend is perfectly in line with the 
primary surplus, revealing thus that interest rate developments have not been so 
important in determining Germany’s budget performance. Fiscal results must 
depend upon government decisions on spending and taxing.
Needless to say, German re-unification put the federal budget under strong 
pressure. When, in July 1990, the Federal and the Democratic Republics of 
Germany were unified, substantial financial transfers started pouring from the 
West to the East. Net transfers grew from 106 billions DM, in 1991, to 140 
billions in 1995, and stabilised around that level thereafter (OECD various 
issues). In this light, the financial implications of unification should by no means 
be underestimated. Still, it is plausible to believe that the necessary financial 
support to unification is only one of the factors that contributed to Germany’s 
disappointing fiscal performance in the 1990s. This thesis proceeds from the 
assumption that the formation of a united Germany represented instead an 
intervening variable, to the extent that its implications undermined the social
1 Especially in 1991 and 1992, unification exerted significant growth effects.
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consensus from which federal governments had benefited until then. This meant 
that fiscal policy became a much less insulated and government-controlled policy 
area than it had been in the past.
1 Consolidated Gross Debt 
■Actual Public Deficit 
-CA Public Deficit 
Maastricht Target
Graph 9. Germany: Evolution o f Actual and CA Public Deficit, and 
General Government Consolidation Gross Debt 1970-2003
Time Period
Source: EU Commission, AMECO Database (last reviewed May 2005).
Even from a purely economic perspective, the argument according to which re­
unification is the one and only cause o f Germany’s more relaxed fiscal stance is 
not completely convincing. Bibow calculated that only one third o f  the country’s 
deficit deterioration resulted from the financial effort imposed by re-unification 
(Bibow 2001). Moreover, it is worth including some other observations at the 
margin. First, deterioration had already started in 1989-90 when unification had 
not yet taken place. Some observed that the deficit had risen as a consequence o f  
lower-than-expected revenues after the 1990 income tax reform (Lindlar and 
Scheremet 1998, 38). Second, the CA deficit started to grow again from 2000  
onwards, at a time in which one would expect the financial impact from re­
unification to be largely absorbed. Third, the incorporation o f  East Germany into 
the political and economic structure o f  the West had a more direct impact on the 
public debt than on deficit levels. In the early 1990s, the financing o f  transition in 
the former DDR was managed by means o f  the Treuhand (Public Trustee 
Office). After having accumulated a substantial debt, the Treuhand ceased to 
exist in 1995 and the debt was officially incorporated into the federal budget
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(Flockton in Smith, Paterson and Padgett 1996,211-32), thereby inducing the 
general government gross consolidated debt to increase from 49.3 in 1994 to 57 
percent of GDP in 1995 (European Commission, 2003b, 180).
Were the 1990s really an extraordinary period in German fiscal history? It was 
certainly not the first time that Germany had encountered serious fiscal 
imbalances. After 1973, both the international macroeconomic environment and 
political factors had contributed to the deterioration of the public deficit. While it 
is true that the German economy was doing well in comparative terms -  at a time 
when most European countries were experiencing severe imbalances following 
an unfavourable combination of slow growth and high inflation - domestically, 
public budgets had never been in such bad shape. In the wake of the two 
successive oil shocks in 1973-74 and 1978-79, the SPD-FDP government did 
little to keep public expenditures under control. On this occasion, the Social 
Democrats were accused of being undisciplined spenders and the small Liberal 
partner started to distance itself from the SPD with the launching of a unilateral 
fiscal consolidation plan. The Finance Ministry tried to react to this, but the 
planned budgetary interventions proved insufficient to reverse fiscal trends in a 
substantial way (Giersch and al. 1995, 193). Partly due to centrifugal forces 
within the coalition, partly as a result of the Christian Democrats’ ability to 
exploit the situation, new elections brought the CDU-CSU to power in alliance 
with the FDP. The two coalition partners shared a similar understanding of fiscal 
policy goals. Chancellor Kohl’s first move was to express strong commitment to 
the restoration of fiscal discipline. With 1982, Germany’s budget policy 
underwent a U-turn (Walz 1985)2. In a few years, from 1982 to 1989, the net 
borrowing requirement moved from a deficit to a small surplus (Graph 10).
It may be interesting to highlight possible differences between the country’s two 
most important fiscal consolidation plans, the one implemented in the 1980s by 
the newly appointed Kohl Government and the one induced by EMU. Again
2 Not all observers agree with this interpretation, although it remains overall only a question of 
nuances. Borchert notes how, after the collapse o f the SPD-FDP Government coalition, economic 
policy-making in Germany did undergo a U-turn, but with an impression o f continuity. True, the 
new establishment was keen to express his commitment to restore fiscal discipline, but the 
Finance Ministry remained in the hands of the FDP, as in the previous Government (Borchert 
1995, 117).
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here, even from a historical perspective, the size o f  the fiscal effort in the 1990s 
was much more modest than it had been in the 1980s. From 1981 to 1985, the 
actual deficit had dropped from 4 to 1.1 percent o f  GDP. It continued to decrease 
thereafter, albeit at a slower pace, moving from 1.1, in 1985, to a 0.1 percent o f  
GDP surplus in 1989. In contrast, from 1991 to 1997, the size o f  actual deficit 
reduction amounted to only 0.2 percent o f  GDP (European Commission, 2003b, 
176); where but the CA result was visibly better, consisting o f  a 2.5 percent o f  
GDP improvement (European Commission, 2002) or 1.1 percent if  calculated 
over the period 1993-97 (Caselli and Rinaldi 1998, 61).
Graph 10. Cyclically Adjusted Public Deficit:
West Germany (1970-90), Unified Germany (1991-2003)
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Source: EU Commission, AMECO Database (last reviewed May 2005)
As earlier anticipated, I place special attention in the size o f  yearly CA budget 
corrections in the belief that changes in the fiscal adjustment effort reflect day-to- 
day difficulties in dealing with the dramatic transformation o f  the politico- 
administrative landscape and probably reproduce more closely the reasoning 
behind the various allocative and redistributive decisions the federal government 
had to take on a yearly basis. Table 7 shows the extent o f  the yearly deficit 
reductions measured in cyclically adjusted terms. It is manifest how proper fiscal 
rigour emerged only in 1992 when the C A deficit decreased by 1 percent o f  GDP 
-or  by even 1.1 percent if  one looks just at the adjusted primary surplus- and, to a 
lesser extent, in 1993 and 1996 when the net borrowing requirement improved by
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0.7 and 0.6 percent of GDP respectively; the latter arguably under pressure from 
EMU as the country needed to meet the Maastricht reference value by 1997.
How can one explain the variation in the intensity of fiscal corrections? In the 
introduction to this chapter, I suggested that a relaxation of fiscal policy would 
reflect a weakening of the political commitment to austerity and/or a more 
difficult socio-economic context in which to impose it. Already here, arguments 
about the importance of the institutional framework appear to be not fully 
satisfactory. Sticky institutions would not explain yearly changes in the extent of 
adjustment. To support this interpretative stance it is useful to look at the 
government’s actual fiscal effort in trillions DM as laid down in official 
documents. Figures in Table 7 include supplementary budgets. Fiscal inactivity 
prevailed in 1994-95, arguably out of the concern that excessive austerity could 
undermine the chances of the governing coalition to be re-elected in the 1994 
national vote. That the CA deficit registered in turn such a considerable 
deterioration shows how the government’s choice of the fiscal strategy was not 
driven primarily by technical considerations. The significant effort in the 
following year is to be understood again through the lenses of political business 
cycle theory and read as the government pursuit of the (conservative) fiscal 
preference of its constituents. Instead, budget consolidation was intense in 1992- 
93. In a sense, this shows that the re-unification unfolding in those years did not 
necessarily prevent the Federal government from pursuing deficit reduction. As 
will be extensively demonstrated in this thesis, the large deficit reduction in 
1992-93 is to be explained with reference to the peculiar macroeconomic 
conditions of the time. More precisely, the looming of the world recession in 
1992 shifted the attention to the domestic cost of money. Fiscal discipline was 
necessary to prevent the Bundesbank from increasing short-term interest rates. 
The fear was that lower domestic investment would add to the weakening 
external demand .
3 From 1992 to 1993, German exports decreased by 5.5 and investment by 4.4 percent of GDP 
(European Commission, 2004).
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Table 7.Germany: Extent of Budget Manoeuvres 1991-98 (+ contraction; 
expansion)_____________________________________________________
1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Actual -13.4 27.56 -16.16 0 28.3 -14.6 -21.8
Actuala 0.7 1.0 0.7 -0.9 0.5 0.6 0.3
Actuals 1.1 1.1 0.7 -0.4 0.4 0.7 0.3
Key: actual (extent) = real size of retrenchment at the end of the consolidation episodes (trillion DM); here,
data tend to be overall larger than projected figures because they do not refer only to Finance Bills but 
include also the impact of emergency budgets, a =  change in cyclically adjusted net borrowing -adjustment 
based on potential GDP (% GDP); b = change in cyclically adjusted primary surplus -adjustment based on
potential GDP (% GDP).
Source: European Commission, AMECO Database (last reviewed May 2005);
Bundesfmanzministerium, Finanzberichte from 1991 to 1998.
1.2.The composition of fiscal adjustment
If one is particularly concerned with the political economy of fiscal reform, then 
the composition of fiscal adjustment does appear to be the most intriguing 
variable. During the run-up to EMU, Germany resorted to a fiscal path which the 
European Commission labelled a “switching strategy” to indicate that, after a 
considerable increase of public incomes, the Finance Ministry opted for a more 
expenditure-based fiscal strategy trying to tackle spending programmes 
(European Commission 2000).
In 1991-92 and 1992-93, deficit reduction was achieved merely on the revenue 
side of the budget. In 1991, a 7.5 surcharge on personal and corporate income 
was introduced with immediate effect. The federal government also opted for an 
increase of the tax rate on mineral oil and other excise duties (von Hagen, Hallett 
and Strauch 2001). Social security contributions were also augmented growing 
from 35.65, in 1990, to 36.7 percent of GDP, in 1992 (European Commission, 
2003b). At the same time, unification pushed the level of public expenditures 
upwards. This state of affair lasted until 1993 when, faced with emerging signs 
of a fiscal revolt above all from part of the business community, the Kohl 
Government took steps in the direction of primary expenditure restraints. For the 
first time, CA public expenditures decreased as a result of cutbacks. The social 
security budget inclusive of unemployment insurance went down by 5 percent 
from the previous year (Bundesministerium 2003, 222). Overall, in 1993, the 
expenditure impulse of the public sector was negative for total DM 49 billions,
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with public consumption contributing for DM 24 billions (Lindlar and Scheremet 
1998, 39)4. The establishment continued to pursue a rather expenditure-based 
strategy until 1998, with the only exception o f  the year 1995 when the re- 
introduction o f the solidarity charge in 1995 had a visible effect on revenue 
levels (Graph 11). Mostly controversial were the measures introduced in 1996, 
which included a fall in unemployment benefits, a reduction o f  sick pay, the 
postponement o f rise in child benefits, and less state-subsidised cures (The 
Economist 4/5/1996).
Graph 11. Germany: Change in CA Primary Expenditures 
and CA Total Revenues (1991-2000)
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Source: European Commission, AMECO Database (last reviewed May 2005)
1.3 .T he p ersis tence  o f fiscal a d ju s tm e n t
Finally, this section looks at the relative persistence o f  Germany’s fiscal 
adjustment. By this, I mean the presence o f  a continuous effort in the period 
under investigation (1991-98), but also thereafter until 2003. Continuity is a 
dimension full o f  political meaning; where present, it indicates a government’s 
capacity to pre-empt potential impediments to successful deficit reduction, those
4 The expenditure impulse is measured as the “deviation o f  the actual level from the trend level, 
as extrapolated from the level o f  the previous year by potential production at current prices” 
(Lindlar/Scheremet 1998, 39).
□ CA Primary Spending 
■ CA Revenues
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being institutional (e.g. veto players in the budgetary process), politico-strategic 
(e.g. electoral considerations) or socio-political (e.g. opposition from domestic 
interest groups)5. CA figures show deficit deterioration in 1994 and again after 
1999. In actual terms, fiscal policy relaxed in 1992-93 and 1994-95 (Graph 9). In 
sum, the country’s fiscal effort was only moderately persistent. This shall come 
as confirmation of the fact that, when the necessary size of adjustment is limited 
to start with, then the room for free-riding improves and so the tensions between 
competing interests, with the result that the discretionary fiscal trend reveals 
uncertain.
2. The Role of Fiscal and Political Institutions
As suggested in Chapter II, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of 
institutionalist approaches to economic policy-making and outcomes. This has 
been particularly evident in the case of fiscal adjustment. With this policy area 
deeply embedded in national budgetary processes, there is no doubt that 
institutional constraints and opportunities play a role. The following sections 
look specifically at the nature of the German budgetary process as well as at the 
political system at large in order to find support for the argument that Germany’s 
recent fiscal difficulties should be ascribed to unification-induced institutional 
deterioration and to the system’s general incapacity to initiate policy change 
against a high number of veto points. According to Scharpf, the system is 
entrapped in joint decision-making where the constant search for compromised 
solutions with social partners or between different government levels (i.e. 
federalism) impedes proper reform (Scharpf 1988). I come to the conclusion that 
institutions remain empty shells if one does not look at the specific socio­
economic interests within institutions themselves. The institutional deterioration
5 It is not the purpose o f the present study to elaborate considerations on the sustainability of  
sound public finances. This would be more o f an economic exercise that requires an in-depth 
analysis o f the composition and age o f the country’s public debt as well as a forecast o f future 
welfare spending. Less ambitiously, I intend to read a persistence o f deficit reduction as proof of  
governments’ capacity to overcome any institutional and/or socio-political impediment to 
successful consolidation.
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that arose in the 1990s derived from government authorities’ incapacity and/or 
uncertainty in dealing with the distributional consequences of re-unification.
2.1.The German budgetary process
Of all variables intervening in fiscal policy-making, budget institutions are 
probably the most obvious ones. The institutionalist literature uses fiscal 
institutions to explain cross-country variation in macroeconomic performances. 
Along these lines, observers have argued that Germany’s most recent difficulties 
in keeping public budgets under control have been the result of a pronounced 
institutional deterioration, marked by a decline in the management capacity of 
the Finance Ministry; by the multiplication of special funds created to finance 
transition of former DDR; and by reduced government planning capacity 
following the frequent and often inconsistent tax reforms introduced in the 1990s 
(von Hagen and Strauch 1999; Hallerberg 2004).
Instead, I argue that Germany’s indisputable institutional weakness in that period 
is just epiphenomenonal of more profound problems, and above all of the Kohl 
Government’s uneasiness with the socio-political consequences of retrenchment 
in the aftermath of re-unification. Confirming this bottom-up explanation of 
institutional change is the fact that no official budget reform was implemented in 
this period. National fiscal rules remained unaltered; hence it is the interpretation 
of these rules that changed. In addition, the permanence of the Kohl 
administration over the whole period under investigation leaves little room for 
explanations that hint at changing constraints on the budgetary process during its 
governmental phase6. The overall conclusive argument is that Germany’s fiscal 
adjustment was less affected by institutional constraints than otherwise believed. 
Or rather, at its origin is the contingent evolution of socio-political preferences, 
which may have in turn lead to a different interpretation of institutional
6 Nonetheless, as it will be explained below, institutional constraints changed in the parliamentary 
phase once, in 1991, the government coalition lost absolute majority in the Bundesrat. Still, 
because the national Parliament has generally only limited influence in the budgetary process, the 
impact on budget policy outcomes is expected to be weaker than it would otherwise be, had the 
institutional set-up o f the governmental stage changed.
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constraints. The section below describes the main features of the German 
budgetary process.
Even if formally shared with the Chancellor Office, in practice the Finance 
Ministry has full responsibility for the drafting of annual budgets. At the 
beginning of the financial year, individual ministries send out their desiderata. 
The Finance Minister takes them into consideration, while also having the power 
to alter them (Horst 1995). In July, the government produces a long-term 
financial planning document, the Finanzplan, and the actual budget proposal, the 
Bundeshaushaltsentwurf. This marks the end of the budget process’s 
governmental phase. A month later, both documents are then submitted 
simultaneously to the Upper (Bundesrat) and the Lower House of Parliament 
{Bundestag). After the Finance Minister has officially presented the budget’s 
contents and aims in the first reading, the fiscal documents are referred to the 
respective budgetary committees, whose amendments are usually accepted in full 
by the other members of Parliament (Horst 1995). After approval by the 
Bundestag, the budget law goes back to the Upper House for final endorsement 
of the Bundeshaushaltsgesetz (Bundesministerium 2001; European Commission 
1994).
Until the late 1960s, decisions on spending and taxing were taken in the 
framework of the 1922 Budget Code according to which German governments 
only had to guarantee that on a yearly basis sufficient revenues were generated to 
cover public expenditures (Bundesfinanzministerium 2001, 4). The first piece of 
mature public finance legislation was introduced in June 1967. The 1967 
Stability and Growth Pact was the product of a time in which, after a rapid 
deterioration of the international economic environment, public authorities had 
realised that existing budget policy tools were inappropriate (Walz 1985). Most 
interestingly, the law foresaw the adoption of the Finanzplan that, by imposing a 
long-term perspective on fiscal policy, became one of the cornerstones of the 
German system. The act also paved the way for a more comprehensive reform of 
budget policy that resulted in the introduction, in 1969, of the Law on Budgetary 
Principles and the Federal Budget Code. The latter is also important because it 
regulates financial relations between government and regions. These rules have
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not been altered since and still inform today’s process (Knott 1981, 20; 
Bundesfinanzministerium 2001).
Until the 1990s, the German budget process was unanimously described as one 
of the most efficient in Europe, against which the less virtuous Italian one was 
often juxtaposed. For a long time, Germany and Italy epitomised the best and 
worst cases of public finance management respectively (De Haan, de Kam and 
Sterks 1992; Poterba and von Hagen 1999). In the early 1990s, when important 
budget reforms were introduced in Italy, government authorities repeatedly 
explained that the spirit of these reforms laid in the imitation of Germany’s 1967 
Stability Law (Camera dei Deputati, September 1992). These are the 
characteristics that make up for the effectiveness of the German process: (1) the 
system of delegation to the Finance Minister; (2) the transparency of budget 
documents; and (3) the Parliament’s limited amendment powers. The natural 
implication for the latter is that the relationship between the executive and the 
legislative is mostly a cooperative one from the very beginning. Government 
budget proposals tend to reflect the will of the parliamentary majority (Horst 
1995, 287). This is confirmed by the fact that figures emerging out of the 
parliamentary process do not differ from initial government projections. From 
1982 to 1990, the German parliament did not altered government spending 
figures by more than 0.9 percent (Table 8). Not only does the Parliament lack the 
legislative power to overrule government decisions, it is also lacks sufficient 
human resources and technical expertise to play such a role (Horst 1995, 330). In 
1992, in a detailed review of fiscal institutions in Europe, von Hagen explained 
clearly why German budget policy was amongst the most rigorous in Europe. It 
consisted of a political and bureaucratic exercise under the strict control of the 
Finance Minister with the support of experts from the Ministry; it was largely 
insulated from Parliament’s pressures as well as completely immune to the 
claims of organised interests (von Hagen 1992). All of this was seen as a 
guarantee of the fact that fiscal policy outcomes would in the end reflect 
government plans.
These features make the process in principle more efficient than the Italian one. 
This does not however exclude that contingent domestic factors condition the
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relative efficiency of German budget policy-making. Hallerberg explains that the 
actual power of the Finance Minister for example is very much dependent upon 
external circumstances. It is constrained under coalition governments or if the 
Bundesrat decides to exercise its veto power; the Constitutional Court takes 
advantage of its authority; or, finally, the Bundesbank threatens to punish fiscal 
profligacy with a restrictive monetary stance (Hallerberg 2004). As to the 
particular situation of the 1990s, there is a relative large consensus around the 
argument that budget policy-making was not functioning well. Still, researchers 
disagree over the reasons for this. Supporters of the superiority of German fiscal 
institutions blame unification. Others argue instead that the worsening of 
government fiscal management capacity started much earlier, constrained by the 
lack of serious reforms after 1969 and happened to be only exacerbated by the 
financial implications of re-unification (Sturm 1998).
What are the tangible signs of this institutional deterioration? The argument 
presented here is that institutional deterioration is a multifaceted phenomenon, 
which implies that it is neither possible nor wise to isolate a single category of 
causes as with different aspects of deterioration come different causes. For 
instance, when analysing institutional changes in the 1990s, it seems reasonable
# n
to distinguish between institutional mechanisms and outputs . The first sheds 
light on emerging decision-making practices and represent a powerful analytical 
tool to identify new constraints and opportunities in the budgetary process. Thus, 
first and most importantly is the fact that the Finance Minister started losing 
control of the budget to the advantage of the Chancellor, who was keen to 
reserve for himself the greatest possible visibility in the wake of German 
unification (Der Spiegel 44, 1992; von Hagen and Sturm 1999; Hallerberg 2004). 
Needless to say, in comparison to the Finance Minister, the Chancellor is 
generally more sensitive to politics. Second, labour market interventions in the 
East were negotiated between party representatives, social partners and 
bureaucrats from the Chancellor Office in the framework of special roundtable 
talks. Thus, at least one budget item was not as insulated from external socio­
economic pressures as it used to be. Kohl’s responsiveness to societal claims was
7 Instead, most o f the existing literature is not particularly sensitive to this distinction (von 
Hagen/Sturm 1999).
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so evident and unexpected that the national press attached to him the name of 
“Chancellor Billion” (Czada 1994 cited in von Hagen/Sturm 1999).
On the other hand, institutional outputs are descriptive in nature. They are 
indicative of a situation of institutional deterioration but are not necessarily 
correlated with disappointing fiscal outcomes. Already outputs themselves, they 
could easily coexist with efficient macroeconomic management. To name just a 
few examples: special funds were created to finance the transition of East 
Germany that remained outside official fiscal documents. This practice had the 
effect of undermining the comprehensiveness and transparency of budgetary 
documents. Second, the government’s loss of control over the public budget was 
apparent also in the large reliance on supplementary budgets. While in 1952-80 
German governments only resorted to four emergency interventions, in 1990-97, 
the Kohl Government introduced seven supplementary financial bills. Third, 
successive tax reforms jeopardised the fiscal authorities’ capacity to foresee 
revenue levels, as these were often overestimated, e.g. in 1995-97 (Horst 1995; 
Sturm 1998; SVR 1995, 138-9)8.
2.2.The economic role of fiscal institutions
While altered institutional practices and outputs are a fact, it is less obvious that 
they are responsible for budget outcomes. I argue that institutional deterioration 
is only a reflection of the Kohl Government’s incapacity to deal with the socio­
political consequences of a firmer fiscal policy. True, social partners did not have 
formal access to budget policy-making, at least not under the terms Italian social 
partners had. However, their claims were still taken into consideration to the 
extent that the elected federal government was concerned with the socio-political 
feasibility of reform and threatened with the prospect of social unrest and/or with 
a possible electoral punishment. The resulting relaxation of fiscal policy in the 
early 1990s was not determined by formal institutional constraints, as some
8 Interestingly enough, when Germany registered a disappointing fiscal performance, it was so 
not because o f excessive spending, as in Italy, but because public incomes were not as high as the 
government had predicted. In other words, while Italy’s problem resided more on the expenditure 
side o f the budget, in Germany, public revenues appeared to be much more troublesome items.
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literature has attempted to suggest (von Hagen and Strauch 1999), but was 
dependent upon societal factors. Under the latter’s pressure, fiscal authorities 
might have been induced to “manipulate” budget institutions to accommodate 
different socio-economic interests. This interpretative approach is confirmed by 
the fact that qualitative structural indexes measuring the effectiveness of the 
German budgetary process do not change in the time span from 1991 to 2001 
(Hallerberg 2003). This is to say that, formally, nothing changed for the worst in 
the country’s institutional set-up.
Interestingly, some of the data usually used to prove the argument of the 
emergence of institutional deterioration offer alternative interpretations. Graph 
12 shows that government planning capacity indeed deteriorated in the 1990s, 
with an expanding gap between government deficit projections and actual 
outcomes. Still, in most cases, government authorities had foreseen a much larger 
deficit than it actually turned out to be -especially in 1992, 1994 and 1996.
While diminished planning capacity in the 1990s is a fact, its impact on actual 
fiscal discipline is debatable.
As for the role of Parliament, figures confirm that members of parliament 
intruded more visibly on the budgetary process. In 1991, 1994, 1996 and 1997, 
parliamentary changes to total spending were, in comparative perspective, quite 
remarkable9. Yet, it was not always the case that Parliament’s intrusion translated 
into greater fiscal profligacy. There has been an instance when the interventions 
of the Upper and Lower House were even made in the name of greater fiscal 
discipline (Table 8). In 1996, two members of Parliament, Wolfgang Weng 
(FPD) and Adolf Roth (CDU), threatened not to pass the government budget 
proposal if deficit projections were not made more realistic (Der Spiegel 38, 
1996).
9 It should be noted that these figures are to some extent problematic. It is hard to discern where 
parliamentary changes stem from parliamentarians’ intention to alter government fiscal plans and 
where they are simply the result o f changes to the macroeconomic scenario against which budget 
decisions are taken. To be sure, the Parliament’s modest average contribution to spending 
decisions is not necessarily a sign o f institutional weakness but possibly an indication that the 
executive took account o f Parliament’s wishes at an early stage, while drafting its proposals 
(Horst 1995, 363-4).
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Graph 12. Germany: Difference Projected and Actual Net 
Borrowing Requirement (- overestimated) 1980-2000
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Source: Bundesfinanzministerium, Finanzberichte 1980-2000.
True, the Finance Minister lost his monopoly over budget policy-making but, 
from an institutionalist point o f  view, this should have not affected the efficiency  
o f  budget institutions to the extent that the process continued to be centralised. 
However, the fact that the Office o f  the Chancellor became the new decision­
making body meant that the only thing that changed was the responsiveness to 
societal claims o f the new fiscal authority. Deficit spending in the first year after 
re-unification was not merely result o f  a loosening budgetary process. Chancellor 
Kohl was consciously responding to the largest possible range o f  claims made 
upon him. On a similar note, Kitterer argued that fiscal profligacy aimed at 
preventing strong distributional conflicts at such a delicate time (Kitterer 1999).
Table 8.Germany: changes decided by parliament over total spending
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
C h a n g e  -0.2 -0.9 0 +0.7 -0.4 +2.7 -0.1 0 + 7.6 n.a. -2.7 + 2.7
Source: Horst 1995, 363; Bundesfinanzministerium, Finanzberichte 1986-1997.
Finally, a budgetary process can be defined as open or closed in relation to the 
degree o f  access social partners enjoy. Corporatism falls under the category o f  
domestic institutions and is believed to have important implications for economic 
policy-making. The traditional argument is that governments’ excessive
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responsiveness to societal claims tends to lead to larger public deficits. Instead, 
the example of Italy has demonstrated that the involvement of social partners in 
budget policy-making allowed for the creation of a stable consensus around 
fiscal austerity by providing legitimacy to the government’s austerity plan; at the 
same time, unions were offered the opportunity to decide over the content of 
fiscal adjustment.
In Germany, forms of cooperation flourished between labour and capital leading 
to an institutional bias in favour of compromised solutions simultaneously 
meeting the preferences of workers and employers. Interest groups have 
historically played a semi-public role by taking part into various stages of the 
economic policy-making process (see Chapter VI). Still, in the 1990s, there was 
no formal role for interest groups in the budgetary process. The Kohl 
Government attempted to involve domestic socio-economic actors in the 
framework of specific projects or policy areas, the most visible examples being 
the institution of a technological council at the federal level (Technologierat) and 
of concerted action in the health sector (Konzentrierte Aktion im 
Gesundheitsweseri), which aimed to induce interested parties to achieve 
voluntary cost control (Sturm in Smith et al. 1996, 127). Against these two clear 
examples of sectoral corporatism, the tripartite roundtables created to discuss the 
transfer of West German labour market institutions to the East were certainly 
more extensive in scope (Strauch and von Hagen 1999; Sturm in Smith, Paterson 
and Padgett 1996, 126), if only because they were deemed to exercise a greater 
impact on the public budget. In addition to these, in the 1990s, the Office of the 
Chancellor would hold periodic round-talks with interest groups to discuss 
various pieces of reform (Kanzlergesprache). In this context, the role of social 
partners was one of mere consultation. The Kohl Government did not seek their 
advice on general issues such as the role of the State in the national economy and 
the future of social security. In power since 1982, the Christian Democrats 
proved in fact reluctant to extend political power to the unions. More 
importantly, the small Liberal coalition partner was strongly against any form of 
social concertation and criticised any timid attempt towards it. Only the Social 
Democrats in opposition continued to support the idea that socio-economic
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policy decisions should be taken with the consent and support of the social 
partners, in the old corporatist tradition.
2.3.The economic role of political institutions
No doubt, political institutions -a  government’s life expectancy and type- 
exercise an impact on fiscal policy-making and outcomes. Time frames direct 
governments’ strategic choices. In addition, the number of potential veto players, 
larger in the case of coalition governments and/or federalist states, conditions the 
political room for manoeuvre. Following this reasoning, a widespread argument 
was that Germany’s successful preservation of fiscal discipline until the 1990s 
was possible thanks to the country’s strong political stability where government 
changeovers were infrequent, and to low political fragmentation, as exemplified 
by the small number of parties and in the formation of large parliamentary 
majorities (GlaeBner in Smith, Paterson and Padgett 1996, 33). In fact, in spite of 
the presence of a hybrid electoral system comprising both majoritarian and 
proportional features, Germany has been functioning as a de facto majoritarian 
democracy since the post-war period (Poterba and von Hagen 1999).
If these arguments are acceptable, then a troublesome budget consolidation in the 
1990s should have derived from changing institutional constraints in the German 
political system. However, in that period, the federal government was no less 
stable than it had been in the past. The same liberal-conservative coalition led the 
country through the EMU convergence process10. Only electoral cycles might 
have exercised some form of constraint. It is manifest that upcoming elections in 
1990, 1994 and 1998 exerted some impact on government behaviour. CA fiscal 
data reveal a relaxation of discretionary fiscal policy in the years before and after 
general elections, in 1989 and 1991, and in 1993 and 1995. Electoral concerns 
mobilised the governing coalition and, for the very same reasons, the opposition 
with inevitable implications for fiscal policy-making. This interpretation is 
confirmed by the fact that, especially before the 1994 federal election, the
10 Still, it is to be noted that, while the overarching political institutions remained unaltered after 
re-unification, the micro-politics changed instead with evident effects on the national party 
system and voting behaviour. Yet, again, it was more about preferences within institutions rather 
than institutions themselves (GlaeBner in Smith et al. 1996, 33).
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partisan polarization between the CDU and the SPD intensified, revealing two 
different ideologically charged fiscal visions, with the Christian Democrats 
supporting small government and cutbacks and the opposition Social Democrats 
recognising the role of the State in social security provision (Budge et al. 2001).
As for the notion of political fragmentation, the CDU/CSU-FDP government was 
to a large extent a coalition not dissimilar to previous ones in German political 
history. The same configuration proved able, in the 1980s, to put in place an 
extremely successful budgetary adjustment. In the 1990s, the government 
continued to enjoy a large majority in the Bundestag. There is no particular 
reason to believe that the SPD opposition could count on greater veto power than 
it had in the previous decade, at the least in the Lower House. However, an 
important limit to government’s room for manoeuvre came from federalism. 
From 1991 onwards, the governing coalition had lost absolute majority in the 
Bundesrat to the advantage of the Social Democrats. While lacking veto power 
on spending decisions, the Upper House co-decides on tax laws (Horst 1995; 
Braun, Bullinger and Waelti 2002). The regions lobbied successfully to get a 
larger share of incomes from VAT (Sally and Webber 1994; Horst 1995, 384; 
Bach and Vesper 2000), but were unable to control their own spending levels. 
Official documents indicate that the accounts of regions and municipalities were 
performing much worse than the federal budget. The Council of Economic 
Experts requested on several occasions that regional actors both in the West and 
in the East strengthen their commitment to fiscal consolidation (SVR various 
years). In vain the government attempted to impose spending limits on regional 
budgets11. Nevertheless, the indisputable importance of federalism does not 
necessarily contradict the argument that preferences were more relevant than 
institutions. Significant pressures from above conditioned fiscal policy-making in 
the 1990s. Federalism does say that these were not only socio-economic but also 
territorial in nature.
11 Even at a later stage, there was no success for the proposal to implement an internal stability 
pact so as to subject regions to the same deficit limits the federal government had committed to 
with the signing o f the Stability Pact.
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There is another, more institutionalist argument about federalism, which is often 
called into question. Federalist states are affected by substantial coordination 
problems. Any anti-cyclical fiscal policy is aggravated by the fact that authorities 
need to coordinate responses between numerous units; this leads either to no 
result or to a considerable delay, and in turn to inefficient outcomes. Re­
unification should have exacerbated this problem as it brought about an increase 
in the number of Lander. Empirical data do not seem to support this account. 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of both actual and cyclically adjusted deficits. A 
large gap between the two figures would indicate weakness in the German fiscal 
reaction function. Interestingly, the federal government’s capacity to put in place 
anti-cyclical fiscal policy was remarkably modest during the 1980s, at a time 
when an extensive deficit reduction was achieved. On the contrary, in the 1990s, 
in spite of the fact that the number of regional authorities increased, as did 
administrative cultures, fiscal authorities seemed better able to pursue 
stabilization policies, as indicated by the fact that the gap between actual and CA 
figures narrowed substantially. Therefore, other factors should account for a poor 
fiscal performance.
3. Partisan and Median Voter Preferences
In the previous sections, I have attempted to demonstrate that pure institutionalist 
arguments have limitations when it comes to accounting for Germany’s fiscal 
consolidation in the 1990s. More precisely, it was suggested that at the basis of 
changing institutional constraints and opportunities were shifts in preferences. 
Budget consolidation appeared like a difficult exercise also because governing 
authorities were tom between ideological and electoral considerations. The 
pursuit of partisan policies and the quest for public support made the federal 
government deviate from principles of optimal fiscal management.
That fiscal efficiency was not at the top of government priorities is evident from 
the gap existing between actual government policies and recommendations 
coming from the Council of Economic Experts. In spite of a political rhetoric in
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which fiscal discipline figured as the ultimate goal, the Kohl Government found 
it difficult to keep public expenditures under control. In 1991 >93, a large part of 
the re-unification process was financed through deficit spending and by means of 
revenue maximising measures. According to Heilemann and Jochimsen, the 
federal government had taken the conscious decision to subordinate economic 
considerations to the political imperative of unification (Heilemann and
Jochimsen 1993, 49). The Council of Economic Experts was extremely critical of
12the fiscal stance . It accused the government of lacking a coherent 
communication policy about its long-term fiscal objectives, something that had 
undermined consumer and investor confidence (SVR 1992, 2). In addition, and 
contrary to Kohl’s decision to augment direct and indirect taxation, the Council 
suggested that deficit reduction be achieved on the expenditure side of the 
budget, possibly by means of a dramatic restructuring of spending priorities 
(SVR 1992, 139). On the other hand, if revenue increases were the only possible 
way to balanced budgets, then indirect taxes other than VAT should be increased 
(SVR 1991,15). Not even Kohl’s strategy switch after 1993 seemed to be 
informed by principles of optimality. True, in apparent accordance with 
recommendations coming from the Council, the Finance Ministry decided to cut 
expenditures and reduce fiscal pressure. However, this did not prove sufficient in 
the eyes of experts, with the Council continuing to lament the lack of structural 
reforms on the spending side of the budget (SVR 1996, 12).
Thus, notwithstanding a genuine belief in the desirability of fiscal discipline, the 
Kohl Government was constrained in its capacity to stick to such a commitment. 
In the following sections, I assess the extent to which fiscal decisions were taken 
on the basis of ideological preferences and electoral considerations (i.e. 
adaptation to the median voter). I will also hint at pressures stemming from self- 
interested domestic socio-economic groups; this topic shall be further developed 
in the next chapter. It should be noted at the outset that the high variation in 
fiscal outcomes in the 1990s does not reflect the fact that the same CDU/CSU- 
FDP government had been in power over the entire period under investigation.
12 The Council’s 1991 Annual Report stated: “where the State has the power to reject 
unjustifiable economic claims, it should not hesitate to do so. Old privileges should not be 
perpetuated and new ones should be denied... if  the Government induced ministers to do so, it 
would also become easier to limit requests coming from socio-economic actors” (SVR 1991, 15).
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This suggests that the government’s declared partisan preferences are more 
important than actual ideological heritages. In other words, pure ideology did not 
play a role and issues of partisanship were always intertwined with opportunistic 
evaluation of government’s chances of political survival.
3.1.Demand-side partisan politics
Even a superficial look reveals that pure partisanship is not a convincing 
explanation for the German experience with fiscal adjustment. Size and 
composition of budget consolidation varied from one year to the other 
discrediting any hypothesis of links between the ideological orientation of the 
(same!) governing party and fiscal policy decisions. Partisan arguments in the 
tradition of Hibbs’ work (Hibbs 1977) are not a satisfactory explanation in this 
particular case. Declared rather than real ideological preferences leave greater 
room for an interpretation of the German experience. And, in fact, in the wake of 
re-unification with the federal government running an electoral campaign, the 
CDU-FDP coalition displayed a much more welfare-friendly rhetoric than the 
Social Democratic opposition (Budge et al. 2001). In an attempt to use the 
historical event of unification as a resource in the electoral competition, the Kohl 
Government publicly insisted on the need to extend the West German generous 
welfare state to the East. In this sense, electoral concerns proved more powerful 
than the government’s attachment to its ideological heritage.
Once the pressure of re-unification seemed overcome, the Kohl Government 
resorted to a more traditionally partisan policy stance. The shift from a revenue 
to an expenditure-based adjustment in 1993 is to be understood in this light. The 
cost of the united Germany had been borne by private and corporate taxpayers 
whose voice soon reached the Chancellor. In addition, fiscal laxity had induced 
the Bundesbank to reduce the money supply. Higher interest rates ran against the 
preferences of private investment. The fear of losing support from his natural 
constituencies in the run-up to the 1994 federal election induced Kohl to reshape 
the government fiscal strategy. Again, electoral manifestos are quite revealing of 
the coalition’s stance in that period. After having supported welfare expansion in
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the early 1990s, the CDU-FDP coalition argued for welfare retrenchment in 1994 
(Budge et al. 2001).
In the parliamentary debate, there was certainly an element of partisanship as 
competing political groups juxtaposed very different views of appropriate 
economic policy-making, with the CDU/CSU and the FDP putting forward the 
case for supply-side reforms and the SPD supporting Keynesian demand 
management (Friedrichs and Weishaupt in Andersen 1998, 76). In the end, actual 
fiscal policy outcomes appeared to be affected more by the Kohl Government’s 
openness to socio-economic interests in a period of unprecedented crisis rather 
than by pure partisanship.
3.2.The German median voter
I have shown above that electoral considerations are a convincing explanation for 
German fiscal policy-making, and in particular for its relaxation, in the aftermath 
of re-unification. Most electoral politics arguments revolve around the notion of 
a median voter whose preferences then become governments’ reference point in 
the phase of policy formulation. Still, the median voter theory does not 
necessarily coincide with the tenets behind the electoral politics literature. The 
latter is a pluralist account of policy-making and describes a relatively open 
process in which voters at large, or rather self-contained interest groups play a 
role. Median voter accounts focus instead on a representative voter but possibly 
fail to shed light on the fact that voters have multiple preferences, at times in
1 'Xcontradiction with one another and often structured in the form of trade-off .
Graph 13 illustrates the position of the German median voter with reference to 
welfare expansion (Budge et al. 2001). Firstly, Germany is one of the strongest 
supporters of the welfare state in Europe. Second, and most importantly, the 
trend is set downward from 1987 onwards. This is possibly the result of the Kohl 
Government’s successful management of the economy in the 1980s, which led 
voters to support rather orthodox economic policy recipes. This might explain
13 For a similar comment, see Besley, British Academy Annual Conference, 2004.
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why Chancellor Kohl dared to propose a few welfare retrenchment measures in 
1994 and 1996. Even if CA social transfers continued to increase until 1997 in 
response to the increasing number of unemployed in the united Germany, they 
did so at much slower pace from 1993 to 1997, stabilising thereafter (European 
Commission 2003b). Yet, as was noted for the Italian case, the median voter 
theory does not capture the fact that preferences are normally multidimensional. 
In this respect, survey-based data might be more revealing of societal 
preferences. In Germany, a larger majority than in Italy is in favour of the 
preservation of the status quo. Interestingly enough, there is no trade union bias 
in this case. Namely, members of trade unions and non-members shared this 
preference to the same degree (Boeri, Boersch-Supan and Tabellini 2001). In this 
respect, unions’ veto of the welfare cuts proposed in 1996 was not the reaction of 
minority vested interests but reflected a wider social feeling14.
Graph 13. Germamy: the Position of the Median Voter on Welfare,
Germany 1946-1998
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This leads us to consider the role of more specific actors, namely social partners. 
While it is true that they were not formally involved in the budgetary process as 
in Italy, it is nonetheless evident that they enjoyed some form of access to fiscal
14 As a matter o f fact, opinion polls show that 72 percent o f the population was against the social 
spending restraints Chancellor Kohl pushed through parliament in April 1996 (FT 2/5/1996).
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policy-making. Still, their preferences were distributed in such a way that there 
was no scope for a comprehensive agreement over fiscal policy issues. In the 
end, any “policy output represent(ed) the lowest common denominator between 
those corporate actors that command the potential to crush the initiative 
completely” (Webber 1992, 174). The Kohl Government’s incapacity to satisfy 
both capital and labour explains half-hearted fiscal consolidation as well as the 
crumbling itself of social partnership. Their incremental ad hoc intervention in 
the German budgetary process during the 1990s together with the government’s 
failure to provide them with any official recognition as budget actors explain 
why their uncoordinated contributions to taxing and spending decisions might 
have been responsible for the country’s loss of its traditional fiscal rigour.
The next chapter should then look at the contribution of social partners to 
German fiscal policy-making during the 1990s.
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CHAPTER VI
The Fiscal Role of German 
Social Partners: The Failure 
of the Social Pact
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1. Macroeconomics and the German Variety of Corporatism
Fiscal policy does not take place in a vacuum. It is reasonable to expect that the 
federal government felt particularly sensitive towards the socio-political impact 
of fiscal policy decisions in the aftermath of re-unification when citizens in the 
West and in the East were already asked to adapt to a dramatically different 
national landscape. In Germany, social partners do not enjoy formal access to 
budget policy-making, at least not in the same way as Italian social partners 
during the 1990s. Still, there are specific areas in which they play a pivotal role 
which spill-over onto public finances. In this respect, they can be said to be 
implicit budget actors.
This is evident in the case of wage bargaining. Collective agreements affect the 
standing of public budgets via two main channels. First, social partners have the 
power to set wages in the public sector. Compensations for public employees 
represent quite an important expenditure item amounting, in Germany, to an 
average of 10 percent of GDP in the period 1991-2000 (European Commission 
2005). Second, by setting wages, social partners affect national inflation levels. 
For example, wage restraints have two positive implications for public finances. 
On the one hand, the resulting low inflation controls the growth of nominal 
public consumption expenditures. On the other, wage moderation impedes that 
the Bundesbank intervenes by raising interest rates, which would expand the 
interest payment bill and, at the same time, exercise a downward pressure on 
public incomes because of lower growth. In addition, German social partners 
play a role in social policy implementation, and hence on the financial aspects of 
it as they administer social security budgets.
Indirectly, to the extent that they are important economic actors on the national 
scene, social partners would in one way or another exert an impact on fiscal 
performances. Even if budget policy is a matter of government control, the 
parties in power are sensitive to their natural constituencies, and thus to either 
capital or labour respective of partisan preferences. But also, the federal 
government tends to consult social partners on various issues. In the early 1990s,
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most of the economic and social details of re-unification were negotiated in the 
framework of special roundtables comprising government authorities, opposition 
leaders and social partners. What do social partners do in Germany? What are 
their preferences? The following section offers a snapshot of German organised 
interests and of the country’s corporatist tradition. For the national labour and 
business confederations, I describe membership; relative importance in the 
national economy; centralization of wage bargaining; and macroeconomic role. 
Finally, I review the country’s variety of corporatism, i.e. the way in which 
social partners have in the past been involved in macroeconomic policy-making 
as well as the nature of their role in the 1990s.
l .l .A  profile of German interest groups
As in most continental European states, social partners have contributed 
significantly to the formation of the post-war German welfare state. With the end 
of WWII, national social partners took up responsibility for reorganising German 
society. Gathered under the umbrella of the Bundesverband der Deutschen 
Industrie (BDI), business actors played a central role in the material 
reconstruction of the post-war economy. Through them, it became soon clear that 
capitalism was the only possible socio-economic model for Germany. In 1949, 
almost all existing labour unions with the only exception of white-collar workers 
joined one labour confederation, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) under 
the presidency of Hans Bockler (Markovits 1986)15. While initially uneasy with 
the political establishment’s rapid embracing of the capitalist model, soon 
thereafter the DGB directed its efforts to finding a “compromise with reality” 
(Schneider 1991), as the economic miracle was creating room for an 
improvement of living standards for all citizens. A favourable economic 
environment allowed business and labour actors to agree on multiple forms of 
cooperation under the ultimate common goal of creating a strong and stable 
national economy. Largely dissimilar cultural and ideological heritages did not in 
fact prevent them from finding some common ground.
15 White-collar workers founded an autonomous confederation, the Deutsche Angestellten 
Gewerkschaft (DAG); however by 1986 this accounted for only 20 percent o f all German white- 
collar workers (Markovits 1986).
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Together with its sister organization representing national employers, the 
Bundes-vereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande (BDA), the BDI 
embraced liberalism from the early days. Similarly to other industry associations, 
the confederation has been generally supportive of “small government’’ and 
opposed to an excessive intrusion of the State in the management of the national 
economy. For this reason, fiscal discipline has always been at the top of its 
agenda. First, balanced budgets hint at the fact that public expenditures are not 
excessive; this is to say that the allocation of resources is efficient because 
induced by the market’s invisible hand rather than being imposed from above. 
Second, and linked to the latter, where government spending is not too high, then 
fiscal pressure is also likely to be contained. Third, financial stability in the form 
of low inflation is desirable because it pre-empts potential for conflict on the 
wage bargaining arena16. Together with the appreciation of fiscal austerity is a 
belief in the desirability of supply-side reforms. Still, within the organization, 
differences existed between the preferences of large and of small-medium 
enterprises. The former were mostly concerned with macroeconomic policies and 
their potential impact on the external value of the DM. The latter were more 
interested in issues of industrial organization (e.g. training schemes, tax 
incentives, etc.). Since the late 1980s, their positions have come more and more 
irreconcilable, a state of affairs that has compromised the unity and power of the 
BDI confederation as such (Streeck and Hassel 2004).
On the other side of the spectrum, the DGB realised soon that Keynesianism 
represented the best approximation to labour representatives’ way of conceiving 
of any advanced capitalist society. At the core of the agenda was an “expansive 
wage policy”, for which real wages had to be high enough to boost consumption 
and, therewith, national economic growth. No surprise then that the 
confederation supported the introduction of the 1967 Stability Law with its 
strong commitment to financial stability and full employment. Sluggish growth 
was often perceived as a serious problem because of its negative impact on 
labour market developments. In recession, the labour confederation would hence
16 For obvious reasons, this is an issue that mobilises in particular the BDA.
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ask the government to support the economy by means of expansionary fiscal 
policies, as happened in the 1970s (Markovists 1986). Such a position was 
perpetuated even in the post-unification period when the DGB insisted that the 
federal government expand spending programmes in the East and that growth 
promotion be privileged over inflation control.
What is the organizational profile of German social partners today? The BDI, the 
voice of the industry, consists of 36 industrial associations organised by product 
group. Almost all German firms are members of the organization. The BDI is a 
lobbying organization and benefits from strong ties with the Christian 
Democrats. The BDA, the confederation of national employers, gathers 56 
associations representing about 80 percent of all national enterprises in 1985 
(Soskice 2000). Employers in the metalworking sector are organised in a single 
organization, Gesamtmetall, which is the bargaining partner of the corresponding 
labour union, IG Metall. In the public sector, by contrast, it is the Ministry of 
Interior that takes part in the collective bargaining process in the role of 
employer (Fuerstenberg 1998).
With a membership of 7.6 million (2002), the DGB is comprised of 16 unions 
representing an equivalent number of economic sectors. Amongst them, the 
metalworking union IG Metall figures as one of the largest across Europe with 
2.6 million members (2002) fwww.dgb.de). German trade unionism is organised 
across sectoral lines. True, there is a partisan element to it, as historically the 
DGB leadership has been close to the SPD17. This affinity was particularly 
evident in the 1970s under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, when the BDI and BDA 
went so far as to argue that the risk of the emerging of a “state union” was 
present and that this signified a serious threat to democracy (Markovits 1986). In 
spite of the traditional closeness with social democracy, German labour unions 
have overall taken quite a pragmatic and moderate stance over most issues 
(Trade Unions of the World, 2001). Independently of the ideological orientation 
of the governing party, the DGB has notoriously been an important reference 
partner for most post-war federal governments.
17 It is to be noted that few management positions in the DGB are reserved to CDU 
representatives (Trade Unions o f the World, 2001).
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With the division into sectors comes collective bargaining at the sector level. 
However, the wage leadership of the export-oriented IG Metall provides a good 
functional equivalent to an encompassing confederation. Indeed, all other sectors 
use wage agreements negotiated in the metalworking as a benchmark (Streeck 
1994). In this area, social partners enjoy full autonomy where the State has no 
right to intervene. Still, bargainers were subject to an important institutional 
constraint, the Bundesbank. With the national central bank having built up a 
strong reputation for inflation control since the mid-1970s, unions had an 
incentive to keep wage increases in line with the evolution of the inflation rate to 
the extent that excessive wage settlements would prompt the Bundesbank to raise 
interest rates, thereby punishing unions with greater unemployment (Ebbinghaus 
and Hassel 2000) or employees in export-oriented manufacturing sector with an 
appreciated exchange rate (Soskice 2000).
1.2.The historical relevance of macro-concertation
In the debates around the different varieties of capitalism, Germany has been 
always presented as the role model for a coordinated market economy (CME) in 
which labour and capital cooperate actively and peacefully to shaping the 
domestic political economy (Hall and Soskice 2001). For most of the post-war 
period, German social partnership has thus been bipartite in nature. In the area of 
wage bargaining, where the parts agreed to the principle of wage autonomy 
(Tarifautonomie), their collaboration is clearly free of external interference. But, 
even in the realm of labour market and social policies, the role of the state has 
been limited to the provision of “overarching legal frameworks” (Katzenstein
1 ft1985) and to the performance of a largely “enabling function” (Streeck 1984) . 
In this respect, Germany’s tradition revolves around a form of diffuse
18 Streeck describes this particular form of “managed capitalism” as follows: “the state in the 
Federal Republic acts in a variety of ways as a supporting, facilitating, encouraging force in the 
formation and preservation o f broad encompassing, internally heterogeneous interest 
organizations. Ironically, but hardly unintended, the interventionist policy o f the German State on 
the organizational forms o f social interests enables it in many cases to abstain from direct 
economic intervention since it provides interest groups with a capacity to find viable solutions 
within and for themselves” (Streeck 1984, 145).
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corporatism quite different from the tripartite macro-concertation that is at the 
basis of recent so-called social pacts.
To find a similar form of consultation between government, employers and 
unions one has to go back to the late 1960s, when in 1967 the Grand Coalition 
initiated the experiment of the Konzertierte Aktion (KA). The 1966 recession had 
lead to growing private sector unemployment. In the framework of this new 
forum, labour unions agreed to wage moderation in the belief that the latter 
would favour the re-entry of the unemployed into the labour market. Real 
economic problems were at the basis of unions’ acceptance of wage restraint. In 
exchange, the federal government promised additional social expenditures 
(Carlin 1996). The terms of an explicit political exchange were set. The 
experiment with tripartism was short-lived. It failed due to increasing tensions 
between government and labour. Labour representatives had accepted 
government interference into collective bargaining with reluctance and, in the 
late 1970s, the DGB found it increasingly difficult to block the spreading of 
unauthorised strikes (Markovits 1986). Also, the monetarist stance of the 
Bundesbank, which translated into the central bank’s readiness to punish any 
potentially inflationary wage agreement, was twisting the arm of unions into 
accepting wage moderation, thereby making an explicit compromise with the 
government at best unnecessary (Streeck in Dore 1994). In 1978, KA ceased to 
exist.
Even if explicit social pacts are not common in German economic history, the 
practice of taking decisions on the basis of a large socio-political consensus is 
undoubtedly a constituent part of the domestic political economy. Germany’s 
comparatively low number of strikes and street demonstrations until the 1990s is 
result of this entrenched consensual policy-making style (ILO Database). In the 
early 1990s, however, German consensus politics started to crumble. Some 
researchers blamed re-unification. I believe that re-unification per se has no 
direct responsibility. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this was indeed the only 
area around which government and social partners could reach an agreement in 
the form, for example, of an unconditional transfer of West German labour 
market institutions to the former DDR (Manow and Seils 2000). The Kohl
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Government needed social support, borne out of a concern about possible 
electoral punishment, should the process prove too costly. With this aim, special 
roundtables involving social partners were created to discuss the technicalities of 
re-unification (Strauch and von Hagen 1999) and, in September 1992, a larger 
Solidarity Pact was launched to engage also the opposition and regional 
representatives.
Using a more sophisticated institutionalist argument, Manow and Seils explain 
the crumbling of German social partnership on the grounds that, once reforms 
were truly necessary as a consequence of unification and of the EMU challenge, 
Germany’s comparative advantage (i.e. its adaptive capacity to changing external 
circumstances) proved self-defeating (Manow and Seils 2000). Others explain 
that macro-concertation ran against the institutional constraints induced by a 
highly developed sectoral corporatism (Siegel 2003). My contention is that such 
explanations are deficient to the extent it does not explain what happens at the 
micro-level when, for example, one socio-economic group is seriously 
committed to radical policy change. From this follow legitimate questions: how 
intensive should one group’s support in favour of drastic adjustment be in order 
to exert a disturbing impact on German highly adaptive system? How intensive 
should a competing group’s resistance be? Partially offering an answer to these 
queries, Streeck suggested that organised interests lost all incentives to negotiate, 
i.e. to come up with compromised piecemeal solutions, as a result of shifting 
macroeconomic conditions, slow growth and high unemployment. The new 
macroeconomic environment in the 1990s is then responsible for the 
abandonment of corporatist practices (Streeck 1997). The following sections 
discuss budget policy-making in the 1990s with an explicit eye on the role of 
social partners where the attempt is to verify if a correlation did in fact exist 
between the macroeconomic preferences of German organised interests and 
weakening social consensus, where the latter is manifest in the striking failure of 
the 1996 Social Pact.
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2. Fiscal Policy-Making in the Aftermath of Unification
This section aims to unveil the main traits of the political economy of fiscal 
discipline in the aftermath of re-unification, with particular attention devoted to 
the preferences of social partners. Quite understandably, at the core of the debate 
were unification and its financial implications. So, in 1991-92, fiscal policy was 
largely constrained by the need to rebuild former DDR. Yet, a year later, the 
government proved able to act with a firmer hand, stressing the need to control 
spending growth and to abandon revenue-maximising measures. The looming 
recession played no marginal role in persuading fiscal authorities that higher 
fiscal pressure would have just further slowed output growth down. From the 
outset, divergences emerged between the government and business actors, on the 
one hand, and the opposition together with the unions, on the other, regarding the 
ways in which the public good of fiscal discipline was to be achieved. This 
dilemma would characterise the entire decade. While in Italy interest groups’ 
concerns shifted from the size to the quality of budgetary adjustment, in 
accordance with changes to the external macroeconomic environment, here the 
composition of fiscal reform had been the crucial variable since the very 
beginning. Labour and capital showed a common interest in balanced budgets, 
but it was only in 1991-92, facing with the government’s not always sound 
public finance management, that capital come in with a comparatively stronger 
claim for austerity.
2.1.First budget response to unification (1991-92)
In 1989, Germany was facing an unprecedented political and financial challenge. 
German unification came after forty years of diplomatic and, most importantly, 
cultural division with, on the one hand, West Germany incarnating the perfect 
model of a well functioning social market economy and, on the other, the former 
DDR organised into a planned economy and for decades largely isolated from 
world markets. The task of the Kohl Government was first to manage the 
transition of East Germany into a modem market economy and, second, to 
facilitate its integration with the West. Faced with an upcoming federal election
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in the winter of 1990, the Chancellor soon realised that his strong commitment to 
a smooth re-unification process would represent the best possible electoral 
programme. From the outset, German unification became a political matter 
(Giersch et al. 1993). The rapidity with which highly significant socio-economic 
decisions were taken at that stage - often against prescriptions coming from 
experts in the different ministries and professional economists - supports the 
view according to which the process was, more than anything else, politically 
driven (Heilemann and Jochimsen 1993)19.
The establishment did its best to spread an optimistic view of the possible 
financial impact of unification. Spending increases in the form of transfers were 
necessary to support transition; nevertheless, it was anticipated that the growth 
hikes expected from the enlargement of the national market would in turn finance 
initial expenditures. The prospect was that re-unification was self-financing. In 
this respect, the Finance Ministry insisted that there was no need to think of 
fiscal discipline as being under serious threat. While the necessary financial 
transfers to the East put pressure on nominal public expenditures, real spending 
would be under control. However, when in February 1991 the German Finance 
Ministry submitted its first Finanzplan and budget draft for the united Germany, 
the figures appeared much less comforting than the government’s repeated 
declarations of rigour. The volume of the intervention for the same year 
amounted to 37 billion DM, of which 20.2 billion consisted of additional 
expenditures and 17.6 billion of new revenues (Bundesministerium 1991). 
Despite repeated public announcements, the budget draft actually envisaged 
some deficit spending. In addition, the largest part of the new spending 
commitments was financed through augmented fiscal pressure, in spite of the 
Kohl Government’s electoral promise not to increase taxation. The adopted fiscal 
stance divided the government coalition. The liberal FPD attacked Finance 
Minister Waigel’s excessive generosity and called for greater austerity as well as
19 A typical example is the decision for a 1:1 conversion o f the exchange rate between East and 
West.
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for cuts to taxes on companies and high-eamers (Der Spiegel 24, 29 and 37,
1991; FT 23/4/1991)20.
There is no surprise that organised interests showed concern over the macro­
changes their country was going through. Content analysis of official documents 
and declarations reveals how, in early 1991, the BDI was above all worried of the 
prospect that fiscal policy relaxed to such a degree that a restrictive monetary 
intervention from part of the Bundesbank would be finally unavoidable. After 
short-term interest rates had grew rapidly since 1988, domestic business actors 
were indeed particularly mobilised against any further restriction. Second came 
their opposition to augmented taxation. The completion of the SEM had created
greater concern around competitiveness, and more so at a time in which higher
01domestic interest rates had induced a slight appreciation of the DM . In turn, the 
BDI insisted that the road to deficit reduction should instead go through a 
rationalization of public administration costs (BDI, Bericht 1990-92, 176).
The German labour union confederation was less critical of the government’s 
fiscal stance. Overall, it was appreciated that deficit reduction was to come from 
the revenue side of the budget. While not criticizing the practice of trying to 
maximise public revenues, the DGB showed more concern about the choice over 
what taxes to augment (DGB, Die Steuerbeschluesse der Bundesregierung, 
Informationen zur Wirtschafts- und Strukturpolitik IWS 18/3/1991). Labour 
unions contested the government’s decision to increase unemployment insurance 
contributions. However, their opposition was not as intense as that of employers. 
First, the latter were facing at the same time a restrictive monetary environment. 
Second, wage bargainers benefited from the option of transferring the additional 
costs onto wages; as a matter of fact West German wages increased over the 
period 1990-92 . In addition, unions opposed VAT increases. By affecting
20 The decision to eliminate the trade and wealth tax after the signing of the coalition agreement 
on 16 January 1991 resulted almost certainly from the pressures o f the FDP (DGB 18/3/1991).
21 In the immediate aftermath o f unification, a pressing concern had been the rapid depreciation 
of the DM against the US Dollar in the back o f increasing uncertainty amongst international 
investors around the financial implications of re-unification. In the first months o f  1991, the 
German currency depreciated by 23.5 percent against the US Dollar (Der Spiegel 29, 1991). Yet, 
the reaction o f the Bundesbank was so prompt that, just a few months later, the DM moved from 
being a depreciated currency to a highly appreciated one.
22 This strategy was viable only until unemployment started to bite.
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consumption, they would be more punitive of low-income groups (DGB, Die 
Quelle 1 and 4, 1991). This came from their conviction that the federal 
government could not withdraw from public investment programmes. To be sure, 
it was necessary to boost infrastructure investment in the new Eastern regions. 
True, fiscal discipline was a priority but additional expenditures were not 
necessarily detrimental to public finances as they were meant to control for the 
rapid increase of unemployment and therewith pre-empt its potentially disastrous 
impact on social security budgets (DGB, Wirtschafts- und 
beschaeftigungspolitisches Sofortprogramm fuer die neuen Bundeslaender IWS 
6/2/1991; Ein oeffentliches Infrastrukturprogramm fuer Ostdeutschland IWS 
11/3/1991). It was possibly the first time that social partners had come up with 
their own well-defined recipes for macroeconomic management. This was also a 
period of unprecedented socio-political unrest. Against this difficult scenario, on 
7 June, the national Parliament approved the financial plan and the budget law 
for 1991 (Heilemann and Jochimsen 1993).
Soon after the Kohl Government had to take decisions on the 1992 Budget. The 
Finance Ministry put forward its long-term financial planning document and 
draft budget in July. The documents envisaged an extensive intervention for a 
total value of 41 billion DM of which 12 billion was in higher spending and 30 
billion was in additional incomes. In nominal terms, the actual expected 
reduction in the general government borrowing requirement amounted to 16.5 
billion DM (Bundesministerium 1991). Considering the circumstances, the size 
of the correction was quite extraordinary. At the end of the year, Germany’s 
actual deficit improved by 0.3-percent of GDP. In cyclically adjusted terms, this 
amounted to a deficit reduction of 0.4 percent of GDP. Needless to say, with 
expenditure increasing, the contribution had to come from public revenues with 
all components rising for a total CA increase of 1.5 percent of GDP (European 
Commission, 2003s).
Still, the extent of the correction was not sufficient to avert the perception that 
price stability was at risk. On 15 August, with inflation at a rate of 7 percent, the 
Bundesbank increased the discount rate by 1 percent (Bundesbank 1991; FT 
24/9/1991). Here and throughout the 1990s, differently from Italy - where
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monetary authorities were sensitive mostly to the extent of the budgetary 
correction - the German central bank showed more concerned with its quality. 
Greater fiscal pressure was by no means desirable; in particular, VAT increases 
were likely to exert an unwanted inflationary impact on the national economy. In 
its 1991 monthly report, the Bundesbank noted: “.. .restraint in public spending 
should have priority over tax increases that would be problematic from a growth 
and stability standpoint” (FT 24/9/1991). The interplay between fiscal and 
monetary authorities as well as domestic interest groups should not be 
underestimated. In Germany, business actors and labour unions formed their 
fiscal preferences by also taking the reaction of the national central bank into 
account. This aspect was certainly more pronounced here than it was in Italy, for 
example.
In front of the new budget proposal, socio-economic actors displayed divergent 
reactions. The BDI was critical of the numerous revenue-maximising measures 
the government had been introducing since 1990. The organization’s standpoint 
was that fiscal pressure was slowing down growth and damaging Germany’s 
image as a favourable business location. On the same note, German industry 
welcomed tax relief and allowances, especially on investment initiatives in the 
new federal regions (BDI, Bericht 1990-92, 176-7). Again, it was believed that 
only the quality of the interventions allowed an improvement of the economic 
environment. Tax alleviation would increase business confidence both 
domestically and internationally. They insisted less on fiscal rigour, considering 
that, in light of the circumstances, the government was proving sufficiently 
disciplined. Hence, in mid 1991, the most intensive preference of the BDI was a 
negative one translating into the strong opposition to greater fiscal pressure, and 
this came in conjunction with the marked appreciation of the national currency. 
Fiscal consolidation was necessary, but it could only be truly achieved on the 
expenditure side of both the federal and the regional budget. The BDI thus 
appreciated the planned cuts to state subsidies (BDI, BDI zu den 
Haushaltsbeschluessen, Pressemitteilung 10/7/1991).
The government budget proposal for 1992 also left the DGB largely unsatisfied. 
The organization explained that the intervention “ .. .was not designed to meet the
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country’s needs and was unfairly financed” (DGB, Die Regierungsbeschluesse 
zum Bundeshaushalt 1992, zur Finanzplanung des Bundes bis 1995 und zum 
Subventionsabbau IWS 5/8/1991). First, projected expenditures in East Germany 
would not be sufficient to sustain transition; hence additional spending 
commitments were urged. The government had rightly concentrated 
consolidation efforts on the revenue side of the budget but the choice of the tax 
base was not appropriate. The DGB opposed VAT increases to the extent that, by 
targeting consumption, they affected low-income groups in a disproportionate 
fashion. Labour unions suggested that the so-called solidarity charge, a 
supplementary tax on incomes, be preserved, albeit with a revision of tax breaks 
(DGB, Die Quelle 11, 1991). At the same time, they labelled tax relief for 
entrepreneurs as “anti-social”, proposing that it be withdrawn (DGB, 
Dokumentation einer unsozialen Steuer- und Abgabenpolitik IWS 13/11/1991).
In response to the government’s decision to cut subsidies, the DGB argued that 
only half of it would contribute to fiscal discipline; the rest (especially cuts on 
employment creation measures) were not only unjustifiable forms of welfare 
retrenchment, but would also not have any significant short-term impact on the 
budget (DGB 5/8/1991).
Not only had Finance Minister Waigel encountered difficulties in justifying his 
fiscal decisions in front of organised interests, he was also put under heavy 
parliamentary pressure. The Social Democratic opposition expressed 
dissatisfaction with the financial law and put forward an alternative plan where it 
was suggested, among other things, that defence spending be reduced; the 
cabinet apparatus slimmed down and state subsidies cut back. In the end, various 
adjustments were made during the parliamentary stage and the final document 
contained a slightly more stringent intervention. Expenditure growth was more 
modest than in the government proposal and tax increases slightly greater 
(Bundesministerium 1991). As suggested in the previous chapter, there were 
occasions during the 1990s when the intervention of the national Parliament was 
oriented towards greater discipline. Still, the political commitment to budget 
consolidation was not sufficiently credible when, on 19 December 1991, the 
Bundesbank raised once more the discount rate by a further 0.5 percent 
(Bundesministerium 1991).
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2.1.Pro-active budgetary interventions (1992-93)
The year 1992 had not started under the best auspices. Germany’s economic 
situation was rapidly deteriorating and so did in turn the domestic socio-political 
climate. Unification had not proved as smooth as the government had expected. 
Growth continued to by sluggish and, in May 1992, the Kohl Government was 
forced to introduce a supplementary budget (SVR 1992). In parallel, business 
actors and large segments of public opinion started showing signs of a fiscal 
revolt after the introduction of several new taxes to finance spending in the East 
(Der Spiegel 9,1992). Moreover, the large number of bargaining rounds 
scheduled for 1992 created concerns among political elites over the inflationary 
impact of wage policy. In manifest disregard of the principle of Tar i f  autonomies 
the federal government intervened in the debate by asking that unions commit 
more firmly to wage moderation. This did not come without the strong criticism 
of IG Metall (DGB, Die Quelle 1, 1992; Handelsblatt 22/1/1992). Under 
increasing uncertainty about unions’ bargaining behaviour, the Bundesbank 
replied with a dramatic increase in the discount rate, which at that point reached 
a historically high value of 8 percent.
The scenario was set for confrontation between the monetarist domestic alliance, 
on one side, comprising the government coalition, the BDI and the Bundesbank 
and the (neo)-Keynesian front, on the other side, represented by the DGB for 
whom such restrictive monetary interventions were constraining independent 
wage policy formation (Der Spiegel 9, 1992; DGB, Die Quelle 3, 1992).
Amongst the most extensive bargaining rounds was that involving public sector 
and engineering workers, who were asking for a 6-percent wage increase. After a 
long strike, the conclusive agreement in May 1992 set the increase at 5.4 percent. 
The government welcomed the settlement as a sign of self-restraint, but the 
President of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DHIT) Hans Peter 
Stihl still regarded it as excessive (FT 19/5/1992). Wage policy was not the only 
area over which the Kohl Government and the unions had come to some 
disagreement. The government’s latest fiscal intervention consisting of a 
retrenchment programme to the value of 11.5 billion DM in the health sector
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came under equally strong criticism. DGB representative Ursula Engelen-Kefer 
labelled it as “socially unacceptable” (DGB, Die Quelle 7-8, 1992).
On 1 July, the federal government submitted its financial plan and budget 
proposal for 1993. Public expenditures and revenues were expected to grow by 
10 and 17 billion DM respectively. In nominal terms, the reduction of the net 
borrowing requirement was relatively contained, amounting to 2.5 billion DM 
from the previous year. Unemployment-induced spending continued to grow and 
so did the cost of servicing the public debt. However, defence expenditures were 
set to decrease by 2.5, family and pension spending by 0.5 and regional subsidies 
by 4.8 percent (Bundesministerium 1991). At the core of the intervention was a 
fiscal strategy slightly different from one adopted in the previous year. No scope 
for deficit spending was allowed; in addition, the government put greater 
emphasis on real expenditure control. Still, in spite of Finance Minister Waigel’s 
constant reassurance that taxes would not increase (FT 8/9/1992), public 
revenues continued to be the main source of finance. The Council of Economic 
Experts strongly criticised such an approach, arguing that real deficit reduction 
would come only from the spending side of the budget and that it would have to 
target simultaneously the regional and communal level (SVR 1992). At the end 
of the financial year, the intervention had led to CA primary surplus rise of 1.1 
percent of GDP thanks to a rise in revenues of 1.5 where spending had increased 
by 1 percent of GDP (European Commission 2003a).
The BDI welcomed the government’s firmer commitment to fiscal discipline. 
With the deterioration of public finance aggregates in the very early 1990s and 
the ensuing restrictive monetary response from part of the Bundesbank, German 
business actors were concerned with the sign of fiscal policy. At the same time, 
the BDI indicated that tax increases by no means represented a viable budget 
consolidation option especially in view of the looming recession; instead, 
considerable savings could derive only from a rationalization of German public 
administration. For the same reasons, the confederation appreciated the 
government’s decision to keep expenditure growth under control and to postpone 
the introduction, in the East, of wealth and capital taxes (BDI, Bericht 1990-92, 
175-7).
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The DGB did not show appreciation for the budget proposal. It was noted that, 
because of the strong inflationary pressures that the national economy was 
subject to, the government projection of nominal expenditure growth was 
unrealistic. In real terms, it translated into significant spending cuts (TAZ 
2/7/1992). The labour confederation criticised in particular the decision to 
decrease allowances in favour of the Employment Ministry, a measure believed 
to exert undesirable socio-economic consequences in the new regions (DGB, 
Brennpunkte der finanzpolitischen Diskussion: Kurzinformationen und kritischen 
Anmerkungen IWS 24/6/1992). The argument was that transition in the East 
could not be financed by means of welfare retrenchment, as the latter would slow 
the reconstruction process down and the results would be counterproductive. 
Instead, further public investment in the East was to be supported through the 
introduction of a supplementary tax on incomes (DGB, Nachrichtendienst 
17/11/1992).
Faced with a deterioration of public finance aggregates, the government was 
forced to adopt a supplementary budget soon after the presentation of its proposal 
for 1993. The emergency intervention aimed at reducing the net borrowing 
requirement by 5 billion DM against actual trends and foresaw additional 
expenditures for 7.8 billion and revenues for 3 billion DM 
(Bundesfinanzministerium, Finanzbericht 1992; TAZ 25/11/1992). In the same 
period, the Bundesbank started to revise its stance, showing clear signs of 
relaxation. This change of attitude resulted from two facts. First, the 
government’s return to fiscal discipline reassured monetary authorities. The 
German macro-economic policy framework consisted in fact of a monetary 
policy-oriented system in which monetary authorities were internalising 
variations occurring in the fiscal arena. Even more so, the government’s 
commitment to expenditure control and partial retreat from revenue maximising 
measures conferred greater credibility on its fiscal adjustment plans. Second, the 
central bank started believing that recession was as serious a problem as
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inflation. On 16 July 1992, after the executive had approved the budget draft, the 
Bundesbank lowered the discount rate by 0.5 percent (Bundesbank 1992)23.
Not only were labour unions sceptical of the government’s fiscal strategy, but 
also the opposition SPD and large sections of public opinion judged it hopelessly 
unrealistic (FT 8/9/1992). The shock from re-unification as well as the Kohl 
Government’s reaction to it contributed to destabilising the domestic consensus. 
In the 1990s, Germany suffered from an unprecedented high number of strikes 
and street demonstrations (ILO Database). With the 1994 federal election 
approaching, the Chancellor came to believe that a return to corporatist practices 
might help him out of the impasse. In this climate, the idea of a social pact 
rapidly took shape with the Social Democrats offering their full support to 
revisiting consensual politics. Still, the conclusion of the pact soon proved a 
difficult task. First, Kohl had to deal with the FDP’s resistance to any kind of 
social concertation. Second, and most importantly, the federal government had 
little to offer in exchange for wage restraint. Quite paradoxically, it introduced 
instead a severe austerity package consisting of a freeze on social security 
payment, a cut in allowance to asylum seekers and, on the revenue side of the 
budget, of a rise in unemployment contributions. The impact of the fiscal 
interventions on the fate of the pact was immediately felt. Voicing the concerns 
of the DGB, Ursula Engelen-Kefer declared that the measures risked postponing 
the pact “into a distant future” (FT 2/11/1992). In turn, negotiations between 
government and unions were suspended.
The parliamentary budget session in the autumn of 1992 proved particularly 
confrontational. Fiscal policy issues surged to a central theme in the pre-electoral 
competition between the CDU-FDP coalition and the SPD. In May, the Social 
Democrats submitted an alternative fiscal consolidation plan. Echoing most of 
the proposals put forward by the DGB, the project envisaged the introduction of 
supplementary revenue maximising measures to support transition in East 
Germany (TAZ 14/5/1992; FT 26/11/1992). Certainly more in line with claims 
coming from the BDI, the government’s fiscal vision was diametrically different
23 It is to be noted here that relaxation was piecemal as the Bundesbank had to regain control and 
credibility in front o f wage bargainers (Lindlar/Scheremet 1998).
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as it began with the assumption that greater fiscal pressure was undesirable in the 
back of the recession (FT 26/11/1992) and would undermine national 
competitiveness in the SEM, having thus the potential to exacerbate the trend of 
slower growth (TAZ 5/6/1992; Der Spiegel 20, 1992). The bill approved by 
Parliament was less fiscally stringent than the one put forward by Finance 
Minister Waigel at the beginning of the budget session 
(Bundesfinanzministerium, Finanzbericht 1993). At the root of this slight 
relaxation of fiscal discipline was the decision to transfer additional 12 billions 
DM to the new regions (TAZ 25/11/1992). Nevertheless, in cyclically adjusted 
terms, the consolidation effort was significant with the primary surplus 
improving by 1 percent of GDP thanks to CA revenues and expenditures growing 
by 2.1 and 1 percent of GDP respectively (European Commission 2003a).
35______ Reconciling Fiscal Austerity and Electoral Politics
With the fading of the unification shock in 1993, fiscal authorities seemed to 
have greater room for manoeuvre to implement their preferred policy options. In 
1991-92, business actors (producers but also financial agents) together with the 
central bank had been complaining about the lack of fiscal consolidation. Largely 
in response to these calls, Chancellor Kohl was keen to re-affirm his commitment 
to sound public finances and introduced, in 1993, a special consolidation 
programme to which both the opposition and the social partners had to 
contribute. That was a clear indication of Kohl’s confidence in social 
concertation and its support in overcoming the unfolding socio-economic crisis. 
After the state budget had appeared more or less under control in 1993 and 1994, 
the attention of budget actors shifted more visibly to the composition of 
adjustment. The year 1995 represents a structural break in the domestic fiscal 
debate, with employers and producers lamenting first the temporary rise in wage 
demands, and, then, more vehemently, Germany’s excessive non-wage labour 
costs (interview with DGB). Because also the DM had been slightly moving on 
the upside, industry was more and more affirmative in its opposition to higher 
fiscal pressure. The government fiscal strategy after 1995 was in fact one that
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combined expenditure restraints with tax alleviation in the belief that lower taxes 
would have produced sufficient growth to offset the deterioration of state 
budgets. In the first section, I analyse fiscal events in the period 1993-95, 
focusing in particular on the input that came from social partners. The second is a 
description of the debate after 1995, when employers and employees found 
themselves agreeing on the need to reduce unit labour costs, but with unions 
blaming the government for an excessively restrictive fiscal stance in the back of 
the recession.
3.1.U-turn in German fiscal policy (1993-95)
Germany’s macroeconomic situation was not showing any sign of improvement 
from the previous year. Quite on the contrary, it was finally manifest that 
expectations about the impact of re-unification had been overoptimistic. Growth 
rates in former DDR had not reached the level originally foreseen. Not only that, 
but after initial overheating, the West German economy was also facing 
impending recession. This had detrimental implications for the federal budget. 
Slower growth would both reduce incomes from taxation and put greater 
pressure on social security budgets, where the deficit in fact doubled from 1993 
to 1994 (SVR 1993).
Set under pressure in the face of the spreading of real economic problems (e.g. 
slow growth and unemployment), the federal government felt reaffirmed in its 
belief that social concertation might be the only way out of the crisis. After a 
difficult phase at the end of the preceding year, negotiations resumed in January 
1993. Chancellor Kohl was ready to involve not only the social partners but also 
the opposition (TAZ 21/1/1993). At the core of the proposed social pact was an 
austerity package, which -  consisting of a mixture of spending cuts and tax 
increases - was clearly a compromise between the preferences of the DGB and of 
the SPD, on the one hand, and those of the BDI and of the most liberal wing of 
the CDU-FDP coalition, on the other. Labour unions appreciated Kohl’s promise 
to continue supporting not yet privatised enterprises in East Germany, his 
assurance that investment subsidies be increased, tax allowances abolished and
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his proposal to augment oil taxes with the purpose of financing the highly 
indebted national railway system. In exchange, the DGB offered its support to a 
few cutbacks24. On the other side of the spectrum, the BDI welcomed some of 
the planned expenditure restraints but criticised measures taken on the revenue 
side of the budget (FT 21/1/1993).
The general dispositions contained in this Solidarity Pact were then incorporated 
in the so-called “Federal Consolidation Programme” delivered on 13 March 
1993. The government plan marked a visible shift in German fiscal policy setting 
the pace for a rapid return to austerity. Amongst its declared priorities was the 
reduction of the country’s structural deficit to show financial markets that 
German unification had been handled properly. With this purpose in mind, the 
re-introduction of the solidarity charge was expected to bring around 60 millions 
DM to the federal budget in 1995-96 (Table 9). Needless to say, while welcomed 
by the DGB, the measure attracted strong opposition from the BDI concerned 
with the country’s continuously growing fiscal pressure (BDI, Bericht 1993,44). 
In an effort to accommodate the preferences of business actors, the government 
declared that, since workers had borne the greatest adjustment burden in the first 
years after unification, sacrifices were now expected from transfer recipients.
The call on welfare retrenchment was explicit, albeit modest in size. Still, the 
move was not sufficient to leave the BDI satisfied; the organization lamented the 
fact that the government had not implemented structural spending restraints and 
that the input of unions had translated into an excessive reliance on revenue- 
maximising measures. The second priority the government was thereby 
attempting to tackle was the design of appropriate fiscal responses in the face of 
recession. There was an awareness that an excessively restrictive fiscal policy 
would exert a pro-cyclical effect, further slowing growth down. The DGB often 
expressed a concern about pro-cyclical policies. All in all, the search for social
9 cconsensus over fiscal adjustment led to a rather union-friendly agreement .
24 Interestingly enough, the DGB was then more compromise-prone than the allied Social 
Democratic opposition. On the left, some party representatives were suggesting that the Pact was 
nothing but a strategy to extend the costs of reunification to new socio-economic categories (TAZ 
3/6/1993).
25 Besides supporting quantitative measures on the spending and revenue side o f the budget, the 
DGB welcomed provisions adopted to regulate financial relations between the federal 
government and the new regions (DGB, Finanzpolitik Ost im Zahlenspiegel IWS 24/1/1994).
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The renewed commitment to fiscal consolidation was not sufficient to avert the 
rapid deterioration of public finance. Soon after, the Finance Ministry was 
obliged to adopt another supplementary budget (Bundesministerium 1992).
There was no surprise when, in July 1993, the Kohl Government responded with 
the even stricter “Savings, Consolidation and Growth Programme”. The plan 
consisted of a combination of spending restraints and revenue increases (Table 
9). For the latter, these would not derive from the introduction of new items but 
from an improvement of tax administration without consequences for the 
country’s fiscal pressure. Moreover, for the first time, the government envisaged 
a significant curtailment of social security spending for a total of 16 billion DM. 
Not only were public consumption and investment deemed to decrease, but also 
labour market policies would suffer from some restraints. It is the content of this 
fiscal adjustment plan that led observers to identify the year 1993 as a turning 
point in German fiscal policy-making (Bundesministerium 1993).
The indications contained in the two consolidation programmes were then 
incorporated in the government budget draft for 1994. The total value of the 
intervention amounted to 40.5 billion DM of which 20.26 billion were in 
spending increases and 21.77 billion in greater incomes (Bundesministerium 
1993). On the expenditure side of the budget, the government intended to cut 
unemployment and social assistance benefits and to put a freeze on public sector 
wages. Commenting with satisfaction on the budget proposal, Finance Minister 
Waigel noted: “we have laid the foundations for improving the ability of the 
Bundesbank to cut interest rates” (FT 14/7/1993). And, there is no doubt that the 
shift to an expenditure-based consolidation was strongly influenced by pressures 
coming from the national central bank and from the business community (TAZ 
3/6/1993). At the end of the year, the manoeuvre had contributed to a 0.3 percent 
of GDP reduction of CA total expenditures. It was the first time after unification 
that total adjusted spending had in fact decreased (European Commission, 
2003a).
The DGB was highly critical of the plan. It was indicated that the welfare 
retrenchment measures contained therein would have extremely negative social 
consequences (DGB, Die Quelle 2, 1993). The Social Democratic opposition
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went so far as to argue that the new budget law consisted of a severe rollback of 
the German welfare state and proposed instead the introduction of ecological 
taxes as well as a new employment pact that would help Germany out of the 
recession (FAZ 13/10/1993). Interestingly enough, even the small Liberal 
coalition partner expressed concern for some of the measures adopted, in 
particular for the abolition of bad weather payments to construction workers. 
However, Finance Minister Waigel detained a powerful position. While enjoying 
a majority in the Bundesrat, the SPD could in fact alter only 10 percent of the 
entire package (FT 12/8/1993). The federal government insisted that the cutbacks 
represented only 1.6 percent of the social security budget (FAZ 23/10/1993), but 
they were unavoidable (FR 25/9/1993).
Table 9. Fiscal Consolidation Programmes (Mio. DM)
FCP 1993 1994 1995 1996
Expenditures -310 -1019 -1110 -1124
Taxes -285 821 31057 36857
O f which
Solidarity Tax - - 28000 31600
SCGP 1993 1994 1995 1996
Expenditures - -5789 -9469 -10074
Taxes - 7900 8700 8800
TOTAL 1993 1994 1995 1996
Expenditures -953 -11914 -17375 -19564
Taxes -1550 7580 39390 47705
L egend : FC P =  Federal Consolidation Program m e (federal level); SCG P = Savings, C onsolidation and 
Grow th Program m e (federal level); TOTAL = refers to the sum  o f  FC P and SC G P for all levels o f
government.
Source: Sachverstandigenrat, Jahresgutachten 1993/94, 15/11/1993.
The Bundesbank gave further support to fiscal authorities. On 2 December, 
against the consensus forecast, the bank again decreased interest rates, justifying 
the move as a response to excessive slow growth (TAZ 3/12/1993). The 
parliamentary passage of the budget proposal had a greater impact on revenues 
than it did on spending. The former were set to diminish by 3 billion DM 
(Bundesministerium 1992). In spite of harsh internal confrontation and of 
widespread societal criticism, on 20 December, the Parliament finally delivered 
the budget law for 1994. The fiscal correction resulted at the end of the financial 
year into a 0.7 percent of GDP improvement in the CA primary surplus with
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expenditures decreasing for the first time by 0.3 percent of GDP (European 
Commission 2003a).
Fiscal policy issues continued to be at the heart of the public debate at the 
beginning of the year. For once, public finance outcomes in the previous year 
had been disappointing. The resultant net borrowing requirement almost doubled 
from initial projections, reaching a value of 66 billion DM at the end of 1993 as a 
result of fiscal decisions taken in 1992 (Bundesfinanzministerium, Finanzbericht 
1994; SZ 5/1/1994); besides being the highest in German economic history, the 
deficit value also overshot the public investment share, in full breach of 
Germany’s constitutionally entrenched golden rule. Newly emerged fiscal 
imbalances created alarm among the business community. The German Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (DHIT) asked for a prompt return to fiscal discipline. 
Most interestingly, the BDI insisted now more than ever on rapid deficit 
reduction but argued also that this could come only from expenditures. At stake 
was not the size of fiscal adjustment but its content. The government was asked 
to cut primary spending, without affecting the level of public investment (FT 
1/3/1994).
In spite of an only moderately successful fiscal adjustment, the government had 
succeeded in passing disputed expenditure restraints. There was the strong belief 
that this path was to be further pursued. In January, the Finance Ministry 
submitted a report with the title “Perspectives on Public Spending Policy”. Here, 
officials suggested that housing, carbon policy and pension systems be subject to 
extensive retrenchment (SVR 1994; SZ 15/1/1994). It was the occasion for 
Chancellor Kohl to restate his commitment to fiscal discipline and, in particular, 
to “small government” in the face of the approaching 1994 federal vote. His 
primary objective was to regain the trust of his natural constituents. Fiscal 
imbalances were not the only national emergency. The unemployment rate was 
still on the rise. In the same month, the government delivered the “Action Plan 
for Greater Growth and Employment”, which contained a recipe to improve the 
country’s employment performance. At its heart was tax alleviation, in perfect 
accordance with requests the BDI had put forward (SZ 19/1/1994). The proposal 
soon catalysed public attention, becoming one of the central items in the electoral
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competition between the CDU-FDP and the SPD. The latter rejected tax relief as 
a means to boost employment creation (SZ 4/2/1994); later on, it would find it 
difficult to combat the image of a tax-friendly party (SZ 16/5/1994).
On 15 July, the government submitted its annual budget documents. The nominal 
volume of the intervention was modest, amounting to 9.75 billion DM, of which 
4.75 billion were in additional spending and 5 billion in greater public incomes. 
Electoral concerns may explain the relaxation of fiscal policy. Inevitably, the 
real result at the end of the financial year appeared disappointing, with a 1 
percent of GDP increase of the CA public deficit. The outcome was remarkably 
negative considering the pressures stemming from EMU and the rapid 
approaching of Stage III. In terms of composition, at the end of the financial 
year, CA expenditures had increased. On the other hand, revenues decreased by 
0.4 percent of GDP, on an adjusted basis (European Commission, 2003a).
If the Kohl Government was probably targeting the median voter, domestic 
interest groups had remained unsatisfied with the budget proposal. The German 
business community called the government’s plan “half-hearted”. The BDI 
insisted that it was necessary to dramatically revise the role of the state in the 
national economy (BDI, Bericht 1994, 41). The BDA would more explicitly call 
the costs of Germany’s welfare state into question (SZ 18/10/1994). The 
president of the confederation, Klaus Murmann, stated: “the burden of the 
welfare state will crush us if we fail to act” (FT 19/10/1994). The stronger the 
attacks on national social security, the more explicit were the unions’ proposals 
for adjustment. True, the country was subject to a dramatic socio-economic 
transformation but the actual response to it should take the form of an expansion, 
possibly in the framework of a reformed welfare state, and not in the curtailment 
of public spending . Unions asked that the government implement an anti- 
cyclical fiscal policy (FA 14/1/1994; 17/6/1994). New social expenditures were 
to be financed through general taxation. Also, an improvement of fiscal
26 Most surprisingly, the DWI, a government-friendly economic research institute, indicated that 
lower spending levels would not help Germany out o f the competitiveness problem; rather a 
postponement o f fiscal consolidation and a more explicit expansionary monetary stance were 
needed (SZ 7/1/1994).
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administration could serve the purpose of preserving fiscal discipline (DGB, Der 
Entwurf des Bundeshaltes 1995 und die Finanzplanung bis 1998 IWS 5/9/1994; 
SZ 5/10/1994).
In its electoral manifesto, the government coalition reiterated its commitment to 
fiscal discipline and to a reduction of the role of the state in the national economy 
(SZ 15/11/1994). The Bundesbank seemed to be in support of government action 
and appreciated in particular tax alleviation measures contained in the long-term 
financial planning document (SZ 20/10/1994). Still, in spite of the firm 
opposition of the FDP, it was agreed that the solidarity charge be preserved as 
this would allow deficit reduction in the short-term (FT 16/11/1994; DGB, Die 
Quelle 11, 1994). The results at the polls reconfirmed the CDU-FDP coalition, 
yet with a more modest majority than in the previous legislation, with the 
government having a majority of only 10 seats. In addition, the opposition had 
further stabilised its clear majority in the Upper House (FT 19/10/1994). The 
difficult parliamentary passage of the budget law confirmed the political 
weakness of the re-elected establishment. Again, the pressure was mostly felt on 
the revenue side of the budget, where tax incomes were set to increase by 5 
billion DM from the original plan (Bundesministerium 1993). Business actors 
were reassured when the Bundesbank announced its intention to keep an eye on 
price stability, but in a way that was not detrimental to output growth (SZ 
23/12/1994).
3.2.Fiscal solutions to unemployment (1995-98)
At the beginning of 1995, there was still uncertainty about the future of the 
German economy. True, the Bundesbank had succeeded in keeping inflation 
under control. In the first months of the previous year, the national central bank 
agreed to reduce short-term interest rates after a severe restriction in the two 
previous years. The decision came about because, in the end, fiscal profligacy 
had not endangered the external stability of the DM, which continued to be an 
international reserve currency (SZ 3/1/1994; FT 6/3/1995). In turn, monetary 
policy decisions spilled over to the national exchange rate with beneficial effects
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for the country’s export performance (SVR 1994). In spite of the comforting 
improvement of exports, the unemployment rate continued to increase. In 
addition, the lack of a government clear-cut fiscal policy stance was making 
business actors particularly uneasy. Possibly to compensate its electorate for 
being reconfirmed in power, the federal government delivered a strategic paper 
on the future of German fiscal policy, which reflected to a large extent the vision 
of the BDI and of the BDA. In “Reduction of the Size of the State Up to 2000”, 
the Finance Ministry suggested that, after being subject to considerable upwards 
pressures, the level of public expenditures be brought back to its pre-1989 level, 
when the ratio to GDP amounted to 45.5. Smaller government would create the 
conditions for greater stability and growth. Lower spending would actually allow 
deficit reduction, while also creating room for tax alleviation 
(Bundesministerium 1994; Der Spiegel 11, 1995).
In its financial plan and budget proposal for 1996, the Kohl Government 
projected cuts to nominal expenditures of 25 billion and revenues reduced by 21 
billion DM. The shading of the re-unification emergency and the positive 
response of domestic investment and exports to the Bundesbank's monetary 
relaxation put fiscal authorities at ease, inducing them to focus more on the 
quality than on the size of budgetary adjustments. There was widespread 
awareness that spending restraints represented the only possible road to deficit 
reduction. In particular, the government believed in the need to send a credible 
message to financial markets after long-term interest rates had started to grow far 
above the central bank’s short-term rates since 1993 (Graph 14). It is to be noted 
that the Federal Consolidation Programme envisaged the re-introduction of the 
Solidarity Charge in 1995. In turn, cyclically adjusted figures at the end of 1996 
reveal a situation in apparent contrast to the spirit of Kohl’s clearly designed 
fiscal strategy. Real incomes increased by 1.2 percent and expenditures by 0.7 
percent of GDP. The net impact on the federal borrowing requirement was 
equivalent to 0.5 percent of GDP (European Commission, 2003a).
Modest inflation, lower interest rates, the slight improvement of the German 
export performance, together with the government’s firmer commitment to 
spending restraints, reassured the business community. The BDI appeared less
196
concerned with fiscal discipline and more with the actual size o f  the public 
sector. The level o f  public expenditures was to go down to 45.8 percent o f  GDP. 
At the same time, it was necessary to decrease the country’s fiscal pressure, 
especially at a time in which the DM had slightly re-appreciated (FT 6/3/1995). 
Both measures would contribute to greater growth and employment creation. 
Cuts to social security spending would reduce Germany’s comparatively high 
labour costs, halting the recent wave o f  re-location o f  numerous production sites 
to Eastern Europe. Also, tax alleviation would stimulate domestic and foreign 
direct investment. Against these guidelines, it is no surprise that the 
Confederation o f German Industry expressed appreciation o f  the government’s 
latest budgetary interventions (BDI, Bericht 1995).
Graph 14 Short and Long Term Nominal Interest Rates, 
Germany and EU 12, 1988-2002
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Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex, 2003.
By the same token, the DGB was negative about developments in German fiscal 
policy. The Finance Ministry was accused o f  stubbornly insisting on the 
preservation o f  fiscal discipline, even at a time in which Germany would need to 
implement anti-cyclical fiscal policies to offset the continuous growth o f  
unemployment. To be sure, the government’s austerity effort went even well 
beyond the Maastricht constraint itself (DGB, Abbau der Staatsquote -ein  
finanzpolitisches Ziel IWS 30/8/1995). Welfare retrenchment was by no means 
an acceptable strategy (DGB, Die Quelle June 1995). There was not sufficient
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empirical evidence to demonstrate that large government is always associated 
with lower growth rates, as the government was arguing in its policy papers. The 
Confederation expressed also concerns about the recent tax policy initiatives. 
Finance Minister Waigel’s tax reform was targeting high-income groups, while 
leaving low and middle-income groups unaffected (DGB, Die Quelle April 
1995). Instead, it was necessary to reduce SSC and the ensuing revenue loss 
would be offset by the introduction of an energy tax. True, the tax system needed 
to be reformed and possibly simplified, especially in the area of corporate 
taxation, but all these measures should have been financially neutral, meaning 
that more urgent tax relief would still be required (DGB, Die Quelle October 
1995).
In the same months in which budget documents were being prepared, the Kohl 
Government intensified talks with the social partners. In the context of the 
Kanzlerrunde, public authorities, representatives of German industry and of 
labour unions confronted each other on the national unemployment emergency. 
The intensity of the consultation led the president of the BDA, Klaus Murmann, 
to talk about a revival of the German traditional social partnership (DGB, Die 
Quelle June 1995). In December 1995, IG Metall launched the idea of a social 
pact, in which unions were ready to exchange wage restraint for employment 
creation measures. Soon after, the DGB offered its support to the initiative. It 
was apparent at the outset how this pact differed from those concluded in other 
EMU candidates to the extent that instead of being aiming at inflation control 
and deficit reduction, the pact envisaged a possible partial relaxation of fiscal 
policy through the creation of new public jobs. In the following section, I expand 
on the details of the pact and reasons for its ultimate failure.
Budget negotiations were again characterised by strong confrontation between 
the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Social Democrats accused the government of 
proving incapable of keeping public finances. This left fiscal authorities with 
little room for manoeuvre. Not only this, but planned cuts to unemployment 
benefits were not a sign of an expenditure-based consolidation but a transfer of 
responsibility from the Federal government to regional authorities (FA 6/9/1995). 
The budget as finally approved differed in its composition from the initial one,
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with restraints increasing by 2.7 percent and revenue shortfalls by almost 50 
percent.
EMU entered the public debate in 1996 for the first time. This is not surprising 
considering that EMU candidates were asked to meet the Maastricht criteria by 
1997. German fiscal authorities were subject to increasing pressures since the 
country’s public deficit had deteriorated in the previous year and was slightly 
above the reference value in the first half of 1996. Budget negotiations proved 
particularly troublesome. The Kohl Government restated its commitment to an 
expenditure-based fiscal consolidation. The DGB criticised the strategy for its 
potential counter-productive effects. Expenditure cuts would further harm job 
creation and, in so doing, impinge on social security budgets (Reuters 
13/5/1996). Similarly, the Social Democratic opposition threatened to exercise its 
veto power in the Bundesrat (Die Presse 11/7/1996). Tensions arose also in the 
wage bargaining arena. In 1995, nominal compensations had been well above the 
average in the previous decade (European Commission, Statistical Annex 2003) 
and employers were suggesting that wage restraint became part of the budget law 
for 1997 (FT 13/5/1996).
On 10 July, the government coalition submitted its official budget documents for 
1997. Net borrowing would diminish by 3.4 billion DM. Again, the fiscal 
strategy adopted was one that combined expenditure restraints of 11 billion DM 
with a tax alleviation of 6.8 billion DM (Bundesministerium 1996). With the 
budget law, the Finance Ministry submitted an extensive tax reform containing 
measures to reduce tax rates, extend the tax base and improve fiscal 
administration. Finance Minister Waigel expounded the view that lower fiscal 
pressure would improve the status of Germany as a privileged business location. 
The subsequent boost to growth would in turn ameliorate public finance 
aggregates (Waigel cited in Andersen 1998, 94-97). At the end of the financial 
year, cyclically adjusted expenditures were lower by 0.9 and public revenues by 
0.1 percent of GDP (European Commission, 2003a).
Being to a large extent a reflection of appeals stemming from the German 
business community, the government financial plan was understandably opposed
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by labour unions. The DGB restated its belief in the need to relax fiscal policy, 
the better to face the unfolding severe recession. In the background was a flexible 
interpretation of the Maastricht fiscal criteria; they held to them only to the 
extent that they did not force governments into pro-cyclical fiscal policies. A 
rigorous pursuit of fiscal was likely to aggravate the situation on the labour 
market (DGB, Der Entwurf des Bundeshaltes 1997 und die mittelfristige 
Finanzplanung bis zum Jahr 2000IWS 10/9/1996; Reuters 31/1/1997; Josselin 
2002). Alarm spread across many sectors of the economy. The leader of IG Bau, 
the construction workers labour union, blamed the Maastricht requirements for 
exacerbating the country’s already disappointing employment record (FT 
7/3/1997). For the Vice-President of IG Metall, EMU membership was not to 
come “at any price nor at any time” (The Observer 16/3/1997). In particular, the 
labour confederation was concerned with the socio-economic consequences of 
Kohl’s numerous welfare retrenchment measures targeting the unemployed, 
families and public employees (The Times 7/3/1997).
The announcement of the Kohl Government’s fiscal strategy was sufficient to put 
a halt to negotiations for a social pact between government, unions and the 
business community. The DGB withdrew from the project when faced with the 
Chancellor’s firm intention to implement welfare retrenchment measures and to 
do so through traditional parliamentary channels rather than in consultation with 
the social partners. Hence, at the basis of the failure of the German social pact 
was clearly a confrontation over fiscal policy issues (DGB 1996; Pierson 2001). 
Against such a difficult social atmosphere, parliamentary negotiations over the 
budget proved also extremely troublesome. Chancellor Kohl was still able to 
secure for himself an absolute majority in the Bundestag and push his welfare 
cuts through. Finance Minister Waigel indicated it was a “signal for investors” 
(FT 14/9/1996; 27/9/1996; FA 30/11/1996).
Tax reform became a central theme of the politico-economic debate in 1997. 
There was large inter-party consensus around the fact that fiscal pressure in 
Germany had reached unbearable levels, but there was still strong disagreement 
over the means necessary to finance lower public incomes (Der Steuerzahler 
1997 cited in Andersen 1998, 105). The government plan envisaged tax
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alleviation to a total value of 37.5 billion DM, which included a two-point 
reduction of the Solidarity Charge. According to the government coalition, lower 
fiscal pressure would be self-financing because of the expected growth effects. If 
greater growth were to prove to be insufficient to preserve fiscal discipline, then 
compensations were to come from the spending side of the budget. The smaller 
coalition partner FDP particularly perpetuated this latter strategy. Since just after 
the shock of unification, the Liberals had suggested a mixed strategy of tax 
reductions and expenditure restraints (Der Spiegel 27, 1997). While in favour of 
a tax reform of some kind, the SPD opposition rejected the proposal to alleviate 
fiscal pressure for the wealthy and pressed instead for lower SSC. German Social 
Democracy did not portray a macroeconomic vision different from Christian
07Democracy but emphasised the tax system as a valuable redistributive tool .
In July 1997, the federal government submitted its financial proposal for the 
following year, which contained also figures for the just agreed supplementary 
budget. Expenditures were expected to remain more or less stable and public 
nominal incomes to grow by 10 billion DM, mainly as a consequence of 
extremely positive growth projections. The overall planned fiscal effort 
amounted to 13.4 billion DM, the second largest budget consolidation effort after 
the one in 1991. The proposal contained also provisions for pension reform and 
other cutbacks to social spending (Bundesministerium 1997). At the end of the 
financial year, total CA expenditures had decreased by 0.5 and revenues by 0.2 
percent of GDP (European Commission, 2003a).
The preferences of domestic interest groups continued to differ. The BDI 
complained about the fact that corporate tax rates were comparatively still too 
high. At the same time, public investment kept on diminishing. True, the federal 
government had committed itself to controlling social spending growth, and this 
was appreciated, but no provisions had been made for structural cutbacks (BDI, 
Bericht 1997). On the other side of the spectrum, the DGB criticised the 
establishment for failing to implement an anti-cyclical fiscal policy in the face of
27 In a similar fashion, analysing the links between partisan politics and economic policy-making, 
Boix has indicated that, while unable to pursue deficit spending in the globalisation era, social 
democratic parties have but continued to favour redistribution and done so by means o f  
alternative redistributive strategies such as tax systems, training, etc. (Boix 1998).
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a deep recession. It was necessary to boost public investment and, at the same 
time, to avoid severe welfare retrenchment. The government’s pursuit of 
unconditional fiscal discipline had exacerbated Germany’s economic position, in 
particular the situation with the national labour market (DGB, Bonner 
Finanzpolitik ohne beschaftigungspolitische Impulse IWS 12/9/1997).
4.______ Social Pacts; Their Content and Financial Impact
There is an extensive literature arguing that social pacts emerged in the 1990s 
contributed to successful macroeconomic convergence in most EMU candidates 
(Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000; Hancke and Rhodes 2004). The general argument 
is that wage moderation keeps inflation down, taking short-term interest rates 
down with it. Where this secures also a depreciation of the real exchange rate, 
significant growth effects are also expected. In addition, wage restraint is directly 
beneficial to public finance. Firstly, looking at public wages, nominal 
compensations per employee will diminish. Secondly, the ensuing low inflation 
dampens the public consumption bill. While generally convincing, this reasoning 
fails to address the institutional foundations of these relationships, which make 
also for the large cross-national variation. Wage moderation is not always 
sufficient for keeping inflation at bay. In addition, it does not necessarily lead to 
a relaxed monetary reaction. The ensuing expansion will be greater under 
floating than under fixed exchange rate regimes. Also, the nature of the monetary 
response will depend upon the degree of central bank independence. Generally, 
economists apply sophisticated econometric or, more generally, statistical 
methods to evaluate the interlocking between fiscal, monetary and wage 
institutions and policies. Inevitably, their modelling of actors’ preferences and 
behaviour is constructed on an abstraction, being it workers’ desire for higher 
wages or for preserving their jobs. While generally robust in their results, these 
models miss case-specific features. In the following sections, I will simply 
describe the specific content and ensuing financial impact, actual or expected, of 
German tripartite agreements with the aim of unveiling the peculiarities of the 
case study.
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4.1.The content of German corporatist agreements
The initial stimulus to a revival of social concertation came from the need to 
create a vast social consensus in the face of the unification emergency. The latter 
represented a sufficiently extraordinary event to force the corporatism-averse 
CDU-FDP government coalition to come to terms with the unions. Over a couple 
of years, the bargaining partners concluded a long series of agreements. In the 
early months of 1991, social partners agreed on the progressive alignment of East 
and West German wages (Leaman 2002). Differently from social pacts being 
signed at the same time in other European countries, this accord did not consist 
of a traditional political exchange. At its heart was the extension of West German 
labour market institutions to the East. As this measure would not create losers but 
just beneficiaries, the role of the federal government was not to deliver side- 
payments but to merely facilitate the dialogue between social partners. The pact 
did not contain calls in favour of the preservation of fiscal discipline. Indeed, the 
impact of wage alignment on public finances was deemed to be detrimental. 
Employees in the East demanded wage increases well above labour productivity
9 o
growth . With this dynamic came an inflationary potential likely to escalate the 
public wage and consumption bill.
Similarly conceived to manage the transition of former DDR, the subsequent 
1993 Solidarity Pact was open not only to organised labour and capital, but also 
to the Social Democratic opposition and the regional governments. Having fiscal 
discipline as one of its explicit objectives, the pact aimed at creating a vast 
political and social consensus around the need to defend Germany’s fiscal virtue 
in front of the dramatic financial impact of re-unification. Interestingly enough, 
the most difficult part of the negotiations concerned the ways in which fiscal 
virtue should be achieved (FT 26/11/1992). The accord lost soon its multilateral 
character. The Chancellor chose to negotiate with the regions on a federal 
consolidation programme and dealt separately with labour and business 
representatives on more directly unification-related issues. At the core of the 
fiscal consolidation plan was the introduction of a Solidarity Charge of 7.5
28 In 1992, the annual increase in average real earnings was o f 5.5 percent against an annual 
increase in national labour productivity o f 3.9 percent (Federal Statistical Office in EIROnline).
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percent on incomes. Deficit reduction was to come from a short-term increase of 
public revenues. The German fiscal performance for the year figured as the best 
one over the period 1990-96 with a 0.7 percent of GDP improvement of net 
borrowing (European Commission, 2003a). On the other side, negotiations with 
the social partners did not prove an easy exercise, especially in the area of wage 
and investment policies as all parties involved were hardly inspired by principles 
of solidarity but by their own self-interest (Lehmbruch in Streeck 1994).
A reconciliation of the preferences of the government coalition and of socio­
economic actors proved even more difficult with diverse policy areas at stake at 
the same time, from wage moderation to labour market and social policies. This 
was the case with the social pact attempted in 1996, which is the only one 
comparable to the tripartite agreements established in other EU countries. It was 
so because, like the latter, the agreement consisted of a traditional political 
exchange, according to which labour unions traded wage moderation for 
employment creation measures. After the initial proposal of IG Metall, the 
parties met again at the beginning of 1996 when they adopted a common 
document known as “Alliance for Jobs and to Preserve German Production 
Sites”. The federal government took over social responsibility for employment, 
declaring its readiness to use public jobs for redistributive purposes. Also, private 
employers gathered under the umbrella of the BDA gave their support to job 
creation initiatives and committed themselves to augmenting vocational training 
opportunities in the private sector. In exchange, unions would agree to wage 
restraint and to some labour flexibility, e.g. working time reduction (DGB 
5/12/1996 in DWP 1996 www.etuc.org).
Much more contentious were the pact’s fiscal provisions. In the document, the 
Kohl Government restated its commitment to budget consolidation. It clearly 
indicated that public expenditures had reached an excessive level. It had to be cut 
back to allow a revival of private entrepreneurship. Unions would not support 
expenditure restraints. Indeed, they requested that the tightening of criteria to 
qualify for unemployment benefits were reversed and that statutory pensions, 
sickness and unemployment insurance would be funded out of general taxation. 
On the whole, the DGB was not satisfied with the scope of the pact, which the
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Confederation was keen to extend. Its position paper reflects the disappointment 
with the pact’s fiscal policy indications and, interestingly enough, identifies in 
those the reasons for the failure of the tripartite agreement:
“Statements on the reduction of the public sector share in GNP and 
consolidation of public sector budgets were contentious. We wanted to link 
the path to consolidation with growth and jobs. We were successful in 
ensuring that the corporation tax reforms will be revenue neutral. No 
discussions were held on further steps aimed at restructuring the tax system 
with a view to promoting growth and employment. And herein lies the 
greatest potential for conflict because the German federal government and the 
employers are essentially relying on a reduction in the rate of government 
expenditure and on tax breaks for companies to be able to open up more 
leeway for investment and jobs” (cited in DWP 1996).
The social pact between government, unions and employers was doomed to fail. 
When in April 1996 the Kohl Government presented an austerity package to 
Parliament without first consulting the unions, it became clear that the prospect 
of an agreement with the latter risked vanishing. The proposal envisaged welfare 
retrenchment measures to a total value of 2 percent of GDP, including such 
measures as: a fall in unemployment benefits; a reduction of sick pay; less state- 
subsidised cures; a gradual increase of the retirement age; the postponement of 
arise in child benefits; and the removal of job protection guarantees for firms 
with less than 10 employees (The Economist 4/5/1996). It was a declaration of 
war against labour. The unions reacted by organising strikes and street 
demonstrations. It was a fatal blow to the country’s social consensus. Herbert 
Mai, president of OETV, the public workers union, acknowledged the end of 
German social partnership (Der Spiegel 18, 1996). While the BDA would have 
been keen on an agreement, the BDI complained that Kohl’s attempt at social 
concertation had been a waste of time (FT 25/4/1996). In the end, the DGB 
refused to sign the so-called “Alliance against Employment”.
While capital and labour agreed on the need to preserve fiscal discipline, the pact 
collapsed over their inability to find a compromise over the composition of 
adjustment. A fundamental limit to the striking of the deal came from the fact 
that the parties involved had clearly different appreciations of the relationship 
between fiscal and macroeconomic policies at large. The Kohl administration,
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together with organised capital, and the BDI in particular, believed in the 
unconditional desirability of fiscal discipline. Fiscal imbalances had to be 
eliminated to start with. Growth and job creation could flourish only within a 
financially stable environment.
By contrast, the DGB supported the view that growth and employment creation 
were means to balance budgets. At the core of Germany’s booming public 
indebtedness were in fact strains on social security budgets, caused by rapidly 
increasing unemployment. Fewer employed reduced the incomes from SSC; in 
addition, the unemployed would put forward their unemployment benefit 
applications, thereby exercising pressure on social expenditures. Unemployment 
was in this respect damaging public finances on both sides of the budget. In 
1996, labour unions asked the government for a shift from “an ambitious to a 
moderate fiscal consolidation”. The macroeconomic environment was sufficient 
reason to put in place some demand management. For its part, the DGB 
suggested working time reduction and wage restraint (DGB, Alternativprogramm 
fur Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit IWS 10/6/1996). In turn, the government 
had to improve public investment towards modernization and the Bundesbank to 
continue preserving an expansionary stance. This brief description of the politics 
of German corporatist arrangements should have shown that unions had no 
incentive to accept wage restraint in the framework of a political exchange with 
fiscal authorities. Along similar lines, the leader of the left wing of the SPD 
explained that wage moderation would have been acceptable only if 
accompanied by sensible budget, tax, and monetary policies, and Kohl’s were not 
(FT 10/6/97 cited in (Ulman and Gerlach 2002, 28).
4.2.The financial impact of social pacts
The description of the content - or rather, would-be content - of the German 
corporatist agreements gives a good indication as to what the real or potential 
financial impact of the agreements was (or would have been). With the exception 
of the 1993 Solidarity Pact and the one that failed in 1996, the other agreements
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did not aim specifically at fiscal discipline. On the other side, it cannot be said 
that the absence o f  voluntary wage moderation in the framework o f  social pacts 
is responsible for an uncertain hand in the management o f  public finances. To be 
sure, Figure 1 shows that real wage increases, with the exception o f  1992 and 
partially o f  1995, were nonetheless quite modest overall (Graph 15). Unions 
accepted wage moderation out o f  fear that unemployment increased. Because the 
latter is perceived as an individual rather than a collective risk (Scharpf 1991), 
fiscal authorities had no need to offer immediate compensations in return. At the 
same time, the hard-line o f  the national central bank was credible enough to 
persuade unions that inflationary wage settlements would be punished with 
higher interest rate (Hassel 2003).
Graph 15 Germany: Annual Increase in Average Nominal and 
Real Earnings, 1992-1999
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So, really, it is not the absence o f  wage moderation, once a social pact has failed, 
what accounts for fiscal misbehaviour. Rather my contention is that fiscal 
consolidation was not successful in Germany because it was conducted in a 
disintegrated fashion, where long time lags existed between one measure and the 
other and between fiscal interventions, on one side, and monetary and wage 
policy adjustments, on the other side. This is because the particular
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macroeconomic environment and the fiscal preferences that domestic groups 
formed in response to this environment did not offer simultaneous trade-offs, so 
social partners could not come to an agreement that was satisfying for all. 
Tripartite social pacts emerged with the purpose of facilitating re-unification and 
contained by definition spending boosting measures. Only the 1996 social pact 
was likely to have a positive impact on fiscal discipline but the failure to agree 
on its content precipitated its collapse.
Having indulged on the details of the politics of fiscal adjustment in Italy and in 
Germany, the next chapter takes a comparative approach to assess the reasons 
behind the divergent distribution of fiscal preferences between Italy and 
Germany. I focus on the determinants of preference formation, which I have 
identified as being countries’ level of public debt and currency regime.
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CHAPTER VII
The Societal Base of Fiscal 
Adjustment: a Comparative
Perspective
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1. Strategic Configurations and Macroeconomic
Contexts
In the previous chapters, I have focused on the possible determinants of Italian 
and German fiscal performance in the run-up to EMU. The analysis has brought 
up some interesting results. On a general note, it is manifest that domestic factors 
continue to be paramount over international ones. While the logic of EMU was 
inspired by the identification of a single economic policy model that was 
accepted as optimal and well adapted to the era of internationalised markets, 
national governments carried on shaping policy formulation and outcomes with 
the result that fiscal policy never stopped being highly politicised. More 
specifically, in this thesis, I have suggested that national institutions such as party 
systems, fiscal and political institutions, and traditions of corporatism are not as 
important as socio-economic interests in explaining different domestic responses 
to a common challenge. In this respect, the theoretical bulk of this piece of work 
consists of the re-appropriation of traditional political economy models.
But what are exactly socio-economic interests? When are they conducive to 
fiscal adjustment? What shapes them? Under what circumstances are they most 
likely to be relevant? I have organised this discussion into two large sections.
The first deals with the concept of strategic configurations. Using data gathered 
on the fieldwork, I order the fiscal preferences of Italian and German interest 
groups, paying attention to their respective relative intensity. The underlying 
argument is that the particular configuration of preferences in Italy made deficit 
reduction possible, as there was sufficient room to strike a compromise between 
the competing interests of labour and capital. The same was not true for Germany, 
where unions’ opposition to welfare retrenchment and business actors’ strong 
refusal of higher taxation made any consensual agreement over deficit reduction 
highly unlikely. In a nutshell, the configuration of Italian socio-economic 
preferences was strategic to governments’ capacity to consolidate the state 
budget; the same was not true for Germany. The argument developed here 
benefits from a game-theoretic interpretation of a set of empirically derived data.
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The second section presents an explanation of preference formation. It explains 
that macroeconomic conditions and their evolution may affect the fiscal 
preferences of the most powerful domestic groups. More precisely, labour unions 
and business actors are influenced by debt-to-GDP ratios and currency regimes 
when taking decisions over their preferred fiscal policy strategy. Under the 
conditions of capital mobility created in 1990, business actors in high-debt 
countries across Europe have been generally supportive of budget consolidation, 
as this was believed to guarantee lower long-term interest rates. The preference 
in favour of easy monetary conditions is more intense where the exchange rate 
does not offer a valuable instrument to boost competitiveness, as is the case 
under fixed exchange rate regimes (e.g. Belgium). While fiscal discipline is 
accepted as optimal economic policy, politically, organised capital would have to 
confront labour over the composition of deficit reduction. With a temporarily 
weak currency capable of fuelling exports, yet at the same time not likely to 
import inflation once wage indexation is eliminated, business will not question 
unions’ support of revenue-maximising measures (e.g. Italy).
In low-debt countries, distributional issues look completely different. Here, 
capital has not internalised an “inferiority complex” relative to financial markets. 
Risk premiums are already low and so are long-term interest rates. Organised 
capital will look at tools other than monetary policy to expand the level of 
activity. In the presence of a strong currency where devaluation is not an option, 
fiscal measures remain the only instrument available to trigger growth, even if 
only through supply-side reforms. In turn, capital and labour would compete 
fiercely against each other before any stabilization measure is implemented (e.g. 
Germany). Competition is only partially softened there were there is some scope 
for devaluation, yet this might not be sufficient to keep export-oriented sectors at 
bay, leaving the battle over the distribution of the adjustment burden unsolved 
(e.g. Portugal).
l.l.T he distribution and intensity of fiscal preferences
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The extensive empirical investigation at the basis of the previous chapters allows 
me to build hypotheses about the exact distribution of fiscal preferences in Italy 
and Germany. I have argued that the domestic constellation of socio-economic 
preferences is paramount in affecting the chances of reaching a compromise over 
fiscal adjustment between competing groups that is by and large satisfactory for 
all stakeholders. In Italy, labour and capital met under government supervision. 
The three parties signed up to a political exchange in which public authorities 
offered unions the opportunity to determine, to a large extent, the content of 
fiscal packages. Business actors accepted these terms because, first, they had 
already obtained wage moderation and, second, their priority was to get an 
extensive adjustment as a means to improve Italy’s credibility on financial 
markets regardless of its specific composition. To better appreciate the 
relationship and ranking between different preferences, I have distinguished 
between high-, moderate- and low-intensity preferences. Only within specific 
configurations is the identification of a common denominator possible. This 
exercise was feasible in the case of Italy, but not so for Germany. Here, the 
absence of a common denominator hindered any political exchange. In Germany, 
the distribution of preferences and the distinction between high, moderate and 
intense preferences will shed light of this aspect. The following section analyses 
the Italian case.
Italy
The Confederation of Italian Industry was typically in favour of fiscal discipline 
as this was associated with small government. According to Confindustria, high 
public debts deprived producers of legitimate resources, thus hindering private 
investment and growth. In this sense, the Italian State was believed to be 
responsible for the country’s modest competitiveness since the late 1970s. 
Historically, employers have covered on average 75 percent of Italy’s high non­
wage costs, which were driven by an overly generous and badly organised 
welfare state. In addition, public wages were comparatively high with consequent 
spillover effects into the private sector. The State proved also unable to provide 
proper infrastructures, and various administrative inefficiencies led to high
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compliance costs. Not only did these factors function as a straightjacket for 
domestic producers, but they also reduced Italy’s attractiveness as a business 
location (www.confindustria.it. November 2004). This position reflects 
Confindustria's strong neo-liberal orientation and generalised plea for small 
government. A balanced budget would be a sign of improvement in economic 
policy management allowing a more efficient allocation of resources.
In the 1990s, the Confederation’s concern with competitiveness came to the 
forefront. The completion of the SEM was well under way. It implied the 
abolition of all barriers to trade and was increasing competitive pressures for 
everyone. Business across Europe was struggling to think of innovative ways to 
boost competitiveness. Competitive devaluations had been in use for two decades 
but seemed to have outlived their usefulness in the sense that Italian business was 
no longer fully convinced of their capacity to generate growth (FT 7/7/1992; 
Corriere della Sera 9/9/1992). In fact, devaluations had exacerbated the country’s 
inflation problem. Price levels continued to grow in a spiral also because the 
operation, since 1975, of a wage indexation system amplified the negative 
consequences from imported inflation, leading eventually to greater wage costs. 
The rise of production costs in the medium-term was thus completely absorbing 
the gains from short-term export-led growth. Policy failure, together with the 
emergence of new reputable studies about the undesirability of devaluation, 
contributed to forging a general disbelief in the usefulness of the exchange rate 
for business purposes (De Grauwe 2003).
Very few alternatives remained to improve Italy’s competitiveness. One was a 
more business-friendly fiscal policy. It was necessary to reduce primary public 
expenditures with the purpose of creating sufficient room to then lessen the fiscal 
pressure. Fiscal discipline was thus desirable in improving the economic and 
institutional environment in which producers operated. The second significant 
instrument was wage moderation in the form of the elimination of the scala 
mobile, responsible for the uncontrolled growth of nominal wages. Confindustria 
believed quite realistically that, as opposed to fiscal consolidation, wage restraint 
had the advantage of being immediately available once the parties had agreed on 
the elimination of indexation. By controlling inflation, wage moderation would
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simultaneously reduce interest rates, making money less costly. Not only would 
the availability of credit support investment initiatives; it would also exercise a 
positive impact on state budgets to the extent that it lessened the value of interest 
payments (Sole240re, various issues). In a nutshell, the support for slower wage 
growth was paramount but it went hand in hand with the need to adjust fiscal 
imbalances. The fact that Confindustria represented both national producers and 
employers explains why wage moderation was never put forward in a vacuum 
but always connected to major issues, such as fiscal pressure, welfare reform and 
public investment.
Against this background, the Confederation’s support for extensive budget 
corrections in the early 1990s comes as no surprise. The official elimination of 
the scala mobile in 1992 had not been sufficient to convince the Bank of Italy to 
reduce interest rates. True, there were signs of a slowdown of inflation, but the 
national central bank was still not very receptive to wage and price developments 
because it was preoccupied with other overwhelming concerns and, above all, by 
the country’s high public debt1. The latter made a policy of comparatively low 
interest rates not feasible, in the short-run at least. In turn, Italian monetary 
authorities were influenced and constrained by the perception that financial 
markets had of Italy’s fiscal situation. Confindustria's intensive preference in 
favour of large credible deficit reduction stems from the belief that successful 
budget consolidation would send a credibility message to markets allowing for 
an externally induced reduction of interest rates. This opinion was even more 
intense in 1992 and in 1994 when, in the wake of a vast political and financial 
crisis, markets turned pessimistic about the future of the Italian economy, as 
reflected in the rapid increase of long-term interest rates. The bottom-line is that 
the acknowledgement of Italy’s lack of an independent monetary policy diverted 
business actors’ attention to outside markets. This explains also why the 
Confederation was more concerned with political stability than with the actual 
colour of government, as well as why it was generally more inclined towards 
moderate party configurations (II Mondo 7/1/1991; 5/8/1991; Mattina 1992).
1 For example, Banca d’ltalia became officially independent just in 1993.
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Second was Confindustria's support for welfare cuts. Capital representatives 
supported strongly the view that fiscal imbalances should be tackled on the side 
of the budget where they originated. They called for a reduction of primary 
expenditures on public employment, pension and health care (Pininfarina 1992, 
478). Behind this plea was the aforementioned belief in the superior economic 
performance of small government. Moreover, it was believed that the structural 
reform of spending programmes would be perceived by financial markets as a 
sign of serious commitment to adjustment, and a guarantee of the sustainability 
of fiscal discipline for the years to come. Markets’ appreciation of Italy’s reform 
policies would initiate a virtuous circle, allowing the country’s risk premium and 
hence its interest rates to decrease (Sole240re various issues). It was again the 
strong dependence on external markets that shaped Confindustria's interests. 
Finally, had the government really succeeded in passing welfare cuts, tax 
increases would not be necessary for the purpose of budget consolidation, thus 
supporting also one of the organization’s moderately strong preferences. Still, 
business actors were certainly aware of the powerful veto unions would exercise 
on welfare retrenchment. In this respect, their immediate interest was in seeing 
the public deficit fall and in negotiating as much as possible over any attempt to 
increase taxes. Only with revaluation of the Lira within the ERM bands in 
November 1996 did the opposition to higher fiscal pressure move into the first 
position, leaving fiscal discipline as the least intensive preference.
At the same time, the Confederation opposed greater fiscal pressure. Overall, in 
1991-98, there is no clear-cut hierarchy between the opposition to tax increases 
and the support for welfare cuts. Especially when consisting of increased social 
security contributions or direct taxes, greater fiscal pressure had the effect of 
increasing production costs but also dampening private consumption so that the 
whole production process was negatively affected both on the supply and the 
demand side. In addition, the consequences would be immediately felt on the 
trade balance, as exports would diminish. With competitive pressures increasing 
as a result of the recent completion of single market, tax competition in Europe 
was more of an issue, although national sensitivities and the reactions to it varied 
extensively from country to country. The opposition to tax increases was only 
moderate since a depreciated Lira in 1992-96 offered a temporary solution to
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preserve the country’s competitive performance. While it is true that, since the 
late 1980s, Confindustria had been conscious of the limits of competitive 
devaluations, the shift from fixed to de facto flexible exchange rates in 
September 1992 opened up new opportunities and was thus welcome2. Under 
flexible exchange rates, the need for rapid fiscal consolidation became in turn an 
absolute priority, to the extent that if interest rates continued to be relatively high, 
this would progressively minimise the depreciation of the Lira with more 
investors interested in taking advantage of high returns on currency investments 
(Walsh 2000). In this respect, business actors were well aware of the interlock 
between fiscal and exchange rate policies.
As in most European states, Italian labour unions had played a significant role in 
the formation of the national welfare state. Since the late 1960s, they had 
supported the implementation of numerous public spending programmes as well 
as the introduction of the Workers’ Statute, which provided wage earners with 
additional guarantees and rights in front of employers (1970). In the periods of 
social concertation, labour unions accepted wage moderation in exchange for 
social benefits, thereby exercising an indirect pressure on social spending levels. 
Only at times of dramatic economic turbulence did Italy’s three largest union 
confederations consciously consider the impact of their demands on the state 
budget (see Chapter III).
If, in the past, unions’ opinion of fiscal discipline had been conditioned by the 
contingent macroeconomic situation, in the 1990s, CGIL-CISL-UIL were less 
ambivalently in favour of budget consolidation. It was generally recognised that 
Italy’s high public indebtedness was responsible for high interest rates. By 
dampening private investment, the excessive cost of money had worked against 
employment creation. On this front, CGIL-CISL-UIL and Confindustria shared 
an identical position. Fiscal imbalances had also led to high inflation. Unions and 
employers had been negotiating over the abolition of the wage indexation system 
since 1983 when the employers’ association obtained a few concessions. The 
approach of the expiration of the 1975 agreement on the scala mobile due in
2 Even government authorities recognised that the devaluation, while not intentionally induced, 
ended up offering some leeway (Ciampi 1996).
216
December 1990 made unions realise that, in the absence of wages’ automatic 
adaptation to actual inflation, other measures would be necessary to guarantee 
that in fact inflation did not rise. Budget consolidation could be one of the most 
effective means to keep interest rates and inflation under control.
In July 1992, after an intense internal confrontation, CGIL-CISL-UIL signed the 
agreement for the elimination of the wage indexation system. Mounting 
speculative pressure on the Lira created great alarm and convinced recalcitrant 
unions of the opportunity of wage restraint. Stefano Patriarca, head of the CGIL 
economic department, explained that his union’s decision to sign the agreement, 
in spite of fierce opposition from the rank-and-file, had a strong economic 
rationale. It aimed at preventing the devaluation of the Lira (CGIL, NRS 8, 
28/9/1992). It was believed that booming inflationary pressures would 
completely offset the gains from export growth. Of the three confederations, the 
CGIL was the most sensitive to inflation differentials since its membership was 
denser in export-oriented sectors. In addition, devaluation would increase the 
burden of foreign denominated debt and be particularly detrimental to budget 
consolidation. It is interesting to note that, with the elimination of wage 
indexation, Italy’s labour unions were more strongly committed to the 
consolidation of public finances as a means to keep inflation under control. In 
this respect, they had no interest in jeopardising governments’ attempt at fiscal 
adjustment.
While the support for extensive budget corrections was there, and was very 
intense for the reasons highlighted above, there was a moderately strong 
preference against welfare cuts. Having already had their arms twisted into wage 
moderation, CGIL-CISL-UIL had no intention of suffering in parallel from 
welfare retrenchment. True, all of them were going through a radical internal 
change coinciding with the embracing of new ideas for welfare reform. Having 
been for two decades the most ardent defenders of the status quo, union 
confederations started being concerned with the sustainability of the national 
welfare state. However, they advocated qualitative policy change. For example, 
they would support a rationalisation of public expenditures if this meant 
eliminating unjust and unfair practices locked in the system, securing greater
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equality. They could not accept unconditional bold expenditure restraints put in 
place with the purpose of balancing the state budgets or, worst, of deliberately 
retrenching the welfare state. Rather than stemming from the need to save public 
money, any adjustment to welfare programmes had to be implemented against a 
vision that took sustainability into consideration.
By default, CGIL-CISL-UIL supported a revenue-based fiscal consolidation. 
They insisted on the creation of a more equitable tax system where the self- 
employed would be subject to the same fiscal duties as dependent workers and 
where tax evasion and elusion were eradicated. While they did not oppose direct 
taxation if changes were progressive, they were less inclined to accept an 
increase in indirect taxation because of its inflationary potential.
Table 10 offers an overview of the distribution of fiscal preferences and of their 
relative ranking according to intensity. It is manifest how deficit reduction was 
possible because both capital and labour could have their first preferences 
satisfied. Confindustria obtained extensive yearly budget corrections. CGIL- 
CISL-UIL would be compensated with less welfare cuts than would otherwise be 
necessary. They gained a free hand in determining the content of fiscal 
adjustment, which in fact turned out to be largely revenue-based from 1992 to 
1996.
Table 10. Italy: the ordering of fiscal preferences 1991-97
Confindustria CGIL-CISL-UIL
HIGH INTENSITY Fiscal discipline Fiscal discipline
MODERATE INTENSITY Support for welfare cuts/ Support for f tax/Opposition
Opposition to f tax to welfare cuts
LOW INTENSITY Opposition to f tax Opposition to welfare cuts
Source: Computed by author by means of content analysis and interviews
(84 observations).
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Germany
Like other business confederations in Europe, the BDI had a strong preference 
for fiscal discipline, as suggested in Table 11. As in the Italian case, it was 
perceived that balanced budgets signalled that the government’s intrusion in the 
market was kept at its minimum. The marked independence of the central bank 
and its punitive behaviour in the face of excessive fiscal imbalances also meant 
that any deficit spending would be automatically followed by interest rate 
increases to the detriment of investment activities. It is therefore not surprising if, 
in the face of re-unification, business actors continued to strongly support the 
goal of sound public finances (interview with BDI). In particular they feared that 
a loss of fiscal rectitude would induce the national central bank to reduce the 
money supply, as initially happened. It is interesting to note however that, on this 
particular issue, the BDI and the BDA did not speak with one voice. The 
employers’ association did not share the same obsession with interest rates that 
producers did. Their absolute priority was a stability-oriented policy that would 
keep the external value of the DM stable even at the cost of higher interest rates 
(BDA 1992).
Second came the opposition of organised capital to tax increases. As was the case 
for Italy, German business perceptions had been importantly reshaped by the 
completion of the internal market in 1992. Competitiveness was a national 
concern in a country that had been benefiting since the post-war period from 
export-led growth. Moreover, in the period 1989-93, profitability in 
manufacturing had declined to 22 percent of gross value-added from 24.2 in 
1984-88 (Glyn 1996 cited in Carlin and Soskice 1997). This explains why 
producers were particularly sensitive to any fiscal intervention that would further 
undermine competitiveness. On top of that was the fact that the unavoidable 
monetary restriction following unification-induced deficit spending led to an 
undesirable appreciation of the DM. Besides a general criticism of greater 
taxation, organised capital and employers in particular vehemently condemned 
the continuous increase in non-wage labour costs, caused mainly by the transfer 
of West German labour market institutions to the East. Greater SSC meant 
greater tensions over wage bargaining for employers. Indeed, econometric
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calculations confirm that workers incorporated higher contributions into their 
wage demands (Tullio and al. 1996).
With a strong preference in favour of fiscal discipline and an almost equally 
intensive opposition to tax increases, the BDI and BDA were naturally 
supportive of an expenditure-based budgetary consolidation, believing in the 
need to trim back public administration as well as the excessively expensive 
welfare state. Welfare retrenchment would exert numerous positive effects. First, 
it would provide financial stability since a large part of the country’s public 
deficit originated in social security budgets. Second, it opened up room for tax 
alleviation in a period in which both consumption and investment needed to be 
boosted. In addition, as regards labour costs, tax alleviation coincided with an 
improvement in the country’s international competitiveness. The latter was a 
reason for serious concern throughout the 1990s, when Germany’s share of world 
exports decreased from 11.5 percent in 1991 to 9.3 percent in 1997 (AMECO 
Database). Moreover, there was a general belief that only an expenditure-based 
consolidation would show to financial markets that unification had been handled 
properly.
On the other side of the spectrum, the preferences of German labour unions were 
conditioned by a genuine belief in the superiority of Keynesian economics 
(interview with DGB). By no means should the Federal state respond to the 
unification challenge with a fiscal restriction. On the contrary, authorities were 
called upon to make new spending commitments in order to support transition. 
This would pre-empt future strains on social security budgets, thereby 
guaranteeing financial stability in the long- rather than in the short term (Die 
Quelle, various issues). Moreover, especially during the 1993 slowdown, they 
insisted on the fact that it was the state’s role to get the country out of the 
recession. Given the slowdown, consolidation should be postponed. Differently 
from Italy, economic agents did not expect that fiscal restriction would be 
immediately followed by looser monetary conditions. First, especially after 1993, 
the money supply was considered sufficient, hence monetary conditions were 
favourable to start with. Second, the country’s hard currency regime excluded 
any significant monetary relaxation a priori as this would endanger the external
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value of the DM. Unions’ support of fiscal discipline was then their less intensive 
preference. They were rather more concerned with anti-cyclical fiscal policies; 
and this was even more evident after 1995, once unemployment rates had 
reached historically highs, creating great alarm amongst labour representatives.
Linked to this is the fact that the trade union confederation opposed above all 
spending cuts, especially if imposed on the welfare state. Faced with the 
recession, expenditure restraints were first of all against traditional Keynesian 
policy recipes. Secondly, with unions having offered an important contribution to 
the creation of the German welfare state after WWII, its curtailment would also 
inflict a wound on their socio-political status. As in other European countries, the 
DGB was rather in favour of the preservation of the status quo (Brugiavini,
2000) and suspicious of any welfare reform pursued just with the aim of putting 
state coffers in order.
Table 11. Germany: the ordering of fiscal preferences 1991-97
BDI-BDA DGB
HIGH INTENSITY Fiscal discipline/Opposition Opposition to welfare cuts
to |  tax
MODERATE INTENSITY Opposition to f tax Support for |  direct tax
LOW INTENSITY Support to welfare cuts Fiscal discipline
Source: Computed by author by means of content analysis and interviews
(78 observations).
Their second most intense preference was for a rise in general taxation that 
would allow all citizens to take part in the financing of unification after a 
substantial rise in labour taxes in 1990-92. They thus supported a revenue-based 
consolidation but made clear that this should be pursued by raising wealth taxes 
and income taxes in a progressive fashion. In fact, besides SSC they also 
opposed indirect taxes to the extent that they affected only low-income groups 
and were thus not equitable in their impact (DGB, Die Quelle April 1993). It is 
interesting to note that, in sharp contrast with their Italian counterparts, unions 
were less concerned with the potential inflationary impact of fiscal pressure. 
With the DM continuing to be a strong stable currency, export-oriented unions
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such as IG Metall were not concerned with inflation differentials (interview with 
DGB)3.
1.2. Explaining preference formation: macroeconomic 
environments
This section focuses on the two most important cleavages around which domestic 
preferences aggregate. The first one is the divide between high- and low-debt 
countries. The fact that Italy and Germany carried different risk premiums on 
financial markets is relevant in that it affected governments’ room for manoeuvre 
during fiscal adjustment. My underlying argument is that the less credible Italian 
economy had a potential for catching-up that the stronger well-established 
German system did not have. This point is corroborated by purely economic 
studies showing that, when embarking on the consolidation of public finances, 
high-debt countries are more successful than low-debt countries because of the 
pressures that derive from a weaker starting position. To be sure, it is not only a 
question of debt-to-GDP ratios. Inflation and interest rate differentials also 
exercise an impact on domestic preference formation to the extent that they affect 
the relative credibility of national economic systems and, in particular, 
competitiveness.
The second important cleavage here considered revolves around the distinction 
between soft- and hard-currency regimes (this links back to the argument on 
inflation and interest rates). Italy and Germany have favoured almost completely 
opposing currency regimes. Before 1996, the Lira was traditionally a weak 
currency, both because successive Italian governments did not refrain from using 
competitive devaluations to fuel exports, and because high debt burdens and two- 
digit inflation rates compromised its credibility on financial markets. On the 
contrary, Germany prioritised currency stability. This preference was enshrined 
in the statute of the Bundesbank and translated in the country’s aspiration to
3 The strength o f the DM even in the midst o f uncertainty provoked by unification was reassuring 
to unions, who associated a weak currency with the loss o f wages’ purchasing power. No surprise 
then that with the approach o f EMU, public authorities insisted on the fact that the Euro would be 
at least as strong as the DM (Der Spiegel 47, 1996). This was seen as part o f the contract between 
the government and rather sceptic public opinion.
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become an anchor currency in Europe, as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made clear 
during the negotiations for the EMS in 1979. As happened later on during EMU 
negotiations, the rationale for the request was the refusal to adapt to policies 
conducted in soft-currency countries (Kaltenthaler 1998).
The low/high-debt divide
I have come to the conclusion that high debt burdens represent a strategic 
advantage during fiscal adjustment and, particularly so, when this is imposed 
from the outside. Highly indebted countries have the option of obtaining 
curtailment to their public deficits through credibility gains on financial markets, 
whereby large budgetary corrections convince markets that the government is 
seriously committed to fiscal discipline4. In turn, market-generated lower interest 
rates allow savings on total interest payments. By way of example, Italy’s 
nominal long-term interest rates fell by 8.6 points in the period 1991-99, and by 
only 4 points in Germany. This shows that markets supported deficit reduction in 
Italy. This is better visible in the evolution of implicit interest rates (ratio of 
interests to gross public debt)5, which fell by 7.2 percent in Italy but by a more 
modest 2.7 percent in Germany during the EMU convergence process (AMECO 
Database). From a political economy perspective, the important implication is 
that high-debt countries dispose of ways to make fiscal consolidation less 
unpopular than it would otherwise be. Not only have financial gains in the form 
of lower interest payments almost non-existent distributional implications -  
being thus unproblematic - but they also release unanticipated resources for more 
urgent needs.
4 The impact o f fiscal policy on long-term interest rates has been subject o f extensive 
investigation but research results have varied from those recognising the existence of important 
effects (Canzoneri et al 2002) to others suggesting that their quantitative significance is small 
(Mountford and Uhlig 2000; Perotti 2002). Overall, there seems to be agreement on the fact that, 
in high-debt countries, such effects are amplified; hence they would nonetheless be significant in 
one way or another. In a recent panel-data study, it has been suggested that the effects o f deficit 
increases on interest rates are quite evident and that changes to the debt stock have a more-than- 
proportional impact on interest rates when the debt burden is large to start with (Ardagna et al 
2004).
5 This measure controls for the fact that the share of interest payments to GDP depends on the 
debt ratio to start with, hence for the fact that it is a slightly endogenous figure.
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Moreover, in the new scenario opened up by the completion of the Single 
European Market (SEM), export-oriented interest groups - arguably both 
employers and employees (Swenson 1991) - will develop a strong resistance 
against excessive interest rate and inflation differentials because of their impact 
on international competitiveness. In high-debt countries, where debt burdens 
have accumulated over years or decades, export-oriented producers and 
employees will more firmly push for rapid fiscal adjustment as this lowers price 
levels and interest rates6. As will be further explained below, this preference will 
be more intense there where the currency regime does not allow the maintenance 
of a competitive edge. To sum up, there are three aspects common to high-debt 
countries that are at the basis of this paradoxical type of comparative advantage: 
risk premiums, inflation and interest rate differentials.
As to the first, the departing point is that high-debt countries suffer from a lack of 
credibility on financial markets with the consequence that their liabilities are 
overburdened with risk premiums. When judging on the likelihood of default, 
market participants tend to rely on a pretty concise set of macroeconomic 
indicators: deficit and debt levels, but also inflation and foreign exchange rates 
(Mosley 2003, 55). International investors have traditionally showed little trust in 
the potential of the Italian economy so that the country’s risk premium was 
comparatively high, at least until the 1990s when the verbal commitment to 
EMU membership was sufficient to improve credibility (Gilbert 1994). The 
downward sloping yield curve in Graph 16 shows that this effect became visible 
after 1994. The financial market channel was extremely important for the Italian 
experience with fiscal adjustment. Even policy-makers admitted explicitly that 
they had been playing with the markets (Ciampi 1996; Bianchi in Bemardi 
1995). On the contrary, in Germany, government authorities had little to expect
6 Again, it is not necessarily true that unbalanced fiscal positions lead to above-average interest 
rates and inflation levels. Empirical studies explain that this has certainly been the case for 
countries with dependent central banks. First, where the national central bank is obliged to 
monetize the public debt, excessive money supply leads to inflation. Italy was victim o f this until 
1981 when the Bank o f Italy “divorced” from the Treasury (Grilli et al. 1989; Fratianni and 
Spinelli 1997). Second, a poorly credible dependent central bank does not prevent unions from 
restraining wage demands to the extent that they will not believe in monetary authorities’ ability 
to keep inflation under control. And indeed, Italy suffered historically from the fastest inflation in 
Europe. In 1971-80, the country’s average annual price deflator amounted to 14.9 percent o f GDP 
against Germany’s 5.2 percent (European Commission 2004).
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from financial markets. Not only was public indebtedness historically low, as 
were interest and inflation levels, but not even the shock of reunification had the 
effect of initially pushing the country’s risk premium up. Quite on the contrary, 
the negative yield curve in 1991-93 is indicative of financial markers betting on 
the benefits of reunification (Graph 16).
What about interest rate differentials? With the completion of the Single Market, 
the fact that high-debt countries had significant interest rate differentials vis-a-vis 
other EU member states represented a potential constraint on competitiveness.
As suggested throughout this piece of work, past policies exercised feedback 
effects on domestic socio-economic interests, and business actors as well as trade 
unions lobbied for less restrictive monetary policies there where interest rate 
differentials were high. Lower interest rates provided multiple advantages. First, 
they would improve competitive performance in a context in which devaluations 
were either unfeasible or undesirable. Second, they supported investment and 
employment. With central bank independence being adopted across Europe as 
the most desirable institutional setting, the only way to obtain a benign (read 
relaxed) response from national central banks was by lobbying fiscal authorities 
for severe fiscal adjustment. Thus, interest groups in high-debt countries have 
strong incentives to desire fiscal discipline in the back of deeper economic 
integration (e.g. SEM). And indeed the Italian Confmdustria was firmly 
advocating a relaxation of monetary policy in the belief that this would narrow 
differentials. This preference became even more intense once the Lira abandoned 
the ERM and comparatively high interest rates risked provoking an appreciation
n
of the currency, given also that capital controls had been eliminated . On the 
other hand, with the DM being the anchor currency of the ERM, Germany was 
dictating interest rates in Europe rather than having to passively suffer from 
differentials vis-a-vis other EMS members. In that respect, monetary policy 
mattered only because of its implications for domestic investment decisions. In 
relation to the outside, the business community supported a monetary policy
7 In the real world, this eventuality did not come to pass. Persistent inflationary pressures together 
with the country’s considerable debt-to-GDP ratio continued to constrain the Lira’s attractiveness 
in the face o f international investors, thereby preventing excessive currency appreciation 
(Giorganni 1997).
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geared towards a stable DM only if  this did not compromise domestic price 
stability (Kaltenthaler 1998, 31).
Graph 16. Yield Curve, Germany and Italy (1989-2000)
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Thirdly, as already suggested above, comparatively high interest rates lead to 
above-average inflation. Where a country has the chance to control inflation 
domestically, then it is also likely to obtain credibility gains on financial markets 
i f  it is true that the risk premium is driven by inflation rates as much as by deficit 
and debt levels (M osley 2003). With the elimination o f  the wage indexation 
system in 1991/92, Italy was set on the right footing to adjust its inflation rate to 
the EU average. And here consensus-building practices in the framework o f  the 
1992 and 1993 Income Policy Agreements can be hardly overstated. Consensual 
wage restraint gave a fundamental contribution to macroeconomic adjustment. 
Deficit reduction would accelerate this process; lower interest rates dragged 
inflation rates down. Because o f  their impact on international competitiveness, 
smaller inflation differentials after 1992 supported the cause o f  export-oriented
o
producers within Confindustria . Converging inflation at the EU level also
8 Italy proved very successful when it came to converging to EU inflation levels. In 1971-80, the 
country’s price deflator was clearly higher than the European average. Some adjustment took 
place already in the 1980s where the annual average GDP price deflator went down by 30 percent
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offered an advantage when it came to perceptions. Real economic fundamentals 
were being unveiled at the same time that inflation differentials narrowed, with 
the result that actors started getting a clearer perception of the real links between 
fiscal, monetary and wage policies.
It is to be noted that aversion to inflation had not always been there and that 
changes to the macroeconomic environment in the 1990s had an important effect 
on preference formation. Since the 1970s, Italy had managed to maintain the 
proportion of exports to GDP relatively stable in spite of the large inflation 
differentials, the progressive decline of manufacturing and the weakness of 
technological innovation. Competitive devaluations -  also in the form of the 
realignments within the EMS after 1979 - allowed for the preservation of short­
term competitiveness. In the late 1980s, this favourable set-up began to crumble. 
In 1988, the Bank of Italy turned to a restrictive monetary stance. Moreover, in 
the same period, the project for the completion of the single market was going 
ahead. Deeper European economic integration would increase competition from 
outside producers.
The soft/hard-currency divide
The underlying argument made with respect to the role of currency regimes is 
that, in the presence of weak currencies, windows of opportunity open up that 
allow a reconciliation of the interests of capital and labour. Once the social 
partners have all recognised the need for (rapid) fiscal adjustment, business 
actors will be more inclined to accept unions’ suggestions for a revenue-based 
consolidation as the costs of higher fiscal pressure are offset by the advantages 
that derive from currency depreciation. Panel data combining EU figures on 
fiscal adjustment episodes and exchange rates seem to confirm this point. In the 
1990s, most soft-currency EMU candidates opted for revenue-based budget 
consolidations (e.g. Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece). In 1991-2000, 
exports of goods and services grew to a larger extent in weak-currency countries, 
even if they were at the same time intervening heavily on the revenue side of the 
budget. In Ireland, Italy and Greece, exports grew by an annual average of 15,
from the previous period. Yet, in the decade from 1991 to 2000, the annual average deflator was 
lowered by 65 percent from the preceding decade (European Commission 2004).
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9.4 and 8.1 percent of GDP respectively against an average of 6.8 percent in the 
EU 12 (European Commission 2004). Fiscal pressure was not perceived as 
detrimental to competitiveness given that a weak currency allowed the share of 
exports to GDP to remain constant or even to improve.
Qualitative analysis further corroborates this line of argument. My study of 
official documents and a set of interviews have revealed how Italian socio­
economic actors acknowledged such a compensatory logic to be in place. After 
having supported exchange rate stability in 1988-91, Conftndustria began to 
advocate the devaluation of the Lira. Considering Italy’s ERM membership, this 
coincided with the request for a shift from fixed to flexible exchange rates. Under 
the pressure of strong speculative attacks, the Lira abandoned the ERM in 
September 1992. At the same time, the Government was asked to commit to 
fiscal discipline. Business actors were well aware of the interlocking between 
fiscal and exchange rate policies. They believed that a move to a flexible 
exchange rate regime would not damage Italy’s competitiveness because lower 
interest rates as a consequence of fiscal consolidation would prevent an excessive 
appreciation of the Lira (see also Walsh 2000, 130-7).
While probably being able to alleviate distributive conflicts, currency 
depreciation can potentially undermine fiscal adjustment through two channels. 
First, when the debt is denominated in foreign currencies, depreciation amplifies 
the value of a country’s debt service. However, the largest part of Italy’s debt 
belonged to domestic investors. Less than 10 percent of the debt issued during 
the 1990s was denominated in foreign currencies (European Commission 1998). 
Second, depreciation can lead to imported inflation, in the short-term at least 
when domestic production profiles cannot be altered. As a consequence, 
government consumption can become more costly; in particular, public wage 
settlements may reflect the adjustment to higher inflation. After 1992, the 
elimination of the wage indexation system prevented a weak Lira from 
endangering the process of budget consolidation9.
9 Along similar lines, Lane and Perotti indicated that, when accompanied by a flexible currency 
regime or by devaluation, fiscal adjustments are associated with export growth; hence they have 
expansionary (non-Keynesian) effects (Lane and Perotti 1998). More recently, Lambertini and
228
A look at exchange rate developments also sheds light on the German experience 
where the situation was, in this regard, dramatically different. Since the early 
1970s and until the advent of the Euro, the DM had been used as a trading, 
investment and reserve currency. Competitive devaluations were not a viable 
policy option nor had the Bundesbank the intention of endangering domestic 
price stability by means of beggar-your-neighbour exchange rate policies. First, 
the currency was extensively used in international trade so that most invoices and 
transactions were denominated in DM. Second, it played an important role on 
international financial markets. In the 1970s and 1980s, capital controls 
guaranteed that demand of DM did not cause excessive currency appreciation. 
Finally, the DM functioned as the second most important reserve currency after 
the US dollar (Gebhard 1998, 139-173). The hegemonic role of the German 
currency in international monetary relations prevented public authorities from 
using the exchange rate as an economic policy instrument and/or as an 
instrument for redistribution. Consequently, in spite of the unification shock and 
the uncertainty surrounding its medium-term impact, the hegemony of the DM 
remained unquestioned until 1999.
Currency regimes are also influential because they link back to the risk premium. 
Italy suffered from low credibility on financial markets also on the back of a 
widespread perception that the Lira was a weak currency. With risk premiums 
being also attributed on the basis of currency risks, long-term interest rates 
continued to be comparatively high even in the early 1990s, in particular in the 
months between 1991 and 1992, when it had become clear that Italy would not 
be able to support the ERM exchange rate any longer. That was a period in which 
the catching-up potential was still large. Financial markets supported successful 
fiscal consolidation only after 1994, once the more realistic prospect of Italy’s
Tavares have argued that successful fiscal consolidations tend to be preceded by large nominal 
exchange rate depreciations -as in the Italian case. Instead, unsuccessful adjustments are 
anticipated by currency appreciation (Lambertini and Tavares 2003). These economic reports go 
in the direction o f corroborating the argument presented in this research project. By pinpointing 
the positive correlation between a currency’s weakness and fiscal discipline, they show that a 
trade-off may exist between fiscal and exchange rate policies and that this trade-off looks very 
much like the one hypothesised in this work.
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EMU membership induced investors to bet on a rapid recovery of the Lira. The 
contrary can be said for Germany. The DM was a stable and strong currency, 
very attractive to both domestic and international investors. In this respect, there 
was no currency risk involved. Most interestingly in relation to the time frame 
analysed here, not even the unification shock endangered the stability of the DM. 
In parallel, this fact explains why German business has never enjoyed from a 
catching-up potential via the exchange-rate channel (Graph 17).
Graph 17. Real Effective Exchange Rate (performance relative 
to the other 23 industrial countries) 1981-99
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2. Further Supporting Evidence: Sequencing
The strong argument behind the present thesis is that macroeconomic conditions, 
especially debt conditions and currency regimes, inform socio-economic 
preferences. In this respect, it would be interesting to test if changes to these 
conditions induce powerful domestic interests to alter their preferences 
accordingly. The next sections evaluate the relevance of sequencing in the 
examples of Italy and Germany. For the reasons highlighted above, there is more 
empirical evidence in support of the general argument in the case of Italy than 
there is for Germany. This is naturally so considering that it is only in Italy that
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social partners could compensate losses in one policy area with gains from 
another. In particular, while changes to the debt level had minimal impact as the 
debt service remained comparatively low throughout the 1990s, an alteration of 
the currency had a much more visible effect. After 1995 and the progressive 
appreciation of the Lira, business actors started expressing support for an 
expenditure-based consolidation since, in the absence of the exchange rate 
channel, this was the only instrument left to boost competitiveness. From a 
methodological perspective, the German case is more difficult to prove, as it 
would involve explaining why something has not occurred. Still, when 
abandoning the idea of a rigorous approach, it remains possible to identify 
correspondences between the changing macroeconomic environment and 
domestic fiscal preferences.
2.1.Italy: the short-term advantage of floating
I believe that a closer look at sequencing provides useful insights into the 
political economy of fiscal adjustment. In this section, I compare the evolution of 
macroeconomic variables in the 1990s with domestic groups’ responses to them.
I have earlier indicated that Italian interest groups managed somehow to 
distribute their influence over different aspects of fiscal reform with the result 
that budget adjustment was both extensive and revenue-based. Business actors 
influenced the size of deficit reduction, whereas organised labour had a free hand 
in shaping its content. Indeed, the support for fiscal discipline cut equally across 
all groups. All budget actors were aware of the fact that the country’s weak 
financial reputation in fact offered a vast catching-up potential and that budget 
consolidation could in theory stem just from credibility gains. With this strategy 
having negligible distributional implications, the confrontation between capital 
and labour softened up. Labour unions would express their concern only in those 
cases when, the planned fiscal effort being extensive, social security programmes 
might come under serious threat. In general, while supportive of prompt fiscal 
adjustment, CGIL-CISL-UIL would by default recommend a revenue-based 
budget consolidation.
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The bottom-line is that there existed some sort o f  implicit political exchange 
between organised capital and labour, according to which the former would 
obtain large fiscal corrections, yet only at the expense o f  higher fiscal pressure. 
Prima facie  quantitative evidence seems to confirm that a positive correlation 
existed between the size o f  consolidation and its revenue component, in 
cyclically adjusted terms. Graph 18 indicates that the greater the extent o f  deficit 
reduction, the more significant the contribution o f  revenues to that result. If the 
limited number o f  observations makes this finding not particularly robust and 
largely indicative, it suggests nonetheless that some sort o f  trade-off existed 
between the size o f  fiscal adjustment and its specific content.
Graph 18. Italy: Correlation between CA deficit change and total 
CA revenues change, 1991-2000
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It was suggested above that at the basis o f  domestic actors’ fiscal preferences 
was the level o f  public indebtedness. Therefore, one would expect that changes 
to the debt ratio to GDP during the 1990s would alter their perception o f  trade­
offs between different policy areas. There are indeed a few  signs o f  shifting 
preferences even if  feeble, something that could be well explained by the fact 
that, while on the downside, the country’s debt remained high by European 
standards. Italy’s debt ratio to GDP started to decrease in 1995. Most importantly, 
this is when the interest rate differential with Germany began narrowing. The 
country continued to benefit from a catching up potential, but this was softening 
and bound to disappear with the launch o f EMU in 1999. It is no surprise if, from
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then onwards, governments and social partners started to show greater concern 
for the quality rather than the size of deficit reduction. Survey-based data 
gathered in the framework of this research project show that Confmdustria 
dropped its prioritisation of fiscal discipline in November 1996, coinciding with 
the Lira re-entering the ERM, to insist more vehemently on its opposition to 
revenue increases (Appendix la).
This is only one part of the story. I have also argued that exchange rate 
developments affected fiscal preference formation. Italy’s export-oriented 
business community tolerated high fiscal pressure for a while precisely because a 
depreciated Lira allowed them to maintain a competitive edge. This “fortunate” 
macroeconomic constellation -  comparatively high debt levels and a weak 
national currency - prevailed from 1991 to 1995, the period in which the fiscal 
effort was mostly concentrated. Not only did the debt-to-GDP ratio in fact 
continue to grow until 1995 but also, over the same time span, the nominal 
effective exchange rate depreciated by an annual average of 6.9 percent 
(European Commission 2003b)10. It was thereafter, in 1996, that the Lira 
regained a large part of its value in conjunction with its re-entering of the ERM, 
one of the conditions for access to EMU. The stronger Lira induced a different 
appraisal of the situation from some of the interest groups confirming their 
sensitivity to exchange rate issues. First, Confmdustria openly criticised the 
excessively high exchange rate on which the government had agreed Italy’s 
membership of ERM. Secondly, content analysis shows that the year 1996 
represents a structural break with business actors shifting their attention from the 
size to the content of budget consolidation, as mentioned above (Appendix la). 
Their most intensive preference became the opposition to tax increases; second 
was their support for spending cuts. Thirdly, after 1998, under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, the correlation between the size of fiscal adjustment and its revenue
10 This figure compares with an average depreciation o f just 1.5 percent in 1988-1990 (European 
Commission 2003). It is interesting to note that this was a period in which, against a rather stable 
and moderately strong Lira, Confmdustria started to push more aggressively for the elimination 
of the wage indexation system. Inflation and wage control allowed export-oriented firms to 
preserve competitiveness once the national currency started alarmingly appreciating.
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component became looser. This should confirm that fiscal aggregates tend indeed 
to reflect societal preferences11.
While it is manifest that Confmdustria adopted this position, it is less obvious 
that this was eventually reflected in policy outcomes. If my overall argument is 
valid, once the macroeconomic environment changed in 1995/96, the very 
interaction between domestic interests should experience some changes. First, 
because there existed fewer options for a political bargain among social partners, 
tensions between labour and capital should rise. Second, deficit reduction would 
be less revenue-based, and more so where the government is sensitive to business 
actors’ claims. As to the first point, it is believed here that it is in the realm of 
wage bargaining that one can best assess the evolution of the relationship 
between labour and capital. Actors’ perceptions of constraints and opportunities 
in the national economy are expected to spill over onto labour markets, thereby 
affecting the relative level of conflict in wage rounds. For instance, employers 
will resist wage rises if they cannot compensate for them in other policy areas. 
They will be keener on wage moderation once the national currency has 
appreciated failing to be a boost to competitiveness. Following this reasoning, I 
should then detect a negative correlation between real wages and currency 
appreciation. And indeed, at the macro-level at least, such a link is discernible.
As soon as the Lira appreciated, real compensations per employee descended. In 
1994 and 1995, real wage changes became negative, for the first time since 1986, 
showing decreases of 0.4 and 0.8 percent respectively (European Commission 
2004)12.
The second hypothesis seems also largely to be confirmed. Empirical evidence 
shows that with the appreciation of the Lira came a shift in fiscal strategies. If 
between 1991 and 1995 the average annual increase of CA revenues amounted to
n The statement might sound arbitrary and will be better qualified in the following paragraph.
12 The identification o f this correlation is extremely significant. It is in fact counterintuitive. 
Conventional macroeconomics theory would suggest that, with currency appreciation controlling 
for domestic price levels, ceteris paribus, real wages would be destined to rise. At least, this is 
expected in the short-term before the stronger exchange rate bits into exports, inducing firms to 
slow production down and with it stop offering jobs with the result that real wages need to go 
down. Yet, this is likely to happen only against the medium-term and would not apply to the two- 
year perspective adopted here.
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1 percent of GDP, then in 1995-98, it went down to a more modest 0.2 percent 
(own calculations). Again, the correlation is loose, as it does not account for 
other determinants of fiscal strategy choices (e.g. partisanship). And it is 
indisputable that also partisanship played a role. In 1994, under the liberal right- 
wing Berlusconi Government, total CA revenues decreased for the first time 
since 1987 by a considerable 2.5 percent of GDP13. Nevertheless, while the size 
of tax alleviation is a signal of the government’s responsiveness to its natural 
electorate, the fact that the trend continued more or less in the same direction 
also thereafter indicates that strong partisan arguments can be discharged. In a 
nutshell, irrespective of their ideological orientation, Italian governments in the 
1990s were all prone to compensate currency appreciation with lower fiscal 
pressure.
I demonstrated above that a diminishing debt and an appreciating currency 
somehow narrowed the common ground between labour and capital. On labour 
markets, unions’ arms got more and more twisted into wage moderation. 
Moreover, after 1995, business actors proved less liable to accept high fiscal 
pressure. Yet, the analysis of official documents and press releases shows that, 
even amongst labour unions, revenue increases were perceived with less 
enthusiasm than in the years before. As a way of confirming the conceptual 
model herein presented, it might be interesting to relate also wage developments 
to the content of fiscal consolidation. Rudimental correlations between real wage 
and total CA income changes highlight a clearly positive relationship between 
the two variables (Graph 19). This confirms that a relationship between wage and 
fiscal policies existed. Namely, once real wages started decreasing at a time 
when EMU was approaching and employers showing greater concern for unit 
labour costs, then it is no surprise if unions’ acceptance of tax-maximising 
measure became less unconditional than used to be.
13 True, in 1994, the Lira was only starting to appreciate but that was sufficient to shift the 
attention o f the business community away from exchange rate policy. In addition, further 
appreciation was expected in the very short-term with one o f the Maastricht criteria being 
participation in normal ERM bands.
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Graph 19. Italy: Correlation between CA Revenue Changes 
and Changes in Real Wages per Employee, 1991-1997
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2.2. G e rm a n y : th e  s tra ig h tja c k e t o f  m o n e ta ry  hegem ony
Earlier I indicated that the striking o f a deal between German capital and labour 
over fiscal adjustment was made difficult by the unfavourable distribution o f  
actors’ preferences regarding deficit reduction and its financing. Low public 
indebtedness and a hard currency regime shut o ff the option o f  obtaining 
credibility gains on financial markets. Moreover, the unification shock was not 
sufficient to create uncertainty and/or to undermine the credibility o f  the German 
economic system. In a nutshell, Germany did not enjoy the catching up potential 
characteristic o f  weak systems. The confrontation between domestic competing 
interests dealt mainly with the composition o f  macroeconomic adjustment, with 
the social partners envisaging quite different deficit reduction strategies. And in 
fact, the correlation between deficit reduction and the change in total revenues is 
not linear, as one would expect in the presence o f  a symmetric trade-off, but U- 
shaped. While the limited number o f  observations hardly makes the result robust, 
a tentative interpretation can nonetheless be pursued. Where the government is 
able to implement rigorous fiscal consolidation (right-side o f  the quadrant), then
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society (i.e. business actors) is willing to accept greater tax levels. As the fiscal 
stance begins relaxing, there is less tolerance for fiscal pressure levels. It is 
instead more difficult to understand developments in the left-hand quadrant 
(Graph 20). Here, there is hardly any evidence o f  a political bargain between 
labour and capital. Instead, fiscal consolidation resolves in a confrontation 
between fiscal authorities and the only demand component (i.e. investment) that 
is believed capable o f  supporting indirectly fiscal discipline (i.e. driving output 
growth).
Graph 20. Germany: Correlation between change in CA total 
revenues and CA deficit reduction, 1991-98
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Source: European Commission, General Government Data 2003
From 1989 to 1993, German fiscal authorities faced severe challenges. Re­
unification had come about with shocking rapidity, and the need to support 
transition in the former DDR with major financial transfers translated into 
growing pressures on the federal budget. At the outset, in order to finance this 
extraordinary spending, the Kohl Government had no other choice but to increase 
public incomes and chose the form o f augmented direct taxation with the so- 
called Solidarity Charge. This fiscal strategy proved highly unpopular amongst 
export-oriented business actors as it was combined with equally unfavourable 
developments on foreign exchange markets, i.e. the appreciation o f  the DM. The 
latter outcome was driven by the Bundesbank's monetary policy. In the fear that
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unification-induced expenditures would push inflation up, in the very early 1990s, 
the German Central Bank increased official interest rates for twelve consecutive 
months. Higher domestic rates attracted capital from abroad, inducing a rapid 
appreciation of the exchange rate. In turn, during this period the fiscal effort was 
relatively modest as the government had to compensate business for the costs of 
greater fiscal pressure and currency appreciation. It did so by providing West 
German firms with investment opportunities in the East, which had the effect of 
amplifying government social and tax expenditures.
Marked by the unfavourable juxtaposition of greater fiscal pressure, fiscal 
profligacy, a restrictive monetary stance and an ensuing appreciated currency, the 
situation soon became unsustainable. In particular, the BDI was intensively 
lobbying the Kohl Government asking that alternative ways be found to manage 
fiscal policy. In other words, currency appreciation here had the effect of 
mobilising organised capital in favour of expenditure restraints. The subsequent 
fiscal interventions were in fact concentrated on the expenditure side of the 
budget, marking a significant shift in the government’s fiscal strategy. In parallel, 
with the Bundesbank having relaxed its monetary stance, the DM started to 
depreciate after 1993. In this respect, in both periods, those of 1990-93 and of 
1993-96, there was no room for a compromise between competing socio­
economic interests over fiscal reform. In the early 1990s, Germany’s revenue- 
based fiscal adjustment came with currency appreciation. As a consequence, 
political considerations led to rather loose fiscal discipline. In the second period, 
once the DM had returned to its initial levels after 1994 fiscal interventions 
concentrated on the expenditure side of the budget.
But did exchange rate changes at least affect the conduct of collective 
bargaining? It was indicated earlier that, once the exchange rate proves 
inadequate to support export growth, business interests try to find compensation 
in the framework of wage negotiations. Again, not even here were German 
employers able to immediately obtain visible pay-offs. Following the decision to 
equalise West and East German wages, the overall level of German wages went 
up. The most significant increases were registered in 1991 and 1992, when real 
compensations per employee for the unified Germany grew by 2.4 and 5.2
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percent respectively. It has been suggested that greater wage costs were 
successively used as an excuse to justify employers’ insistence on a necessary 
reduction of their contributions to social security programmes as well as on 
welfare state reform (Leaman in Berger and Compston 2002). Fiscal adjustment 
in Germany had no chance of being consensual, as demonstrated by the fact that, 
at the same time as the Government’s fiscal strategy started targeting public 
expenditures, unions’ wage demands relaxed under the threat of growing 
unemployment. Again, there is no indication that a trade-off existed between 
fiscal, exchange rate and wage policies. This is reflected in the failure of the 
1996 Pact.
As to the evolution of public indebtedness, it is interesting to note how, against 
Italy’s surprising recovery, the German debt-to-GDP ratio rapidly deteriorated, 
yet not to the extent that it created uncertainty about the soundness of the 
German economic system. In fact, notwithstanding the revolutionary character of 
unification, the Federal Government continued to adhere to economic orthodoxy, 
trying to keep inflation at bay by means of a restrictive monetary stance. Possibly 
thanks to the country’s positive inflation record, international investors did not 
loose confidence in the prospect of a successful transition in East Germany, as 
demonstrated by the fact that government bonds continued to enjoy a low risk 
premium -  even after the debt level had overshot the Maastricht reference value - 
and that, overall, the international value of the DM remained surprisingly stable.
Again, as in the Italian case but in a more dramatic manner, debt changes did not 
induce a significant shift in the preferences of domestic groups; instead, 
historical debt levels are of significance. This confirms the centrality of the 
arguments on credibility, where the latter is built around a more complex set of 
variables than yearly deficit and debt levels. Domestic preferences were instead 
more visibly affected by exchange rate fluctuations. However, the resulting new 
constellation was still not one that would have favoured the formation of an 
inclusive social consensus over budgetary consolidation.
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3. Extending the Argument: Shadow Cases
A two-country comparison always risks becoming entangled into the specificity 
of the cases treated, raising doubts about the applicability of the research results 
to other realities. No doubt, the story that has been told here is strongly informed 
by the politico-economic peculiarities of Germany and Italy. In this section, I 
intend to test if my general hypothesis about the role of societal preferences and 
social pacts can be applied to other instances too. With this aim, I introduce the 
shadow cases of Belgium and Portugal. I will examine if and how socio­
economic interests in these EU countries have incorporated debt levels and 
exchange rate trends into their evaluation of the costs and benefits from fiscal 
adjustment. As in the previous exercise, I am concerned with exposing the micro­
foundations of EMU-induced budgetary consolidation.
Before turning to the analysis, a definitional clarification is necessary. Countries 
are classified with an eye to long-term developments. High-debt countries are 
those that have suffered from comparatively high public indebtedness in the 
period from 1970 to 1998 (e.g. Belgium, Greece, Italy and, to some extent, 
Ireland). By the same token, low-debt countries are those that, in the same period, 
have enjoyed relatively low debt-to-GDP ratios (e.g. Finland, Germany, Portugal 
and Spain). This categorization appears quite functional considering that small 
differences in the debt burden from one country to the other are not likely to 
matter, nor to induce different processes of preference formation. Along these 
lines, Belgium is probably the only country one can meaningfully compare with 
Italy as it suffered from a similar debt-to-GDP ratio. The same historical 
perspective is used to identify currency regimes. Hard-currency countries are 
those that have showed a record of currency stability from 1970 to 1998 (e.g. 
Belgium, Netherlands). Germany is in this respect a particular example; as the 
anchor currency of the DM was irrevocably stable, at least in the EU. Soft- 
currency countries have known frequent depreciations against the DM over the 
same period (e.g. Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain).
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3.1.Fiscal adjustment and interest politics in Belgium
Stylised facts
The aim of this section is to describe fiscal adjustment in Belgium, the shape of 
the country’s budgetary process and the contribution of social partners to deficit 
reduction in the 1990s. While the primary interest lies in EMU-induced budget 
consolidation, the interpretative approach adopted here calls for a consideration 
of the country’s economic history as well. Since the 1970s, in parallel to events 
in other European countries, Belgium suffered from a growing debt burden. By 
the end of the decade, the country’s stock of debt had already reached a 
significant level. At that point, political elites started accepting the idea that 
macroeconomic adjustment was unavoidable. In 1981, the Christian Democrat 
Martens implemented a drastic austerity programme, yet only after having 
formed a coalition with liberal parties on the right that gave him sufficient 
political back-up to pursue such an unpopular plan (Jones 2003). The programme 
displayed positive results with the public deficit set on a firm downward trend 
after 1982 (Graph 21). It is interesting to note that, in those years, voluntary 
wage restraint from part of labour unions offered an important contribution to 
fiscal discipline, as in Italy in the 1990s.
However, from 1987 the net borrowing requirement started to deteriorate again. 
When in 1991 the country committed itself to EMU, the deficit was about 8 
percent of GDP. It was only from 1993 that the Belgian government was able to 
reduce it to a considerable extent, in the end managing to bring the country into 
EMU. As to the timing of reform, it is interesting to note that, while certainly 
visible, the Maastricht-effect was less pronounced in Belgium than in other 
countries, considering that a trend of continuous deficit reduction had already 
been set in motion in 1981 -  with some observers including Belgium in the 
category of “early adjusters” (Hancke and Soskice 2003). The size of deficit 
reduction is testimony of a successful adjustment; yet not to the same extent as 
the Italian one. In nominal terms, the Belgian government managed to bring the 
deficit below the Maastricht target. However, in real terms, the country’s 
discretionary fiscal effort was not equal to Italy’s. In 1989-1997, the CA primary
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surplus improved by 3.3 percent of GDP against 9.6 percent in Italy (Caselli and 
Rinaldi 1998), the difference being larger than the initial gap between their 
respective deficit levels. The Belgian adjustment tale is also special in terms of 
its composition. Belgium resorted in the first years to revenue-maximising 
measures but then switched to an expenditure-based strategy. In the period 1995- 
98,80 percent of the improvement of the primary surplus came from lower 
primary expenditures and only the remaining 20 percent from a rise in total 
public revenues. Most expenditure cuts concerned the federal level and social 
security budgets (Ministry of Finance 1998). If the debt ratio is such an important 
determinant of fiscal adjustment, why did two countries with similar debts 
perform so differently?
It seems that country’s currency regime might in fact explain this paradox. The 
Belgian exchange rate policy is a peculiar one. The country has historically been 
in favour of exchange rate stability. With the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971, the national government opted almost immediately for a 
stabilization of the Franc against the DM. It was the significance of export-led 
growth in this extremely open economy that led domestic actors to prioritise 
price stability, export competitiveness and economic policy autonomy see 
(Frieden 2002). Interestingly, this perspective was shared by both export-oriented 
and sheltered sectors. Currency stability had firstly the advantage of maintaining 
the price of imported goods constant. Second, an appreciated Franc protected the 
economy from imported inflation. Third, a stable exchange rate was believed to 
favour borrowing from abroad, should deficit spending be necessary. This 
strategy implied costs too. To maintain competitiveness, wage and price 
developments had to be kept under strict control. In addition, overly 
expansionary fiscal policies were risky to the extent that they pushed demand for 
imports upwards, thereby threatening the exchange rate itself (Jones 2003).
Belgian fiscal policy is to be understood against this background; most fiscal 
decisions happened to be subject to the exchange-rate constraint. There is ample 
evidence of these two policy areas being strictly interconnected. For example, 
just before implementing his austerity programme, Prime Minister Martens 
succeeded in imposing on a recalcitrant Socialist opposition a realignment of the
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Franc against the DM, which consisted de facto  o f  a devaluation. If industrial 
sectors welcom ed the prospect o f  greater export-led growth, Socialists feared the 
impact o f  a devalued currency on wages. But, in this instance, Martens was 
sufficiently persuasive in arguing that his budgetary consolidation plan would 
keep price levels under control, thus pre-empting the inflationary potential o f  
devaluation. In the 1990s, the Belgian Government continued to pursue a hard 
currency policy line until the adoption o f  the Euro. This approach required that 
wage developments also be consistent with fiscal and exchange rate policy 
choices. And, in 1991-93, unions’ lack o f  discipline together with the continued 
operation o f  automatic wage indexation had the effect o f  widening Belgium ’s 
wage gap with trading partners (FT 12/7/1993).
Graph 21. Belgium: Public Debt, CA and Actual Deficit, 1981-
2000
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The Belgian budgetary process
Engineered to guarantee representation within a divided society, over the years 
the Belgian electoral system has produced multi-party coalitional governments. 
The country’s fragile institutional set-up has probably compromised fiscal 
discipline at various times. Not only have budgets to be negotiated between
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ministers responding to different socio-economic constituencies, but also 
federalism implied that regional cleavages existed too and that, as a result, 
multiple institutional levels and actors had to cooperate towards the achievement 
of the agreed fiscal targets. One can therefore understand why budget reform was 
on the political agenda for a long time. For example, successful deficit reduction 
in 1981-87 was preceded by the parliament’s granting of special powers to the 
government and by the introduction of rules requiring a firmer commitment to 
budget targets from fiscal authorities. Similarly, in 1989, in an attempt to 
overcome coordination problems between the regional and the federal level, 
some budget responsibilities were transferred directly to regions. Still, most of 
these changes were not sufficient to reverse the course of fiscal policy. First, 
during the 1980s, in spite of positive results, budget targets continued to be 
regularly overshot (Hallerberg 2003). Second, in 1987, deficit and debt levels 
started to grow again (Graph 21). When, in 1992, Von Hagen computed 
structural indexes with the aim of measuring the relative efficiency of different 
national budget processes, Belgium figured amongst the less virtuous budget 
systems, together with Italy and Greece (von Hagen 1992).
Under the threat of exclusion from EMU, in 1990-98, Belgian budget institutions 
showed clear signs of improvement. The external constraint functioned as a 
catalyst towards the common goal of fiscal discipline. In this period, the 
government further strengthened the role of the High Council of Finance, an 
advisory body responsible for providing government with indications on the 
macroeconomic scenario and on fiscal goals. The Council set budget targets 
which political leaders accepted committing themselves to, partly in the fear that 
failure to adjust public finances would lead to severe electoral punishment. 
Overall, there is no doubt that the Belgian budgetary process has been subject to 
some ameliorative restructuring in the 1990s. Measured again in 2001, the Von 
Hagen structural index showed some improvement. However, it should be noted 
that, this was modest compared to the experience of other countries that, in the 
same period, underwent budget reform, e.g. Italy, Ireland, Greece (Hallerberg 
2003). Against these data, it can be concluded that political and budget 
institutions per se have not been key determinants of the country’s fiscal
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performance. They fail to explain either successful nominal adjustment or 
modest real adjustment or the choice over the content of deficit reduction.
The social partners
Moving on to social partners, the interesting trait of the Belgian performance in 
the 1990s is in fact the failure of social pacts. This contrasts with Italy’s glorious 
results. What does this failure say about social partnership in hard times? Social 
concertation is deeply rooted in Belgian social history. As early as 1944, in the 
wake of WWII, trade unionists and employers’ representatives drafted an 
agreement known as “Draft Social Solidarity Agreement”. With it, both parties 
recognised each other’s role. They confirmed their right to autonomous 
collective bargaining. Most importantly, they became budget actors to the extent 
that the Government was obliged to consult them on various social and economic 
issues before the parliamentary budget session. Finally, the agreement set the 
guidelines for the creation of a social security system based on contributions 
coming from employers and employees. It was in this respect a typical case of 
tripartite consultation where the Government played only an ancillary role, just 
having to supervise decisions taken by the social partners. Indeed, any more 
direct Government intervention, especially in the area of collective bargaining, 
was badly received by both sides. For instance, in 1976, when in the wake of a 
deep economic crisis the Belgian Government unilaterally imposed wage 
restraint, the social partners reacted with disapproval. But, from then onwards, 
Governments never lost sight of wage developments. The deficit reduction 
successfully implemented in the early 1980s was set against the background of a 
typical political exchange between Government and labour unions:
[The Prime Minister and the Christian Democratic trade union leader] traded- 
off wage moderation against fiscal consolidation -setting targets for how 
much restraint the unions could be expected to deliver and how much 
expenditure reduction they could be expected to tolerate. One result of these 
meetings was to focus attention on the introduction of subsidies from general 
coffers for social welfare outlays that traditionally received their financing 
through payroll taxes. In this way, (the Prime Minister) could use fiscal 
outlays to reduce labour costs and so compensate for any shortfall in wage 
moderation (Jones 2003, 13).
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After the disruptions experienced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, social 
concertation came once again to the forefront of governments’ agenda at the end 
of the 1980s, as the project of European monetary unification was taking shape. 
Comparatively, Belgium continued to show, in those years, weak public finances. 
After a notable improvement from 1983 onwards, the public deficit and, as a 
result, the debt burden deteriorated once again. The revival of social concertation 
led to the signing of a Competitiveness Act in 1989, with which the social 
partners and Government agreed to control wage increases in comparison with 
those of the country’s main trading partners. When, in 1993, domestic actors 
registered for the first time a real competitiveness loss, with the public deficit 
still set on an upward trend, an attempt was made to come to a more 
comprehensive social pact that would include also employment and social 
security. After its failure following the withdrawal of Socialist union FGTB (FT 
25/10/1993), the Government intervened unilaterally, in spite of widespread 
protest, and introduced a wage freeze, a change to the price index and a 
conditional reduction in SSC. A renewed attempt to conclude a social pact failed 
again in 1994 (Arcq and Pochet in Fajertag and Pochet 2000).
Slowly the attention started to move from public finances to Belgium’s 
increasing unemployment rate. In 1996, the Government and the social partners 
agreed on a new Competitiveness Act. Here, the focus was on the reduction of 
labour costs. It was believed that excessive SSC together with the operation of a 
wage indexation system were undermining national competitiveness and 
therewith employment creation. And, in this respect, it is interesting to note how, 
in contrast to Italy, Belgian unions and employers failed to agree on the 
elimination of the wage indexation system14. Amongst other goals, the new pact 
aimed at “setting out a general framework for lowering wage costs, whilst 
maintaining financial equilibrium of the social security system by such means as 
alternative funding methods” (Official Statement, 12/2/1996 in www.etuc.org). 
But, in 2002, failure to find “alternative funding methods” led to a deterioration 
of social security budgets (Fajertag and Pochet 2000).
14 The maintenance o f the wage indexation system is well explained by the fact that Belgium, 
because o f the hard currency regime in which it was in, continued to benefit from a low inflation 
level.
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Arcq and Pochet noted how any agreement between social partners and 
Government was constrained by the inability of the latter to provide the parties 
with side payments. It was difficult in this respect to come to a compromise over 
an agenda that included simultaneously fiscal discipline, wage moderation, and 
welfare reform (Arch and Pochet in Fajertag and Pochet 2000). If this was indeed 
the case, then it seems interesting to explain why, in Italy, such a compromise 
was possible with social partners agreeing on deficit reduction, the elimination of 
the wage indexation system as well as on a qualitatively significant pension 
reform in 1995. It is argued here that differences between the two currency 
regimes may have contributed to these divergent outcomes.
Italian unions agreed to the elimination of so-called scala mobile in the summer 
of 1992 in the hope that this move would allow the Lira to stay within the ERM 
bands. The measure was not sufficient to halt the rapid devaluation of the Lira. 
However, in the middle of fiscal retrenchment at a time in which domestic 
consumption was rapidly decreasing, Italy’s export-oriented business community 
could take advantage of the depreciated currency. By default, it left unions with 
the responsibility of defining the content of deficit reduction, which in fact was 
based on additional public revenues and was accompanied by a financially 
neutral reform of the public pension system. No similar trade-offs were possible 
in the political economy of Belgium. The Belgian Franc continued to be a strong 
and stable currency. As a consequence, devaluation was not a viable option to 
boost competitiveness. Moreover, there was no particular advantage from wage 
moderation in itself; what mattered was rather the development of Belgian wages 
in comparison to those agreed in Germany, France and the Netherlands. In other 
words, there were constraints on the type of political exchange social partners 
could come to under Government supervision. Arcq and Pochet explain this state 
of affair and its evolution as follows:
In the eighties and nineties, under pressure to reduce the public debt, [the 
government] has provided a framework for bargaining by laying down in 
advance the often narrow margins for negotiations, in an attempt to safeguard 
the balance between wages, competitiveness and social security. The most 
recent agreement has also shifted the players’ positions somehow. The social 
partners are attempting to regain a degree of autonomy and the government is
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using what little room for manoeuvre was created by an unexpectedly rapid 
reduction in the public debt to promote the conclusion of an agreement (Arcq 
and Pochet 2000, 132).
Sequencing as supporting evidence
In this section, I intend to examine briefly whether a closer look at sequencing 
may shed additional light on the Belgian political economy of fiscal adjustment. 
With this aim, it is analysed whether changes to exchange rates and debt levels 
altered domestic actors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits from budget 
consolidation. Compared with the Italian case, the Belgian experience differs in 
one important respect, namely the fact that, because of the country’s hard- 
currency regime, the exchange rate did not appear as a realistic instrument to 
compensate losers. The Franc was quite stable in comparison to other EU 
currencies (e.g. Italian Lira, Greek Drachma, Spanish Peseta). Still, in the 1990s, 
minor fluctuations in the exchange rate did take place. The decision to move 
from a revenue- to an expenditure-based strategy in 1993/94 took place after the 
nominal effective exchange rate had been losing value for three consecutive 
years. This development was perceived as alarming considering that ensuing 
imported inflation was pushing labour costs upwards through the operation of 
wage indexation, widening the wage gap with the country’s trading partners. 
Against this background, any intervention on the revenue side of the budget 
would be detrimental to competitiveness. This explains the decision to focus on 
expenditure restraints. In addition, until then, the debt-to-GDP ratio had 
continued growing, possibly also being one of the causes behind the Franc’s loss 
of credibility on financial markets. A reversal of the fiscal strategy was deemed 
necessary, yet fiscal authorities had no alternative but to “go it alone”. There was 
less of a confrontation between the interests of labour and those of business; it 
was a question of survival of the national economy at large. Cuts were 
unavoidable, but left unions unsatisfied. Their decision not to sign a social pact is 
to be understood against this context. The government had no means to pay them 
off, either directly (more spending) or indirectly (preservation of welfare state).
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3.2. Fiscal Adjustment and Interest Politics in Portugal
Stylisedfacts
Portugal had been suffering from a growing debt ratio to GDP since the 1970s, 
partly as a result of the nationalization of banking and heavy industry in 1974/75, 
partly because of the presence of a dependent central bank inclined to monetize 
government debt (de Macedo and Sebastiao 1989). As had been the case of Italy, 
this particular system of fiscal governance soon led to strong inflationary 
pressures. In the second half of the 1980s, it became apparent that the situation 
was not sustainable. In turn, in close collaboration with the social partners, the 
government implemented a far-reaching fiscal adjustment programme. When in 
1991 the Portuguese government committed itself to the project of a single 
European currency, the debt-to-GDP ratio had already started to decline, 
signalling one of the most celebrated successes of the social democratic 
government in office since 1987. However, the improvement was short-lived. 
From 1992 to 1995, the debt burden deteriorated, registering also the lagged 
impact of an uncertain deficit trend (Graph 22).
It is striking that the Portuguese CA deficit began to expand in 1992, once the 
conditions for access into EMU had already been set out in the Maastricht Treaty. 
In terms of timing, there is hence little evidence of EMU being the main driver of 
the country’s fiscal performance. After significant deficit reduction in 1991/92, 
the net borrowing requirement increased again in 1992/93 in response to the 
government’s expansionary fiscal policy stance. From Figure 2, it appears that 
deficit spending was initiated once the economic cycle had turned negative, with 
the result that the actual deficit turned out to be even higher than the cyclically 
adjusted one. It started decreasing steadily only from 1992, only to grow again 
after 1997. Inevitably, unsuccessful deficit reduction fed into the debt, which 
continued to grow until 1995, marking a modest overall fiscal performance. As to 
the size, in 1989-1997, the CA deficit fell 1.7 percent of GDP, largely thanks to 
descending interest payments with, in fact, the primary surplus deteriorating by 
0.4 percent of GDP. As for the composition, most of the interventions concerned 
the revenue side of the budget. In 1991-98, cyclically adjusted revenues
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improved by 4.2 percent o f  GDP, while expenditures decreased by 1.1 percent. 
Primary expenditure growth was driven mainly by greater compensations for 
public employees. Expenditure restraints were only possible in the field o f  
interest payments thanks to a rapid convergence o f  short-term interest rates to the 
EU average.
Graph 22. Portugal: CA, Actual Deficit and Public Debt, 1981-
99
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As to exchange rate policies, Portugal has gone through several regime changes. 
In 1989, the Escudo joined the ERM. The choice o f  opting for exchange rate 
stability came after the country had suffered for a long time from imported 
inflation. From 1973 to 1989, average annual depreciation against the DM had 
amounted to about 15 percent (Frieden 2002). The Social Democratic 
government that had brought the country into the ERM bands was keen to stick 
to the exchange rate commitment and managed in fact to preserve a good degree 
o f  stability thereafter. Behind this decision was the belief that a strong exchange 
rate would force domestic firms to improve competitiveness (FT 3/11/1992). 
When in September 1992 the Spanish Peseta devalued by 6 percent, Portuguese 
monetary authorities attempted to resist speculative attacks on the Escudo, but 
were forced in November to devalue by the same amount. The national currency 
remained relatively weak until August 1993 when the ERM imploded and all 
currencies were allowed to float within a 15-percent band (FT 23/11/1993).
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Overall, in spite of the marginal devaluation in 1992, the Portuguese government 
remained keen on currency stability. To be sure, export-oriented sectors 
appreciated the decision to follow the Peseta suit, but lamented the fact that the 
currency continued to be too strong. With this approach to the exchange rate 
came the fact that domestic interest rates had to be maintained relatively high to 
defend the parity. Such a restrictive monetary stance was especially detrimental 
to the interests of SMEs (FT 8/11/1993). In spite of the unpopularity of economic 
policy, even in the following years, the government went on prioritising 
exchange rate stability over monetary easing (FT 28/10/1994). Finance Minister 
Daniel Bessa commented: “the only way Portugal can regain competitiveness is 
by continuing to lower inflation and interest rates -unless it devalues, but that 
would be worse” (FT 26/3/1996).
The Portuguese budgetary process
Similarly to Italy, Portugal has historically been characterised by a very unstable 
institutional set-up. After democracy was restored in 1975, a proportional 
electoral system generated multi-party coalitions. Not only were Governments 
made of a large number of parties, but also they were highly unstable, changing 
almost yearly. The emergence of a single-party majority Government in 1987 
under the social democrats of the PSD, a party at the right of the domestic 
political spectrum, opened up a unique period of institutional stability, which 
lasted until 1995 when a new minority Government took office (Magone 2000). 
From 1987 to 1995, even the budget process reflected the rise of political 
stability. Decision-making was centralised around the Finance Minister who, 
during that period, managed to exercise a good degree of control over public 
finances. In sum, the efficiency of the budget institutions was significantly 
improved, at least until 1995 (Hallerberg 2003).
Nonetheless, there is insufficient evidence to prove that the centralization of 
budget policy-making improved the country’s fiscal performance in a dramatic 
fashion. True, from 1987 to 1988, when the newly appointed Government 
implemented a far-reaching and unexpectedly popular fiscal adjustment 
programme, deficit and debt levels visibly diminished. Yet, such a trend had 
already begun in 1985. Moreover, as of 1989, the net borrowing requirement was
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rising again and did so until 1991 when the PSD government was confirmed in 
office with a large majority at the end of quite an aggressive electoral campaign. 
Over that period, deficit deterioration was caused by the government’s decision 
to raise monthly paychecks for all public employees, a decision reached in the 
run-up to the elections. In addition, it does not seem that the establishment of a 
minority Government in 1995 and the ensuing weakening of the Finance 
Minister had an immediate negative effect on fiscal policy outcomes. One has to 
wait until 1997 to see deficit levels deteriorate. Arguably, having obtained green 
light for access into EMU, Portugal did not feel the threat of exclusion from 
European monetary integration.
In all these respects, it does not seem that political and budget institutions were 
somehow responsible for the country’s sub-optimal fiscal performance in the 
1990s. Contingent factors (e.g. electoral cycles) and Governments’ 
responsiveness to socio-economic interests seem to have played a greater role.
The social partners
Social concertation was initiated in Portugal at a time when the other European 
countries were starting to distance themselves from it. After the creation of the 
Standing Committee for Social Concertation (CPCS) in 1984, Government, 
employers and part of the labour unions intensified contacts with each other. This 
led to the approval, in 1986, of the first Income Policy Agreement. Not 
surprisingly, wage policy was the first area to be subject to a trilateral agreement. 
At the time, wage-driven inflationary pressures were believed to be the country’s 
most urgent economic problem. The exclusive focus of the agreement was to 
control wage growth (Royo 2002). On the other hand, the Economic and Social 
Agreement (AES) signed in 1990 was more comprehensive, as it attempted to 
tackle issues of health and safety, vocational training and working time 
reduction. Its success was constrained by the non-participation of Portugal’s 
largest union confederation, the communist CGTP, and by the ensuing difficult 
implementation of the pact’s provisions.
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A response to those difficulties was found in 1996 when the Government first 
presented a Short-Term Social Concertation Agreement and then inaugurated a 
programme entitled “Strategic Concertation to Modernise Portugal”, which 
became the Strategic Concertation Agreement (1996-99). Among the decisions 
taken within the pact was the setting of minimum terms for collective bargaining 
in all sectors -  establishing for example benchmarks for wage rises - and the 
reduction of the working week from 44 to 40 hours in two consecutive years (FT 
25/1/1996). The latter agreement had two important features. First, it was meant 
to be comprehensive; social partners were asked to contribute to diverse and 
wide policy areas, such as income and employment policies, social security, 
environment and agriculture. Second, it introduced majority voting as a substitute 
for the previous consensus-building strategy that had been used within the AES 
(Campos Lima and Naumann 2000).
What induced Portuguese social partners to take part in social dialogue in spite of 
the fact that the country had no a corporatist tradition? The Portuguese 
Confederation of Industry (CIP) was rather sceptical about the whole experiment. 
It accused social concertation of being “a complex system controlled by the 
State”. Moreover, organised capital was critical of the very inefficiency of the 
system. It would not matter if the agreed measures were economically desirable 
or not, as their implementation would be nonetheless blocked by labour 
representatives at the workplace. In spite of its rhetorical scepticism, the 
Confederation nonetheless participated in the agreements. On the other side of 
the spectrum, national labour unions were quite divided in their appreciation of 
the social dialogue. The CGPT that refused to sign the 1996 agreement insisted 
that bilateralism was the best approach to industrial relations. Conversely the 
view of the General Workers’ Unions (UGT) was positive. It was recognised that 
social pacts had allowed inflation control; industrial conflict had declined; unions 
proved stronger, obtaining much larger real wage rises than in the periods where 
no collective agreement existed (http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/ 1999/12/ 
inbrief/pt9912171 n.html).
Overall, it can be observed that the determinants of social concertation in 
Portugal have been quite similar to Italy’s. All parties involved agreed on the fact
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that exclusion from EMU would be extremely detrimental to the national 
economy. By helping to keep inflation at bay, fiscal discipline would allow to 
improve the country’s competitiveness. But at the basis of the country’s 
macroeconomic adjustment was a “distributional coalition” so that all reform 
attempts have been labour protective overall (see Rhodes in Pierson 2001). In 
particular, the absence of wage moderation might explain Portugal’s 
disappointing fiscal performance in the 1990s.
Sequencing as supporting evidence
Did changes to the debt level and the exchange rate lead socio-economic actors 
to alter their perception of the costs and benefits from fiscal adjustment? The 
debt-to-GDP ratio continued growing until 1995, yet it was not particularly high 
and certainly not sufficient to allow deficit reduction to take place only through 
financial channels. In that respect, fiscal consolidation was bound to be a difficult 
political exercise to start with, as competing groups were required to reach an 
agreement over the distribution of the real adjustment burden. In 1992 the 
Escudo became subject to continuous speculative attacks. Monetary authorities 
were eventually forced to devalue in November and again in May 1993. While in 
1992 CA revenues increased by 4.4 percent, in 1993 they decreased. There were 
no visible trade-offs between fiscal and exchange rate policy. To be sure, the 
initial depreciation had not been sufficient to fuel exports; for this to happen, one 
has to wait until 1994 (Bibow 2001). In that respect, export-oriented sectors were 
still not satisfied in the early 1990s. Social pacts only allowed inflation control, 
but were not signed against a framework of visible macroeconomic trade-offs 
between policy areas, as was the case of Italy. The fact that one of the unions did 
not participate is indicative of the fact that it was not only a question of macro­
interests but also of confederations’ political and cultural heritages, which 
overshadowed grand plans.
The use of shadow cases should have corroborated a few ideas behind the present 
thesis. First, fiscal consolidation episodes are deeply embedded in their wider 
societal context. Second, socio-economic interests are probably more important 
than institutional structures to the extent that they often end up shaping
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institutions from within. Third, all high-debt countries have a strong incentive to 
consolidate (e.g. Italy, Belgium). Yet, as evident from Table 12, not only does 
their level of commitment differ, but so does the composition of adjustment. In 
particular, hard currency regimes are unlikely to opt for revenue-based 
consolidations (e.g. Belgium, Germany). By the same token, soft-currency 
regimes are not as afraid of greater fiscal pressure if the exchange rate remains a 
viable competitiveness-boosting instrument (e.g. Italy, Portugal). In this respect, 
one should include the currency regime to better account for the choice over 
composition. The combination of debt level and currency regime is what opens 
up opportunities for a political exchange between social partners. It is possible 
than in turn the presence or not of this exchange, exemplified in the successful 
conclusion of a social pact, affects the relative size of deficit reduction and even 
its persistence.
Table 12.The Hard-Soft Currency and High-Low Debt Divide: a Synopsis
HIGH-DEBT LOW-DEBT
HARD-CURRENCY
SOFT-CURRENCY
Needless to say, these results are rather indicative but it does provide a roadmap 
to understanding the link between fiscal, monetary and wage policies in the run­
up to EMU. It will be interesting to verify if and how these relationships have 
changed once EMU entered into full operation. And in the next chapter, I intend 
to look more closely at the German and Italian experience with fiscal discipline 
and social concertation after 1998 to test the extent to which EMU membership 
created a constraint or rather an opportunity. The next chapter will also offer a 
more general discussion on the political economy of fiscal consolidation and on 
future research trends and agenda.
BELGIUM (failed pact) 
Large Deficit Reduction 
Switching Strategy
GERMANY (failed pact) 
Small Deficit Reduction 
Switching Strategy
I T A L Y  (pact)
Very Large Deficit Reduction 
Revenue-Based Strategy
PORTUGAL (half-pact) 
Very Small Deficit Reduction 
Revenue-Based Strategy
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CHAPTER VIII
The Political Economy of 
Italian and German Fiscal 
Consolidation
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1. Changing Models of Capitalism in the Euro-zone?
This research project has provided a detailed analysis of the process of EMU 
convergence, of its politics and economics. At the same time, it should allow us 
to draw some conclusions about the changing nature of capitalisms and, in turn 
also of neo-corporatism, in EMU. The fact that countries reacted dissimilarly to a 
common constraint is in support of the so-called divergence theory, according to 
which deeper economic integration does not necessarily eliminate cross-country 
differences in the way in which economic systems are organised. In a more 
sophisticated fashion, the varieties of capitalism literature would argue that 
national systems are perpetuating themselves through the exploitation of their 
respective institutional comparative advantage (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Hall and 
Soskice 2001). Still, the story told here is peculiar in that it corroborates the 
divergence school of thought but contradicts the concept inherent to the varieties- 
of-capitalism literature, according to which domestic institutions continue 
adapting themselves to newly emerged circumstances, thus maintaining the 
system almost intact. The examples of Italy and Germany would in fact not 
confirm this latter point.
The Italian economic system changed quite remarkably in the 1990s. It achieved 
financial stability and improved its external credibility. In addition, social 
partners started being involved in decision-making in a more mature manner than 
was the case in the past and centralised collective bargaining was 
institutionalised. By contrast, the German coordinated market economy (CME) 
started visibly to crumble. Fiscal discipline appeared to be a more troublesome 
target and continues to be so at the time of writing. Social partners lost ground to 
the advantage of an almost fully sovereign state (Vail 2002). To what extent are 
these changes contingent? Are they structural, pointing to a transformation of the 
two respective models of capitalism and of corporatism? Was unification the 
cause of the German disease or was it just the event that brought existing 
structural weaknesses to light? These are some of the issues that will be briefly 
discussed here, inferring from events in the run-up to EMU, but in particular in 
light of the subsequent evolution from 1999 to 2004.There is an additional theme
257
to take into consideration. With the entry of EMU into operation, the European 
economic landscape has been dramatically altered. Euro-zone countries are now 
under a single monetary policy rather than in the process of making their own 
converge as much as possible. They have been deprived of the interest and 
exchange rate instrument. With fiscal policy being also relatively constrained 
under the Stability Pact, wage policy remains by and large the only game in town. 
It is certainly worth asking if the convergence process has brought about some 
form of institutional adaptation with the inevitable narrowing of differences 
between CMEs and LMEs, as suggested above. However, the investigation 
around the working of different varieties of capitalism under the new EMU 
regime is a different but similarly worthwhile matter of empirical investigation, 
which could be developed in future research. The following paragraphs look at 
these issues.
1.1.The Italian variety before and after Maastricht
One of the weakest European economies since the 1970s, Italy has been catching 
up with its EU partners in the 1990s. First, against any rational expectation, the 
country succeeded in correcting serious fiscal imbalances, thereby gaining access 
in the first wave of EMU. Budget consolidation was facilitated by the country’s 
parallel success in the fight against inflation, obtained mainly through the 
abolition of the wage indexation system. Surprisingly enough, in spite of the 
tremendous fiscal restriction, growth rates have not been as negative as might 
have been expected. With the improvement of the economic fundamentals came 
significant changes in the organization of the national economic system. The 
most visible novelty in the 1990s has probably been the intensification and 
subsequent institutionalisation of consultation rounds between government, 
employers and unions (Regini and Regalia 1997; Regini 1999). Until then, the 
varieties-of-capitalism literature had described Italy as an ambiguous model; 
however, there is no doubt that in the 1990s it started to resemble more and more 
the typology of CMEs. Needless to say, the EMU constraint represented a 
powerful incentive as in fact, after 1998, the tension towards fiscal discipline 
softened and so did the demands for social concertation.
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Having secured EMU membership, fiscal authorities relaxed their stance and in 
1998, 2000 and 2001 the country’s structural deficit even deteriorated by 0.2, 0.7 
and 1.1 percent of GDP respectively (Table 13). Still, deficit levels remained 
overall in control and most importantly in line with the Growth and Stability Pact 
provisions, at least until 2003. It is to be noted however that Italy fulfilled its 
international commitment from 1998 to 2003 only because the EMU-induced 4.1 
percent of GDP fall in interest payments contributed to maintaining the net 
borrowing requirement under control. Indeed, discretionary fiscal policy was 
slightly expansionary as authorities aimed at reducing the country’s 
comparatively high fiscal pressure, which had gone up by 6.2 percent of GDP in 
1991-97. Already the Prodi Government had introduced a far-reaching tax 
reform in 1998. Income tax brackets were reduced to 5 from 7 and the maximum 
rate cut to 46 from 51 percent. In 1999, the D’Alema Government opted for total 
SSC relief in the South for all new employment contracts (European Commission, 
2004, 64). After a rapid rise in the early 1990s, labour taxation went down to 
initial levels and from 1997 to 2001 overall fiscal pressure decreased by 2.7 
percentage points of GDP. Tax alleviation was responsible for the slight 
deterioration in the country’s fiscal position considering that spending levels 
remained relatively stable, in spite of a few attempts to alter their structure.
Table 13. Italy: Details of Fiscal Adjustment, 1998-2004
A CA deficit ACA TR ACA TE Alnterests
1998 -0.2 -1.6 -1.4 -1.1
1999 1 0.3 -0.8 -1.6
2000 -0.7 -1.4 -0.8 -0.2
2001 -1.1 -0.2 0.9 0
2002 0.9 0.1 -0.8 -0.7
2003 0.3 1.3 1 -0.5
2004 0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.3
Tot 98-04 0 -2.2 -2.7 -4.4
Key: A CA deficit = change in cyclically adjusted public deficit (as o f % GDP); A CA TR = 
change in cyclically adjusted total revenues (% GDP); A CA TE = change in cyclically adjusted 
total expenditures (% GDP); A Interests = change in interest payments (% GDP).
Source: European Commission, CA General Government Data, 2005.
Against this framework, social concertation lost momentum. In 1997, at a time 
when politics started to regain ground and the national party system to look more
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bipolar than ever, the Prodi Government already made an attempt to reduce the 
input of social partners into fiscal policy-making. He delegated to a technocratic 
commission the draft of a proposal for a vast welfare state reform without the 
initial consent of labour unions1. Subsequently, in 1999, Prime Minister 
D’Alema extended access to the negotiating table to a much larger number of 
socio-economic actors in the attempt to empty social partnership of its strong 
political connotation. The social pact signed in 1998 was by no means 
comparable to those achieved during the financial emergency. The so-called 
Christmas Package introduced measures to enhance labour market flexibility, but 
the government’s commitment to it was moderate and labour union 
representatives continued to complain about delays in the implementation of the 
pact provisions. The launching of the EU Lisbon Strategy and renewed external 
pressures on the fiscal policy of the newly appointed Berlusconi Government 
created once again an environment favourable to the signing of a social pact in 
2002. The latter revolved around wage moderation but also contained provisions 
for tax reform and a major review of the 1995 pension reform (Patto per l’ltalia
2002). Still, the fact that CGIL, the largest union confederation, refused to sign it 
is indicative of the declining importance of social concertation.
The weakening of consensual fiscal policy-making depended on numerous 
concomitant factors. First, the end of the financial emergency coincided with the 
loss of a significant incentive. Second, the business community had less of an 
interest in striking a deal with the unions. EMU membership by itself guaranteed 
relatively low and, most importantly, convergent interest rates. In parallel, the 
loss of the exchange rate instrument deprived industrialists of an important 
compensation mechanism, one that in the 1990s had allowed them to recoup 
international market shares, even if the gain was short-lived. On the other hand, 
even unions had little to offer. Once the wage indexation system had been 
eliminated, they only had a marginal role when it came to affecting inflation 
levels. Nor can they signal with monetary authorities. With Italy representing 
about 20 percent of Euro-zone GDP, their inflation expectations are insufficient 
to impact on the ECB’s policy decisions. This has loosened up the link between
1 The Prodi Government was not sufficiently strong to proceed and the proposal failed to translate 
into concrete policy outcomes when faced with unions’ opposition.
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wage, fiscal and monetary policy, possibly creating policy mix problems. And 
indeed, an important finding behind the present thesis is that the particular 
constellation of socio-economic preferences in the 1990s was not only significant 
in that it allowed for successful fiscal consolidation, but also because it created 
sufficient room for an effective coordination between wage, fiscal, and monetary 
policy, which does not seem yet available in EMU2. Thirdly, consensual policy­
making faded away together with the demand for the social-partnership model 
with the coming to power, in 2001, of the rather concertation-avert Berlusconi 
government.
In conclusion, it could be probably said that the Italian variety of capitalism has 
moved in a direction that makes it more similar to the CME-model. However, the 
new institutions remain empty shells where the interests of national economic 
agents do not exploit them to full potential. It is possibly the case that the process 
of policy and institutional learning is still under way. Moreover, when EMU 
entered in operation in 1999, Italy’s restructured institutions were too “young” to 
bear the impact of a completely new regime. First, after the Bank of Italy had 
made a tremendous effort in the 1990s to establish credibility for low-inflation 
also in the face of wage bargainers, the interest rate instrument was lost. Second, 
the loss of the exchange rate itself made social partners more sensitive to the 
relation between wage and productivity growth, with the result that firm-level 
bargaining acquired greater importance to the detriment of the successful 
experience of central wage determination characterising the 1990s.
1.2.The fate of Modell Deutschland in the Euro-zone
In recent times, a heated debate has developed around the reasons behind the 
demise, in the 1990s, of the German variety of capitalism. The weakening of the 
German economy comes after its extraordinary success in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when the country proved well equipped to sustain the international economic 
crisis managing, against the odds, to deliver low inflation, high growth and 
employment rates. One of the most exploited explanations of the recent fall calls
2 This issue will be further discussed in 1.3.
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re-unification into question. From a rather different perspective, Kitschelt and 
Streeck indicated that the very peculiarities of the German system (i.e. the 
stability of the political system and incrementalism in decision-making) 
themselves impeded a constructive response to changing external circumstances 
(Kitschelt and Streeck 2004, 3). Along similar lines, this research work has 
argued that this historical event probably simply had the effect of bringing 
existing structural weaknesses to light. Namely, Modell Deutschland started to 
fade when faced with a macroeconomic environment in which Germany’s 
original social institutions proved unable to perform as in the past. This does not 
necessarily mean that Germany has stopped being a CME but that, in the new 
context created by EMU, domestic institutions are operating in a way that leads 
to sub-optimal macroeconomic results. First, the country had to give up control 
over exchange rate policies. Second, monetary policies at large are now the 
exclusive responsibility of the ECB, with the result that national wage bargainers 
have lost an important reference partner (see Soskice and Iversen 1998). Growth 
is no longer dependent upon the behaviour of other countries, as when exports 
were driving the German locomotive. In addition, with Germany being de facto 
the anchor for wage setting in the Euro-area real exchange rate adjustment is not 
available (Hancke and Soskice 2003). With this come fiscal difficulties with 
slower growth having detrimental effects for the budget balance. In contrast to 
Italy, Germany did not even have the option of taking advantage of the regime 
change. The monetary straightjacket the country suffered from in the 1990s 
happened simply to be perpetuated under the new EMU regime .
Fiscal management changed with the coming to power, in 1998, of the Red- 
Green coalition under Chancellor Schroder. The latter was not subject to the 
unification-induced structural constraints the previous government had had to 
deal with, as the transition was more or less complete, as was the injection of 
extraordinary resources into the East. The Chancellor succeeded in cutting 
spending by 0.8 percent of GDP in 1998-2002 as well as in reducing fiscal 
pressure by 1.6 percent of GDP over the same period. In this fashion, fiscal 
discipline was preserved until 2000. However, since then Germany has
3 This issue will be further discussed in 1.3.
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experienced growing public deficits to the point where the country failed to 
respect the SGP provisions. According to the EU Commission, excessively 
numerous and inconsistent tax reforms, coupled with generally lower growth 
rates, produced lower-than-expected public revenues with the result that deficits 
surged (Table 14). This explanation is surely representative of the economics of 
the German fiscal performance; still it might be interesting to dig into the 
political rationale for so many tax reforms. Secondly, the figures illustrate that at 
the heart of the deterioration in 2000 is actually discretionary fiscal action 
leaving the impression that the federal government consciously relaxed fiscal 
policy for mere electoral purposes. Again, the picture will be complete only after 
politics are brought in.
Table 14. Germany; Details of Fiscal Adjustment, 1998-2004
A CA deficit ACA TR ACA TE A Interests
1998 0.3 -0.2 -0.5 0
1999 0.5 0.4 0 -0.1
2000 -0.4 -0.8 -0.4 -0.1
2001 -1.5 -1.5 0 -0.1
2002 -0.4 0 0.4 -0.2
2003 0.3 0.4 0 0
2004 -0.1 -1.4 -1.3 -0.1
Tot 98-04 -1.3 -3.1 -1.8 -0.6
Key: A CA deficit = change in cyclically adjusted public deficit (as o f % GDP); A CA TR = 
change in cyclically adjusted total revenues (% GDP); A CA TE = change in cyclically adjusted 
total expenditures (% GDP); A Interests = change in interest payments (%GDP); A TE no I = 
change in cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding (non adjusted) interest payments (%
GDP).
Source: European Commission, CA General Government Data, 2005.
To what extent is a reference to social consensus useful to understand the 
German experience after 1999? Following Kohl’s failed attempt to bring 
business and labour together, the ball fell in the court of the new Social 
Democratic Chancellor. Schroder was eager to show he was a supporter of 
concerted reform. By December 1998, the Government had already succeeded in 
getting the social partners to sign a new ‘Alliance for Jobs’. Participating parties 
wanted to discuss measures to boost employment. But, the pact contained also 
provisions aimed at “fundamentally” restructuring the national system of social 
security (http://www.bundesregierung.de/ artikel,-56651/Gemeinsame- 
Erklaerung-des-Buen.htm). What changed in the constellation of domestic socio­
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economic interests that allowed German social partnership to reappear?
Certainly, business continued to promote its tax-alleviation agenda just as it had 
done under the previous government. Yet, at this point, tax relief in the form of 
lower non-wage labour costs represented an area of common agreement between 
employers and employees. The considerable increase of SSC in the early 1990s 
was fundamental to exacerbating unions’ concerns for excessive non-wage 
labour costs. Nevertheless, this was not sufficient in the end to set up the terms of 
a political exchange as IG Metall refused, as a matter of principle, to consider 
SSC during wage bargaining rounds (Streeck and Trampusch 2005). At the root 
of the new social pact were also strategic considerations. The BDA and the BDI 
thought that this was their only chance to influence a traditionally more union- 
friendly Government coalition (Streeck and Hassel 2004). By the same token, the 
DGB was initially sceptical, as it expected Schroder to be sensitive to its claims 
anyways.
Interestingly enough and against functionalist predictions, the social pact was 
signed in spite of the growing organizational weakness of both organised capital 
and labour, with the first internally divided by the confrontation between large 
companies and SMEs and the second suffering from on-going membership 
losses. This confirms the interpretative perspective adopted in the present thesis 
according to which social concertation is driven above all by a convergence of 
interests rather than by the existence (or not) of the appropriate institutional 
preconditions. In the context of the new Alliance, labour unions in particular 
managed to obtain important results; higher SSC were imposed on self-employed 
and pension reform was successfully postponed. Yet, on the whole, negotiations 
proceeded at a slow pace and hardly any comprehensive cross-sectoral fiscal 
decision was taken.
Even if timid, decisions taken in the framework of the new social pact 
nonetheless exercised an impact on the country’s fiscal performance. Requests 
for lower corporate taxation put forward by the business community together 
with unions’ insistence on the preservation of the welfare state had no other 
effect except to relax fiscal discipline in the presence of a Government coalition 
that was in constant search for the largest possible consensus. Added to this was
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slowing economic growth which amplified the negative impact of tax relief on 
the state budget. Against this background, the European Commission itself 
repeatedly urged the German Government to re-launch social concertation, 
especially with the view of guaranteeing the effective implementation of the EU 
Lisbon Strategy. Yet, in May 2003, the Alliance officially ceased to function. It 
was soon clear that structural reforms would have to follow the more traditional 
parliamentary root. The subsequent pension reform was supported by a large 
inter-party consensus forged in Parliament rather than the result of the operation 
of corporatist mechanisms.
In conclusion, this thesis suggests that at the root of the German demise is the 
disaggregating of the favourable constellation of socio-economic preferences that 
had allowed successful macroeconomic adjustment in the past decades. The 
distributional implications of re-unification contributed to it having instead the 
effect of bringing existing structural weaknesses to light.
1.3.Italy and Germany in Comparative Perspective
It was the aim of the present research project to explain why Italy’s experience 
with fiscal consolidation in the 1990s was comparatively more successful than 
Germany’s. The question does not overlook important and deeply rooted 
differences between these two politico-economic systems (e.g. relative influence 
of economic orthodoxy, monetary institutions, models of corporatism, etc.). 
Before EMU convergence, it was clear that Italy and Germany represented two 
extreme poles and that the conditions that made the latter successful were exactly 
those the Italian system was mostly deficient in. Germany performed well until 
the late 1980s thanks to fiscal authorities’ pursuit of economic orthodoxy, to the 
presence of an independent and inflation-averse central bank and to collaborative 
relations between social partners. At the opposite extreme, Italy achieved quite 
disappointing economic results due to governments’ excessive fiscal profligacy, 
to the presence of a politically dependent central bank and to conflictual 
industrial relations. Quite paradoxically, these very differences are part of the 
explanation of their performance in the 1990s rather than a methodological 
limitation. The underlying argument made here is that their two different
265
economic and institutional heritages exercised feedback effects (see Pierson 
1996; Pierson 2000) in a way that allowed Italy to exploit a peculiar comparative 
advantage over Germany.
What exactly does this comparative advantage consist of? Italy’s high public 
indebtedness, wide inflation and interest rate differentials vis-a-vis its trading 
partners and a weak currency regime induced powerful domestic groups to form 
preferences over macroeconomic adjustment in such a way that a compromise 
between competing interests was achievable. Here, exchange rate, monetary, 
wage and fiscal policies were interlocked in such a way that budget actors had a 
real-time perception of possible trade-offs between different areas. True, the 
Italian government had much less room for manoeuvre than its German 
counterpart but was quite independent in the case of exchange rate and monetary 
policies. The currency was floating from 1992 to 1996. Bankitalia was then freed 
of the burden of supporting the external value of the Lira. Monetary policy has 
thus been supportive of fiscal consolidation overall, with short-term interest rates 
set on a continuous downward trend since 1992 (Table 15). In the face of fiscal 
retrenchment, when compensations in the form of greater public spending failed 
to be a viable instrument for consensus building, at least exchange rate 
developments offered a short-term leeway. Moreover, the country benefited from 
the regime change after 1999 in terms of improved credibility. EMU membership 
allowed for example a revaluation of the Lira without an overly restrictive 
monetary policy being needed for that purpose.
Table 15. The status of different policy areas before and after Maastricht
GERMANY ITALY
Pre-Maastricht Post-
Maastricht
Pre-Maastricht Post-
Maastricht
Exchange Rate Policy C onstrained Single Independent Single
Monetary Policy C onstrained by 
fiscal policy
Single M oderately
independent
Single
Wage Policy Constrained by 
m onetary policy 
unem ploym ent
Independent C onstrained by 
exchange rate
Independent
Fiscal Policy C onstrained by 
unification
C onstrained by 
SGP
C onstrained by 
high debt ratio
C onstrained by 
SGP
By way of contrast and quite paradoxically, Germany was subject to a much 
larger number of constraints. Relatively autonomous in the 1980s, fiscal policy
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came under fire in the face of the costly re-unification. The resulting fiscal 
interventions attracted the attention of the Bundesbank adding a monetary 
constraint, as central bank authorities reacted quite strongly to the unification- 
induced fiscal expansion. This in turn affected wage developments. In 1991-92, 
as the central bank was reducing the money supply, West German wages 
increased exponentially. All this impacted on the external value of the DM in a 
way that was damaging to business interests. Thus the exchange rate failed to be 
a compensatory device to the extent that the abolition of capital controls 
prevented monetary authorities from managing the international value of their 
currency. At the same time, financial markets never lost confidence in the DM. 
As a result, there was no room for market-induced fiscal gains and any fiscal 
restriction had to affect real government activities, thus targeting one socio­
economic category rather than another. True, after 1994, once employment 
loomed as a much more urgent problem than inflation, wage bargainers returned 
to restraint, but this made their opposition to welfare cuts probably even more 
fierce, thereby leaving the size of the win-set over fiscal stabilization small. In 
this respect, consensus building was a much more difficult exercise than it had 
been in Italy. Modelled around the German institutional set-up, EMU just 
happened to perpetuate this regime, adding to the system’s incapacity to react to 
the new challenges (e.g. competition from East Asian markets, more favourable 
labour market conditions in Central and Eastern Europe).
Having provided for an evaluation of macroeconomic policy constraints and 
opportunities in Italy and Germany in the run-up to the single currency and once 
in EMU, I intend to discuss in the following sections the political economy of 
fiscal consolidation more in general.
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2. The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidation
At the present time, there is nothing more politically salient and theoretically 
challenging than the economics behind fiscal adjustment and the commitment to 
fiscal targets. The Maastricht Treaty had imposed significant reform pressures on 
EMU candidates in the early 1990s with the result that traditionally undisciplined 
countries finally succeeded in putting their budgets in relative good order (e.g. 
Italy, Greece). In addition, the subsequent SGP created an institutional 
environment in which fiscal misbehaviour would be punished. At the time of 
writing, a proposal has been put forward that suggest a reform of the SGP on the 
grounds that it has forced Euro-zone countries to adopt pro-cyclical policies in 
recession, which soon become politically unsustainable, as the French and 
German experiences demonstrate. What is clear is that there is no political 
consensus over the relative importance of such things as a Stability Pact. In this 
context of uncertainty, the economics profession has come to the fore tasked with 
the ungrateful job of measuring the Pact’s costs and benefits. In this chapter, I 
discuss briefly my main findings concerning the economics of persistent fiscal 
discipline setting them in the context of the current academic debate.
2.1. The economics of fiscal adjustment
In the economics literature on the topic, two separate research agendas are 
distinguishable. One focuses on the economic and political determinants of fiscal 
adjustment. It is about quite static models identifying the relative importance of 
economic (e.g. starting position, currency regime) and political factors (e.g. type 
of government, budget and labour market institutions) for fiscal policy outcomes 
(e.g. size, composition and duration of fiscal adjustment). The second agenda 
revolves around the macroeconomic consequences of consolidation, after a 
seminal work by Pagano and Giavazzi (1991) established that, under certain 
circumstances, budget consolidations have non-keynesian effects. From a 
political economy perspective, this thesis has suggested that there is some 
connection between the determinants of fiscal outcomes and their general 
macroeconomic effect. Certainly, there are strong elements of endogeneity that
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actually put into question the very decision to distinguish between the two 
research agendas. For example, as has been demonstrated here, the persistence of 
fiscal discipline depends on domestic interests having solved, within a relatively 
stable equilibrium, distributional conflicts over the content of adjustment. Rather 
than being affected by the composition of adjustment itself, persistent fiscal 
discipline can only come after successive game rounds between competing 
domestic socio-economic interests. Against this background, the following 
discussion will treat the two research agendas as two sides of the same coin, 
focusing on the most relevant issues concerning budget consolidation: initial debt 
levels, currency regimes, political and fiscal institutions, labour market 
institutions, and sustainability of fiscal discipline.
Initial debt levels
In this thesis, I have often recalled findings from the economics literature 
according to which high-debt countries perform better than low-debt countries 
when trying to put public finances in order. This is to say that, in high-debt 
countries fiscal discipline is successfully achieved, as well as being preserved for 
a longer period of time. The argument rests on three possibly-not-necessarily 
alternative explanations. First, credible contractions in high-debt countries induce 
a significant reduction of long-term interest rates, thereby allowing for better 
investment conditions (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990; Giavazzi and Pagano 1996; 
McDermott and Wescott 1996; Alesina and Ardagna 1998). Cheaper money 
would impact for the greatest part on investment, and only marginally on private 
consumption (Zaghini 1999). Second, highly indebted countries tend to rely more 
on expenditure cuts than on greater revenues to consolidate their budgets; this 
should explain long-lasting discipline (von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch 2001, 20); 
the argument is thus related to the strand of literature ascribing superior overall 
performance to expenditure-based fiscal adjustments (Perotti 1996). Third, it has 
been also noted that the composition of consolidation does not matter once 
agents in high-debt countries believe that the change is structural and that a 
dramatic fiscal policy regime is under way. By expecting lower fiscal pressure in 
the near future, consumers and investors are encouraged to be more active 
(Blanchard 1990; Sutherland 1997; Ardagna 2004). This thesis confirms that
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governments in high-debt countries have the option of obtaining deficit reduction 
by “signalling” with financial markets. It adds to the existing literature where it 
suggests that this opportunity is quite valuable when they are asked to adjust 
within a short-time horizon, one in which there is little time available to forge a 
broad (stable) social consensus in favour of austerity. At the same time, my 
research refutes the argument according to which fiscal consolidation would be 
more successful in these countries because of their inclination to opt for primary 
spending restraints4. Finally, to the mechanistic view of agents consuming and 
investing more in the expectation that fiscal authorities will “behave”, I juxtapose 
a micro-foundational interpretation that hinges on interest groups’ actual 
preferences formed in response to a specific macroeconomic environment. By 
means of example, one of the arguments was that, after having suffered from 
comparatively high interest rates, business actors in high-debt countries will 
strongly advocate fiscal adjustment as a means to obtain less restrictive monetary 
policy conditions, and this happens (1) the deeper the economic integration, 
hence the greater the external competition; (2) when the exchange rate stops 
being an effective and/or realistic economic policy tool; and (3) under capital 
mobility, when high interest rate differentials also mean currency appreciation -  
under floating exchange rates. This shows that there is more at stake than just 
investment rising after interest rates have been reduced. Normally employed to 
detect significant correlations, econometric analyses tend to miss qualitative 
aspects of investment behaviour. On the other side, in the case of Italy, the most 
intriguing aspect seems to be the contribution to exports to GDP, which was 
important over 1992-96. This leads us to a brief evaluation of the role of 
currency regimes in fiscal adjustment, whether the debt level is high or not.
Currency regimes
There is abundant evidence coming from the economics literature showing that, 
when accompanied by currency devaluation, fiscal adjustment is more likely to
4 It is fair to say that some economists have attempted to dig into the political economy o f fiscal 
consolidation. For example, with the aim o f accounting for the persistence o f expenditure-based 
adjustment, Perotti argued: “Ex post (expenditure-based consolidations) are more persistent 
exactly because only strong governments can and want to implement them.. .cuts in the wage bill 
and transfers might be politically costly because they reduce the bargaining power o f organised 
labour” (Perotti 1998, 371).
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be successful, as export-led growth will produce expansionary effects 
counterbalancing the fiscal restriction (Lane and Perotti 1997; Alesina and 
Ardagna 1998; Lambertini and Tavares 2003). While not all economists confirm 
this correlation (Alesina and al. 2002; Ardagna 2004), the literature generally 
shows that fiscal discipline and devaluation are not inconsistent, as traditional 
Keynesian macroeconomics would predict. There are then strong empirical 
foundations supporting the suggestive interpretation offered here according to 
which, in Italy, revenue-based fiscal adjustment was traded with currency 
depreciation. The country’s successful deficit reduction in 1992 was preceded by 
11-percent devaluation of the Lira against the DM. It was not so much a question 
of positive net exports contributing to GDP growth, but of business actors 
advocating fiscal adjustment as a means to avoid appreciation once the currency 
started floating in September 1992 and high interest rate differentials risked 
attracting excessive foreign capital. At the same time, wage moderation agreed in 
the framework of social pacts had the effect of absorbing the potential 
inflationary impact of the weak Lira (see also (Alesina and Ardagna 1998).
Political and budget institutions
Institutional economists have insisted on the importance of political and budget 
institutions for fiscal policy outcomes. Under strong governments and in the face 
of efficient budget institutions, fiscal discipline is more easily achieved (von 
Hagen, Hallett and Strauch 2001). Conversely, this thesis has showed that social 
consensus is possibly more important than institutional constraints and 
opportunities. The latter matter only in the role of mediating variables, but are 
hardly sole determinants of successful fiscal adjustment. In spite of weak 
governments and of only moderately efficient fiscal institutions, Italy managed to 
put state budgets in order. Even in the case of Germany, where some institutional 
deterioration did in fact take place, raw institutionalist interpretations are not 
satisfactory as at the core of weakening budget procedures was mainly the Kohl 
Government’s incapacity to solve (unification-induced) distributional conflicts in 
society. Not even federalism appeared to create a stronger constraint than in the 
1980s, for example, as economic indicators suggest that, over the period under 
investigation, fiscal policy performed more of a stabilising function than had
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been the case during the adjustment in 1982-88. In addition, if one were to 
include social partnership and the relative involvement of interest groups in 
budget-policy making as an example of an institutional constraint, then this thesis 
suggests that, when it comes to corporatist arrangements, the preferences of the 
actors involved, even when just strategic, matter at least as much as the 
institutional setting in which they operate, as is further explained in 2.2. In a 
nutshell, institutionalist interpretations of fiscal consolidation are mainly 
deficient to the extent that they do not provide a clear methodological or 
empirical solution to control for the undeniable endogeneity of institutions, and 
particularly of socio-economic institutions.
Voluntary wage restraint and labour market institutions 
Economic studies suggest that a positive correlation exists between wage 
moderation and fiscal discipline. When it concerns the public sector, wage 
restraint is certainly beneficial to public coffers (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 2000). 
Moreover, by controlling inflationary pressures, it reduces the real value of the 
debt service. These dynamics are likely to emerge only in the presence of 
encompassing unions, namely where wage self-restraint is actually feasible. The 
Italian case supports this hypothesis. The 1992 and 1993 Income Policy 
Agreements induced a restructuring of collective bargaining towards greater 
centralization. This created the appropriate institutional conditions for the 
imposition of nationwide wage moderation. In 1991-2000, real compensations 
per employee grew on average by 0.2 percent against 3.1 percent in the period 
from 1971 and 1980 (European Commission 2003b). Undoubtedly, the evolution 
of labour costs supported fiscal adjustment. It is important to note that wage 
restraint was the subject of an exchange between labour unions and government, 
where the latter gave up the idea of retrenching the welfare state and opted for a 
revenue-based budget consolidation, especially in 1991-93. From there it follows 
that the ensuing of greater fiscal pressure was socially accepted and did not lead 
unions to demand higher pre-tax real wages, as envisaged in Alesina and 
Perotti’s critique of revenue-based adjustment (1997). This thesis has also shown 
that wage moderation is not always and not necessarily conducive to fiscal 
discipline. With the exception of the immediate unification aftermath when wage
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equalization between East and West Germany pushed average compensations 
upwards, German labour unions have behaved quite responsibly during the 
1990s. However, this was not sufficient to support the government’s still firm 
commitment to sound public finances. The argument set forth here is that wage 
moderation is supportive of austerity only when, being the subject of a political 
exchange between government and unions, it occurs simultaneously to the 
introduction of consensually agreed fiscal measures; yet, not any type of 
measure. Certainly, the wage restraint German unions were ready to accept, 
before the 1996 pact failed, stemmed from a peculiar motivation, namely to 
create employment. This means that the government was expected to offer in 
exchange expansionary side payments. In conclusion, the motivation behind 
unions’ self-restraint is variable, and economists should take it into account 
considering that it is likely to affect unions’ readiness to internalise (fiscal) 
negative externalities.
The sustainability conundrum
As highlighted above, most of the recent political economy literature insists on 
the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contractions. As suggested above, this 
operates through two non-mutually exclusive mechanisms. On the demand side, 
deficit reduction induces agents to believe that in the future taxes will be lower; 
domestic consumption is stimulated in turn (Perotti 1998; Giavazzi, Jappelli and 
Pagano 2000). In addition, credible adjustments allow for a reduction of interest 
rates, thus fuelling consumer spending and in particular investment (Giavazzi 
and Pagano 1990; McDermott and Wescott 1996). In 1995 and 1996, when 
Italy’s debt ratio to GDP started decreasing and interest rates levels to soften, 
investment growth accelerated at a faster rate than consumption. On the other 
hand, German investment was not necessarily as sensitive to interest rate 
developments. It actually peaked in the aftermath of unification (1991-92), at a 
time when interest rates reached historical highs. It continued to lag behind 
afterwards even if monetary conditions were relaxed. In a nutshell, the demand 
side channel has a diversified impact on national economies that depends on the 
specific (often embedded) preferences of domestic economic agents. Generalised 
models then provide roadmaps, but are not satisfactory when it comes to
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accounting for individual case studies. On the supply side, the argument is that a 
fiscal consolidation that relies on cuts to public wages and transfers will lower 
unit labour costs and improve competitiveness (Alesina and Ardagna 1998; 
Alesina and al. 2002). The Italian case shows that this is not necessary if the 
exchange rate is sufficiently low to fuel exports, even in the presence of higher 
fiscal pressure and comparatively high real unit labour costs. Italy’s exports grew 
by an average of 9.7 percent of GDP in 1992-95, exactly in the period of the 
floating Lira, but reached a more modest average growth of 3.5 percent of GDP 
in 1996-98. Even revenue-based consolidations can then guarantee persistent 
fiscal discipline when the currency regime allows domestic exports to maintain a 
competitive edge and/or when the intervention is not perceived as just transitory, 
a state of affair that is likely to emerge there where tax levels were low to start 
with (e.g. Portugal).
2.2.The new political economy of corporatist patterns
Tripartite social concertation flourished in the 1970s allowing, where present, a 
smooth passage through times of stagflation. The 1980s witnessed a decline of 
corporatist modes of decision-making and a general shift of European industrial 
relations towards greater decentralization. This latter development exercised an 
impact on corporatist practices to the extent that, by multiplying the centres of 
responsibility, it made macro-level concertation more difficult. Emerging at a 
time when forces towards greater decentralization of industrial relations were 
still at play and in countries that did not have a strong corporatist tradition, social 
pacts in the 1990s appeared to many to be a theoretically challenging 
phenomenon. By excluding compensations in the form of greater social 
spending, governments’ pursuit of fiscal discipline was at odds with the logic 
behind traditional political exchanges. Indirectly, this thesis has thus shed some 
light on the emergence of social concertation in Italy and its unexpected demise 
in Germany in a way that privileges a preference-based approach to an 
institutionalist one.
274
The literature on the emergence of social dialogue looks at three sets of 
explanations. The institutionalist perspective is that corporatist agreements come 
into being where wage bargaining is centralised, intermediate organizations well 
organised and the dialogue between government and social partners somehow 
institutionalised. As it has been extensively demonstrated in this thesis, this 
interpretation fails to account for the success of social pacts in Italy and their 
failure in Germany over the 1990s. The second strand of literature focuses on the 
demand side to identify the conditions under which governments have an interest 
in looking for the support of social partners. Amongst these conditions 
partisanship is likely to play an important role. In the case of Italy, it was rather 
the absence of partisanship that made concertation more likely considering that 
the most relevant social pacts in 1992 and 1993 were signed under formally 
technocratic governments (see also interview with Andrea Monorchio). The 
leftist Prodi Government was the one that did most to moderate unions’ influence 
over economic policy-making (Mania and Sateriale 2002).
On a different note, the line of thought adopted here is that macroeconomic 
conditions are important predictors of the emergence and functioning of social 
institutions. They matter to the extent that they shape preference formation and, 
in turn, affect the very operation of those institutions. Hassel has suggestively 
argued that unions accepted negotiating with government in the 1990s in the 
attempt to limit the negative impact of the restrictive policy mix (Hassel in 
Jochem and Siegel 2003). In a more positive fashion, my argument is that 
tripartite agreements were signed when the general macroeconomic conditions 
opened up room for pay-offs and compensations that involved areas other than 
fiscal policy (e.g. monetary and exchange rate policies). Previous studies have 
attempted to account for the successful implementation of welfare state reform 
by referring to the important legitimising function that social partners’ 
participation exerted on any reform effort. In contrast to these approaches, this 
research has explored the micro-foundations of fiscal adjustment, pointing at the 
significance of social pacts’ specific content. True, the sense of financial 
emergency is an important trigger of corporatism but it is not about an abstract 
external threat. Social partners take decisions with an eye to the specific 
distributional implications that the unfolding of the crisis may have.
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2.3.Limits and future research agenda
Most of the literature on EMU focuses on the role of European integration and 
institutions, both national and supranational. More recently, in front of the 
successive breaches of the SGP provisions by France and Germany, a heated 
debate has developed that looks at the functioning of EU fiscal co-ordination, 
and at the relative effectiveness of fiscal targets imposed from above (Pisani- 
Ferry 2002). Some observers have gone so far as to question the very legitimacy 
of the EU. By contrast, there is little on the domestic political economy of fiscal 
discipline. While the economics profession generally agrees on the desirability of 
fiscal rectitude, it has failed to justify convincingly the need for a rule-based 
coordination of national fiscal policies as well as to identify the socio-political 
conditions that best allow for the preservation of austerity, especially in bad 
times. With the fate of the Stability Pact unclear, there is at present even greater 
need to identify where fiscal discipline is viable and where it is an unrealistic 
target. In this thesis, I have somehow attempted to fill in the gaps by showing 
that fiscal policies remain entrenched in domestic societal contexts so that any 
successful deficit reduction needs to count on a favourable constellation of socio­
economic preferences. By extension, it can be derived that, to be both credible 
and effective, any attempt at fiscal coordination should take country-specific 
circumstances into account. Most importantly, and on a more pessimistic note, if 
it is true that domestic preferences are endogenous, coordination at the EU level 
is hindered by different national perceptions of the ensuing costs of and benefits 
from coordination. Once again, the differential domestic distributional effects of 
such coordination are deemed to be an important factor.
Needless to say, the present work has limits too. First, because the story I have 
been telling here is strongly embedded in the characteristics of the two countries 
analysed, any application of the general argument to other countries would have 
to start from scratch controlling for the multiplicity of economic, social, political 
and institutional variables that may have a bearing on stabilization. The treatment 
of the two shadow cases of Belgium and Portugal has required in fact a fresh 
look at political and fiscal institutions, corporatism and social pacts, and at the
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peculiar evolution of socio-economic preferences in the two countries. Second, 
my work falls short of providing a clear-cut hierarchy between alternative 
explanations. Econometric analyses would have probably served the purpose. It 
would have been desirable to determine, for example, the relative importance of 
wage moderation, disinflation and export growth to successful deficit reduction. 
By contrast, econometrics is unable to capture the aspect of preferences and to 
correct the most visible methodological and theoretical flaw in the existing 
literature, i.e. the failure to recognise that preferences cannot be determined a 
priori; they are structured as trade-offs that evolve with the external 
macroeconomic environment. Given the absence of systematic surveys of social 
partners’ views of fiscal adjustment, any rigid formalization of domestic 
preferences within an econometric model would have missed the point. Only if 
public opinion more generally is taken as the reference object, then there might 
be scope for employing econometrics to establish links and hierarchies between 
alternative explanations of fiscal adjustment (for a similar experiment see 
(Scheve 2004). Most obviously, the reader might be disappointed with the fact 
that most of the arguments here presented not only are country-specific, but have 
also remained open-ended, as at this stage any evaluation of fiscal policies in 
EMU and of the transformation of varieties of capitalism in the Euro-zone can be 
merely tentative.
Leaving methodologies aside, factually, there is now greater scope for research 
as, with EMU coming into operation, European economic governance has been 
subject to a substantial regime change. In the new context, Euro-zone countries 
have lost the ability to manage both the interest and the exchange rate, and with 
this arguably an important instrument to be used in negotiation with the social 
partners. At the same time, the preservation of fiscal discipline is a top priority as 
long as the Stability Pact keeps insisting on the respect of the 3 percent deficit 
target -even if the EU Commission is deemed to take account of country-specific 
circumstances more often than before (e.g. level of public debt, will and speed in 
the implementation of structural tax and welfare reforms). At the EU level, the 
ECB takes monetary policy decisions with the primary aim of preserving price 
stability and, in general terms, there is no scope for member countries to affect 
monetary policy indirectly through the management of their national inflation
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levels as each of them is too small relative to the size of the union to bear any 
significant impact5. All that remains available is the indirect choice over the real 
interest and exchange rates mainly through national wage policies. Against this 
background, there is no surprise then if, in the context of the Lisbon Strategy, the 
EU has insisted on the need to re-launch social concertation with the aim of 
promoting (ideally coordinated) wage restraint.
Until now, Euro-zone countries seem to have followed quite differentiated paths 
with possibly just small countries having to “look abroad” when taking wage 
policy decisions (e.g. Belgium, Netherlands). Even on the fiscal front, Euro-zone 
countries’ experiences have varied enormously between 1999 and 2004 with 
small countries proving more disciplined than large ones. And because the 
existence of an international binding commitment and budget reforms introduced 
in the 1990s have been probably necessary but not sufficient to twist 
governments’ hand into austerity, it is here believed that only a societal approach 
allows for a thorough understanding of the persistent divergence in fiscal 
performances across the EU. Quite a few issues deserve attention. With Italy 
showing clear signs of fiscal relaxation especially in 2003 and 2004, it might be 
worth evaluating if this indeed derives from a different constellation of socio­
economic interests, after the entry into operation of EMU minimised the room 
for comprehensive macroeconomic policy coordination. The absence of visible 
trade-offs between fiscal, monetary and wage policies may explain why social 
concertation lost its initial momentum just after 1998. In the case of Germany, 
there is no doubt that EMU has dramatically changed the national economic 
landscape. More visibly, wage bargainers have lost their traditional reference 
partner. If coordination between fiscal, monetary and wage policies was 
troublesome in the 1990s, as this thesis has attempted to demonstrated, then one 
shall expect the situation to have further deteriorated after 1999. This is but a 
matter of empirical investigation, and a worthwhile one as it could in parallel 
shed light on the current German disease. In addition, this thesis has left out an
5 O f course, this changes if the three largest economies, France, Germany and Italy find 
themselves in the same position vis-^-vis the cycle. A related argument would be if  in EMU 
national business cycles have become more alike or they are deemed to converge, on the one 
hand, or if they would rather diverge in countries’ respective struggle to preserve their 
comparative advantage by means o f ad hoc supply-side reform, on labour and product markets.
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important societal actor, namely the banking sector. With the latter being 
particularly influential in German politics, there is certainly scope for extending 
and enriching the present analysis. More generally, a societal approach should be 
useful to explain the abovementioned variation in fiscal performances between 
small and large countries. First, in small countries, labour and capital tend to 
have convergent preferences as their very existence depends upon external 
markets. This corroborates the idea that successful fiscal consolidation is more 
viable where there is large social consensus. Second, it is reasonable to believe 
that the preferences of socio-economic actors in small countries form in response 
to the general macroeconomic environment -an idea extensively developed in 
this thesis- and this should be more visible here than in large countries. The 
dependence from imports makes small countries particularly vulnerable to the 
real exchange rate. In turn, they would enact both fiscal retrenchment and wage 
moderation with the purpose of keeping inflation levels under control as, in light 
of their modest size relative to the whole Euro-zone, any hope to bear an impact 
on the ECB’s decisions is deemed to remain disappointed. Finally, the same 
approach can be employed to clarify the dynamics of inter-country adjustment in 
EMU, an aspect that is to a large extent under-investigated (see Allsopp and Artis
2003).
In conclusion, this thesis set forth a series of propositions that can be brought to 
bear on a wide variety of problems having to do with the political economy of 
EMU. Such problems will be of great analytical and policy importance in the 
years to come.
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O c t-9 6 3 X X X 2 X
N o v -9 6 X X X 2 3 X
Prodi Nov-96 X X X 3 X X
Govt. Nov-96 X X X 3 X 2
MeanL 2 3 2 X 1 X
MeanC 1 X X 3 X 2
Mar-97 X X X 3 X 2
Apr-97 X X X 3 X X
Apr-97 2 X X 1 X 3
O ct-97 3 X X 3 X 2
O c t-9 7 X X X X 3 X
N o v -9 7 X X X 3 X X
N o v -9 7 2 X X 3 X X
MeanL 3 3 1 X 2 X
MeanC 1 X X 3 X 2
N. 84 observations
MeanL(92-97) 3 1 X 2 X X
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MeanC(92-97)
L e g e n d :
CISL Union M agazine
CGIL Union M agazine
CONFIN C onfederation's Annual R eports
PRESSL All P re ss  for Unions
P R E S S C  All Press for Confindustria
M ean L  M ean for Labour
M ean C  M ean for Capital
Appendix lb
GERMANY: Content Analysis: Ranking of Fiscal Preferences 
(1991-1997)
Preferences for Fiscal Adjustment:
D is c ip l in e  N o  C u t s  Vlore T a x G  N o  T a x L  M o re  E x p . C u t s
Sources:
DGB
BDI
PRESSL
P R E S S C
J a n -9 1 X 1 3 2 X X
J a n -9 1 X 3 2 X 3 X
J a n -9 1 X 3 2 X 3 X
F e b -9 1 X X 3 X 3 X
F e b -9 1 X X X 3 X X
M ar-91 X X 2 3 3 X
M ar-91 X X 2 3 X X
A pr-91 X X 3 2 1 X
Jul-91 3 X X 3 X 2
A u g -9 1 X 2 3 3 3 X
A u g -9 1 X 2 2 X 3 X
S e p -9 1 X 1 X 2 3 X
S e p -9 1 X 3 2 X X X
N ov-91 X 3 2 2 X X
N ov-91 X X 3 3 X X
N ov-91 X X X 2 3 X
Year 91 3 X X 2 X 1
MeanL X 3 2 1 1 X
MeanC 3 X X 2 X 2
J u n - 9 2 3 2 1 X 2 X
A u g -9 2 X 3 X X X X
S e p - 9 2 1 3 X 2 X X
O ct-92 1 X X 3 2 X
N o v -9 2 X X 3 2 X X
N o v -9 2 X 1 X 3 2 X
N o v -9 2 2 3 1 X X X
N o v -9 2 X 3 2 X 1 X
Year 92 3 X X 2 X 1
MeanL 1 3 2 2 1 X
MeanC 2 X X 3 2 X
J a n - 9 3 3 X X 1 2 X
Jan -93 3 X X 2 X 2
Jun -93 3 X X X X 2
F e b -9 3 X 3 X 2 X X
F e b -9 3 1 X X 3 X X
A p r-9 3 X X 1 2 3 X
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J u n - 9 3 2 2 3 X X X
J u l - 9 3 X X X X 3 X
J u l- 9 3 X 3 X X X X
A u g -9 3 X 3 X X X X
Y e a r 93 3 X X 1 X 2
MeanL 1 3 X 2 2 X
MeanC 3 X X 1 X 2
J a n - 9 4 X X X 2 3 X
M ar-9 4 2 X X X X 3
M av -9 4 2 X X 3 X X
J u n - 9 4 X X X 2 3 X
S e p - 9 4 2 3 1 1 1 X
O c t-9 4 X 2 X X 2 X
O c t-9 4 1 X 3 X X 2
O c t-9 4 2 X X 3 X 3
O c t-9 4 1 X X 2 X 3
N o v -9 4 X X X 2 X 3
N o v -9 4 3 X X 2 X 2
D e c -9 4 X 3 X X 2 X
Y e a r  9 4 2 X X 3 X 3
MeanL X 2 1 1 3 X
MeanC 2 X X 3 X 3
J a n - 9 5 2 X 3 1 X X
A p r-9 5 X X X 3 2 X
A u g -9 5 2 3 2 X X X
O c t-9 5 X X 2 3 X X
Y e ar  95 3 X X 2 X 2
MeanL 2 1 3 3 X X
MeanC 3 X X 2 X 2
0 1 /0 1 /1 9 9 6 X X 2 3 X X
M ar-9 6 X 3 2 2 X X
A p r-9 6 X 3 X X X X
M ay -9 6 X 3 X X X X
J u n - 9 6 X 3 1 X 2
J u n - 9 6 1 3 X X 2 X
A u g -9 6 1 3 2 2 X X
S e p - 9 6 X 3 X X X X
S e p - 9 6 X 3 2 X 3 X
S e p - 9 6 X 3 X X X X
O c t-9 6 X X 3 1 2 X
D e c -9 6 X 2 1 X 3 X
Y e a r 9 6 3 X X 2 X 2
MeanL X 3 2 1 2 X
MeanC 3 X X 2 X 2
F e b -9 7 2 X X 3 X X
M ar-9 7 X 2 3 3 X X
A p r-9 7 X X X X 3 X
M ay -9 7 2 1 2 3 X X
A u g -9 7 X 3 X X X X
S e p - 9 7 1 X X 2 3 X
N o v -9 7 X X X 3 2 X
N o v -9 7 2 X X 3 X X
D e c -9 7 X 2 X 3 X
Y e a r 9 7 2 X X 3 1 3
£ o \
MeanL 1
MeanC 2
N. 78 observations
MeanL(91-97) X
Interview 1
MeanC(91-97) 3
Interview 3
L e q e n d :
DGB Union M agazine
B D I C onfederation's Annual Reports
PRESSL All P ress for Unions
P R E S S C  All P ress for BDI
M e a n L Mean for Labour
M e a n C Mean for Capital
2 1 3 2 X
X X 3 1 2
3 1 2 1 X
3 X 2 X X
X X 2 X 1
X X 2 X 2
M o re  TaxC Higher General Taxation
N o  T a x L  Lower Taxation on Labour or Capital
3o2_
Appendix 2a
INTERVIEWS: Italy
Ministero del Tesoro 
05/03/2003
Semi-structured interview with:
-Prof. Andrea Monarchio, Treasury official responsible for budget
Consiglio dei Ministri 
20/10/2001
Semi-structured interview with:
-Prof. Giuliano Amato, former Prime Minister
CGIL
04/06/2003
Semi-structured interview with:
-Dr Lapadula, responsible for economic policy CGIL
SOURCES: Italy
Newpapers
(bulleans: budget law, deficit, social partners, Maastricht, unions, Confindustria)
Corriere della Sera, from 1991 to 1998
La Repubblica, from 1991 to 1998
Sole240re, from 1991 to 1998
Financial Times, from 1991 to 1998
II Mondo, from 1992 to 1993
The Economist from 1991 to 1998
Internal Magazines
Nuova Rassegna sindacale (CGIL), from 1991 to 1995 
Conquiste del Lavoro (CISL), from 1991 to 1997 
Annual Report (Confindustria), from 1995 to 1997
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Appendix 2b
INTERVIEWS: Germany
Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
12/11/2003
Semi-structured interview with:
-anonymous, Treasury official responsible for budget 
-anonymous, Treasury official responsible for budget
DGB
29/01/2004
Semi-structured interview with:
-Dr. Dierk Hirschel, responsible for economic policy DGB 
BDI
14/11/2004
Semi-structured interview with:
-Dipl.-Volkswirt Dietmar Gegusch, responsible for budget policy
SOURCES: Germany
Newpapers
(bulleans: budget law, deficit, social partners, Maastricht, unions, BDI, DGB) 
Financial Times 
Die Tageszeitung 
Der Spiegel
Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Handelsblatt 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung 
The Economist
Internal Magazines
Die Quelle (DGB), from 1991 to 1998
Internal press releases (DGB), from 1991 to 1998
Internal press releases (BDI), from 1991 to 1998
Annual Report (DBI), from 1991 to 1998
Annual Report (BDA), from 1991 to 1998
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Appendix 3a
Size of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes, Italy 1991-97 (Trillions Lira)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
B. PLAN 5/91p 7/92s 7/93s 7/94s 6/95 6/96s 7/97
Total 49.100a 83.000a 38.500a 47.000ap 34.100a 33.000a 26.500d
Total WI 43.400a 78.500a 31.000a 45.000ap 32.500a 32.400a 25.000a
R 17.400a 16.500a 3.000a 17.800ap 16.500a 11.200a 10.000a
X 16.000a 47.000na 28.000na 25.800nap 16.000na 21,200na 15.000a
Priv. et al. 10.000a 15.000a n.a. lO.OOOap n.a. n.a. n.a.
Deficit 127.800r 150.000o 144.200a 138.600a 109.400a 88.000a 58.700d
Primary 16.000q 39.200r 31.800a 34.150e 80.000a 105.400a 131.000d
SUPP. B. 5/91 7/92 5/93s n.a. 2/95 6/96 3/97
Total 11.600a 30.000o 12.500a n.a 21 .000h 16.000'a 15.500d
R 9.300a 16.200o 7.500a n.a 15.500h 5.100a 15.050d
X 2.300na 6.8OO0 4.000na n.a 5.500h ll.OOOna 70nd
Priv. n.a 7.000o n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
B. PROP. 9/91 9/92 9/93 9/94 9/95 9/96s 9/97 eg
Total 55.500r 93.000o 38.500p 50.000d 34.100d 65.100d 26.500d
Total WI 51.395r 90.800q 31.000b 48.500d 32.500d 62.500a 25.000d
R 22.700r 34.100r 3.800b 20.200d 18.000d 12.500d 11.115d
X 20.200nr 52.500r 27.200nb 28.300d 14.500nd 22.000nd 13.850nd
Priv.et al. 9.000r 7.000o n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Deficit 127.800r 155.000o 144.200p 138.600d 109.400d 61.400a n.a.
Primary 26.395r 50.000p 31.800p 37.500e n.a. 131.000a n.a.
EXT. B. n.a. n.a. 12/93 n.a. 12/95 Europe n.a.
Total n.a. n.a. 6.700b n.a. 5.285”e 25.000d n.a.
R n.a. n.a. 6.700b n.a. 3.800e 12.500d n.a.
X n.a. n.a. 0b n.a. 1.485e Od n.a.
Treasury n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12.500d n.a.
B. LAW 12/91 12/92 12/93 12/94 12/95 12/96 12/97 eg
Total n.a. 93.3001 31.3001 49.2001 34.1001 n.a. 26.5001
Total WI 55.200 93.3001 31.300 47.200g 32.5301 62.500 25.000nf
R 31.700 44.400o 5.000o 23.100g 22.5901 38.000 13.000f
X 20.200 41.900o 26.3000* 24.100g 9.940nl 24.000 12.000f
Priv.et al. 15.0001 9.2001 1.0001 n.a 01 5.9001 n.a
Legend: Deficit T = Deficit Target; MB= Mini-Budget; EI=Extraordinary Intervention; n = 
No Interests; Treasury= Accounting Operations; * = RPP
Sources:
A = Original Dpef 
h = Dpef following year 
B = Parliamentary Debates
C = Confindustria’s Intervention in front of Parliament 
D = Bernardi/Parlato 
E = Annali CNEL
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F = Camera dei Deputati, Commissioni Riunite V della Camera dei Deputati e 5 del Senato 
della Repubblica. Attivita’ Conoscitiva Preliminare all’Esame del Documento di 
Programmazione Economico-Finanziaria per gli Anni 1999-2001. Audizione del Govematore 
della Banca d’ltalia, Antonio Fazio, 22nd April 1998.
G = OECD, Economic Survey 
L = Degni et al, 2001
O = Bollettino Economico BI (o Relazione Annuale)
P = Camera dei Deputati, Debito Pubblico e Fabbisogno. Evoluzione e Politiche di Rientro 
1983-1994, n. 35, Servizio Studi, September 1994.
Q = Camera dei Deputati, Debito Pubblico e Fabbisogno. Evoluzione e Politiche di Rientro 
1982-1992, n. 108, Servizio Studi, May 1993.
R = Camera dei Deputati, Debito Pubblico e Fabbisogno. Evoluzione e Politiche di Rientro 
1982-1992, n. 43, Servizio Studi, October 1992.
T = Camera dei Deputati, Debito Pubblico e Fabbisogno. Evoluzione e Politiche di Rientro 
1980-1992, Servizio Studi, April 1992.
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Appendix 3b
Size of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes, Germany 1991-97 (Bn DM)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
B. PLAN 7/91 7/92 7/93 7/94 7/95 7/96 7/97
Total -16.56 -2.53 0 -0.3 10.8 -3.4 -13.4
R 26.13 17.3 21.77 2.3 -21.4 -0.9 10.9
X 12.23 10.55 20.26 4.75 -25.69 -11.1 2.4
Other R 2.65 -4.32 -1.45 2.7 -15.2 -6.8 -4.8
Deficit 49.86 38 67.5 68.8 59.8 56.5 57.8
B. PROP. 7/91 7/92 7/93 7/94 7/95 7/96 7/97
Total -16.56 -2.53 0 -0.3 10.8 -3.4 -13.4
R 26.13 17.3 21.77 2.3 -21.4 -0.9 10.9
X 12.23 10.55 20.26 4.75 -25.69 -11.1 2.4
Other R 2.65 -4.32 -1.45 2.7 -15.2 -6.8 -4.8
Deficit 49.86 38 67.5 68.8 59.8 56.5 57.8
SUPP. B. 7/91 3/93 n.a n.a. n.a. 7/97 n.a.
Total -4.8 24.6 n.a n.a. n.a. n.a n.a.
R 6.9 -3.7 n.a n.a. n.a. -9.16 n.a.
X 3 22.5 n.a n.a. n.a. 18.7 n.a.
Other R 0.9 1.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.8 n.a.
B. LAW 12/91 12/92 12/93 6/95 12/95 12/96 12/97
Total
R 26.86 9.67 18.67 1A1 -31.81 -5.5
X 11.77 10.55 21.81 -2.27 -26.38 -11.4
Legend: B. Plan = Financial Plannnig Document; B. Prop. = Government Budget Proposal; 
Supp. B. = Supplementary Budget; B. Law = Budget Law; Total = Size of Deficit Reduction 
(bn DM); R = Interventions on Tax Revenues; X = Interventions on Expenditures; other R = 
Interventions on Other Revenues; D = Deficit Target.
Sources:
Finanzministerium, Finanzberichte 1991-2000
1 Total 16.000 bn register the impact on 1996 aggregates. They consist o f 11.000 bn in spending cuts 
and 5.100 bn in revenue increases. Yet, the calculation o f the impact o f the measure on 1997 
aggregates involves a minor revision o f the figures. The total value is o f  18.000 distributed in 11.000 
bn on the spending side and in 7.000 bn on the revenue side o f the budget (Dpef 1997-99, 39).
" The Government proposal was that o f collecting total 5285 just from additional revenues (CNEL 
1996, 93). Through the parliamentary passage, it was split between revenue and spending measures.
Half o f which concerning capital spending (Bank o f Italy, Relazione Annuale).
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